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Preface. 
The Battle of Jutland, 31st May-1st June 1916, was the only occasion 
during WWI that the main British and German Fleets met it action. Both 
sides responded to it differently. Subsequently, discussion in British circles, 
especially after the war, began to analyse the result and this rapidly led to an 
examination of the causes of it. The result, whilst it did not comprehensively 
favour either side, was a disappointment to the Royal Navy. By November 
1918, the reduced likelihood of ever again fighting the German Fleet 
increased this disappointment. However, the German Fleet's internment at 
Scapa Flow somewhat relieved that disappointment. Whichever way one 
looked at the situation, the reality was that Germany's High Seas Fleet (HSF) 
would never again be a threat. 
Without the subsequent actions of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, 
who had commanded the Battlecruiser Fleet (BCF) at Jutland, it was unlikely 
that there would have been a Jutland controversy. Some debate would 
doubtless have taken place, but without Beatty's persistent involvement it is 
hard to see how it could have become as embittered as it eventually did. This 
was because, whilst most of the Navy realised that the action could have had 
a more favourable outcome, the majority had accepted that, by 1919, nothing 
could be done to change it. After the HSF was scuttled, on 21st June 1919, 
the Navy's opponent for the past five years had been neutralised more 
completely than could have been achieved in any battle. As far as Beatty was 
concerned, this was simply not sufficient. 
Beatty's feelings on the prosecution of the war in general were 
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repeated throughout his correspondence, particularly with his wife. In 1914, 
he wrote to Winston Churchill (to whom Beatty had been Naval Secretary 
when Churchill was First Lord) that: 
"Nothing less than complete annihilation can or 
must be allowed to satisfy us... what disturbs me 
is.. . whether we can be. reasonably certain of 
annihilating [the First Scouting Group, composed 
of the German battlecruisers] without which I 
should feel we had failed. " 1 
It was evident that, in light of this, although the strategic outcome of the 
battle had been favourable to the British, Beatty felt a sense of failure. The 
German Fleet had not been eliminated and this atmosphere of failure was 
not alleviated by time. After Jutland he noted his: 
"haunting fear that we never shall [meet the 
HSF]... and the Grand Fleet will never be able to 
justify itself... [Jutland was] one of the saddest 
days of my life... the Navy missed one of the great 
opportunities of achieving the greatest and most 
glorious victory. " z 
This coloured his opinion regarding the performances of British ships and 
personnel, especially those of the battlefleet (BF), who Beatty felt had not 
supported his efforts as fully as they might have done. He also noted that the 
management of the Grand Fleet by its C-in-C, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, had 
left much to be desired, that Jellicoe was unable to select "good men", was 
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"half-hearted" and had "mismanaged" the action at Jutland. 3 There was not 
the personal animosity that might be imagined from Beatty's assessment, but 
there certainly was much frustration. 
Almost every argument on the battle was the result of a response to a 
statement or action of Beatty's, or one made on his behalf. The majority of 
the service was prepared to let the unsatisfactory result of Jutland lie, but 
Beatty was not. Before the war Beatty had come to the attention of a public 
that loved heroes and whose Naval heroes were long-since dead. Essentially, 
Beatty was the first of a new era of heroes that concentrated public attention 
upon the Navy and its role defending the nation's interests. As Beatty's 
background and personality were the principal factors that later motivated 
and determined the Jutland controversy, they require some consideration. 
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Central to the initial phases of Jutland and the subsequent controversy, 
was Beatty's character and approach to the Navy. Since becoming a Cadet, in 
January 1884, his career was not especially distinguished until he was a 
Lieutenant (aged 27) commanding a gunboat in support of Kitchener's 
campaign to re-conquer the Sudan. His efforts won him a DSO and special 
promotion to Commander. Two years later, his actions in the Boxer wars saw 
him promoted Captain. He was then not only renowned within the service, 
but had been introduced to public adulation and discovered that he liked it. 
His six-buttoned jacket and cap worn at a slant also made him a more 
noticeable and familiar individual than most other officers. It was such an 
image that he encouraged. 
Whilst recovering from wounds sustained in China, he was introduced 
to two more things that he liked: Ethel Tree, the only daughter of chain-store 
pioneer Marshall Field (who introduced such novelties as generous credit 
terms for customers and an in-store restaurant and whose shops permitted 
the return of goods) and her father's sizeable annual allowance. When Field 
died, on 16th January 1906, he left an estate worth approximately £30,000,000 
(nominal). In addition to Ethel's annual allowance, he left separate trusts of 
£3,000,000, £2,000,000 and £1,000,000 for her when she reached forty. 
Following her divorce from Arthur Tree, Ethel married Beatty, in 
1901. He then had things that most other officers did not: fighting experience, 
medals and enough money to ensure that he could continue his lifestyle 
without ever needing to work again. Indeed, in 1905, Beatty had got into 
trouble for straining the engines of the cruiser Suffolk and Ethel remarked 
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that if there had been any serious damage, she would buy the Admiralty a 
new one. It was a true statement, one that did Beatty's increasing kudos no 
harm at all. However, along with others' feelings of envy, this confident 
attitude was, to others, mixed with an appearance that seemed to be brash, 
bombastic and arrogant. In a service where diffidence was prominent, if not 
implicitly preferred, Beatty inspired either praise or loathing. 
As a Captain, Beatty had periods in which his interest in the service 
wavered. Ethel, like many sailors' wives, complained at his many absences. 
His promotion to Rear-Admiral, in 1910, made him the youngest admiral 
since Nelson and heroic comparisons were encouraged by many newspapers. 
He subsequently turned-down the offer of becoming second-in-command of 
the Atlantic Fleet. For a junior Rear-Admiral, an alternative appointment 
would be hard to come by, not to mention the Admiralty's dislike of his 
refusal. It was seen as arrogance by the Navy and historians alike, but there 
was much envy in these claims. Beatty had quite legitimately secured his 
worldly position and made it clear that if he were to remain in the Navy, then 
it would only be in a significant post or as commander of a major Fleet. 
At this point, Beatty's interest in a Naval career evidently wavered 
again. It could well be suggested that any serious career officer would have 
accepted the Atlantic Fleet post without question. Beatty's personal situation 
in relation to his professional one is important, but especially so when he 
took command of the Battlecruiser Squadron (BCS), on 1st March 1913, 
arriving directly from a holiday in Monte Carlo. With selected friends and 
favoured battlecruiser captains (the two were sometimes the same thing) the 
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Beattys spent much of the war socialising in Lothian and Fife. At Scapa, 
Jellicoe spent more time moulding the battlefleet around routine and his own 
ideas, there being few distractions from the Navy in such a remote location. 
Both he and Beatty had ample opportunity, when serving, or off duty, to 
develop their respective forces' operational principles. However, Jellicoe was 
more effective than was Beatty at doing this and, leaving aside the relative 
merits of this, this had later repercussions for Beatty that he keenly sought to 
hide. It was Beatty's success in hiding these defects from his contemporaries 
and historians that is the subject of this work. 
Beatty's appointment to the BCS command was justified on important 
grounds. There was little doubt that he was confident, inspired confidence in 
others and was, to that extent, a good leader. Few of his contemporaries had 
these qualities of leadership, or his action experience (albeit experience 
involving little actual Naval element). By 4th August 1914, the Admiralty had 
replaced Admiral Sir George Callaghan (C-in-C Home Fleet) with whom they 
thought to be a more robust, healthier and younger man - Jellicoe. The 
qualities of Callaghan, Jellicoe, Beatty and other potential candidates for 
senior commands can always be debated, but crucial to the Admiralty was 
effective leadership. They believed that they had this in Jellicoe and Beatty. 
Jellicoe was the knowledgeable technical specialist and had held important 
commands; Beatty was more the dashing, determined fighter. Jellicoe's 
seniority and experience was appropriate to his overall command. Beatty's 
image, confidence and experience made made him the only serious candidate 
for such a significant command as the battlecruisers, however much others 
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might have carped. As was to be realised later, neither had all the benefits or 
defects possessed by the other, which was to cause controversy after the war. 
In short, Beatty lacked Jellicoe's detailed service knowledge and Jellicoe 
lacked Beatty's confidence and more aggressive attitude. The matter was not 
this simple in detail, as any attributes taken to the extreme are usually 
harmful, but generally, the differences in both their characters and 
experiences, at differing times, accounted for the survival of the German 
Fleet by 1st June 1916. 
Since assuming command of the BCS, Beatty attempted to institute a 
greater freedom of action than was allowed for in Fleet Orders at the time. 
In fact, those Orders allowed very little freedom for individual action. As 
most of the Navy was used to, and preferred, the status quo, this marked-out 
Beatty as being different. His natural confidence, some might say arrogance, 
was doubtless encouraged by his personal situation. However, there was a 
positive side to this. Beatty was the most prominent senior officer to 
encourage such views so openly in his command of the BCS. Despite this, 
others in the BCS (later the BCF) were not so naturally confident or as 
financially secure as was Beatty. This resulted in, from Beatty's point of view, 
a less than satisfactory adoption of his reforms. 
Whatever might be said for and against any officers of the period, 
although they might have had distinguished or mediocre careers until August 
1914, none of the belligerents had experience of fighting the modern 
dreadnought-type ships that they commanded. It need not, therefore, have 
been a disadvantage to have been hitherto undistinguished, or vice-versa. 
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What was central to the debate regarding individual suitability, in 1914 and 
after the war, was the extent to which senior officers adapted to the 
experiences of the war. 
On the outbreak of war, the British battlefleet were active conducting 
a series of sweeps in the southern North Sea, believing that they might 
encounter German ships attacking the British Expeditionary Force crossing 
the English Channel. On 21st and 23rd August, German ships made their first 
sorties into the North Sea. A plan to restrict and discourage such movements, 
was devised by Commodore Roger Keyes (CO 8th submarine flotilla). The 
Harwich Force, under Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt, would attack German 
patrols in the Heligoland Bight on 28th August, with the aim of inducing 
heavy German ships to move out, where seven D and E class submarines 
were lying in wait to the north and west of Heligoland, under Keyes' 
command in the destroyer Lurcher. The Battlecruiser Squadron (BCS) under 
Beatty's command and Commodore William Goodenough's First light 
Cruiser Squadron (1stLCS) were the only support allowed by the Admiralty, 
but they failed to inform Keyes and Tyrwhitt of this, or Beatty and 
Goodenough of Keyes' and Tyrwhitt's presence. 
At first light on the 28th, Tyrwhitt, by chance, encountered the 1stLCS. 
A few hours later, he engaged two German destroyers and light cruisers. As 
the action progressed, Keyes sighted the IstLCS and reported them as enemy 
vessels, causing Tyrwhitt to order the 1stLCS to chase Keyes' `enemy' 
cruisers. One of Keyes' submarines then attacked Southampton. As the 
1stLCS withdrew (when Keyes recognised them), Beatty, who was delayed, 
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ordered them back to support Tyrwhitt. Beatty's concern was that the action 
was taking place only 25 miles from two major enemy bases and increased to 
full speed in support. Despite the whole force overwhelming the enemy 
destroyers and light cruisers, the BCS sank only the light cruisers Köln and 
Ariadne before visibility deteriorated and the action was broken-off. 
Beatty emerged a hero and the battlecruisers had proved their utility 
as effective, heavy support for cruisers. However, the difficulty of dispatching 
the enemy ships, even after they had sustained serious damage, suggested 
that future victories might not be easy to come by, despite the Royal Navy's 
numerical and technical superiority. Equally significant, was the realisation of 
organisational blunders, essentially concerning communication. Despite this, 
future actions (which would prominently feature the battlecruisers) were 
plagued with poor communications. These were not simply of signalling, but 
related to understanding and communication between senior officers 
regarding strategy, tactics and operational effectiveness of all vessels. 
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For many years after the Battle of Jutland, participants and 
non-participants alike became immersed, to varying degrees, in disputes 
regarding the battle itself and what they felt that it demonstrated about the 
Royal Navy of the early 20th Century. The British Grand Fleet (GF) had 
awaited an opportunity to face the HSF for almost two years since the war 
began, expecting to deal it a serious blow. To the public, by 1916, the Navy 
seemed to be scarcely involved in the war, especially when compared to the 
army. This perception was the result of previously indecisive encounters with 
parts of the HSF. 
Early on 16th December 1914, German battlecruisers of the First 
Scouting Group (lstSG), under Vizeadmiral Franz Hipper, with battleship 
support, bombarded the Yorkshire coast. The British Admiralty were unaware 
of the German battlefleet's support, and the Commander-in-Chief, Jellicoe, 
was directed to send only Vice-Admiral George Warrender's Second Battle 
Squadron (2ndBS) and Rear-Admiral William Pakenham's Third Cruiser 
Squadron (3rdCS), to join the Battlecruiser Fleet (BCF) commander, 
Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, with his four battlecruisers, to attempt an 
interception. In support, were Commodore William Goodenough's First Light 
Cruiser Squadron (1stLCS) and Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt's Harwich 
Force of cruisers and destroyers. The German C-in-C (Admiral von Ingenohl) 
believed that he was about to encounter the British battlefleet and headed 
home at 05: 45. By this time, Whitby and Scarborough (both undefended) had 
been attacked by the battlecruisers Derfflinger and Von der Tann, whilst 
Hartlepool had been attacked by Moltke, Seydlitz and the armoured cruiser 
10 
Blücher. The light cruiser Kolberg laid mines off Filey. 
The Germans' potential lines of retreat through the east coast 
minefields were barred by the 2ndBS, Tyrwhitt to the south, Beatty in the 
centre, and Vice-Admiral Bradford's pre-dreadnought Third Battle Squadron 
(3rdBS) to the north. Hipper chose the centre for his escape. In poor 
visibility and rain squalls his ships were seen by Goodenough, who was ahead 
of Beatty. Beatty then ordered Goodenough's squadron to resume its cruising 
station, but did not intend the signal for Goodenough himself, in 
Southampton, or for Birmingham. As he obeyed the signal, Goodenough 
quickly lost contact with the German ships. Second-in-Command of the 
2ndBS, in Orion, was Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot. Soon after 
Goodenough lost touch, Arbuthnot saw Ilipper's ships. His Flag-Captain, 
Frederic Dreyer, asked permission to open fire, but this was denied by 
Arbuthnot without a signal from Warrendcr. 
Following the raid, a recruiting poster showed a wrecked house and 
asked: 
"Men of Britain! will you stand this? No. 2 
Wykcham Street, SCARI3OROUGIi, after the 
German bombardment on Dcc. r 16th. It was the 
home of a working man. Four people were killed 
in this house including the Wife, aged 58, and 
Two Children, the youngest aged 5.78 Women & 
Children were killed and 228 Women and 
Children were wounded by the German raiders. " 
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Whilst it was stirring, it also reflected the Navy's operational problems 
encountered on the 16th December and general criticism of the Navy. Many 
newspapers were quick to question how the Navy had allowed the Germans 
to escape and why it seemed that little could be done to prevent such raids 
recurring. On 24th January 1915, the BCF engaged the IstSG off Dogger 
Bank. The BCF were in pursuit of the fleeing Germans and closing on them, 
heavily damaging Blücher. Then, Beatty's flagship, Lion, was disabled. Ile 
signalled to the other four battlecruisers to engage the enemy bearing NE. 
Beatty's second-in-command, Rear-Admiral Archibald Moore (in New 
Zealand), led the BCF to the target bearing NE, the damaged Blücher, 
which was later sunk. During this, the lstSG were drawing out of range and 
later reached port. Beatty was livid. Ile claimed that it was obvious that his 
signal referred to the lstSG, not Blücher alone. Similar claims were made by 
Beatty regarding what he thought others should have done at Jutland to 
effect a defeat of German forces. They were to rankle with him for the rest 
of his life. 
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Introduction. 
A few months after the Dogger Bank engagement, a recruiting poster 
featured a picture of a luscious red/orange sunset over ships of the fleet. In 
the right hand corner, was a picture of Nelson. Between the dates 1805 and 
1915 was written "England Expects" above "Are YOU doing YOUR duty 
to-day? " Coupled with the Scarborough raid and Dogger Bank action, there 
was much irony in this poster. The Royal Navy had reached a pinnacle with 
Trafalgar, in 1805, and Nelson's achievements were particularly feted. In 
1914, Britain expected the Royal Navy to continue such successes where 
Nelson had left off. However, much had changed since 1805. Apart from the 
many technical and industrial advances that had changed warships beyond 
recognition since 1805, the Navy's approach to strategy, tactics and training 
was radically different. Dr. Gordon's The Rules of the Game, sought to 
explore "how, while the Royal Navy was undergoing its fifty-year conversion 
from oak and canvas to steel and turbines, its once clear, empiricist 
understanding of `product' was pilfered from the lay-apart store by the vested 
interests of `process'... " I and how this affected Jutland. The profound effect 
of the fatal collision between the Flagship of the Mediterranean fleet, 
Victoria, and CCmpcrdown, in June 1893, was seen as the end to the efforts 
of Admiral Sir George Tryon (C-in-C) to encourage initiative. The result was 
a Navy enmeshed in restrictive subject detail, with a fearful obedience to 
authority that stifled the initiative that had been evident in the late l8th/carly 
19th Centuries and which was immortalised in Nelson. The lack of success at 
Scarborough and Dogger Bank rc-opened the question of whether or not 
13 
prewar practices were appropriate to the practicalities of war. The Jutland 
controversy perpetuated this underlying dispute between initiative and efforts 
to urge reform on the one hand - Beatty's echoing Tryon's - and 
maintaining the status quo on the other - which was largely embodied in 
Jellicoe's views. 
On 31st May 1916, Grand Fleet ships engaged those of the 11SF, the 
result being tactically inconclusive. On 3rd June, the British Admiralty issued 
a brief account of the battle that suggested a partial British defeat. Much of 
the account was involved with listing British losses, rather than noting British 
successes (which were uncertain). More British ships and lives had been lost 
than German, but strategically, Britain was in no worse a position than before 
the battle and could justifiably claim to have strengthened its position. In fact, 
24 hours after the battle, the surviving Grand Fleet ships were ready for sea, 
which was not true for the German Fleet. Some German ships were not fit to 
sail for five months. 
In contrast to the British Admiralty's announcement, the Kaiser 
claimed "a great victory in the North Sea". 2 In one sense, this was correct. 
From a German perspective, they had managed to achieve their perception of 
victory, by inflicting more material damage than they received, and partially 
fulfilled their aim to have reduced some of the Royal Navy's fighting 
capability. h Iowever, although they caused relatively little material damage 
compared to British over all fighting capability, the Germans were more 
aware from the end of the battle that the perception of what had been 
achieved was equally important (possibly more so from their perspective) 
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than what had actually happened. 
In early June 1916, debate began in British and German journals 
regarding what had been achieved and who had won the engagement. From 
the British perspective, several aspects had gone seriously wrong. Most 
importantly, they had failed to inflict the sufficient and decisive permanent 
damage to the I1SF that they had hoped for. Central to this, were issues 
relating to the operation of the Navy, its training, composition, tactics, 
strategy and personnel. In short, the whole organisation of the Navy came to 
be questioned from within and outside the service. Issues that had been 
discussed previously to Jutland, such as the study of history, the influence of 
technological developments, personal attributes, tactics and strategy, were all 
analysed with a view to suggesting improvements to enable the service to fight 
a future action to a more successful conclusion than at Jutland. 
Following the battle, the Royal Navy began to polarise around two 
already familiar bodies of opinion. Some individuals bclicvcd that the study 
of history was neglected, being largely subjugated to technological 
advancements. Operational orders for the centralised system of command 
that existed, were seen as too numerous and inflexible, leading to dangerous 
restrictions on actions in battle. Central to this reforming point of view, was 
the aim of establishing a clear sct of principles, based upon historical study, 
that gave commanders much more freedom to use their initiative and 
judgement in order to bring about a successful action. It was a concern that 
this flexibility had been lacking at Scarborough, Dogger Bank and Jutland. 
Before and after Jutland the most prominent and senior exponent of such 
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views, was the BCF commander, Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty. 
The opposing body of opinion believed that the status quo had served 
the Navy well and should continue to do so. Those sharing this view believed 
that a detailed knowledge of technology, along with obedience to higher 
authority, were crucial to maintaining the Naval mastery developed 
throughout the Victorian era. The study of technical subjects and practical 
subject specialisms was favoured above that of history. Close, centralised 
control of the fleet, using many signals, was favoured above greater individual 
freedom of action. This was embodied in the Grand Fleet Battle Orders 
(GFBO) of the C-in-C (Jcllicoe). Jellicoe's supporters felt that Jutland had 
vindicated both these ideas and Jellicoc's conduct at the battle. This view was 
not shared by Beatty and his supporters. 
To many, the Jutland controversy has focused essentially upon who 
won, or came closest to it, the merits of the battletlect's deployment, 
Jcllicoc's lack of resolve in pursuing the action, as opposed to Beatty's dash, 
and the heated arguments expressed in many subsequent articles regarding 
why Jutland was not a conclusive success. Carlyon I3cllairs's most effective 
contribution to understanding the dispute, was the title of his book, The 
Battle of Jutland: The Sowing and the Reaping, which was a summary of 
what the controversy was really about. Officers' education; technical and 
material advances (or lack of them); the Navy's preparations for war, its 
prosecution of it and developments in light of the experiences of the war, 
were all rightly referred to because the development of the battle itself was 
largely a product of prewar education and practice. These factors were under 
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debate before, during and after Jutland, and although they are important to 
the development of the controversy, they are not, contrary to popular belief, 
the whole issue. 
After the war, those urging reform within the service often used 
Jutland to show where improvements were required, which, by their nature, 
included inherent criticisms of the architects and managers of the Navy as it 
was by 1916. These issues and their relevance to Jutland have been discussed 
before. However, there still remain significant and unaddressed omissions. 
Without knowledge there are no solutions, and subsequent statements 
regarding any issues that Jutland raises or involves, can only depend for their 
accuracy upon the accuracy of the evidence from which they derive. A 
fundamental impediment to understanding any event as fully as possible, is 
the availability of sufficient evidence and whether or not it is accurate and 
reliable enough to reflect what actually happened. David Beatty was well 
aware that interpretation of the evidence would decide how the Navy 
developed after Jutland. Therefore, he sought to influence the Jutland 
histories to his advantage - to support his reforms and enhance his image - 
by corrupting the evidence upon which contemporary perceptions of the 
battle were based. 
For many years after Jutland, newspapers featured critical and 
controversial articles on the battle, referring to the absence or presence of 
tactical prowess and personal courage. These ephemera were widely assumed 
to have been significant in later disputes, and although they reflected and 
abetted strong expressions of opinion, they had little actual effect on the 
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Navy. Newspapers must sell copies; they do not exist as a neutral platform for 
outside debates, nor do they exist to provide and objectively analyse the 
varied, detailed and classified data that is required for a thorough 
understanding of an event (as far as this is ever possible). Although there was 
passionate debate, little was based upon a reasonably sound factual 
understanding. 
That strong feelings were expressed in publications regarding Jutland 
was true, but a crucial distinction needs to be asserted. Views publicly 
expressed reflected the feelings of retired and serving officers alike, but were 
based upon little factual evidence. However, having strong opinions on 
Jutland did not necessarily mean that these had any actual affect upon the 
conduct, discipline and promotion of officers, or the operational conduct of 
the service. Contrasting views abounded in the 1920s reflecting opinion within 
the service. 3i Iowever, contrary to almost every account of Jutland, these 
were not a close reflection of the intra-scrvicc controversy. In the 1920s, few 
had any detailed knowledge of what had happened at the battle. Indeed, the 
desire to rectify this by producing an official account had itself initiated the 
controversy. Jutland caused much well-known and heated debate. However, 
this was separate from the controversial, and less well-known, intra-service 
manoeuvrings to use the histories to influence wider perceptions of the battle. 
Thcrc is a big difference between a point of view and an opinion that actually 
alters something. 
It is understandable that I3cllairs's and Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon's 
Jutland books were charged with emotion, given their strong sympathies with 
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Beatty and Jellicoe respectively. These reflected popular expressions of 
opinion. However, they did not reflect, to any significant degree, the 
intra-service manoeuvrings to change perceptions of the battle, or the means 
employed to do so (essentially because all authors were ignorant of this). All 
works on Jutland have suffered by not recognising this sufficiently, if at all. 
Most recognised that defining accurately what happened and reconciling 
extant evidence was, and still is, difficult. The most serious defects in this area 
have still not been detailed sufficiently, yet are crucial to a more complete 
understanding. Any defects in the sources are almost universally considered 
to be natural historiographical discrepancies, which is most erroneous. 
Natural historiographical discrepancies there are, but what still remains 
to be examined are the deliberate alterations to the evidence and the efforts 
to make it appear to be authentic. Most of these were instigated by Beatty. It 
is these actions and their consequences for the Navy that need study. They 
are significant, because to legitimise his favourable idea of his own 
performance and the principles he wished to see adopted by the Fleet, Beatty 
knew that there had to be an account that endorsed his views, which was also 
endorsed by the Admiralty and which was generally accepted as accurate. 
The OED defines "Politics" as "Conduct of private affairs... scheming, 
planning" and the "political principles.. . or sympathies of a person or party"; 
"Politic" as "In a sinister sense, scheming, crafty, cunning... artfully contriving 
or contrived". These are the definitions that most accurately reflect the 
subject; the "sinister" aspects, the "scheming" and "contriving" to influence the 
histories in a particular interest. 
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The ultimate effectiveness of military institutions depends strongly 
upon the interaction of specialists. In the Royal Navy of the early 20th 
Century, these specialisms were mostly technical and scientific. This was a 
major difficulty that supporters of history had to overcome. The most 
prominent supporters of history and reform, and, therefore, supporters of 
Beatty, were Lieutenants Herbert Richmond, Kenneth and Alfred Dewar and 
Reginald Plunkett (later Plunkett Ernle-Erle-Drax). In 1912, Plunkett wrote 
in his diary that: 
"I cannot help thinking that Richmond, Dewar, I 
and a few others must try to undertake the 
regeneration of the British Navy. " 4 
It was a major task, but even allowing for some exuberance, this was what 
Plunkett and others sharing similar ideas attempted. Perhaps the most 
significant impediment Plunkett had already realised - that there were 
literally only a "few" keen to promote the cause. Including the names he gave, 
there totalled approximately ten historians to compete with the thousands of 
technical specialists. However, this was not the set-back that it might have 
seemed. This was because their cause was supported by a high-profile officer 
- Beatty. It was thanks to Beatty's rapid rise through 
important posts - the 
First Lord's secretary (1911), BCF commander (1913), C-in-C GF (1916) and 
First Sea Lord (1919) in under ten years, that Plunkett's and others' objective 
of the "regeneration" of the Navy had a good chance of being achieved. 
Analysis of the largest Naval engagement of the war was to be central 
to this regeneration. In his unpublished biographical notes on Beatty, his 
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friend Sir Shane Leslie defined the source of the controversy. He wrote that 
following Jutland "Beatty knew the battle was with history". 5 The importance 
of this as the keystone of the affair, has been overlooked thus far. 
Following the raids on Yorkshire in December 1914 and Dogger Bank, 
the BCF received public criticism for not intercepting the enemy raiders. 
Beatty then wrote-up and sent away his reports of the two actions. Following 
Jutland, he complained to the First Lord of the Admiralty (A. J. Balfour): 
"I have now had occasion to write three sets of 
despatches... In the first two instances my reports 
were distorted and cut about, so that what 
eventually appeared in the press bore a 
considerably different sense from what I wrote ... I 
have a very vivid recollection of one.. . very 
pungent article [finishing with] "The British 
Admiral let the enemy escape... Admiral Beatty's 
report ... proves on 
his own showing that he 
deserves not glory, but a Court Martial.. . with the 
ghost of Admiral Byng present as an interested 
spectator"! My written despatch. . was so altered 
that I asked that an announcement should be 
made in the Gazette that it was an abridged 
copy. " 6 
Between the 19th and 20th June 1916, 'Beatty corresponded with Jellicoe. In 
this exchange he feared that "quotations may not fully explain the movements 
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of the Force under my command" and that: 
"I fear greatly that quotation will never clear the 
movements etc. of my little lot. They can always 
be twisted and turned. I have already had 
unpleasant experiences in this matter.. . This 
caused considerable adverse criticism...! was 
stigmatised as [a] rotter... it cannot be good ... to 
be always put down as a bloody fool.. . Again on 
this occasion I have already been the subject of a 
considerable amount of adverse criticism and am 
looking to the publication of the Despatch to 
knock it out. " 8 
Jellicoe responded, informing the First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Henry 
Jackson): 
"It is surely not his business to edit it or to have 
anything to do with the plans which it is proposed 
to publish.. . my view would 
have been for the 
Admiralty to have told him that the plan [of his 
Flagship, Lion] was not his business. " 9 
This exchange contained the beginnings of the controversy. Beatty was highly 
sensitive to his role in command of the BCF, because it was counter to his 
broader case to admit to major failings. The battle had not shown him in as 
good a light as he had wished, nor had it endorsed his BCF tactical regime 
sufficiently to support its wider implementation. As Beatty experienced 
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difficulty in stating his case to the public and the service at large, his fear was 
not simply of unjustified personal criticism, but that his underlying aim to use 
Jutland to support his reforms would falter or fail. 
In light of this exchange, recalling Shane Leslie's words, the conclusion 
that Beatty was determined to see to it that his view of his part in the action 
would be told as he wanted it to be told is clear. It is also clear from the 
above exchange, that Beatty did not trust others to do this. So, he himself 
schemed to achieve it. 
When Beatty became First Sea Lord, on 1st November 1919, the 
opportunity to assert his view of his role in the proposed official account was 
one that he could not resist. Apart from expressing his personal views when 
others were not permitted to express theirs, he also hid crucial defects in his 
management of the BCF that had contributed to the results at Scarborough, 
Dogger Bank and Jutland. This was important to sustaining Beatty 's 
post-Jutland image and ensuring that the BCF should avoid close scrutiny, 
lest the operational defects be found out and weaken the general impression 
of his much vaunted, self-stated success in the action. Equally important, was 
that tactical reform would not suffer because of the perception that Beatty's 
operational principles were fundamentally flawed. 
Essentially, the problem in understanding the controversy is in 
understanding the histories - upon which many reformers and conservatives 
alike based their views - and how they were composed. Beatty pursued a 
deliberate course of action to alter the official accounts of the battle, by 
insisting upon his views being inserted whether or not the extant evidence 
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supported him. The manner in which he attempted to do this has not yet 
been given the consideration it requires, but the extent to which it affects 
many significant assertions regarding the battle is important. The fact that 
there were only ever a few people involved in this has led all authors to 
assume, erroneously and to varying degrees, that the disputes concerning the 
composition of the histories were not important. This meant that subsequent 
understanding of the controversy has suffered. An examination of the most 
significant literature is illustrative of this and indicates the areas in need of 
investigation. 
In February 1919, the First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss) 
initiated the preparation of a basic account of ships' movements at Jutland, 
under a committee led by the Director of Navigation, Captain John Harper. 
Following the controversial decision not to publish this committee's report, 
Beatty achieved his greatest coup - and might not ever have realised its full 
extent - by arranging the publication, in 1920, of original despatches, track 
charts, a list of signals and miscellaneous information, commonly referred to 
as the Jutland Despatches. This appeared to offer the basic and objective 
evidence of the battle, but there was a problem. Most people did not, and 
could not be expected to, have the knowledge or sufficient time and patience 
to disseminate this voluminous raw information into an understandable 
account. This had been Harper's task. This fact was also true of a collection 
of accounts from survivors published, in 1921, in Fawcett & Hooper's The 
Fighting at Jutland. 
Because of this persisting complexity with the raw information, Beatty 
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needed an analytical narrative of the battle that would be superficially 
objective but, in reality, favourable to his views. However, all was not well. 
Details of Beatty's involvement with Captain Harper - ordering him to make 
alterations - had leaked out. Opponents of Beatty were alarmed that he 
seemed to be surreptitiously writing his own, biased account. They thought 
that Beatty would try to pass-off his limited and erroneous views under the 
guise of it being the considered verdict of the Admiralty. This idea originated 
because Captain Kenneth Dewar and his brother, Commander Alfred, had 
been chosen by Beatty to write a confidential account with liberty to comment 
as they wished. It was no secret that the brothers had been supporters of 
Beatty for many years and the work's title, the Naval Staff Appreciation of 
Jutland, supported the concern of Beatty's opponents that it was not a 
reflection of the whole Naval Staff's views. The stridency of the work's 
criticisms of Jellicoe and the battlefleet, however, precluded wider circulation. 
Commander Bellairs's 1920 book endorsed Beatty's view of his own 
role at Jutland, but Bellairs's opinions were seen, by opponents of Beatty, to 
be unfairly weighted in his favour. A counter was needed. It came in the form 
of the first published official account, in 1923, written by naval historian and 
former War College lecturer, Sir Julian Corbett, as the third volume of the 
Official History of the War at Sea. His account of the action was sufficiently 
accurate, given the restraints on classified information at the time, but 
suffered too much from the author's close personal friendship with Jellicoe. 
The conclusions reached were highly coloured to both Jellicoe's and Corbett's 
own views. This was widely recognised and detracted from the work's impact 
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as a balanced account. However, unlike the Dewars' work, it was widely 
available and widely read. Many, therefore, gained a more favourable 
impression of Jellicoe than that given by Bellairs. 
Beatty had lost out in the race to publish his own `official' version first. 
However, the Dewars' Appreciation was edited - even more sympathetically 
to Beatty - and became, in 1924, the Admiralty Narrative of the Battle of 
Jutland. This made highly questionable and spiteful criticisms of Jellicoe and 
his supporters' actions at Jutland, and was economical with the truth to the 
point of fabrication. Jellicoe's friend and supporter, Admiral Sir Reginald 
Bacon, was incensed at the Narrative and published, also in 1924, a harsh, 
and, in many cases ridiculous, but occasionally accurate, riposte, The Jutland 
Scandal. This work berated Beatty and his role at Jutland and was popular 
enough to run to at least four editions. 10 It seemed, therefore, at least to 
partisans favourable to Jellicoe, that the balance had been somewhat 
redressed. 
Largely overlooked in this hostile atmosphere, was the publication of 
German accounts, the official history of the war at sea, Der Krieg in der 
Nordsee, in 1920, and Korvettenkapitän Georg von Hase's (Gunnery Officer 
of the battlecruiser Derfflinger at Jutland) Kiel and Jutland, in 1921. This 
seriously undermined a better understanding of the battle. Beatty had made 
much of an absence of German evidence preventing the true nature of his 
part in the battle being understood. He did so until these publications 
suggested that his beliefs were erroneous. Thereafter, he did not seek to 
advertise his longing for German sources, especially as they showed that the 
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BCF had not been at all impressive. By 1925, Beatty's eldest son felt that 
hostility towards his father had reached its peak and subsided thereafter. 11 It 
had, in one sense, in that most serving officers debated Jutland less 
frequently and vehemently. However, the effects of Beatty's involvement with 
the histories were subtle, far-reaching and endured well beyond the 1920s. 
Harper indicated Beatty's corruption of the first proposed account (his 
`Record') in his The Truth About Jutland, in 1927. It was a work which, 
given Harper's troubled experiences with Beatty, was moderate and balanced. 
However, most readers then and since thought it to be tainted with what was 
wrongly assumed to be Harper's inherent dislike of Beatty. Whatever Harper 
thought of Beatty, the book dealt with their troubled relationship moderately, 
accurately informing the reader of how the public had been seriously 
"misled. " 12 For reasons including carelessness and neglect, the accuracy of 
Harper's work and its main theme was missed by subsequent authors. With 
this, the true nature of the controversy was also missed. Moreover, Harper 
helped neither the cause of history, nor his reputation, by co-writing, with 
Langhorne-Gibson, in 1934, The Riddle of Jutland, after over six years in 
retirement. Here, the balance, reasoning and moderate tone of his first work 
deserted him. 
During the 1930s, accounts of the battle were written by E. Altham, 
Commander H. H. Frost and Rev. J. L. Pastfield, whose title, New Light on 
Jutland was misleading as it added nothing new, except a moderation of tone. 
Reginald Bacon's 1936 biography of his old friend, Jellicoe, was equally 
sterile. At this point, it seemed as if all the significant evidence had come to 
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light and all that remained for any future author, was to clearly assess what 
had happened and to evaluate the merits of individuals' actions. One major, 
unrecognised, assumption stood in the way. Every author up to his point, 
whether or not they knew of Beatty's interference, assumed that the basic 
material used in the official accounts - mainly from the Despatches - was 
accurate. No-one tested the validity and accuracy of this evidence. The 
Dewars did not, Corbett did not, and the Admiralty Narrative certainly did 
not. Neither did Bellairs, Bacon, Altham, Frost or Pastfield. Harper had 
provided a sure indication of where authors should have looked if they had 
wanted a better understanding of the issue, but they assumed that Harper's 
views were corrupted because of his poor opinion of Beatty. This was a 
serious and erroneous mistake. 
The two German accounts, cited above, contained simple facts that 
have stood unchecked to the present day, but which alone cast a very 
different light upon what had happened. This is especially so if the accounts 
are juxtaposed with evidence that Beatty and others denied to Harper. They 
showed that the most significant statements made by Beatty regarding the 
battlecruiser action in claiming to have inflicted serious damage - where he 
was most sensitive - are erroneous. Because people assumed that the 
controversy was solely reflected in an immediate post-war atmosphere of 
heated debates about strategy, tactics, education and individuals' 
characteristics, the most significant point - how the BCF actually performed 
- was missed. David Beatty contrived to control the supply of the most 
significant information upon which these arguments were based. Later on, 
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Harper even told people about it, but was not believed. The lack of a 
thorough analysis of the histories and their composition led to the battle 
being misunderstood. 
Subsequent accounts continued, often accidentally, to perpetuate this 
flaw. Lord Chatfield's (Beatty's former Flag-Captain) autobiography, The 
Navy and Defence, of 1942, might have provided more information, but he 
was especially careful when referring to important points on Jutland, to write 
in such a way that no mischievous inferences could be drawn from them to 
anyone's detriment. He might have elucidated much, but elaborated upon 
nothing. In 1951, Beatty's former assistant navigator, (now Rear-Admiral) 
William Chalmers, published his Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty. 
Much was revealed regarding Beatty's personal life, but little was added to a 
more thorough understanding of the controversy. The book also suffered 
from Chalmers being closely monitored by the second Earl Beatty, who took 
active steps to avoid controversy over Jutland. Much that might have clarified 
the subject was suppressed because of this. 
In 1957, Captain Donald Macintyre published Jutland. This was 
followed, in 1964, by Captain Geoffrey Bennett's Battle of Jutland. Both 
were, and still are, good, thorough accounts. Yet, not enough was done in 
either work to test the validity and accuracy of the evidence upon which the 
accounts were based. In 1966, Professor Arthur Marder issued his volume on 
Jutland, as part of his From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow series. He 
included new sources, including many interviews with survivors, but as with 
every author before him, he neglected sufficiently to test the validity of 
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officially endorsed evidence which formed the basic structure of his account. 
Captain Stephen Roskill's 1981 biography of Beatty utilised Marder's work, 
but also replicated some of the erroneous assertions he had made. However, 
Roskill's work was an informative and balanced biography of Beatty, not an 
extensive treatise on Jutland alone. 
Roskill also mentioned the latest work on the crucial aspect of gunnery 
and fire-control. This had been introduced with the publication of Anthony 
Pollen's The Great Gunnery Scandal, in 1980, and was reinforced by 
Professor Jon Sumida's In Defence of Naval Supremacy, in 1989. Another, 
hitherto neglected, facet which called for attention was a detailed examination 
of the actual fighting. This was dealt with by N. J. M. Campbell's Jutland: An 
Analysis of the Fighting, in 1986. Progress was certainly being made, but 
there was still one significant flaw. Up to this point, all works utilised the 
Despatches without question, either directly, or derived their information 
from accounts that did. 
In 1991, Eric Grove's Fleet to Fleet Encounters reassessed previous 
understanding, covering such aspects as the battlecruiser losses and 
fire-control methods and equipment, utilising much new evidence. However, 
the possibility of further advancement was well and truly reversed in Correlli 
Barnett's Engage The Enemy More Closely, in 1991. This book impeded a 
better understanding by accepting too readily the erroneous assertions made 
in early works on Jutland - essentially that German material was superior to 
British. V. E. Tarrant's Jutland: The German Perspective, in 1995, gave an 
account from the German side for the first time, but missed a good 
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opportunity to assess the strengths and weaknesses of both British and 
German sources. Like most before him, he placed too much faith in the 
information that filtered its way from the Despatches and German evidence 
of equivalent age and type into subsequent works. Andrew Gordon's The 
Rules of the Game, in 1996, went some way to remedying compositional and 
factual flaws in the evidence, by questioning some evidence for many 
important events. It promised much, but the Jutland aspects reached too 
many conventional conclusions to be of significant help. 
There is still a serious, and largely unaddressed, problem with the 
evidence relating to Jutland. Harper indicated this in the early 1920s and 
more fully in 1927, but his main assertions that Beatty deliberately corrupted 
evidence and interpretations, remain significantly untested. All accounts suffer 
from not examining them. Harper knew that there had been a deliberate ploy 
on Beatty's part to hide and fabricate evidence, and had some indication as to 
why. Beatty was sensitive regarding the BCF and its conduct and, knowing 
that he had to battle with history to protect his image and aims, he did just 
that. 
All despatches and plans from ships attached to the BCF were sent 
initially to Beatty. A few weeks after the battle, the senior survivor from 
Invincible, the Gunnery Officer, Commander Hubert Dannreuther, took them 
with him to London, to show to the King and the Admiralty. 13 It is by no 
means certain to what extent the material in the published Despatches 
reflects what was actually written by each captain; much original material has 
long-since been destroyed. Nor is it certain to what extent even the original 
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despatches are an accurate reflection of what happened. 
After the battle, the only requirement for a captain was to submit a 
plan and report to which he was happy to put his name. He was under no 
obligation to make it as accurate as possible or use as much evidence as 
possible. He was not obliged to sit down with range and fire-control data, to 
assess whether or not the times quoted were synchronous, or to check his 
information with other personnel or ships to produce a report or chart. As 
Jellicoe indicated above, what was published was done according to the 
Admiralty's wishes. The reports, charts and other information, were written 
by Naval personnel, on Navy paper, using Navy pens, pencils and typewriters. 
In the days before asserting moral rights to works, it was solely a matter for 
the Navy, as the owner of the evidence, to decide what it would, if at all, 
publish. This is one more reason to question the accuracy of the evidence. 
Most despatches recorded personal experiences, which were naturally 
limited, and many accounts span hours over the space of a few paragraphs 
without noting times. However, it is this information which is frequently used, 
being thought unquestionable. Achieving publication of the Despatches was a 
significant advantage to Beatty, because he chose in 1916 (as BCF C-in-C) 
and 1920 (as First Sea Lord), what evidence went into them. Indeed, in at 
least one case, he even re-wrote a portion to suit his views. Much of the 
extant evidence held by the Admiralty had been seen by Harper before 
publication of the Despatches. However, as he was to find out, there was a 
good deal more not disclosed by 1920 which proved that Beatty had 
something to hide regarding his command in the BCF. 
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It has been part of received and assumed understanding since 1916, 
that the service was significantly effected internally by wrangling over Jutland. 
However, information to substantiate the existence of bitter factional disputes, 
as implied by Bacon and Bellairs and stated in newspaper articles, is 
conspicuous by its absence. Nowhere in currently available service records is 
there any hint of bias because of Jutland. The likelihood of all such evidence 
having been deliberately destroyed with a uniform thoroughness by the many 
individuals concerned, or their many relatives, to save it from others' prying 
eyes and any perceived or imagined embarrassment, when so much else 
remained, is highly implausible. Nowhere in surviving papers, is there any 
evidence to confirm any severe factional disputes, nor do many relatives of 
those involved or implicated in controversy, some of whom served in the 
inter-war Navy, recall any such great rift. 14 What is much more likely, is that 
this absence of supporting evidence indicates an absence of supposed general 
inter-personal or professional rifts. 
Attention must, then, focus upon the central issue - Beatty's efforts 
to assert his own views of the battle and why he did this. Jutland saw the 
repetition of major BCF errors that had been identified at Dogger Bank. 
After Jutland, Beatty contrived to cover-up defects of the BCF's operations 
that were his responsibility. He was abetted in this in later years when some 
former BCF officers succeeded to influential Admiralty posts under Beatty as 
First Sea Lord. Those who actively sought to alter the Jutland accounts to 
protect their reputations as individuals and that of the BCF as a whole, were 
limited in number. They not only misled the public, but their actions created 
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a detrimental image of others, which sometimes had serious personal effects. 
When Beatty became First Sea Lord, one of the many tasks he 
oversaw was the compilation of the proposed official account of Jutland. In 
1916, he had used his position in the BCF to control some evidence of the 
battle. In 1919, he could influence the evidence far more by virtue of his 
position to affect the perception of the Navy's performance and its policies. 
Some officers knew, or suspected, that sinister moves were afoot to corrupt 
perceptions of Jutland, but remained silent, hoping problems would fade 
away or never arise. This helped reduce opposition to Beatty's cause in the 
early stages. Analysis of what really did happen suffered from apathy, 
ignorance and the growing revulsion of most against criticising others about 
Jutland. With the reluctance of many to criticise others, the views of the 
historical school stood a realistic chance of instituting reform. 
Despite Beatty's new appointment, reform was not necessarily 
inevitable. The Navy of the early 1920s was reduced in the post-war 
disarmament atmosphere. The newly-formed Royal Air Force controlled 
Naval aviation in addition to competing for resources and attention with the 
other armed forces. Much of Beatty's time was spent defending the Navy 
from those who sought to detract from it, either to augment the other forces, 
or for political ends. At this time, the Navy needed as much support as it 
could get. A publication espousing the successes of Jutland would show that 
the large expenditure on the Navy was justified and that its strategy, tactics 
and management during the war had been vindicated. It would also be a 
persuasive argument for maintaining the Navy as far as the Washington 
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Treaty, expenditure and politics would allow. 
However, although a favourable publication on Jutland would be 
beneficial to the service, this was very much an ancillary issue. There is no 
evidence to deny that the original motivation in composing a general official 
account was simply to clarify what had happened at Jutland. This emphasis on 
clarity was infiltrated by Beatty, principally to cover-up operational defects 
regarding his management of the BCF. Throughout Beatty's and others' 
papers, there is no mention that the motivation in writing about Jutland was 
the desire to defend the Navy's performance in the war, nor its financing or 
composition afterwards. It was to show the BCF in as favourable a light as 
possible. 
Because this was the case, much of the emphasis on the battle refers 
to those parts of the action in which Beatty and the BCF featured most 
prominently. The battle itself can be divided into five phases: 
O the preliminary movements of both sides before 
action was joined; 
0 the battlecruiser action and intervention of the 
5thBS (the run to the south); 
0 the intervention of the German battlefleet (the 
run to the north); 
® the intervention of the British battlefleet and 
the two German attempts at escape from 
6: 15-7: 30pm; 
G the night actions. 
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To concentrate so much on the BCF, essentially the first three phases, more 
than eighty years after the battle, might appear to present a highly 
imbalanced account. The tactical significance of the battlecruiser action, 
compared to the involvement of the battlefleet, was minimal. Only the BCF 
and its sympathisers did not, at least not publicly, admit this afterwards. This 
is why, for the purposes of examining the controversy, this emphasis, or 
rather over-emphasis, on the BCF is essential. The main thrust of Beatty's 
argument was that the BCF were in action for longer than the battlefleet, 
sustained and inflicted heavy damage, and led the German Fleet up to the. 
rest of the Grand Fleet, where it should have been seriously damaged. That 
the HSF was not so damaged, Beatty attributed to Jellicoe's tactical 
irresolution and the battlefleet's reluctance to continue the action that he had 
so gallantly begun. In Beatty's opinion, the battlefleet's involvement was 
limited to a few sporadic bursts of fire that he never thought was justified by 
the term `action'. However, the effect on the HSF of the appearance of the 
GF was decisive. The German Navy never intended to engage the GF in full, 
or near full, strength. Until approximately 6: 15pm, when the British 
battlefleet arrived on the scene, the Germans had relished the chase of the 
British advanced forces centred upon the BCF. After learning of the presence 
of at least part of the GF, they eagerly sought to disengage. 
In the histories, when the descriptions of the action reached the 
intervention of the battlefleet, Beatty sought to minimise its role by 
emphasising its lack of involvement in the fighting. In contrast, he sought to 
maximise the BCF's actions prior to 6: 15pm. This was where he began to get 
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into difficulties in justifying himself. Such evidence as there was by no means 
supported him unequivocally. So, if he wanted to appear to be the Jutland 
hero, he had to force his opinion. If necessary, this was to be at the expense 
of what the evidence showed. 
There was general agreement that the night actions were not fertile 
ground for serious criticism. In 1916, the Royal Navy was not prepared to 
fight at night. No-one suggested that a refusal to seek action during the night 
of 31st May-1st June 1916 was an unforgivable act of negligence. All that was 
criticised, were the actions of some in not reporting definite sightings of the 
HSF so that Jellicoe could arrange to open action the following morning. 
Furthermore, there were inherent difficulties in producing a detailed analysis 
of the night action. So much happened in the night as ships blundered into 
each other and engaged in many brief, confused and fierce actions. Not only 
was there heavy loss of life, but many ships did not survive the night, taking 
their documentation with them. Over all, the night action was a series of so 
many confused, violent and heroic skirmishes, that it is impossible to provide 
anything but a general narrative. 
This brought attention back to the period from 6: 15-9: 00pm. It was an 
important criticism of the battlefleet by Beatty, that, had the battlefleet and 
Jellicoe shown more resolution at this time, the action might well have been 
decided in favour of the British before nightfall. By focusing on the 
battlecruiser action versus the role of the battlefleet, Beatty felt sure that he 
could convince the service and the public of the legitimacy of his views. 
The controversy began with Harper claiming Beatty's interference with 
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the text produced by his committee. Curiously, exactly what happened with 
regard to this has never been properly explained. At best, it has only been 
briefly referred to in some subsequent works. The over all impression given, 
for example, in the works of Bennett, Marder, Roskill, Tarrant and Gordon, 
is that, although Beatty did tamper with Harper's work, this was to very little 
effect because the original `Record' was never circulated. Such works omitted 
to clarify Beatty's involvement with Harper's `Record' and subsequent 
accounts, concluding that the causes of the dispute were simply those 
concerning interpretations of evidence. 
The general progress of the action was not doubted. However, the 
controversy did not concern the general movements, but the details of certain 
points. Disputes over the battle resulted from the fact that inherent 
deficiencies regarding the evidence meant that it could never be conclusive. 
However, that evidence could be suppressed, destroyed, altered, manipulated 
and controlled. In 1916, Jellicoe and the Admiralty had a clear indication that 
Beatty was both highly sensitive to how the evidence might be used and that 
he had attempted to control it after every previous engagement he had been 
involved in. No author mentioned this subsequently. It is a curious omission 
because later, when Harper drew attention to Beatty's interference, Harper 
was not making any claim that had not previously come to the attention of 
the Admiralty. Subsequently, Beatty interfered with every one of the official 
publications. It is, therefore, by no means certain to what extent every 
subsequent account of Jutland has been biased by Beatty's interference and, 
if so, why. Assessing this significant aspect is the basis of the following work. 
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After Harper's `Record' was shelved, it was used in the accounts 
compiled by the Dewars and Corbett. All later accounts used, to varying 
degrees, Corbett's Official History, the Narrative - edited from the Dewars' 
original Appreciation - and, occasionally, the Appreciation itself. Therefore, 
as these drew their basic facts from the Harper committee's work, it follows 
that, as Beatty interfered with that committee's work, all subsequent works 
might be based, to varying degrees, upon evidence of doubtful authenticity. 
The Jutland histories, therefore, must be subject to a more than casual 
examination to establish in detail how the facts were arrived at, and whether 
or not this process was in any way corrupted. This must be the primary task 
in any modern academic analysis and must be distinguished from merely 
producing a new interpretation of that evidence. So far, in existing literature, 
differing interpretations have obscured the fact that there is much room to 
question. the validity of the very evidence upon which those interpretations 
are based. An analysis of the histories will explain how and why the original 
evidence was corrupted and how this affected subsequent works. 
Hitherto, it has been widely believed that Beatty ordered Harper to 
alter his `Record' because it did not reflect what Beatty believed had 
happened. In short, it was seen to be only a difference of interpretation 
based upon generally accepted evidence. Be this as it may, it has not yet been 
ascertained whether or not the motivation for Beatty's persistence to see to it 
that an account favourable to himself should be issued was simply a matter of 
personal pride, or if there were other reasons for this. There was enough 
evidence in Captain Roskill's biography to strongly support the view that 
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Beatty was a very vain individual, more so than most, if not all, of his 
contemporaries. This alone would offer sufficient explanation. However, 
although prestige was important to Beatty, studying the histories reveals that 
there was a highly significant underlying reason why Beatty took the path that 
he did - his less than successful management of the BCF. It also reveals why 
he persisted so vehemently with his assertions about the BCF's role at 
Jutland. 
As the controversy began with the dispute over Harper's `Record', any 
analysis must first deal with the issues it raised. This work, therefore, will 
examine the functioning of the BCF up to, and including, Jutland. It will then 
be possible to ascertain whether or not there were any grounds to support 
Harper's claim that the evidence, rather than interpretation, did not support 
the BCF's role as it was believed by Beatty. This will also determine the 
extent to which Beatty was justified in trying to correct the over all 
impression that Harper's `Record' gave. 
By analysis of subsequent accounts of the inter-war period, Beatty's 
involvement will be traced to determine the extent to which his influence 
effected understanding of the battle. Most works written after 1930 used, to 
varying degrees, those previous works which had been the centre of so much 
controversy in the 1920s. It is important to clarify the integrity of those works 
of the 1920s, because all other works were derived from the information they 
contained. They are first generation accounts. That is, they were composed 
from original documents not utilised in later works. The opinions of the 
post-1930 works can largely be excluded because they gave secondary 
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opinions and interpretations based upon the printed evidence, rather than an 
analysis of it. However, they are useful in some instances. This work, 
therefore, will be restricted to a detailed analysis of the much-disputed works 
of the 1920s - when the bulk of the basic printed evidence was generated. 
As the various Jutland accounts were being debated, in the 1920s, it 
was a concern to many that their conclusions might be disruptive to the 
service in general. However, this general disruption did not materialise. In 
certain respects, however, the histories seriously affected some individuals' 
lives. Beatty's insistence upon asserting his own views of the BCF's role, 
despite contrary evidence, had a serious adverse affect upon the health of Sir 
Hugh Evan-Thomas, who commanded the SthBS at Jutland in support of the 
BCF. This is discussed, in Chapter 5, as an important example of Beatty's 
over all attitude and the fact that the controversy was not simply an academic 
dispute. Throughout, personal and service interests were essential to how 
Jutland was presented. 
Beatty's actions regarding Jutland were aimed at achieving a 
favourable public image of the BCF's role to suggest that his operational 
ideas had been more successful than they actually were, thus making them 
appear preferable to Jellicoe's. This was important because, if this image of 
success in action was generally accepted, it would also help to endorse 
Plunkett's move for the "regeneration" of the Navy in a way favourable to 
Beatty's views of greater freedom. Support for reform reprised the conflict 
evident in Tryon's push for greater freedom some twenty years previously. 
Although the Jutland controversy concerned the battle and the histories, the 
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underlying motivation in the controversy was to use Jutland to endorse 
differing operational principles. 
The events and facts of the battle need fresh examination, but so do 
the uses to which they were put - to support operational principles - as 
this was a significant reason why the evidence was initially interfered with. 
This also explains why the controversy lasted as long as it did and why Beatty 
persisted so vehemently to have his views accepted. Beatty wanted to be both 
the hero of Jutland and to have his Naval views adopted throughout the 
Fleet. It was, therefore, vital to him that evidence suggesting his mistakes 
should not be revealed, regardless of who suffered by its suppression. 
The final chapter assesses the extent to which the contemporary view 
that former BCF members dominated the Admiralty and instituted any of 
Beatty's reforms in the inter-war years was accurate. In order to give effect to 
reform, Beatty needed to show that adopting his views would be 
advantageous to the Navy. Along with showing that his views had been 
successful in action, Beatty needed sufficient support in influential Admiralty 
posts to implement reform. The chapter reveals the extent to which this was 
the case by assessing how promotions were made. This is, then, the end of a 
political process that began with the BCF's operation before Jutland. 
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1. The Battlecruisers: something to hide? 
Following the Falklands battle, on 8th December 1914, battlecruisers 
did not see action again until the engagement off Dogger Bank on 24th 
January 1915 and no battlecruiser would be present at both battles. None of 
the battlecruisers that carried 13.5" nuns were nresent at the Falklands. nor 
had they previously engaged enemy vessels of the same type. Doer Bank 
would, then. be the first time that the battlecruisers had been in action with a 
remotely equal force. This was also the first test of the fighting powers of 
these types. 
The possibilities that advances in fire-control devices had given to the 
battlecruisers, in theory, had given them the power to commence effective 
hitting beyond the effective range of the enemy. However, it was to the 
surprise of the Germans that, at Jutland, the British battlecruisers did not 
take advantage of the extra range that the 13.5" eun possessed over their 12". 
It is often assumed that poor visibility played major a part in this and that the 
BCF could not oven fire sooner as the targets could not be distinguished 
properly. Yet, if one compares the firing of the 5thBS at the 1 stSG at the 
limits of visibility (roughly 23,000 yards), it was curious why the battlecruisers 
did not begin firing until the range was estimated to be lust over 18.000 yards 
(although it was actually nearer 16,000). 
In his despatch after Dogger Bank. Lion's captain. Ernie Chatfield. 
noted that Lion had straddled Blücher at around 20,000 yards and 
established hitting about 15 minutes later (roujzhly the same time that it took 
the enemy to do so). but that "It was impossible to distinguish hits at this 
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distance. " I He suggested that Grand Fleet Orders dealing with gunnery 
should state that unless large structural damage was caused, hits could not be 
seen and that overs were hardly ever seen. 2 The difficulties of spotting at 
such long ranges caused some concern and the conclusion was reached that 
Falklands and Doer Bank: 
"have proved that hits can be made without 
difficulty at 19,000 or 20,000 yards, but this range 
is not decisive, and the percentage of hits too 
small. 
An hour's fighting may find guns disabled 
and ammunition running short with no decisive 
result obtained; therefore there is no harm in 
slow firing at lone ranee. but we must try to get in 
closer without delay. Probably 12.000 to 14.000 
yards would suit us well. this being outside the 
effective range of enemy's torpedoes and 6-inch 
nuns... We must try to combine early hits with 
decisive hitting soon afterwards. " 3 
It would, therefore, appear that there was much in the German official 
history's comment that British fire-control had not kept sufficient pace with 
greater gun ranges and sizes. 4 Chatfield continued that a very small spread 
of shots in any salvo made straddling difficult, thus affecting spotting. There 
was the possibility that a sliehtly larger spread of shots, if eenerally accurate, 
provided a better chance of a hit and Chatfield concluded that if the enemy 
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had had a wider spread, many more hits on Lion would have been 
experienced. 
Differences in fire-control should be mentioned. Director-firing 
involved the use of centrally supplied data to lay and fire the guns, which 
were fired by one man in a director control tower at a high point in the ship 
as his sights came `on'. Individual firing could make use of the same data 
transmitted to the turrets, as it had done before the introduction of directors, 
but with the turret crews actually laying and firing the guns. At close range 
the crews could range, spot and fire individually on their own, if required. 
There is some evidence that the introduction of director-firing had not been 
without its problems. These stemmed from its very effectiveness in aiming all 
the ship's guns at the same point; this assumed a highly accurate fire-control 
solution, one which was beyond the capabilities of most British capital ships 
given the weaknesses of their fire-control equipment. Prior to the war, Lt. 
Geoffrey Blake was charged with experiments with one of the first director 
installations in an Iron Duke class battleship. In one test, at 15,000 yards, 
under undemanding conditions that allowed relatively good shooting, the 
spread of shot was so narrow that thought was given to deliberately widening 
it. 5 Given the inherent inaccuracies of long range fire from one fast, moving 
platform to another, over many miles distance, a relatively wide spread of 
shot had its advantages in scoring at least some hits. Hipper is often quoted 
regarding the British battlecruisers' wide spread of shot at Jutland when 
compared to that of the 5thBS. This assumed that good shooting equated 
with a narrow spread of shot. This was not the whole issue, and it should not 
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necessarily be assumed that Hipper's observations are proof of good and bad 
shooting on the part of the BCF. A wide spread of shot seems to have been 
intended. It was a mark of a difference in doctrine not a deficiency in 
practice. 
Nevertheless, whatever the doctrines and instruments controlline its 
emnlovment, battlecruiser Lyunnerv was not effective enough during the run to 
the south to damage or distract the enemy sufficiently for the Germans to be 
unable to inflict disnrooortionate damage on Beatty's forces. This had serious 
repercussions both for the Royal Navy and for the battlecruiser's reputation 
as a type. After Jutland. it was concluded that the ideal type of capital ship 
should be a hybrid of a battleship's heave armour and a battlecruiser's speed 
-a combination that necessitated the much greater size of HMS Hood and 
her projected sisters. This was largely based upon a misunderstanding of why 
the battlecruisers oroved vulnerable compared to the battleships viz. that 
practical fire-control equipment was not sufficient to ensure good enough 
shooting at long enough range to prevent accurate German shooting 
exploiting fatal deficiencies in the BCF's ammunition handling arrangements. 
This alibi covered uo two major defects that the BCF and later the Admiralty 
thought best forgotten: that BCF gunnery had been poor for varying reasons 
and that ammunition safety practices had been poor throughout the Fleet, but 
with especially disastrous consequences for the BCF. The decision to move to 
shorter ranges had not had the benefits expected and had proved almost 
disastrous. 
A conscious decision had indeed been taken by the BCF at Jutland, 
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to compensate for defective long-range firing by exploring the benefits of 
shorter ranges, below c. 17,000 yards. Although long range hitting was 
desirable - if possible - it might not be practical. There were suggestions 
that medium-ranges (c. 12.000-16.000 vardsl had the ereatest over all potential. 
DoLy-aer Bank had shown that damage could be caused to the enemy at very 
lone ranges, but the predominant conclusion from the action was the more 
dubious one that fighting at shorter ranges would enable more effective 
hitting. However, success at this type of firing depended upon making 
effective fire faster than the enemy and there were many tactical factors that 
might undermine such a system (as was to become evident at Jutland). The 
battlecruisers had little opportunity to test their gunnery doctrines other than 
in action. Yet Beatty, Chatfield and the rest of the BCF had to make 
decisions for an action that might be imminent at anv time. Given the 
uncertainties of the BCF's command structure (see below) it is, perhaps, not 
too surprising that the solutions developed were in retrospect muddled, 
inconsistent and in the end ineffective, embarrassingly so for at least two 
future First Sea Lords (Beatty and Chatfield). 
In his report on the action at Dogger Bank. Chatfield noted that: 
"at any range under about 22,000 yards hitting can 
be attained within a few minutes. The mistake 
made was in not at once eoine into rapid 
independent and putting forth our whole volume 
of fire, regardless of ammunition expenditure. 
Enemy would then have been overwhelmed and 
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never recovered... The general feeling when 
Derflinger was on fire.. . was that we had 
her.. . There seemed therefore plenty of time, and 
that it was better to continue deliberate salvos and 
not to throw away ammunition at the long range. 
This proved an error. " 6 
Chatfield thus highlighted the difficulties in long-range firing and the benefits 
of rapid fire. It had been mentioned that independent firing at such long 
ranges was, for practical purposes, very difficult. So, the question seemed to 
resolve itself into two solutions. Either firing could be commenced and 
continued slowly at long range, or if the rate was to be increased, shorter 
ranges only would be of assistance to the rapid independent firing necessary 
for action within the range of the enemy. Whatever was decided upon in 
action, it does seem that a slow rate of fire under any circumstances was not 
a popular idea, however accurate it might have been, and that rapid fire 
seemed to marry frequent hitting to better spotting. 
The opinions of most who took part in the action at Dogger Bank 
were made with the fact that of the battlecruisers, only Tiger was equipped 
for director-firing (all the 13.5" battlecruisers had their directors by the 
beginning of 1916). Tiger's captain, Henry Pelly, made his most significant 
comment that the scale on the Dreyer table (which calculated the target's 
range) only reached 17,000 yards, 7 nearly 7,000 short of the maximum gun 
range. A common note in many reports was the interference of spray 
covering sights during independent firing (due to the speed of the battle and 
48 
spray thrown up by gun blast from wet decks) and that the blast from guns at 
such close quarters seriously affected vision from the turrets. All of these 
were good arguments to support director-firing. Beatty also commented that 
many of Tiger's salvoes were reported as being a long way over with a 
smaller spread than those of the other battlecruisers. Again, the smaller 
spread attained with director-firing was evident, but the idea that seemingly 
formed in Beatty's and others' minds was that a close spread might be very 
well if hits are achieved, but if not, all shells would miss with equal accuracy. 
'Overs' were hard to spot and of little use. Introducing a deliberate spread 
seemed to have been seen as providing a better chance of more effective 
spotting and hitting. This was thought to be easier to achieve at medium 
ranges under each turret's independent control. 
In theory and judging from Beatty's prewar comments regarding the 
development of use of battlecruisers, they were believed to represent a vessel 
capable of selecting the range at which to fight, keeping it and having heavier 
guns to out-reach the enemy equivalents. It was an absence of adequate 
means - both mechanical and methodological - to effectively out-reach the 
1stSG that contributed to the result of the battlecruiser action at Jutland, 
which subsequently became such an embittered and disputed point. There 
was, however, little mention of inadequate fire-control or ranging accuracy in 
the post-war literature until the works of Pollen and Sumida half a century or 
so later. Where gunnery was mentioned, it was merely referred to as good or 
bad according to the number of hits achieved (or estimated), without there 
being too much of an examination into the causes of this and the reasons 
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behind the approaches to gunnery. Ultimately though, it was the number of 
hits and damage to the enemy that really mattered and, whichever method of 
firing the battlecruisers adopted as a group or individually, their lack of 
success was the matter at issue, less so why they were not successful (the 
reasons for which their commanders were not keen to advertise). 
During the war, the fact that Beatty had encouraged development of a 
less rigid tactical system amongst his ships, led to the belief that the 
battlecruisers could achieve great things with such flexibility governing their 
actions and such speed and fire power at their disposal. This was often seen 
as a favourable contrast to the system under which the battlefleet operated 
and such were embodied, in many peoples' opinions, in . 
the characters and 
approaches of the BF and BCF commanders. The realisation of the 
battlecruisers' potential, however, lay largely in the hands of battlefleet men, 
who were not enthusiastically supported by some BCF personnel. Prior to the 
war, they had been instrumental in establishing Dreyer's fire-control devices 
in the Fleet. These devices were cheaper than those offered by Arthur Pollen 
and adopted largely because it was thought that they could do the task 
required just as well. Yet, the perception of just what gunnery was supposed 
to achieve and how it was to be achieved was the heart of the matter. 
Pollen's equipment took measured ranges and bearings of a target. 
With the firing ship's speed and course, the target's estimated speed and 
course, and measurements of wind speed, air temperature and density, plus 
other ballistic factors, it could, with a good degree of accuracy, calculate the 
future range of the target. 8 Such rapid course changes and varying rates as 
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Pollen's devices could cope with, were not thought to be required principally 
because it was not expected that the constantly varying conditions for which 
they allowed would materialise in any battle. So, Dreyer's equipment, which 
was slower in operation and relied less upon mechanical calculations, fulfilled 
two important considerations: it did the required job and was cheap. As far as 
advancing gunnery effectiveness was concerned: 
"the Dreyer system abetted an inhibition about 
one's own movements, at the expense of a 
proactive interest in those of the enemy, and 
compounded the Grand Fleet's psychosomatic 
command-and-control constraints. " 9 
Thinking along such lines as being restrained to the single line of battle and 
of not acting without an order - the predominant view - only helped 
support the limitations that Dreyer's system could deal with. 
By and large, those in the battlecruisers were encouraged to take 
advantage of what opportunities offered themselves in action. This was 
allowed for in the battlefleet as well, but seldom, if ever, practised, largely 
due to preconditioning. It was realised in the BCF that current deficiencies in 
equipment could adversely affect fighting ability. However, the predominant 
feeling in the Fleet was that the High Seas Fleet would conform to British 
movements on parallel lines and stay in range long enough to be sunk, thus 
this was the expected contingency. Those who prior to, during and after the 
war had advocated a more flexible tactical system found little in Jellicoe and 
his orders to please them, yet much in Beatty's approach. The Dreyer 
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equipment could well be seen as a battle fleet-sponsored limitation on the 
movements and effectiveness of ships in battle and the BCF had some 
experience of this limit to their fighting capability. More and more, in the 
opinions of those in the BCF, it was realised that the enemy would have to be 
sought and forced into action if they should be met and that one could not 
afford the luxury of waiting for the enemy to come to the slaughter. It irked 
some in the BCF that many thought that the enemy would do just that. 
The battlecruisers had, by the time of Jutland, been in action with the 
enemy more than once, which led to their feeling that they were more 
involved in the war as compared to the battlefleet. It was a source of friction 
then and after the war that the BCF had practical experience of how their 
ships behaved in battle that the battleships did not. What action they had 
seen had shown that improvements in gunnery technique and equipment were 
needed, even if extemporary, and that fighting would probably not develop as 
one might expect or hope that it would. Beatty's Battlecruiser Fleet Orders 
legislated for this slightly better than did Jellicoe's GFBOs. However, when 
the big day came, the BCF had not solved the problems of gunnery and 
communications that had presented themselves at Dogger Bank, many of 
which were to be repeated at Jutland. This was substantially Beatty's fault. 
Throughout the Fleet, there was a justified confidence in the ability of 
each ship to score successful hits on the enemy. In the BCF especially, it 
would seem to have been felt that the British would dictate the fighting, 
having the larger guns and speed to do so. The fault in this belief was that 
effective gunnery did not depend upon speed, the larger size of guns or 
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weight of projectile alone. The range at which firing commenced would, as 
suggested by Chatfield, be critical. Visibility was also important, in addition to 
communicating under fire and in periods of intense excitement. Although 
these other factors were recognised as being important in developing tactical 
cohesion, they do not seem to have received such attention with a view to 
improvement as did the development of methods of shooting which alone 
would, it was thought, ensure better chances of hitting. Although BCF 
gunnery was severely criticised during, but more so after, the war, the BCF's 
ability to score hits was severely hampered by the tactical position in which 
they began the battle at Jutland - within the enemy's gun range. This had 
resulted from perceived limitations with fire-control equipment when 
director-firing. 
With regard to Dogger Bank, there were three significant mistakes 
made which adversely affected the action. Firstly, although firing commenced 
at over 20,000 yards, it was felt to have been too slow. The possibilities 
envisaged for success resulting from a more rapid rate at the beginning of an 
action influenced BCF thinking at the time of Jutland. Secondly, distribution 
of fire had been inconsistent, allowing enemy ships to escape bombardment. 
This was recognised (see Chatfield below) but the problem recurred at 
Jutland. Thirdly, confusion as a result of signals being misread or 
misinterpreted had led to Moore breaking off the chase. At Jutland, lax 
signalling or difficulties experienced with flag signals, accounted for crucial 
errors just as much as did the absence of signals. It was all too often assumed 
that communications related to signals between ships. Yet, faults equally 
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arose from the fact that communications between officers were not 
sufficiently clear or frequent. If anyone wished to diminish the use of signals, 
then the necessity for personal contact and understanding became imperative. 
One might suggest that had Evan-Thomas been appraised in person by Beatty 
of the principles which governed the BCF, the outcome of the battlecruiser 
phase would have been somewhat different. 10 
It would appear from the raid on Scarborough, in 1914, that Beatty 
had not appraised any commanders beyond those of his battlecruisers alone 
of what would be his guiding principles in action. Yet, at Jutland, he expected 
Evan-Thomas to comply with his intentions at a key point at the opening of a 
major action. It seems strange to have expected compliance with certain views 
if these were not properly explained. In later years, Beatty was to criticise 
what he saw as others' failings, but these were the result of his own lax 
management; it was scarcely justifiable to blame others for not being 
telepathic. This defect even affected his own forces, however. At Jutland, 
confusing communications, opening fire too late and incorrect distribution of 
fire all combined to disadvantage the battlecruisers seriously. All of the above 
difficulties were rooted in Beatty's lack of clarity. 
Following the turn to SSE of the battlecruisers at 2: 35 at Jutland (see 
diagrams #1-6), it became evident that the enemy could not avoid action. It 
was also evident that the British battlecruisers could have opened fire much 
sooner than 3: 47. New Zealand reported that at 3: 15 (Despatches) 5 enemy 
ships could be seen (the 10-1, G) and at 3: 25 (Despatches) Lion reported the 
enemy in sight. New Zealand was 3 miles from Lion and according to 
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Chatfield's notes the range at 3: 31 was 23,000 yards from Lion to the 
1stSG. 11 At this point, New Zealand was out of gun range, but Lion was not. 
At Dogger Bank, firing commenced as the targets presented themselves, with 
each ship shifting up fire when the next enemy vessel up the line appeared. 
This was not the case at Jutland. Chatfield noted: 
"3: 35 [2 enemy] "quite distinct to me. " 
3: 40 "I can see 4 enemy port bow. " 
3: 44 [5 enemy seen]. " 12 
However, firing had still not commenced. Another 31h minutes were to pass 
before fire was returned, by which time the range was roughly 16,000 yards. 
So, roughly 221h minutes elapsed between Lion first sighting the enemy and 
its opening fire. In that time, the range closed by 8,000 yards and more 
targets were seen. 
Georg von Hase noted that, whilst searching for the enemy: 
"The horizon ahead of us grew clear of smoke 
[from the cruisers], and we could now make out 
some English light cruisers... suddenly my 
periscope revealed some big ships.. . They were 
still a long way off... they showed up clearly on the 
horizon. " 13 
He identified the six British battlecruisers. For this to have been possible, all 
the battlecruisers must have been slightly below the horizon in order for him 
to be able to count them; they must also have been clearly identifiable to 
note the classes and disposition. Given this, they must have been about 10 
55 
miles away at least, but their approach had been hidden by smoke, explaining 
why they all came to view so suddenly. From New Zealand's report of 5 ships 
at 3: 15, it was evident, contrary to what many later assumed, that the British 
saw the Germans first. Lion at this point was over the horizon and out of 
sight of the enemy. The German official history noted that when the British 
battlecruisers were seen "much to everyone's surprise, the enemy's guns 
remained silent". 14 Georg von Hase noted that the Germans thought Beatty's 
steaming into their range was a daring move. 
Chatfield had noted that the mistake made at Dogger Bank was, after 
opening fire, not going into rapid independent firing as quickly as possible. It 
is not clear just what the resulting BCF gunnery doctrine really was at 
Jutland, if indeed there was one at all and if it was uniform. Steaming closer 
to the enemy was consistent with the view that rapid firing was the most 
beneficial, but this did not necessarily mean that fire had to be withheld until 
the range was well within the maximum. Confusingly, there was the 
implication in Chatfield's comments that rapid-fire could be achieved at long 
ranges, as he noted that after opening fire at Dogger Bank (at over 20,000 
yards) rapid firing should have begun. If rapid fire was only to be effective at 
shorter ranges, then he did not explain that one cannot leap instantly from 
over 20,000 yards to about 15,000. It would seem that he advocated 
deliberately getting under 20,000 yards, despite the capabilities for 
director-firing over this range, to ensure better results from rapid firing. Even 
so, withholding fire for so long, especially when the enemy were out-ranged, 
was something that was not explained. More importantly, it was not even 
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examined after the battle. It must have been deliberate, especially when one 
notes that, at 4: 11, Chatfield recorded a straddle being made on the enemy, 
when the range was almost 23,000 yards. 
Those writing about the battle too often seemed content to accept the 
BCF's versions of events without question. Perhaps it was felt that after the 
sudden losses of two of the class, it was in bad taste to question exactly what 
had happened. Yet matters of taste would surely not obscure such an 
examination of the BCF's tactics. That the losses were the direct result of 
cordite explosions seemed to be a sufficient answer. Yet, is one really to 
believe that no-one considered how and why the battlecruisers had got into 
the position that they did and the part that this might have played in the 
downfall of two of the type? The latter was attributed more to luck and bad 
design. Although initial firing may have been slow, this was no handicap when 
shooting at an enemy that could not shoot back. The 13.5" gun out-ranged 
the 11" of Von der Tann by over 3,000 yards and the 12" German gun by 
roughly 4,000. On both sides there were deficiencies in finding the initial 
range, but for the British, this seemed to be harder to overcome. 
Following Dogger Bank, Chatfield noted: 
"That rapidity of fire is essential. The difficulties 
in controlling it are nothing compared to the 
disadvantages that ensue once the enemy's volume 
of shorts is greater than your own... Shorts are the 
only guide, and the great value of them must be 
impressed on control officers. The main object 
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when opening fire must not be the straddle, but to 
obtain a big volume of fire short, and then work it 
up by small "ups"... Directors must fire rapid 
double salvos as soon as the range is found... That 
no enemy must be left unfired at must be further 
driven home. Sights of 13.5-inch guns ... to be 
graduated up to 25,000 yards. "' 
Jutland brought out the many ironies and defects in these comments. The 
part relating to rapid fire, as it turned out, was true, but demonstrated by the 
Germans. With regard to the start of the action at Jutland, the German 
official history noted that: 
"In the German Navy great stress has always been 
laid on the importance of finding the target 
quickly and of maintaining the highest possible 
rate of discharge during "rapid fire". The 
soundness of this practice was now proved up to 
the hilt ... [and the 1stSG] were able to establish 
fire superiority over the enemy shortly after 
finding the range. " 16 
Although rapid early fire was stressed in Germany, it seemed to have been 
mentioned only to varying degrees amongst the British battlecruisers and was 
not necessarily widely adhered to. Aided by better visibility, resulting in 
clearer images at longer ranges, the opening German fire was both rapid and 
accurate and created the situation for the enemy that Chatfield had hoped it 
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would for the British, so the positions were reversed. By the time Lion 
altered course, at about 4: 02, it had been hit 6 times; Tiger received 9 heavy 
hits in this phase (from Moltke) from 3: 47-56 (four in the space of a few 
seconds, two of which temporarily disabled X and Q turrets). Princess Royal 
had guns put out of action (one permanently), Indefatigable suffered from 
early hitting and would soon sink and there were many shorts that hampered 
an effective return of fire, again, just as Chatfield had predicted, or hoped, 
would be inflicted upon the enemy. By the most kind of any standards, the 
British battlecruisers could scarcely have got into a worse position. 
Another recommendation was that a large volume of shorts should at 
first be the objective. At Jutland the range was over estimated by roughly 
2,000 yards, but the real defect was in not correcting swiftly enough. Far from 
starting short and working up, as Chatfield had previously urged, Lion's 
Control Top and Transmitting Station recorded highly erratic shooting (see 
Table 1, end of Chapter). 17 This was not as good a start as had been desired 
and when firing commenced, matters became much worse for Lion. The sizes 
of the range corrections show that Lion at least was shooting, in most cases, 
much too short or much too long and certainly could not hold on to the 
target, particularly under helm. Thus, subsequent corrections would be 
adversely affected, especially if the ship was not starting short with the aim of 
working up, as Chatfield had felt desirable. 
Chatfield's notes give some idea of the effects of German fire upon his 
ship: 
3: 49 enemy over 3: 501 hit sustained 3: 52 hit sustained 3: 54 enemy short 
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3: 541h enemy short 3: 57 2 enemy over, 1 short 3: 57'/2 straddled 
3: 58 "Tell fore top we are short. " 3: 59 straddled 3: 59V2 straddled 
4: 00 Q turret hit 4: 01 hit sustained 4: 01'/z hit sustained. "I think 
Indefatigable blew up about now. " 4: 02 straddled, a/c lpt S 
4: 03 hit sustained 4: 09 range 21,000 4: 11 a/c P 4: 12 enemy short, 
course SSE 4: 1212 course SE 4: 17 enemy over 4: 19 enemy over 
4: 20 a/c SSE 4: 24 2 hits sustained 4: 241/2 hit sustained 
4: 28 fire around Q turret 4: 29 Port 5 4: 32 enemy short 4: 33 a/c SSE 
4: 34 enemy over 4: 43 Course N 4: 48 re-opened fire 4: 51 a/c lpt S 
5: 01 hit sustained 5: 02 hit sustained 5: 09 fire reported: X turret. 18 
There was much in this to suggest that Lion played less of a role in the battle 
than was claimed. Following the hit at 4: 03 (see diagram #8), the ship turned 
over 50°, out of sight and out of enemy range from 4: 07-16, during which 
time only two of six 13.5" guns that were available were bearing on the enemy 
until 4: 09/10.19 It was little wonder that the BCF were so keen to defend 
their actions afterwards and to admit the effectiveness of enemy fire as little 
as possible. Where they had to admit it, they flatly retorted that their fire was 
just as damaging. 
In contrast to Lion's shooting, that of Invincible was undoubtedly the 
best of the battlecruisers, crippling Lützow. In an account of the battle, AB 
E. Danridge (Invincible's range taker) noted that firing commenced roughly 
1,200 yards short, but small ups were made until the range found and kept. 20 
Admittedly the range was shorter than earlier in the day, but it was good 
evidence of Chatfield's feelings regarding the benefits of starting short then 
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working up, and of the practice undergone by the 3rdBCS at Scapa the day 
before the battle. However, this seemed to further suggest that each 
battlecruiser was using whatever methods the Captain or Gunnery Officer 
thought appropriate for whatever reasons. Midshipman Frank Layard was 
working a dumaresq (a fire-control instrument) aboard Inflexible and noted 
some telling facts: 
"We' had only done one test firing with our new 
firing system a day or two before leaving Scapa. 
The Gunnery Officer therefore had a difficult 
decision to make. Should he use the new system 
which, though more efficient, was virtually 
untried, or... revert to the old less accurate but 
well tested system of gunlayer firing? He decided 
not to risk using the new Director System and so, 
throughout the action, guns and turrets were 
individually laid and trained. " 21 
It was evident that the "new" system was director-firing, but it was curious 
that, in 1916, this should be seen as particularly "new" for a member of the 
supposed spear-point of the fleet (old ships or not). Yet, it explains why the 
BCF behaved as they did at Jutland, because they had not yet reached, 
collectively or individually, a sufficient standard of gunnery to replace the 
more doubtful efficacy of individual firing as a last resort. Moreover, given 
the poor reputation of the BCF's gunnery it seems probable that the BCF 
had not sufficiently mastered even individual firing to the extent of full 
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efficiency. 
Layard admitted that individual firing was inferior, but for his ship, 
gunnery was simply a case of better the devil that the gunnery officer knew. 
In contrast, Dannreuther, in Invincible, made excellent use of director-firing, 
as supported by Danridge's comments, but such a discrepancy in the methods 
of two ships in the same squadron is worrying. That a known inferior system 
was preferred simply because the gunnery officer was familiar with it, when 
they had just been at practice with the newer, illustrates the non-existence of 
uniform gunnery policy or method in the BCF. One would suspect 
Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood (CO 3rd BCS) to have been 
immediately responsible for this lack of uniformity, but it was ultimately 
Beatty's direction (or not) in BCF matters. 
Layard also noted that: 
"Captains and Admirals in those days were remote 
and mysterious people.. . were seldom seen.. . there 
was never an occasion that I can recall, when the 
Captain fell the men in to give them a pep talk. 
During my two years only once did the admiral of 
our squadron come on board and not once did we 
see Admiral Beatty; not even after Jutland. How 
different it is today. " 22 
Whilst it was by no means obligatory for Admirals to make regular visits, 
when one considers that Beatty did not seem to be too keen to meet 
Evan-Thomas, it seemed that Admirals being scarcely seen, or scarcely seeing 
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each other, was not uncommon. Naturally, junior officers would not be too 
aware of Captains' or Admirals' movements, but considering what is known 
of the workings of the BCF, it seemed very much as if Beatty was content to 
trust his Admirals and Captains to bring the ships up to standard, without 
actually checking what was done in much, if any, detail. It was true that if he 
had anything important to impart, then others would visit him, but even these 
occasions were few and far between. This undoubtedly led to the 
discrepancies and irregularities in the functioning of the BCF seen at Jutland. 
The 13.5"-gunned battlecruisers, however, all began the action under director 
control. Whether or not this was through individual choice is uncertain, but 
most likely. 
The British received roughly four times as many hits as were achieved 
in the battlecruiser phase. Later, the effects of poor quality shell provided 
some of the answer to why the lstSG did not suffer more damage. Hipper, 
however, noted that there were many shells that appeared to have very 
irregular flight patterns, as if from ricochets. 23 There were ricochets on both 
sides, but the high number noted by Hipper, led him to suggest that this 
might have been due to there not being sufficient gas pressure and muzzle 
velocity to set the fuses of British shells. This would have explained the 
irregular flights and poor explosive power. Such could essentially only result 
from the fact that there was not enough energy as was required, to set the 
fuse, spin the projectile and to give it sufficient energy to reach the target. No 
guns were reported as misfiring, which might explain the problem, yet so 
would the scenario that reduced charges were being used. 
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For Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal and Queen Mary, the full charge for 
a 13.5" gun (Mk V) was 293lbs 7A which gave a maximum range at 20° 
elevation of 23,800 yards. The reduced charge was 2193/4 (a reduction of 1/4) 
giving a maximum range of 17,850 yards. Such reductions would lead to a 
slower spin and slower speed of flight, which would result in the resistance 
from the air slowing the shell sooner. Given that the range varied from 
c. 14,000-19,000 yards (for the majority of this phase), the use of reduced 
charges in certain cases, would preclude there being too many (if any) overs, 
which Chatfield had felt were a waste of shell. Lion's range corrections only 
served to indicate that spotting overs was very difficult indeed and that 
insufficient corrections of range were made at first, partly due to this excess 
of overs. Reduced charge firing could help prevent this, but only if the enemy 
were near the maximum range of a reduced charge gun. Although Hipper did 
not specify when these irregular shells were seen, or from which ships, it 
would seem that he referred to the whole phase of the battle at differing 
times. Judging by the amount of overs when Lion opened fire and the 
adverse effects that this had on effective gunnery, reduced charge firing might 
have been seen as a good answer to the problems that were experienced with 
ranging, but might not have been successful. One must not be led off the 
scent too much by Hipper's equating good gunnery with small spread of shot, 
contrasting the BCF and 5thBS as poor and excellent respectively, as each 
were using different equipment and differing methods to achieve hits. 
With regard to ranging, the Barr & Stroud FQ2 (9' base length) 
rangefinders in the battlecruisers were shorter than the F F24 (15'), yet the 
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FT24 was carried only in ships of the Queen Elizabeth class (5thBS) onwards. 
The FT24 was, however, accurate to within 168 yards at 20,000 yards (223 at 
23,000), three times more accurate than the FQ2, which also accounted for 
the good marksmanship of the 5thBS. The fact that lion's gun sights only 
went up to 20,200 yards was a mitigating factor, but this did not explain or 
excuse why some shots were not fired when the enemy first came into range. 
The lack of damage to the SthBS from the 1stSG in this phase was 
also due to the fact that, in Hipper's words: 
"Reply to the effective fire of these ships which 
were right under the sun [c. 20° above the 
horizon] ... was impossible, only an immediate turn 
away saved the situation. " 25 
Chatfield's post-battle -sensitivity concerning gunnery incorporated all the 
above factors and his real and alleged role in the BCF, not just as the 
Captain of one ship. Despite being a former Captain of the gunnery school, 
HMS Excellent, Chatfield's reputation as a gunnery officer was not 
unquestionable, nor unquestioned in the Fleet (at least after Jutland). 
The fact that, at Jutland, a ship - Derfflinger - went 10 minutes 
without being fired upon was a repeat of another weakness identified, but not 
remedied after Dogger Bank. Von Hase noted that after firing commenced: 
"I laughed grimly and now I began to engage our 
enemy with complete calm, as at gun practice, and 
with continually increasing accuracy. " 26 
Had he been under fire, it is reasonable to assume that his shooting would 
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not have been as good. Little, if anything, had been done after Dogger Bank 
to prevent the repetition of this serious error, which at Jutland had such 
disastrous consequences. 
It is not too clear to what extent Beatty controlled the action between 
the battlecruisers at Jutland and how far Chatfield's views, stated above, were 
practised. A major bone of contention, even up to the early 1970s, was the 
extent to which Chatfield was responsible for the gunnery of the 
battlecruisers. His sensitivity regarding their shooting at Jutland, after the war 
especially, was largely the result of it being suggested that he was responsible 
for defects in gunnery, when these were not, in most cases, within his powers 
or authority to remedy. It was often assumed that as Jellicoe's Flag-Captain 
was Fleet Gunnery Officer, then Beatty's must be Battlecruiser Fleet 
Gunnery Officer, but this was far from being certain. Admiral Sir William 
James, in 1968, recalled his experience as Commander aboard Queen Mary 
and stated that Chatfield was definitely not responsible for the gunnery 
efficiency of the battlecruisers. 27 In fact, the situation is so obscure, as to 
question whether or not there actually was an individual responsible for the 
whole BCF gunnery at all. If there was, he performed appallingly. 
Each battlecruiser was, then, responsible for its own gunnery. It must 
not be too readily assumed that this was a critical defect in the management 
of the battlecruisers as a force, but it would result in a lack of uniformity 
which might disadvantage some ships more than others, thus weakening the 
strength of the force as a whole. If standards differed widely, then this could 
well affect the force in action. The responsibility for ensuring certain 
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standards in the force was Beatty's and it was an odd oversight (if that is what 
it was) that he gave consideration to how he hoped the force would act in 
battle, but did not seem to ensure that the means to achieve his aims were in 
place. In the absence of much detailed evidence, it would appear that Beatty 
was content for each ship's captain to ensure that his ship could meet all 
requirements. In this, he was disappointed. 
Being the Flagship for the battlecruisers, Lion would be the leader to 
be followed and be guided ultimately by the senior officer (SO) of the force. 
The ship, , though, was Chatfield's responsibility, not Beatty's. Chatfield 
indirectly ensured the safety of his ship from the end that befell three of the 
same type (and one of similar class), but it was obviously not his place to 
insist upon this being the case in other ships. Without Beatty's support, he 
could not tell other Captains (he was not the senior Captain in the force 
either) how to run their ships. Even if they were aware of Lion's ammunition 
handling system, developed by the Chief Gunner, WO Alexander Grant, 
which enabled the rapid supply of ammunition whilst maximising safety, they 
might not have approved, or thought it suitable for their ship. One should 
wonder why these evident differences, amongst so many others, were allowed 
to persist. 
Signalling was another area that was to plague the battlecruisers in 
action, there being little guidance from Beatty in this as well. Had Beatty 
appointed a qualified signals expert to deal with the BCF's signalling, one 
might suggest that he could have reduced the probability of errors. 
Appointing a competent staff officer to ensure the BCF's signalling or 
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gunnery standards and methods would have aided easier identification of 
weaknesses and the consequent seeking of remedies for them. Some might 
suggest such appointments to be essential, which no careful admiral would 
overlook. 
At Jutland, although enemy ships were in sight for some time before 
firing commenced, the other battlecruisers seemed to be waiting to follow the 
Flagship's lead. This could have resulted from the fact that Chatfield's ideas 
regarding rapid fire were being practised (and possibly supported by Beatty) 
and there might have been some feeling in the other ships, that the Flagship 
would, or should, dictate how the action was to be pursued. However, the 
BCFOs had encouraged individual action should there be suitable 
opportunity. One could suggest that there was more than ample opportunity 
for this. It was stressed that no enemy ship should be left un-fired at, yet this 
only seemed to have been interpreted as relating to the distribution of fire 
after firing commenced (this had, after all, inspired the instruction). 
For over 22 minutes the 13.5"-gunned battlecruisers had seen the 
enemy, but did not open fire, even though the enemy were within range. 
Although Beatty and others were later to criticise alleged sloth, reluctance 
and mismanagement in the battlefleet, they seemed unaware of such errors of 
their own. It could be mentioned that when Marlborough opened fire, at 
6: 17, it was not felt to be necessary to wait to see if the Fleet Flagship was 
firing first. In fact, of all firing that took place during the daylight hours, the 
battlecruisers are the only ones who withheld fire on capital ships after the 
enemy had been identified. By 6: 00, visibility had deteriorated and despite 
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some tactical inhibitions, most battleships fired immediately they could see a 
target. This was not the case in the BCF. 
After the war battlecruiser personnel, as their evasiveness suggested, 
were all too aware of their collective and personal failings and adopted the 
offensive in the war of words hopefully to blind the opposition - as they had 
hoped to do, yet failed, at Jutland - and they succeeded with this in the 
early 1920s. If they did not consider the battlecruiser action to have been 
mismanaged, then the reasons for acting as they did and the resultant 
successes, needed to be explained. This, they did not do. After the war, much 
criticism was made of Evan-Thomas and of his late entry into the 
engagement, although he opened fire as soon as he was in range. However, 
Beatty was late in entering the battle too and he withheld fire when in range. 
That the battlecruisers threw away an important advantage over the enemy, to 
trade punches on more equal terms, required justification and it was some 
measure of their success in the war of words conducted after the war, that 
they were able to obscure the issue so much, as to blame battlecruiser design 
(amongst other things) for lack of success, which was not the case. 
Prior to the battle, it was common in the Fleet for there to be a large 
amount- of ready-to-use charges, exposed in the magazines. This aided the 
rapid rate of firing that it was thought essential, particularly in the early 
stages of an action. Chatfield was just one of those who felt that this rapid 
rate of early fire was essential and experience from Dogger Bank, only 
underlined this in his view. He consented to Lion's Chief Gunner, Grant, 
limiting the amounts of ready-to-use charges and insisting that any doors 
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between the magazine and guns be closed except for the feeding of 
ammunition and charges. Although Grant ran the risk of Chatfield's 
displeasure (and later, his praise) by potentially slowing the rate of fire, 
Chatfield's endorsement of Grant's system showed that it was feasible to 
achieve as rapid a fire as was possible, in addition to securing the safety of 
the ship and its crew. This being the case, one wonders if he ever mentioned 
this to Beatty and if he did, why did Beatty not act upon it? If he did not 
mention it, one might ask why not? One is left again to wonder at the exact 
role that Chatfield played in the force with regard to gunnery, despite what 
many erroneously assumed that he did - that of the BCF's formal gunnery 
officer. It almost beggars belief though, that for something of this magnitude, 
Chatfield did not mention it, but equally, so does Beatty's apparent 
non-intervention. However, one should bear in mind that Beatty might have 
disapproved of Grant's system. 
Grant's regime, perhaps deliberately, was far from being common 
knowledge at the time. When Grant's memoirs were used by Marder, in the 
1960s, Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Blake (who had been on Jellicoe's staff at 
Jutland) felt that Marder had been inventive. He told Vice-Admiral Aubrey 
Mansergh (editor of the Naval Review): 
"I am quite sure that [Grant] would have certainly 
mentioned the drill to me, as I saw him very 
shortly after the action. " 
211 
However, perhaps Grant assumed that Blake already knew about such a vital 
matter. What seems only too clear is that, given the way each battlecruiser 
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operated, there were aspects of the running of the ships of the BCF that were 
not considered to be sufficiently important to be communicated to officers 
outside the individual units. Beatty did, of course, make it clear that he did 
not want excessive centralisation of mundane issues, but seemed to go to the 
other extreme - of laxity. As a result, the effectiveness of the whole force 
suffered. Chatfield stated that: 
"The ship [Lion] has been in commission for so 
long, and the men so highly trained... that even in 
action they can do almost anything without their 
officers". 29 
Chatfield had allowed his ship to get well into the enemy's range before 
opening fire, when as rapid a rate as possible could have been achieved from 
maximum range downwards. This ran the risk of having to compete on similar 
terms with the enemy - terms which their methods favoured - which was 
evidently the plan of action, but it was far better to have used the range 
advantage his guns had. That this was not done suggests that the 13.5" gun 
without adequate fire-control mechanisms, was not seen so much as a device 
designed mainly to give range advantage, but to provide a heavier projectile 
to fire at a similar range to that at which the enemy was firing. If, indeed, it 
was decided to forsake the range advantage, Fisher's motto to hit first, hit 
hard and keep hitting, was of crucial importance. The BCF failed in all three 
of these respects. 
Although Beatty's encouragement of initiative was admirable, the use 
of initiative was just as prone as any other system to lead to problems if not 
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used appropriately and there were limits to its benefits. In later years, when 
the two apparently different battlefleet and battlecruiser systems were held to 
represent both the good and bad in tactics, strategy and training, these 
systems were used in limited ways to suit particular causes. Unless there was 
a uniformity in understanding just what initiative was and how others might 
use it, problems of misunderstanding and misinterpretation would appear, just 
as they did before and during the battle. The nature of whatever system was 
in place was of less importance than its efficacy when in use, but all too often 
it was assumed that the mere existence of less strict procedures equated with 
improved operating efficiency. However, this efficiency depended upon 
Beatty ensuring that all his captains knew what he wanted and how this was 
going to be achieved; this was where the failure occurred. 
When the BCF did open fire it was evident, from German accounts, 
that Lion, at least, was adhering to Chatfield's views regarding rapid fire and 
using a larger spread. The necessity for having to correct in the first few 
minutes for over estimating the range, reduced the effect that rapid fire might 
have had upon Liitzow. It is worth noting that prior to the battle, there were 
concerns over the accuracy of the battlecruisers' shooting and they had only 
limited opportunities to practice frequently. The full-calibre firing they 
needed was not practicable in such a populated area and securing the mouth 
of the Forth against submarines was difficult. Despite this, the crews did 
know how to use a gun, and the problems faced in the first 20 minutes of the 
action at Jutland, were more the result of poor and confused gunnery and 
operational methods, than they were due to poor marksmanship alone. All 
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too often the two are separated, but the adverse effects upon marksmanship 
were the results of the faulty tactical application of the vessels. 
The tactical considerations themselves were largely based upon the 
uncertainties of the fire-control equipment carried, which, by and large: 
"tended to emphasise the importance of simple 
spotting of fall of shot as the keystone of accurate 
gunnery-Some [fire control officers] indeed 
detected the weaknesses of the non-Argo Dreyer 
tables and went so far as to practically dismantle 
them, trusting to cruder methods of spotting guns 
on to the target. 11 30 
This weakness could be traced back to those of the battlefleet who had 
supported Dreyer's devices. As far as the post-war arguments were 
concerned, much ill-feeling felt by former BCF men and their sympathisers 
had resulted from perceived and actual constraints initiated by battlefleet 
men. Fire-control pervaded the development of battlecruiser theory and 
application and its practical limitations, in 1916, led to the limitations imposed 
on what it was hoped they could achieve. This meant that the BCF had to 
find other ways to overcome this handicap, but they were not helped at all by 
extremely piecemeal doctrinal development and failure to collate the 
significant findings of Dogger Bank. Although Beatty and his sympathisers 
criticised centralisation, it did not mean that a less rigid system could be 
achieved by less work, but Beatty's actions, or rather his evident lack of 
action, suggested that he thought that with common understanding between 
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himself and his captains, the whole system would automatically turn out to 
function as he desired. His relations with some of his immediate subordinates 
were far from cordial. Many were also reluctant to adopt his principles of 
greater tactical freedom, which played a large part in the poor functioning of 
the BCF at Jutland. 
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The issue of the Fifth Battle Squadron sheds some light on BCF 
gunnery doctrine. Beatty had been asking for these ships for some time prior 
to the battle. His reasoning was often varied and confused, and he also 
enlisted the help of other battlecruiser commanders to petition the Admiralty. 
The basic reason given for his desire for some or all of these ships was that, 
with the Queen Elizabeth s, the BCF would have an overwhelming advantage 
over the 1stSG, almost guaranteeing the outcome of any engagement. Even 
including the possibility that Hindenburg (with reputedly 15" or 17" guns) had 
been added to the lstSG, the British battlecruisers were superior to their 
German counterparts theoretically. The British battlecruisers were faster and 
more heavily armed than each German equivalent class and should have been 
superior in practice. Yet, serious doubts existed as to whether this was really 
the case. The action off the Falklands had shown that the battlecruisers, 
although successful, had taken far too long to establish accurate fire. There, 
they were pitted more correctly against armoured cruisers of an earlier 
generation, but they evidently could not afford to take so long against similar 
types. By the time of Jutland, they were no nearer to solving the problem of 
accurate fire-control, which meant that such fire power as was boasted and 
widely believed to have existed, was not actually achievable. They needed the 
Queen Elizabeth class to make good this collective deficiency. The 
13.5"-gunned battlecruisers were, however, still superior if used correctly, but 
were hampered in this respect by poor fire-control methods and equipment. 
The addition of the 5thBS augmented Beatty's force to make it more 
powerful than most other nations' entire navies. However, the Grand Fleet 
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could do this without weakening the rest of the battlefleet. For the BCF, the 
5thBS was, in reality, an essential item. 
It is understandable that anyone who had seen action and been part of 
a force that suffered such losses as did the battlecruisers, might not take too 
kindly to anyone suggesting that their efforts were largely unsuccessful. There 
was a feeling in the BCF after Jutland that it was necessary to emphasise any 
successes that were scored over the enemy, largely to satisfy themselves that 
the enemy had not escaped undamaged. Yet, this developed into a situation 
whereby they were reluctant to admit to many of their failings and to deny 
that the battlefleet nlaved any significant role. This largely came about, 
because Jutland had seen deficiencies identified at Dogger Bank being 
repeated and this cannot have been easy to accept. Beatty and others were 
aware of these failings and of the responsibility for their occurrences. The 
battlecruiser action and the damage inflicted upon the BCF, largely explained 
the sensitivity of former members, in later years, to any criticism. What 
undoubtedly made such criticism harder to accept was the repetition of errors 
already made. That these mistakes were known only made acceptance and 
admittance of responsibility harder. Chatfield, for example, must have been 
aware that better ammunition handling measures would almost certainly have 
saved the 3 battlecruisers, especially following the near loss of his own (and 
probably his life). 
Grant's initiative meant that Lion was able to survive three serious 
incidents in less than 45 minutes. Without it, the first would have claimed the 
ship. The hit on Q turret, at 4: 00. caused potentially catastrophic fire. At 4: 28. 
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cordite ignited in the turret trunking and, later, Chatfield noted: 
"the Battlecruisers altered course 180 degrees to the 
northward, bringing what wind there was ahead. It 
was at that moment that the other charges (eight in 
number), in the supply hoist caught fire and a 
considerable explosion took place, a flame shooting 
up as high as the masthead. " 31 
He might well have felt in some way responsible in that he had not 
mentioned Grant's system to any other captain. Beatty cannot have been 
unaware of the factors that disadvantaged his force and might well have felt 
that his aims and wishes had not been adequately practised, which was largely 
his own fault. This might have made him more aware of the fact that he did 
not meet Evan-Thomas before the battle, or that he might have been wrong 
to place undue reliance upon his captains to ensure that their ships were up 
to his desired standard. That the BCF seemed not to have learned much of 
any use at Dogger Bank, when there was much to learn, would only add to 
such feelings of guilt as existed. There was little that Jutland had shown up 
that Dogger Bank had not. 
Whatever redeeming features there were in the BCF organisation, if 
there were any, one cannot share Professor Marder's view that: 
"Beatty did everything possible to improve 
battle-cruiser gunnery, as by carefully studying the 
lessons of Heligoland Bight and the Dogger 
Bank... [his] immediate adviser on gunnery 
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matters was Chatfield.. . Everything considered, the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet was quite an efficient unit 
when the day of Jutland arrived". 32 
Beatty certainly did not learn the useful lessons that the two actions gave, 
even if he "carefully" studied them and, whereas Chatfield was his advisor, 
one must not suppose that this was synonymous with being BCF Gunnery 
Officer. As to the last comment, it was clearly something of an overstatement. 
It is hard to draw comparisons between Jellicoe's battlefleet gunnery 
and that of the BCF, or to assert that one was better than the other. The 
essentially two 15-20 minute periods of battlefleet firing were enough to give 
the HSF the fright of their lives, to which many of them attested, but more so 
because it undoubtedly announced the presence of the battlefleet, at which 
Scheer sought escape. Had conditions been clearer, the greater weight of 
British fire would almost certainly have decided the action, but as is the case 
with victories, little analysis is done as to what could have been done better. 
The battleships might have shot poorly, yet still sunk every German 
equivalent. It was only necessary to be as good as was needed to sink as many 
ships as possible and this might not necessarily have required a very high 
standard. Had the battlefleet been obliged to be engaged for as long as the 
BCF, the results would be interesting and make more accurate comparison 
possible. Most fire-control equipment was the same and some of the best 
equipped battleships in this respect were not in action for very long at all and 
did not even open fire until an hour after Marlborough. 
Any comparison of the battleships' and battlecruisers' gunnery 
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effectiveness suffers from other factors outside pure ordnance. Much criticism 
of the battlefleet stemmed from the fact that the Royal Navy was greatly 
superior to any other Navy, more so than many contemporaries felt. The 
odds were that it would be folly to seek action with it, or if action was joined, 
it would be brief. As a unit, the Grand Fleet was so powerful that just by 
being "in being" it was unlikely ever to be fully tested. The BCF alone did not 
suffer from this and were tested. However, over all, it could be convincingly 
claimed that the result of the action with the 1stSG was equal for both sides. 
Of the surviving battlecruisers, the Germans had more guns out of action 
during the run to the north, Von der Tann lost all guns and, along with 
Seydlitz, was taking-in water. The point to bear in mind, is just how much 
better it might have been, within the knowledge and powers of the individuals 
concerned and it was here where the serious flaws lay. 
It is not unusual that after such crucial events, people often examine 
where they made mistakes and torment themselves with what might have 
been but for simple flaws. Often there is much that they are responsible for, 
but it is not unusual that people blame themselves for things over which they 
could have had no control. As BCF CO, Beatty seemed to have felt much of 
the responsibility for the way his ships fought, which was not surprising given 
his position. He would have been unintelligent not to have reflected on the 
battle, where faults occurred and the extent to which he might have 
prevented these, had he done this or that. His actions following the battle, 
especially as First Sea Lord, must always be seen with this in mind and it 
must not be forgotten that it is a very unusual person indeed who admits all 
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his flaws openly and encourages public criticism of them. 
There was much in the fact that the BCF felt that they had seen the 
greater part of action in the war and at Jutland had been let down by the 
battlefleet. However, this was partly due to the fact that, although the 
battlefleet was seen to be unadventurous in seeking the enemy and using the 
advantage of its greater numbers, the BCF let slip their advantage over the 
1stSG, which was almost entirely their own fault. It rankled with them and 
they needed to hide this. The post-war controversy began, rather innocuously, 
with Beatty's objections to some of the statements made by the Harper 
committee. Yet, Harper's objections to Beatty's ordered alterations awakened 
old sensitivities to criticism with regard to what had happened at the battle. 
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Table 1. 
Notes from Lion's Transmitting Station at Jutland. 
Bearing(enemy) RF Rangle (yards) Spotting observations 
3: 47 a/c [alter course] 1pt [1 point=11.25°] S[tarboard] 
3: 471h R42 [Red=port, 42° aft] D800 
3: 491/2 D600 
3: 50 R57 15,500 a/c S 
3: 51 R78 
3: 511/2 D800 
3: 52 R89 D100 
3: 52'/2 a/c S 
3: 53 R108 D400 
3: 54 R107 14,500 
3: 55 a/c S 
3: 561/2 D200 
3: 57 U800 
3: 571/2 U200 
3: 58 R114 U600 
4: 00 R114 a/c S U200 
4: 01 R129 16,750 U800 
4: 02 R144 
4: 03 "A&B not bearing" 
4: 04 R125 U400 
4: 07 R127 U200 
81 
4: 08 R127 
4: 09 R120 
4: 11 R103 
4: 111/2 
4: 12 R91 
4: 121/2R81 
a"1a R78 
d-15 R80 
4: 16 R80 
4: 17 R84 
4: 18 R87 
4: 181/2 
4: 19 R107 
4: 20 R106 
4: 21 
4: 24 
4: 25 R110 
4: 251/2 
4: 261/2 
4: 27 R132 
4: 28 
4: 29 
bearing. " 
4: 32 
21,400 
a/c P 
Straddle made 
a/c P 
23,000 
2t275 
21,000 
a/c S 
18,800 
16,000 
a/c S 
a/c S 
U200 
U400 
D400 
D400 
D800 
D400 
D800 
D800 
D1000 
D1000 
D800 
D800 
U400 
U400 "Smoke obscuring target A&B not 
a/c P D1000 
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4: 33 enemy a/c P D1000 
4: 36 16 point turn 
4: 48 G78 [Green=starboard] 20,300 
derricks on after funnel. " 
4: 49 D400 
4.50 20,000 a/c p 
4"Sn1/, U400 
4: 51 G101 DSOO 
4"i4 "A&B not hearing" 
4-5R 21,000 
4: 581/2 a/c P 
5: 00 D800 
5: 02 G1 Id U800 
5: 03 16,250 U400 
5: 04 a/c S U400 
U800 "Target has 2 
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2. The Harper Record. 
In early 1919 Captain John Ernest Troyte Harper' was chosen by the 
First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, to compose a record of the 
Battle of Jutland using only documentary evidence that was available at the 
Admiralty. This would become the official expression of Admiralty opinion 
and, in as far as was possible so close to the event, the most accurate account. 
In addition, it was thought suitable that the author of the account should not 
have been present at the battle itself. At the time of Jutland, Harper had 
commanded the AMC Carmania (famed for its engagement with the Cap 
Trafalgar). He was now Director of Navigation, adequately qualified for the 
task that lay ahead, although he could scarcely have been prepared for what 
happened. Work began on 6th February under the supervision of the ACNS 
(Rear-Admiral J. A. Fergusson, who had commanded Thunderer at Jutland) 
and included a team of assistants to Harper that included 
Lieutenant-Commander H. C. B. Pipon (who had served aboard Temeraire at 
Jutland), Lieutenant-Commander J. F. H. Pollen (an assistant at the 
Hydrographic Department and later at the CID) and Lieutenant-Commander 
Oswald Frewen. Lieutenant-Commander W. S. Chalmers (of Beatty's staff 
from Lion and Queen Elizabeth) also assisted with the diagrams. 
The work was completed on 2nd October of that year and handed in 
to the Admiralty. On 24th October, in Harper's presence, the Deputy Chief 
of the Naval Staff (DCNS), Vice-Admiral Osmond Brock (RA 1stBCS, in 
Princess Royal at Jutland) was about to sign his name signifying Board 
approval when he remarked: 
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"As Lord Beatty is assuming office as First 
Sea Lord in a few days it must wait for his 
approval. " 2 
This marked, in Harper's view, the start of a long and bitter series of events 
which need not have happened had Brock not hesitated. It is true that events 
might have taken a different course if Brock had signed, yet with the battle 
itself being such a significant part in the lives of many, some controversy was 
inevitable, especially as events had not proceed according to how the Navy 
had hoped. Indeed, in a letter to the First Lord, W. H. Long, Wemyss noted 
that Jellicoe had been asked to postpone the release of his forthcoming 
account of his part in the war, but had refused. He thought that this decision 
might cause controversy since the two accounts of Jutland would almost 
certainly differ enough for questions to be raised regarding what had actually 
happened. 3 It would seem, then, that Wemyss recognised that some dispute 
would arise, but hoped that the speedy issue of the account prepared by 
Harper would help neutralise any wild claims about what happened at Jutland 
and whether or not the whole story was being told. 
Although only Admiralty evidence was used and no oral testimonies 
were allowed, such limitations to the work were bound to result in the 
accuracy of the work being questioned. Wemyss was attempting to minimise 
controversy, but he assumed that purely plotting ships' movements could be 
accurately accomplished with evidence of such limited scope and that the 
problem over Jutland was simply establishing the movements of ships. No 
matter how brief any record of the battle was to be, the deliberate exclusion 
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of evidence that could corroborate or shed light upon any uncertain matters, 
however much time it might save, was a mistake bound to lead to such a 
dispute as arose. Admiral Sir William James (who served on Benbow at 
Jutland) told the second Earl Beatty, in 1968, that: 
"The mistake Wemyss made was in getting his old 
navigating officer, of no distinction, to prepare a 
0 record on Jutland, before the German reports of 
the battle were available. " 4 
Although the omission of German material is by no means the whole issue, it 
does point to the selective use of sources. Wemyss, if he sensed that disputes 
would arise, was somewhat naive if he felt that excluding personal accounts or 
opinions would do anything to help placate matters. The matter was 
controversial anyway and it should have been realised that it was far better to 
produce as detailed and accurate a historical account as was possible rather 
than to produce an unsatisfactory work which would only inspire other works 
of varying accuracy and purpose. 
The `Record' appeared to be the considered verdict of Harper's 
committee, basically detailing the movements of ships present with some 
details of gunnery. To help explain events, colour charts were also produced. 
The initial disagreements between Harper and Beatty touched on only a few 
points of the battlecruisers' actions, yet there are inconsistencies in the text 
which were overlooked in the later dispute. Of the section concerning the 
actions of the battlecruisers up to junction with the battlefleet, there is no 
examination of the confusion with the 5thBS at 2: 32 and scarcely any mention 
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of it at all. However, it had yet to become such a disputed issue. There is no 
mention of Lion's falling out of line just after 4: 00, but given these absences, 
it is not surprising to find that Beatty only disagreed with three main points at 
this time. These were, in his view, the lack of prominence given to the BCF; 
the over-emphasis on the battlefleet and the BCF's 360° turn at 
approximately 7pm at Jutland. 
A discussion of the above matters was strictly not part of Harper's job 
and he refrained from doing this. He did, though, allow himself, or lapsed 
into, one comment of some truth that Beatty expunged: 
"The disturbing feature of the Battle Cruiser ý>' 
action is the fact that 5 German Battle Cruisers 
engaging 6.. . supported after the first 20 minutes, 
although at great range.. . were yet able to sink the 
Queen Mary and Indefatigable. It is true that the 
enemy suffered very heavily later.. . but even so, 
the result cannot be other than unpalatable... But 
it is also undoubted that the gunnery of the 
German Battle Cruisers in the early stages was of 
a very high standard. " 5 
One can hardly be surprised at this. It was conspicuous for the fact that it was 
an unusual personal comment, even though it was accurate, and, therefore, 
encouraged the reader to concur with the author's opinion. This should not, 
however, be assumed to be evidence that Harper was intent on portraying the 
BCF in the worst light possible. In general, the account reads as it was 
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intended to be -a basic account of events. 
Despite allegedly having all the available logs, charts and despatches to 
work from, Harper was handicapped by a lack of comparative detail from 
German sources. In general, this did not affect the work quite as much as one 
might at first assume. The most significant defect in the work concerned 
inconsistencies with particular events in various parts of the work. For 
example, the section dealing with the battlecruiser action up to 6: 00 noted 
that the 5thBS opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards at 4: 08.6 Yet, the 
section dealing with the movements of the 5thBS has them opening fire at 
4: 11 at 19,000 yards. 7 Regardless of which was correct, one would at least 
expect consistency in the work. This flaw appeared again when the 5thBS 
turned north on sighting the HSF. The events concerning the BCF and 5thBS 
in the period between 2: 20 and 5: 00 pervaded the controversy, particularly in 
the early years, and it is instructive to examine the references to these at 
varying times. 
The section dealing with the battlecruiser action noted that, at 4: 53: 
"the Fifth Battle Squadron was passing steering in 
the opposite direction, and a signal was made 
ordering them to alter course 16 points. " 8 
Yet, the 5thBS section noted that, at 4: 50: 
"Lion approached the Fifth Battle 
Squadron... with the signal flying.. . to turn 16 
points.. . This turn was made at 
4: 56pm after our 
Battle Cruisers had passed. " 9 
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This had serious implications for the movements between the two forces at 
this juncture. Only one paragraph noted the time of the turn (4: 56), but one 
would expect consistency and accuracy in the way the information was given. 
If the time was known, there was no reason why there should be such a 
discrepancy and vagueness in accounts that were supposed to indicate the 
same event. Any discrepancies in the sources should have been analysed and 
discussed before being set-down in the text. Harper's task was, as 
editor-in-chief, to coordinate the effort and finalise the work. There are 
essentially only two explanations to cover these oddities in referring to the 
same events. Either Harper forgot himself in writing up the account, or the 
two sections were written by different authors and not carefully checked. One 
would suppose the evidence to favour the latter reason, which was surprising. 
In any event, the work was inconsistent and not thoroughly checked. 
The first quote noted that a signal was made, but did not say when - 
this was the crucial issue concerning this point. The second quote was more 
accurate, in that the signal had been hoisted (at 4: 48), but it was not made 
executive for some minutes. In the first quote, the executive was seemingly 
made at 4: 53. Other sources differed slightly, 10 but by 4: 56, the turn was 
under way, so the second quote was accurate in one sense, yet not as precise 
as it should have been. However, the references all point to the turn being 
later than the much-quoted 4: 48. This matter was not trivial and called for an 
accuracy that the evidence available to the committee could easily have given. 
Yet, faults in the method of construction confused the account and confused 
later writings that used evidence prepared by the committee. It must be 
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admitted, however, that Harper's work was the first to admit to the later 
timing of Lion's signal and for many decades was the only one. Had the 
record been published as was hoped, such disputed points might never have 
become so inflamed. Many criticised Evan-Thomas for slowness of mind, but 
the evidence in 1919 suggested very much that the responsibility for the delay 
in his squadron's turning to follow the BCF, lay with Lion making the signal 
later than was required and later than subsequent accounts stated. However, 
this was suppressed with the account and all manner of criticism was made 
about Evan-Thomas based upon poorly constructed subsequent accounts by 
many authors. 
Harper's task was to provide a basic account of the movements at the 
battle and the committee was chosen with this in mind. However, it was 
perhaps naively assumed to be purely a matter of cartography. Other 
evidence could conflict with that from navigational details and mistakes began 
to creep in. Equally important sources were gunnery ranges and signal logs, 
yet these were, in many cases, misinterpreted and under-used, had they been 
fully understandable to the members of the committee. The committee were 
not helped by the fact that evidence could not be checked in any way with 
personal recollections. On the committee, there sat the Director of 
Navigation, an ex-member of the Hydrographic department (Pollen), a 
navigation specialist (Frewen), one from the battlefleet (Pipon) and Chalmers 
(another). There was no signals or gunnery specialist to explain those sources. 
Had there been, some factual errors and assumptions might not have been 
made. 
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The compiler of the list of signals (Pollen) might not have been fully 
aware of signalling practices, but his task, and that of the committee, was not 
to question the nature and accuracy of the evidence before them, but simply 
to prepare an account from it. Flag signals in the list of messages, when 
hoisted, were often confused with being made executive and, even worse, 
turned into navigational times. Yet, it did not always follow that obedience to 
a signal was instantaneous, nor that the signal itself was instant. 
At 4: 48, the list of messages showed Lion making the signal to 
Barham to about turn. Curiously, this differed from the information in the 
text. Pollen almost certainly recorded it as the executive that the source 
showed, but the compiler of this fair signal log from Iron might well have 
deliberately confused the preparatory with the executive. Even the written 
account suggested this, but it must be wondered in what state were Lion's 
rough notes to have caused, or aided, this misunderstanding. The signals staff 
would know not to record the signal until it was hauled down and it was a 
simple three flags signal. However, there was enough uncertainty over the 
accuracy of the fair logs for this confusion to have arisen naturally and been 
recorded quite honestly, let alone with human assistance. It is possible that 
the signal was hoisted at the dip, but mistaken for having been fully hoisted 
by the individual who recorded it. If it was moved up or down slightly to 
ensure that other signals could be seen this might have been confused with 
the executive. During this time Lion was making many signals in only a few 
minutes and it must be remembered, that signalling speed and clarity were not 
Lion's strengths. The timing also depended upon the synchrony of whatever 
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watch or clocks were being used with the actual real time. 
One must conclude that Harper was content with obvious 
inconsistencies in the text and signals, or did not think the discrepancies 
significant. This meant that, with the sources long since unavailable to others, 
the committee misinterpreted them and these originals cannot now be 
checked with the evidence used to compiled the account. The only way to 
attempt to verify the accuracy of the times and movements given, is by using 
many other sources, but if the originals had been properly used, any 
weaknesses could be better identified. It is now impossible to know just how 
much is correct, but in some cases, accuracy can be improved. Of all the 
accounts the Harper committee had access to much of what was, by the 
mid-1920s, to be destroyed without being seen by anyone else. 
In light of later comments and accusations regarding Jutland, it might 
seem that to question the accuracy of such evidence as above, is merely a 
device to undermine what is known to be accurate, simply because it does not 
fit a preferred set of suppositions. The conclusions to be drawn from the 
evidence would always be disputed, given an individual's sympathies, but as 
the conclusions can only be accurately made on accurate evidence, the state 
of the evidence must be understood before any comment is made on it. The 
accuracy and authenticity of that evidence was not universally agreed upon. 
Debate upon this only added to the dispute. 
In April 1919, it was reported that Iron Duke's log could not be found 
and the matter was investigated by, amongst others, Jellicoe's secretary (H. H. 
Share) who felt that the log had been sent to Cyclops or Imperieuse (Depot 
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ships at Scapa) "for safe custody. " 11 If this was true, which is more than 
likely, it would seem that whoever was responsible for disposing of the log in 
the correct manner, knew that the recognised procedure was not being 
adhered to. 12 However, he might have had no idea what ultimately happened 
to it. The attention of the Royal Victoria Yard at Deptford was not drawn, as 
it should have been, to the fact that the log was on its way "and the absence 
of any such notification removes the possibility of the Log having been lost in 
transit". 13 So, it would seem that someone suspected that once the log left 
the care of Iron Duke, it might well fall into hands that could alter the 
contents maliciously to denigrate Jellicoe's performance. One must wonder 
what motivated the person responsible for the log take such steps. Do his 
actions mean that it was felt that the log would not be safe from interference 
in transit or at Deptford? 
Whilst the Harper committee was working, it came to the attention of 
the Board of Admiralty that: 
"the drawing up of a narrative of the Battle of 
Jutland from official documents is being much 
impeded owing to the fact that the Signal Log of 
the C-in-C's Flagship Iron Duke cannot be found, 
and that enquiries at Deptford, whither under 
King's Regulations it should have been sent, and 
at the Admiralty, had failed to trace it. As the log 
is an historical document of very great importance 
it was agreed that a formal Inquiry as to its 
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disappearance should be held at the Admiralty at 
which evidence can be taken from the various 
Officers of the Fleet whose duties brought them 
in any way in contact with the Signal Log. " 14 
Therefore, it would appear that the proper procedure was not being followed 
and that this was recognised as not being a trivial matter, or one based on 
groundless rumour. The log had gone missing in mysterious circumstances. 
Apart from being the important document stated, the disappearance did not 
seem to have caused undue alarm. As Admiral Montague Browning (Second 
Sea Lord) felt, its disappearance only hampered the compilation of basic 
facts. No other inference was drawn, nor did foul play seem to have been 
suspected at this time. When the subject of alterations to the `Record' came 
to light, this fact suggested that there was much more significance in the log's 
disappearance, not to mention what had, or might have, happened to other 
ships' logs. By 1919, it was evident that although the controversy had yet to 
become a raging public and service issue, there was suspicion that the log of 
the former Fleet Flagship might come to be tampered with. This might have 
led to caution regarding its disposal, but it was highly irregular to have 
behaved in this way with it. Such a step would scarcely have been taken 
without very good reason and this strongly suggests that, within the service, 
some seemed set about fixing the evidence. 
According to enquiries made regarding the log, Jellicoe and his staff 
stated that they knew nothing of the log's disposal. On 19th June 1919, the 
ACNS raised the issue again (probably at Harper's request) and concurred in 
94 
Oswyn Murray's proposal for a formal Inquiry. 15 Captain G. W. Vivian and 
Lt-Cdr E. L. B. Oliphant investigated and reported, on the 6th August, that the 
log had not been found. Admiral Madden was questioned about this, on the 
24th July, and replied that: 
"the boxes mentioned had been unpacked by the 
Staff of the late Commander-in-Chief [Beatty] and 
there was no record in Queen Elizabeth of what 
was in them. " 16 
This led to Cyclops, Imperieuse, Deptford and Rosyth Dockyards being 
searched. On the same day that Harper handed in the record, 2nd October, 
all Admiralty departments were ordered to conduct a search. All ended with 
the same negative result. 
On 13th November, Captain M. H. Hodges (Madden's COS) reported 
that the log had been found and sent to the Admiralty. Suggestion followed 
for an Inquiry being launched in connection with this seemingly miraculous 
recovery. This does not appear to have been carried out, but the Board 
minutes of 26th November noted that: 
"On 13th November, however, the reference to 
enquiry made last July and subsequent 
correspondence, enquiries had been made of 
certain members of the staff of the late 
Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet [both Beatty or 
Jellicoe could be meant], and after further search 
the Logs had been found on board HMS Queen 
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Elizabeth. The Board noted the reappearance of 
the Logs and directed that [Harper should be 
informed]. * 17 
Many questions, however, were raised that will almost certainly never be 
answered. It was difficult enough for the Board to divine that this much had 
happened and the extant memoranda are by no means comprehensive. From 
what there is there are two obvious explanations. The first search was either 
not thorough and the logs too well hidden, or that the search was thorough 
and the logs were not aboard the ship then, being subsequently replaced. The 
latter explanation is the most unlikely, but this was an unusual case. As 
Jcllicoc's staff professed to know nothing, there seemed to be a mysterious 
third party acting as Jcllicoe's protector. 
To further complicate matters, Harper noted that the log was used in 
the Communications Division concerning the Record of Messages and was 
subsequently sent to Quccn Elizabeth. Is It would appear that after the above 
searches, the log was returned whence it came, which only adds more 
confusion. Whatever exactly happened to the log is unclear for, under the 
Instructions for its handling, it had no business being anywhere except in 
Iron Duke or at I)cptford. It should never have been sent to the depot ship, 
let alone Quccn E/izabcth, but to return it there only compounded the 
procedural errors. Having the log returned to the ship now flying Admiral 
Madden's (now C-in-C GF) slag might have been a similar security measure, 
as was sending the log to the depot ship. however, someone must have 
known this to be in error and it is surprising to find that the Board did not 
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think the matter worth investigating further. There had been a blatant 
disregard of procedure and this is suggestive. 
One must always be wary of drawing inferences from an absence of 
evidence, but it appeared that the Board were not satisfied simply that the log 
had been found and used. However, they were dissuaded from pursuing the 
matter further. The orders for searches of ships and Admiralty Departments 
were made whilst Wemyss was First Sea Lord, but when the logs were 
reported as being found, Beatty had replaced him only thirteen days before 
and no more was heard of the matter by the Board. One can only guess as to 
the coincidence of this. 
Any matter out of the ordinary that concerns Jutland is worth looking 
at in depth and this incident with the logs is instructive. There are basically 
only two explanations that cover the apparent loss of the logs: negligence or 
deliberate actions. The former can be discounted on the grounds that it is 
extremely unlikely that all the different people who came into contact with 
the logs did not know what should have been done with them, surely at least 
one would have been aware that something was amiss. I laving the logs sent to 
the depot ships seems to be a pointless move, since one might just as well 
send them to Deptford according to procedure. What was most likely was 
that they went with t3catty and his staff from Iron Duke to Queen Elizabeth. 
In any event, they were acquired by Queen Elizabeth before 7th April 1919 
when Beatty hauled down his Union slag. The only other evidence for the 
logs comes from Commander A. R. W. Woods (Grand Fleet Signal Officer), 
who made a copy reported by the Board memoranda to be "inaccurate and 
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incomplete", but on whose authority this was based was not noted in the 
Board memoranda. 
In the later Staff Appreciation, it was noted that Iron Duke's log was: 
"written in ink and from an historical point of 
view bears all the signs of having been compiled 
subsequently to the battle from other signal 
logs.. . only two contemporary signal 
logs proper of 
Iron Duke have been seen... both omitting a 
number of important signals. " 19 
The work added that Iron Duke's was one of the most incomplete logs. The 
authors invited the conclusion that the former C-in-C and his staff (or both) 
attempted to fabricate evidence of the battle by hiding certain aspects of their 
conduct. However, the Dewars made no mention (because they did not know) 
of the logs having been missing, nor do they even appear to have been aware 
of how logs were kept. 20 Such ignorance of the state of evidence only 
hampered further works on the battle. 
When the `Record' had been completed, it contained an extract from 
Lion's log: 
"4: 55pm-Most of the records of the outgoing 
visual signals were lost and destroyed in the 
action. The records had been sent down to the 
Port Signal Station to be logged but, on account 
of bursting shells and smoke and fire, they got 
lost or damaged. " 21 
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It was highly convenient that the very signals apparently lost here were those 
that were subsequently most hotly debated - the log takes great pains to 
stress "outgoing visual signals" - but the Dewars, given their sympathies with 
Beatty, chose not to deal with this. Many years later, Admiral John Godfrey 
noted that Colonel Daniel (Secretary of the Historical Section of the CID): 
"finally told me that the only reliable written 
evidence was that of the signal boys who wrote up 
the signal+W/T logs as they were the only people 
who had no axe to grind and were therefore 
"unaligned". " 22 
This is highly doubtful. Why, of all those in the service the "signal boys" were 
immune from any allegiances, is too much to expect. If anything, they were 
the ones with most opportunity to access the logs. However, this comment is 
significant for suggesting that the signallers are unlikely to have been a party 
to tampering: the implication is that others might have been. 
Logs, however, were not the only evidence to be subject to doubtful 
influences. It was also noted in Board memoranda that "It is understood 
however that there are several [original] copies of the BCF plans in the 
private possession of officials at the Admiralty ... including the First Sea Lord" 
for which there was no excuse. Some might produce "for safe keeping" as a 
defence, but one cannot help thinking that there was something in these 
sources of perceived embarrassment at the very least, or that they were taken 
away to be altered to suit, to be removed from scrutiny to wait for interest to 
wane, or to be destroyed. When the Despatches were being prepared, Beatty 
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unsuccessfully attempted to switch Lion's chart to one he found more 
convenient. It must always be remembered that he remained very sensitive to 
his own role and that of the BCF at the battle, and that these were by no 
means the last attempts to tamper with the account. 
Many authors have assumed Harper to have been too sensitive where 
his role in the committee was mentioned and many others have followed this 
assumption blindly. He is exonerated from this charge by the above dealings 
and it is evident that the difficulties he faced regarding accuracy were not 
imaginary or insignificant. Commander Geoffrey Blake recalled that: 
"I am inclined to think that any lack of good 
feeling which existed among the junior officers 
was stirred up by Dreyer, Charles Forbes and 
myself, being sent down to Rosyth early on. We 
had to examine the plots of the Battle Cruisers 
and the (G) officers did not care for this. " 23 
So, it is evident that, even a few weeks after the battle, there was unease in 
BCF circles over the general outcome and what existing evidence showed. It 
has been seen (in Chapter 1) what the withheld evidence proved about the 
battle and given this, it was no wonder the (G) officers did not take too 
kindly to having the BCF examined so closely. Already, there was a clear 
understanding in the BCF of certain faults in the progress of the battle. Some 
of those within who would be seen to be responsible for aspects of the BCF's 
performance were subsequently as evasive and prohibitive as they could get 
away with being. Pressure from the Board, in 1919, had flushed out Iron 
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Duke's logs, but only because they were identified specifically as missing. 
Although there was good reason to suspect that these items were not the only 
victims, it was not widely suspected until later on. On the 2nd June 1916, 
Jellicoe had ordered all logs to be secured under lock and key, but some, plus 
other evidence, was bound to fall through the net. Although Harper 
encountered such difficulties with the evidence, not to mention the limitations 
imposed by Wemyss, and remembering that the work does have some flaws, 
his general conclusions were largely correct. However, this made some former 
BCF officers as uncomfortable in 1920 as they had been in 1916. 
After the manuscript was submitted, it was not long before Beatty 
(who became First Sea Lord on 1st November) had read it. During 
December 1919 Beatty held interviews with Harper and sent instructions via 
his additional secretary, former Flag-Lieutenant and devotee Commander 
Ralph Seymour, regarding alterations which Harper was to make to Beatty's 
satisfaction. It is often stated that the reason Beatty began to alter the work 
was that the series of events as portrayed by Harper was highly erroneous, 
especially concerning the BCF. The reason that Harper had initially been , 
instructed not to accept any oral testimonies was to prevent the very situation 
that arose. Every personal testimony was bound to differ even if true and 
could always have been tailored to suit any purpose. The account now began 
to deviate in the use of source material, to which Harper took exception and 
a brave stance in doing so. His name had been given to the House of 
Commons as the author of the `Record', so the contents would be seen as 
expressing his approval that Beatty's preferred version was a true account of 
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the action. Harper had to obey orders from his senior, but these contradicted 
the instructions under which he had begun the work. He objected to this with 
good reason. Harper's dilemma was either to have complete authority over 
the contents, or to have his name removed from any responsibility for them. 
Had the world not been aware that Harper was the author, he might have 
objected less strenuously to Beatty's interference, but he would still be 
associated within the service with the account. One must not ignore Harper's 
integrity. He had been given a specific job and intended to complete it 
according to the original instructions. However, he realised Beatty's motives 
- that moves were afoot to hoodwink the reader and public at 
large into 
believing Beatty's preferred version of Jutland - and was not prepared to be 
a party to endorsing what he saw as a fabrication. 
From the evidence then available at the Admiralty, Harper had 
compiled an account which was not as accurate as it might have been, but it 
did portray what had happened accurately enough. To be fair to Beatty, one 
must consider his point of view that: 
"These plans & diagrams when received by those 
who were present, were found to be in some 
instances entirely inaccurate and not in 
accordance with the facts as known to them, & 
subsequently were discarded, which caused 
Harper to be disgruntled... Further later 
information... not available to Harper showed that 
in many cases the deductions drawn by Harper 
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were inaccurate & misleading, & consequently it 
was considered premature to issue an Official 
Record until all the detailed information was 
available. " ' 
This seemed to suggest a departure from the original instructions regarding 
evidence. Beatty seemed to be judging the record submitted by Harper by 
much wider criteria than those indicated in Wemyss's original instructions. 
Harper had only used such British material as he had been given, so his 
account could only have been as good as this allowed. One must also 
remember that Wemyss was no longer First Sea Lord and Beatty was under 
no obligation at all to abide by Wemyss's decisions. In fact, it could be 
convincingly argued that when Beatty admitted personal information, albeit 
only that which he himself admitted, he had recognised that Wemyss's 
original instructions to Harper had been far too limiting. 
It has been written that under different conditions Beatty would have 
deplored such actions as he was now taking 25 and that: 
"The sad fact is that Beatty had emerged from the 
action tinged with heroism at the time, yet he 
subsequently found the verdict of historians going 
against him.. . Beatty, 
in the 1920's, must have 
been outraged at what looked like a conspiracy to 
denigrate what, in his opinion, was his finest naval 
hour. This sense of injustice and a real desire that 
the men in his ships should feel no reason for 
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shame made him react. " 26 
This is an accurate assessment of the situation as Beatty saw it. Although he 
might have felt that altering the `Record' was wrong in principle, in his 
opinion, issuing it as it stood would be a greater wrong to the BCF. This was 
his justification of his actions. That there was no reason for any shame to be 
felt was true, yet the public view of the success of the BCF at Jutland had, in 
truth, been based upon little more than wishful thinking. As will be seen, the 
new evidence from Germany and Britain was far from flattering about the 
role of the BCF and its performance. The realisation that a myth had been 
believed for three years would be the subject of much public disappointment. 
With three battlecruisers being lost with nearly all hands, the battle was a 
bitter blow. In the BCF's opinion, this was relieved somewhat by the fact that 
they had engaged enemy capital ships for longer than did the battlefleet later 
in the day. This was where the myth that the battlefleet played an 
insignificant part by comparison to the BCF began to be forcefully 
encouraged by Beatty and Seymour. The main thrust then became that the 
battlefleet failed the BCF's heroic efforts. For the purposes of what those 
within the BCF believed the whole picture mattered little. 
Soon after the battle it should have been made clear what exactly had 
been achieved, but, due to a lack of evidence, this absence of an accurate 
narrative allowed the suppositions made on the day to persist. The longer 
something is believed to be true, the longer it takes to disprove and the 
greater resistance it meets in doing this. 
Harper recalled from his own experience that: 
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"During the last of the interviews (18th December) I 
had with Commander Seymour he made the 
following remark in explanation for the reason of the 
proposed deletions: "We do not wish to advertise the 
fact that the Battle Fleet was in action more than we 
can help. " " 27 
One might assume that this statement was made solely because he 
experienced difficulties at this time and wished to cast slurs by way of 
revenge, but one must remember that this source was a sworn oath detailing 
Harper's involvement with Beatty, written a few years afterwards. Although 
the tone was far from complimentary to Beatty, this did not make it an 
unreliable account. In fact, examination of it shows it to be accurate in the 
main points it made. 
Seymour's comment fitted exactly with what it was hoped the 
alterations to the `Record' would do - minimise the role of the battlefleet 
and endorse the belief that the battlecruisers alone had repelled the Germans 
so effectively that by the time the battlefleet arrived on the scene the action 
was all but over. Although there were chances for a major victory after 6pm, 
they proved inconclusive for many reasons. Harper's account stated this as 
the narrative developed, but Beatty wanted the account to be written from 
the stance that the most dramatic and spectacular action - involving the 
BCF - must be the most important aspect. He found it hard to come to 
terms with the fact that he was being proved wrong in his beliefs. Since 1916, 
the BCF believed that they were the sole heroes of that day. Beatty sought to 
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perpetuate this in the histories. Harper was threatening this view. 
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One of the most contentious issues that arose in the early stages of the 
controversy, was that concerning the actions of the battlecruisers a little 
before 7pm on the day of the action. Harper's `Record' noted that, at 6: 53: 
"a turn was made in succession to starboard 
through a complete circle and speed reduced to 
18 knots to keep station on the Battle Fleet. " 28 
Beatty replied that such a turn was never made, despite evidence to the 
contrary from his former Flag-Captain, his navigator, Harper's staff and 
others who later explored the incident. That the turn was made as told by 
Harper is undoubted. Yet, it must have seemed very odd to many that Beatty 
should have denied the evidence and the experiences of those present in the 
BCF who knew that such a turn had been made. The incriminating statement 
from Beatty was made in response to Harper requesting, with the help of 
Brock and Chatfield, oral evidence to aid in substituting Lion's original track 
(which showed the 360° turn) and it gave away Beatty's intentions that: 
"All the evidence in the world will not alter the 
FACT that we did not turn 32 points to 
starboard... The object was to turn 8 points to see 
what the Battle Fleet were doing. " 29 
This committed to paper Beatty's intentions that wherever the facts were 
unpalatable, his will would become evidence of a far more genuine nature. 
The sad fact was that all the evidence in the world was not required to prove 
the turn, but it was selectively chosen to create a particular image that did not 
destroy the myth of the battlecruisers at Jutland. 
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The tracing with which Beatty eventually concurred, showed Lion 
turning through an "S", but Indomitable and Inflexible turn through a 
complete circle (see diagram #16). 30 In attempting to alter the evidence, 
Beatty ignored its impact upon the rest of the work. By concentrating solely 
upon his ship to ensure that he should not be criticised, he ignored the 
movements of other ships. His attempts here only complicated the picture of 
how the BCF turned at this time. Beatty thought that he had exonerated 
himself, but remained unaware of the evidence that remained to confirm his 
guilt. The unpublished `Record' stated that this revised track was uncertain as 
evidence was conflicting. It was not, it only conflicted with what Beatty 
wanted to believe. The significance, if any, of this is that at the time the 
battlecruisers were out of sight of the battlefleet and they did not see the 
enemy. The BCF, therefore, must have been out of the action. The horror 
that this should be discovered motivated Beatty's editing. 
Harper later suggested an explanation for Beatty's actions: 
"An element of mystery has always been made 
about this turn, though why the battle-cruisers 
should not turn through 360°, if so desired, is not 
clear. They were not in action. No possible danger 
of any collision would be involved... [and in order 
to gain touch with the main fleet] what more 
natural, therefore, than to turn, and having turned 
nearly 180° before realising that there was no 
necessity to continue any further to the 
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Northward, to resume the original 
course... through 360°. This matter is not one 
which can be swept aside as of no importance, if 
accuracy in plotting the ships's tracks is 
required. " 31 
This illustrated that the battlecruisers were not so close to the action as 
Beatty would have had others believe. This showed Beatty's intentions with 
regard to the work. For Beatty to deliberately try to obscure an event about 
which evidence was unusually clear, was to be wondered at, especially when 
so much about the battle was unclear. By now, Harper clearly knew Beatty's 
intentions and Beatty knew that Harper realised this. A trial of stubbornness 
ensued. 
There is no doubt that Beatty wanted to have an account faithful to his 
recollections, but he sought this in a way which ultimately proved fruitless. It 
was significant that Jellicoe had used his time since his dismissal as First Sea 
Lord, in December 1917, to compose an account of his time with the Grand 
Fleet. However, Beatty was in no position to write his own account and 
suspected that he and the BCF might not gain the prominence that he felt 
was justified if accounts that implicitly or overtly favoured the battlefleet were 
issued. Jellicoe might, for all Beatty knew in 1919, neglect the role of the 
BCF. That Beatty should want the true story told was natural, yet this was not 
dependent upon anyone's point of view and sympathies. What had happened 
had happened, regardless of what one felt or supposed had occurred. The 
truth, as evidence was coming to light, was that others were aware that the 
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battlecruisers had not performed as well as they had supposed and that the 
battlefleet did have a significant, if intermittent, effect upon the enemy. As 
Beatty had no means of safe expression to the public, to ensure that Harper's 
account told the story according to his view was within his means and would 
have to suffice. 
The fact was that the truth to Beatty and that as dictated by the 
evidence were, in some places, different things entirely. His view throughout 
was largely conditioned by his experiences aboard Lion, which at best were 
limited. He also failed to accept that there were factors in the battle of which 
he could not have been aware at the time, nor could anyone have expected 
this of him. From his point of view after the war evidence was emerging that, 
as it did not square with his recollections, must be incorrect. So, he sought to 
change the official `Record' according to his views. 
The obvious sense of disappointment that was felt in the BCF was ably 
explained by Walter Cowan (Captain of Princess Royal), who noted that 
approaching 6pm on the day of the battle: 
"the advanced screen of the Grand Fleet hove in 
sight and... we felt like throwing our caps in the 
air, it looked a certainty we had them... [the 
Germans were] confronted by our splendid fresh 
and preponderant Battle Fleet all wild for blood 
after nearly two years of monotonous waiting. " 32 
This at least hinted at the fact that not all in the BCF were unaware of the 
tactical significance of the arrival of the battlefleet. From this, it is evident 
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that expectations were great, but a little later: 
"It was a disappointment for us in the Battle 
Cruisers. We had found the enemy, fought them 
and led them up into the jaws of our main 
Fleet. " 33 
This, coupled with heavy losses, did not leave pleasant memories. A similar 
view was expressed by Lt. William Tennant (of Nottingham), but which 
explained in a little more detail the feelings of the time. He noted that, at 
3: 50, "[we] could not help wondering where were the 5th Battle Sq. where 
was the C-in-C +the Grand Fleet. " 34 This was a sentiment shared by others 
and it cannot have been too comforting to realise that the battlecruisers and 
supporting forces were going into battle without the support of the 5thBS or 
GF that they had expected to have. Following the destruction of 
Indefatigable, Tennant noted that "the German from what we could see had 
had it all his own way" but soon after the SthBS came into the action and 
were the four ships "that saved the day. " 35 It should be remembered, when 
examining the shooting of the 5thBS and BCF, the impression and effects 
that their respective firing made upon the enemy at the time. The Germans 
were not complimentary about BCF gunnery. 
From 4: 30, it was evident that the situation for the BCF was becoming 
desperate and this did not escape the eyes of those present, but soon after: 
"our joy was great when we heard that he 
[Jellicoe] was coming down to the eastward of the 
Germans+so getting the "light. " " 36 
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This echoed the sentiments noted by Cowan, that whatever had happened 
initially expectations were great for when the battlefleet would appear. These 
expectations were, of course, dashed and coupled with the news of the losses 
of the battlecruisers, cruisers and destroyers: 
"This was not very cheering and particularly for us 
who had been in that part of the action where the 
losses had been heaviest. " 37 
This doubtless contributed to the feeling that the battle had been mishandled 
by the BF after a good initial BCF performance. It was one which many 
shared and which came to summarise the argument over the action. To have 
been deflated after having such high expectations left scars for many, but 
Beatty only made matters worse when he insisted upon alterations to the 
`Record'. Instead of making events seem more favourable and less painful - 
which was his intention - his requests were met with evidence that proved 
his view of the battle, and his role in it, were erroneous. Despite this, he 
fought fiercely to deny it. 
As Beatty seemed intent upon emphasising the facts of his personal 
experiences at the battle, he would have to diminish the role played by other 
forces to maintain any coherence in the `Record'. A significant point arose 
when he questioned the necessity of it being recorded that: 
"As Hercules started to turn into line of battle she 
was straddled... The enemy's shell were also 
falling close to Vanguard and Revenge. " 38 
Harper, Jellicoe and Long all insisted that the correct impression was given 
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that parts of the battlefleet were within enemy range, which Beatty was loath 
to accept, as it was firm evidence that the battlefleet were in a position to 
play a part. Long told Beatty that "straddled" gave the correct impression to 
the general reader as well as the seaman. Beatty then made the telling 
remark " "If Jellicoe writes books I do not see why I should not do so. " " 39 In 
doing so, he betrayed his real intentions. As previously stated, he wanted an 
account that reflected his views and was frustrated at the fact that none could 
be produced, so he had to alter Harper's account or do nothing. He wrongly 
assumed that unless he did something to alter this account, then the role of 
the BCF would be forgotten. Perhaps this was his way of justifying his actions 
to himself. 
His notes on the `Record' relating to this incident of salvoes and the 
battlefleet in action stated that "it ill becomes the Admiralty to holster up 
what is already a shattered illusion". 40 This was the irony of the affair. The 
illusion was not the fact that the battlefleet was in action, but that the 
battlecruisers alone had repulsed the German attack. It would seem that 
Beatty was in a minority in believing this, for even Cowan evidenced a better 
appreciation of the situation although he, like many others, was just as 
disappointed as was Beatty. Beatty's friends and colleagues almost certainly 
knew that he was wrong to believe that all the faults lay with the BF, but 
Beatty acted as if fixing the account to suit himself would make the BCF's 
disappointment vanish. However, he could have known all too well that 
doctoring the official account was a much better way of stating his case. By its 
very nature, many readers would assume that it was an unbiased, 
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unimpassioned, factual account of what happened, making it hard to dispute. 
So, if any criticism was made of himself or his battlecruisers, then Beatty 
could claim that the official record was not likely to lie. This was more 
convincing than having his own account, under his own name, which people 
would realise was limited ultimately to his opinion. Thus, he could well and 
truly claim that he had right on his side. Although he never published his own 
account, he attempted, with some success, to press his views through Bellairs, 
the Dewar brothers, the Admiralty Narrative and tried, but failed, to alter 
significantly the account of Sir Julian Corbett. 
When the subject of Beatty's proposed alterations came to the 
attention of the First Lord, Walter Long, he ordered Beatty to cancel his 
orders to Harper. This was done on 11th March 1920 and it then looked as if 
printing would soon begin, but Beatty was not prepared to give up a fight that 
was almost a lone battle. On 26th May, Harper received a list of alterations 
similar to those that he had initially been told to make and an impasse was 
again reached. 41 It was agreed by the Board that proposals would be invited 
from the Sea Lords as a basis for discussion, to which Harper would have the 
opportunity to respond, with a decision then being reached. A meeting was 
held on 21st June, with the Sea Lords, Brock, Chatfield, Long and Harper 
present in an attempt to finalise the account. Remarks from Chatfield 
(ACNS) centre around the fact that the account "reads rather, as a record of 
disasters and misfortunes", 42 and was based upon British evidence, which was 
not flattering. Brock (DCNS) ventured a little further, in that the impression 
was given that a great battle had occurred with the enemy having the 
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advantage, to which he disagreed. 43 He added that the German retreat was 
not stated with the emphasis that many felt it deserved. However, this would 
have meant emphasising the role of the BF, which Beatty did not want. In 
Brock's opinion, it would have to suffice that: 
"if we are bound to issue an official account, this 
account.. . must be published, but I feel that it will 
do the Navy no good ... On the whole I think it 
best to say nothing. " 44 
Brock and Chatfield, both having been present in the BCF, might have been 
expected to follow the line set by Beatty, but their comments related to the 
work as an account of the battle as a whole and they made valid historical 
points. Nowhere was there a hint of the type of comments from Beatty that 
the battlefleet was not really involved, or that they felt that the role of the 
BCF appeared to be under-played. There was no reference to the fact that 
the 32 point turn did not occur, nor any attempt to suggest that the role of 
the BCF be enhanced. 
This suggested that both were mainly in agreement with what Harper 
had written and were not so much criticising his work, but the limited nature 
of the evidence used and what this showed. So, it was more the suitability of 
issuing any half-baked account which they questioned. There are in these 
comments no hints that Beatty might have asked the two to support his 
opinions and alterations - if he did they refused - or that he tried to 
build-up support to have his way. In fact, Brock's statement that it was best to 
say nothing could not have been further from what Beatty would have hoped. 
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It was realised by some that any account issued when the battle was a living 
controversial issue would not reduce controversy, however impartial it was. 
The whole subject of the alterations was a personal crusade of Beatty's to 
impose his opinion in response to imagined or anticipated criticisms of his 
conduct at Jutland. He obviously suspected that his image as a righter could 
be undermined and that he could then have been accused of fostering an 
image that he knew was erroneous, thus finding himself in an embarrassing 
situation at the very least. 
At the above mentioned meeting of Harper and the Sea Lords, the 
subject of including a foreword to the work arose. The meaning of this, 
Harper was led to believe, was to "remove the incorrect impression which 
might be caused by the predominance of British evidence. " 45 There was 
nothing wrong in attempting to point out this fact to the general reader, but it 
became another means by which Beatty tried to bias the record in his favour. 
Harper had drafted three such potential introductions: 
"on the lines believed to be desired, one of which 
the Board may desire to insert in the official 
record. " 
1. "some time before the advanced forces under 
Sir David Beatty were reinforced by our 
Battlefleet, the enemy became so demoralised 
that, on meeting our Battlefleet, every opportunity 
was taken to avoid action. " 
2. "[the enemy were] demoralised before meeting 
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our Battlefleet, and after this meeting, the enemy 
assisted by poor visibility, succeeded in avoiding a 
great battle. The small amount of firing which 
took place between the opposing Battlefleets 
being sufficient to cause the enemy to return. " 
3. "if the enemy had realised the proximity of our 
Battlefleet, the return to harbour would have 
been made before. " 46 
These extracts did not show that a wrong impression might be given by the 
preponderance of British evidence, but sought to lead the reader into 
believing that when the main battlefleets met the most significant action was 
over. The first two paragraphs gave the general impression that the meeting 
of the main fleets was brief in comparison to the battlecruiser action earlier 
in the day. Underlying this was the implication that the battlefleet played little 
part in the action, which was what Beatty always maintained. This was 
probably what Harper meant when he mentioned their being "on the lines 
believed to be desired" i. e. to suit Beatty. 
Underlying each piece, prominent in the third, was the fact that a 
small amount of fire from the battleships was sufficient to cause the enemy to 
seek to avoid action, whereas for over two hours the Germans seem to have 
relished the prospect of engaging Beatty's force and were not discouraged 
from pursuing the action. What Beatty seemingly did not consider was that 
the enemy believed that they had achieved their objective of bringing an 
inferior force to action with no support from the Grand Fleet. This was the 
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decisive point. These pieces, then, were not suitable to Beatty and something 
more favourable to the battlecruisers was required. 
The piece that was decided upon was proposed by Beatty. It began 
that the battlecruisers and their supporting forces were greatly inferior in 
numbers by comparison to the enemy and that: 
"On learning of the approach of the British main 
Fleet the Germans avoided further action and 
returned to base - The enemy has acknowledged 
that the 1st Scouting Group was unfit for further 
action on the 1st June, as a result of the Battle 
Cruiser action, whereas the efficiency of the 
British ships to which they had been opposed was 
not seriously impaired. " 47 
These were the most contentious statements, largely because they were 
factually inaccurate. The general impression was more suited to how Beatty 
wanted it to be. Even in proposing his own piece, the fallacies of Beatty's 
beliefs can, be seen. It was being confronted by the Grand Fleet that led the 
enemy to avoid action, not learning of the approach. Had this been known, 
they would almost certainly have retired sooner and more easily. 
The second draft paragraph was designed to give the impression that 
the battlecruisers alone, without the 5thBS, had successfully engaged and 
destroyed the opposition. The truth was that the 1stSG was heavily hit by 
battleships and battlecruisers as the battle progressed. Any false statements 
could be detected by those that made a point of examining the text, but 
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reading it without much prior knowledge, or with little persistence, would 
lead one to share Beatty's views regarding what had happened. The fact, then, 
was that any comments that invited the reader to form an opinion as suited 
Beatty, would be incorrect if the evidence itself did not wholly endorse his 
opinion. If the account had carried such a foreword and omitted most of the 
deletions which Beatty tried to make, then the introduction would contradict 
the information in the text. The account, from Beatty's point of view, needed 
to be altered to suit. Any introduction that was inserted would have to 
obviate any doubt that might arise regarding what the evidence really showed. 
Above all else, Beatty wanted the introduction to be a summary of his views 
to prepare the reader to accept them throughout the text. 
The subject of including a foreword had been first suggested in 
February 1920, and Seymour drafted such a piece. He stated that, as 
members of the Board took part in the battle, it would be "unseemly" for 
them to give an opinion of the actions of other officers, their seniors and 
opponents. 48 This was ironic. Had this been included and the account 
published, the impression would be that there had been due restraint from 
making any personal observations. However, it did not mention the fact that 
the account could have been subject to interference before publication. Thus, 
it could express opinions from beginning to end because it had been tailored 
to suit, but these would be less overt. 
Another half-truth was told when it was mentioned that: 
"At no time has the policy of the Admiralty been 
to conceal the facts of this battle from the British 
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public. " 49 
This was erroneous, but, in the minds of some, what was "fact" was that idea 
of the battle that existed only in their own minds, regardless of any evidence 
to the contrary. Beatty's actions essentially centred upon whether or not he 
was genuinely convinced of what he believed had really happened and saw it 
as his duty to prevent the wrong picture being given to the public, or that he 
knew that he was not completely correct and deliberately pursued a course of 
action to suit his own ideas of how the battle should have proceeded. 
A familiar theme emerged in this foreword, as it had in meetings 
between Harper and Beatty - the role played by the battlefleet. Seymour 
went further than the pieces suggested by Harper and Beatty later on in the 
year. He did not leave to doubt that of an engagement between battlefleets: 
"There was no such engagement. From the 
evidence of... Scheer's report it is established that 
the German Battle Fleet never saw the British 
Main Fleet, and neither fired their guns or 
torpedoes at it. From the evidence of the British 
Main Fleet it is established that a small number 
of rounds were fired from the main armament of 
certain ships, at what were then thought to be 
ships of the enemy's battle fleet... the majority of 
these rounds were actually fired at enemy light 
Cruisers. " 50 
This stated as obviously as possible what some felt to be the case. That the 
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Germans never saw the British battletleet can be taken in more than one way. 
There was no doubt that gun flashes from a wide arc could be seen by enemy 
battlecruisers and battleships, and that they concluded from the fall of shot 
that this could only mean that the Grand Fleet was more or less in front of 
them. If Seymour expected the reader to believe that not seeing the Grand 
Fleet meant that the Germans were unaware that it was present, this was 
untrue. The battlefleet did fire at, and hit, enemy battleships and 
battlecruisers when they could be seen. Although sightings were intermittent 
and brief there was little doubt that this made the enemy attempt to use the 
poor weather conditions to help effect an escape. That no ships of the High 
Seas Fleet fired at the British battlefleet is really neither here nor there, but 
by comparison to the battlecruisers, who had been hit much more often, some 
assumed that this meant that the battlefleet played little or no part. Later, the 
BCF were intent on proving it in spite of evidence to the contrary. 
The claim that the majority of rounds fired were at light cruisers had a 
little more to support it. They and the First Scouting Group were in the van, 
so that they should have received most hits in poor visibility was not 
surprising. Approximately twice as many of the British battleships noted that 
they felt they were engaging "battlecruisers", than those that reported they 
were engaging "battleships". 51 There was little doubt that a perusal of the 
evidence proved that the battlefleet was engaged. Beatty and Seymour 
privately knew it, but publicly disagreed. So, the only solution that remained 
was to question the accuracy of the evidence, or, more correctly, to contradict 
it when it could not be proved erroneous. 
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Beatty had noted that the title "General Fleet Action" in Harper's 
account was misleading, as such had not occurred. As was typical of events, 
he made the claim based upon his opinion and Harper replied with evidence 
that: 
"during the time (6: 15pm to 7.25pm) dealt with 
under this heading every squadron [sic] was 
taking more or less active part in engaging the 
enemy ... This was the only period during 31st May 
that all squadrons were engaged. " 52 
This was obviously contrary to what Beatty wanted to believe. In conjunction 
with this, Beatty also suggested that the list of ranges and times of opening 
fire be omitted, as they "are very misleading and of no apparent value". 53 
Harper rightly disagreed with this. Their value was in proving that the 
battlefleet was engaged and the extent of that involvement in the battle. It 
must be wondered in what way they were misleading, unless one did not wish 
to give credit where it was due. 
Beatty's disagreement with the time span of the "General Fleet Action" 
depended upon interpretation. From tables prepared by the Harper 
committee Marlborough opened fire at 6: 17, but it was not until 7: 17 that 
King George V- in the van, further away from the action - opened fire. 
Harper's title covered this period, but Beatty, with justification, noted that the 
battleships engaged the enemy, essentially in two short spells and not all 
simultaneously. Harper's title gave the impression that fire was opened and 
general between these times quoted. This was certainly disputable. Seymour's 
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foreword continued to be more biased and erroneous as it progressed, with 
perhaps the worst statement being that: 
"Whilst maintaining contact the action of the 
British advanced forces, according to the 
testimony of the German Commander-in-Chief, 
was such as to render those vessels of the enemy 
with which they were engaged incapable of further 
fighting, and to produce such an impression 
throughout the remainder of the enemy's fleet 
[that the reported presence of the Grand Fleet 
was sufficient to make the enemy return to 
base]. " 54 
This was far from being the truth. 
A common feature regarding how the battlecruiser action was written, 
was that the 5thBS was selectively mentioned, if at all, and its effect upon the 
battle was often attributed to the battlecruisers. That the 1stSG was incapable 
of further fighting as a result of the battlecruiser action was a fallacy. It was 
surprising that such a claim could have been expected to be believed by 
anyone who had read the `Record'. Far from being perturbed by the effect of 
the fire of the British advanced forces, the Germans pursued what they 
believed was an unsupported force, but this fact was not mentioned. The 
conclusion must be that the alleged effectiveness of the advanced forces 
generally was a fallacy. It was obviously counter to the interests of those 
making a case for the BCF to mention evidence that might contradict the 
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statements being made. 
Beatty did not seem to have been perturbed by the obvious 
unsuitability of these proposed forewords and sought other ways in which to 
lead the reader to certain conclusions. On 9th August, the official historian, 
Sir Julian Corbett, received a telegram from Beatty regarding "important 
matters. " Three days later, they met to discuss a proposed foreword. Beatty 
wanted it to: 
"explain how good our gunnery was... [and failed 
only because of] bad shell against good 
armour-mean to get out of doing it if I can. " 55 
The following day, Corbett told Brock that his publishers (Longmans) would 
object to his writing this foreword. However, he was less willing to refuse a 
more tempting offer regarding the history of Jutland made soon afterwards 
(in Chapter 3). What was also clear, was that Beatty was determined to have 
BCF gunnery officially vindicated and still saw the problem solely as one of 
poor British shells being resisted by strong German armour. Despite all these 
efforts, no foreword was issued and another scheme had failed to produce 
the desired result for Beatty. 
From German evidence, it was the fire of the 5thBS and battleships 
that was more impressive and effective, not that of the BCF. In July 1916, 
Hipper wrote to Scheer that: 
"The fire of the English battle-cruisers has not 
caused to our battle-cruisers damage of 
considerable gravity. Since the fall of shot was 
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rarely in close proximity to our own ships it is not 
possible to judge very accurately as to the "spread" 
of the shot.. . the fire of the Malaya battleships 
(5th BS) and equally later on, that of the bulk of 
the enemy, produced an excellent impression. The 
salvoes arrived absolutely dense (with no 
spread). " 56 
This was contrary to what both Seymour and Beatty were trying to insert into 
the `Record'. They could no longer maintain that an absence of German 
evidence made the account incomplete and inaccurate. That evidence only 
confirmed generally what Harper had written. Beatty and others had 
recognised that an account based purely on British evidence was limited and 
pursued this partly as an excuse to delay issue of the `Record' and alter the 
contents. When evidence was forthcoming from Germany, it was obviously 
hoped that it would prove that Harper had not been able to give an accurate 
account. This at least would have been an excuse to alter it. As it was, 
although the Harper committee did not produce as accurate a piece of work 
as they might have done, they had worked under restrictive conditions and 
their basic assertions were correct. 
Had Harper been obliged to use German evidence, the picture would 
have looked much less favourable to Beatty and the BCF. So, it would seem 
to have been wisest to have issued the `Record' as quickly as possible after 
October 1919, or not to have issued it at all. In waiting for some evidence 
which he hoped would contradict Harper, Beatty drew attention to his 
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interference whilst no good came to him from doing it. In fact, this further 
weakened his case. In the face of such evidence, Beatty's actions are not 
easily excused or explained away. Had he conceded that he had been wrong, 
then he could at least have claimed that he had been looking for the truth 
and now accepted that it had not been as he had supposed. 
If the shooting of the battlecruisers during the run to the south is 
discussed, it is worth bearing in mind the action as seen from the German 
perspective. The German official history noted that: 
"From Lützow it appeared about this time [4: 06/7] 
as if the British flagship hauled out of the 
line... she seemed to disappear behind other 
vessels in a thick pall of smoke.. . At times the 
enemy's fire ceased altogether and tactical 
cohesion of the British line appeared to be 
seriously shaken. " 57 
At this time the destroyer Landrail reported a periscope on the disengaged 
side, whilst the light cruiser Nottingham made similar reports. One can 
dismiss the supposition that this quote might just be the Germans boasting of 
how they disarranged their opponents. At the time the Harper `Record' was 
being debated, it was commonly thought that the battlecruiser action was one 
where both sides fought along more or less parallel lines. However, the 
addition of German evidence, far from proving Harper wrong, as Beatty had 
hoped, showed that the `Record' did not go far enough. 
One cannot criticise too much the actions of ships suffering from the 
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effects of fire in action, but the actions of individuals in later years to suggest 
that the action was a running fight where the firing was continuous and the 
line unbroken, were suspect. Much of this was doubtless caused by the fact 
that some did not want it known that in the initial phase of the battle the 
BCF were much more seriously effected than they cared to admit. German 
evidence supported Harper's case, endorsing Lion's movements as seen in 
Chapter 1, much more than it did Beatty's. 
On 20th July, a meeting took place at which Harper, Chatfield, 
Algernon Boyle (4th Sea Lord and Captain of Malaya at Jutland) and 
Spickernell were present to further discuss the contents of the `Record'. No 
evidence was produced to prove Harper wrong in what he had written: 
"except oral evidence from the Assistant Chief of 
the Naval Staff and Fourth Sea Lord, which 
depended on memory ... the Assistant Chief of the 
Naval Staff produced a written memo, from the 
First Sea Lord, instructing him what decisions 
were to be arrived at. This did not, however, 
influence the other members. " 58 
In general, this seemed to indicate that Beatty was not strongly supported in 
his actions. It was agreed that the 32 point turn was made, but Chatfield, 
more from duty than allegiance to Beatty, felt bound to obey. Whatever were 
the relations between Beatty and the others present, they do not seem to 
have been so deep as to mean that others would have willingly countenanced 
such actions as Beatty was taking. The implication was that if Chatfield had 
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not been ordered in this case, then he too would not have supported Beatty. 
It was probable that Beatty was becoming increasingly aware of just how 
unsupported he was, but it would seem that this encouraged him even more 
to fix the account. As Chatfield's view of the action differed from Beatty's, it 
further weakened Beatty's case as the two were in almost the same position 
at the battle. If Chatfield had to be ordered to reach certain conclusions, he 
was probably unwilling to countenance lies, or Beatty was making sure that in 
his absence from this meeting his will would prevail and Chatfield was just 
the messenger. Even so, it seemed that Beatty felt that he could not rely 
upon the Sea Lords endorsing his view, much as he would have liked them to 
have done. 
Although Chatfield agreed with Harper's general conclusions regarding 
the battle, he took a stubborn stance akin to Beatty's when BCF gunnery was 
questioned. The Director of the Gunnery Division was Dreyer, Jellicoe's 
former Flag-Captain, and Chatfield refused to accept gunnery evidence 
because of this fact. 59 It did seem that it was one thing to agree with 
documents in general, but another where the actions and abilities of an 
individual might come into question. Chatfield agreed with the general facts 
of the battle, but the battlecruisers' standards of gunnery were ultimately seen 
to be his responsibility, just as the actions of the BCF as a whole were that of 
Beatty. The gunnery records did not support the views of Beatty, Brock and 
Chatfield as to the relative positions and effectiveness of the battlefleet and 
battlecruisers. Beatty then chose to disregard the gunnery records, an action 
that was: 
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"typical of the policy followed throughout all the 
meetings. Oral evidence.. . was expected to be 
accepted from the First Sea Lord... but 
documentary evidence from the 
Commander-in-Chief or the Battleships was 
objected to. " 60 
With this, it was becoming evident that it would be almost impossible to 
arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. 
On 22nd September, Oswyn Murray (Secretary of the Admiralty) told 
Harper that the First Lord had suggested that publication should not go 
ahead. This found favour with all the Sea Lords except Beatty. He suggested 
that the original despatches, charts and signals be published. 61 On 27th 
October, the House was informed that the Admiralty would not publish the 
account and that it was to be handed to Corbett. On 21st June 1921, Corbett 
noted that "Harper came to leave with me all his papers re. Beatty's efforts to 
cook the Jutland [account]+the Sea Lord's comments". 62 A few months later 
the Dewar brothers also received a copy. The Despatches were later issued. 
They did little to clarify what had happened and largely only confused the 
majority of readers. Various letters to newspapers and questions in the House 
produced conflicting replies and did nothing to clarify the situation as to 
when, or if, Harper's `Record' would be published. 63 If it were to be 
published, then discrepancies between some charts and evidence in the 
Despatches as compared to the evidence in Harper's `Record' would have 
been evident, a fact which worried Harper further. 
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It was decided by Beatty, Chatfield and the new First Lord (Lee) that 
the charts would not carry the author's name if published, despite Harper's 
protests that the work was associated with him personally even though it was 
officially an Admiralty account. It would seem that despite a year of 
protesting the accuracy of his work, Harper was no nearer seeing the truth 
told, or, if an altered account was issued, in proving that he was not 
responsible for any alterations. As it turned out, handing the account to 
Corbett had extricated the Admiralty from a difficult situation that would 
never have been resolved to universal satisfaction. 
To some, the non-appearance of the `Record' naturally suggested that 
it had been shelved because it either contained excessively critical comments, 
or that it told unpalatable truths to those at the Admiralty that could affect its 
composition and issue. In truth, although Beatty had attempted to alter it to 
suit his limited view, he gave Harper and others the opportunity to state their 
cases and objections. It is true that this was the case when his actions came to 
the attention of Long, but even so, he seemed to realise that it was more 
satisfactory to reach a compromise with Harper and obtain general Board 
agreement, if only to portray an image to others that all agreed in general 
what had happened at the battle. A compromise might have succeeded had 
Beatty moderated his requirements, 64 but to have done this would, in his 
opinion, have been as ineffectual as if he had done nothing all along. 
Beatty had tried to have information relating to his role in the battle 
omitted or altered where it showed him in anything less than a competent 
light. It had been shown that Beatty had not performed as well as he wished 
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others to believe. Yet, he evidently felt that if others saw how he had actually 
acted and how this differed with what he led many to think that he had done, 
then he would be in some way discredited. It is a strong person who can 
endure any criticism willingly. Beatty was in a position where he could easily 
question the work and raise objections, but even as First Sea Lord this course 
was plagued with difficulties. He evidently did not expect that Harper would 
have put up so much resistance. 
More than a year fighting the head of the service cannot have been 
easy and Harper noted in 1920 that he was "full of Beatty's bullying 
attitude". 65Both men, however, acted in a similarly stubborn manner. Harper 
was as convinced of his case just as much as was Beatty and each obviously 
felt the other to be rather obstinate. Harper was more accurate in his 
conclusions, which Beatty probably suspected. Beatty seemed to think that 
continually making demands would eventually weaken Harper's resolve. It was 
evident that Beatty could not do whatever he pleased and could not 
necessarily coerce others into doing as he wished by virtue of his rank and 
office. 
He might have been the head of the service, but the Navy was not 
Beatty's personal possession. Beatty might well have wondered just what he 
had to do to tell his side of the story. The situation ultimately resulted in 
there being little room for manoeuvre for either himself or Harper. For 
either to have conceded to the other would have made a nonsense of the 
proceedings since late 1919. It doubtless came as a relief to both parties that 
the matter was now over. 
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In the 1960s, Professor Marder wrote to the second Earl Beatty that: 
"I happen to know that Harper began his work 
with a pro-Jellicoe bias and an anti-Beatty bias. " 66 
If true, this contradicts common understanding of the dispute over the 
`Record'. In another letter, Marder remarked that Pipon, who had been on 
Harper's committee, "could if he wanted to tell you a thing or three about 
Harper's outlook vis-ä-vis D. B. & J. R. J. " 67 This suggested that Beatty did 
have genuine reason to take issue with Harper over what he had written. The 
implication was that Harper had all along been intent upon biasing the 
account in Jellicoe's favour. Having said this, there was very little to which 
Beatty could have taken genuine exception and it is worth bearing in mind 
that Beatty might have been aware of Harper's views as suggested by Pipon. 
If this was so, before he read the account for the first time, Beatty could have 
been alerted to look for defects and areas of bias, if not to expect them. 
Regardless of this, he soon found much to disagree with. 
That the battle did not proceed as was felt it should have done was a 
widely held opinion, but many did not criticise others' actions publicly as no 
actual good could have come from it. When Beatty began to suggest that he 
was the hero of the day at the expense of others' reputations, those who were 
slighted, such as Jellicoe, Evan-Thomas and other BF officers, naturally 
resented the fact that Beatty had taken advantage of their silence. Beatty also 
criticised Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, who, when leading the BF from 
7pm, did not, in Beatty's opinion, evidence sufficient initiative. Cowan noted 
that: 
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"What we were hoping for was for one of their 
[BF's] Divisions of 8, to tail in astern of us, just to 
give a bit more weight of gunfire. " 68 
Drax echoed this in his paper Lessons from the Battle of 31st May 1916: 
"the van Divisions should steam at high speed so 
as to assist the Battle-Cruisers in enveloping the 
enemy's flank. " 
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This helped explain the resentment felt by the BCF that the BF had failed to 
fully support their efforts in seeking the enemy (see diagram #15). 
Subsequently, Jerram was distinctly out of favour with Beatty. A little after 
Jutland, a concert was held on board King George V: 
"and Beatty markedly cut Jerram dead.. . His 
bitterness was reserved for Admiral 
Jerram... Jerram remained in the line. This Beatty 
never forgave. " 70 
Jerram had been singled-out by Beatty, but he also resented that Jerram's 
lack of initiative, from his point of view, had been repeated elsewhere in the 
BF. This failure by Jerram to join with the BCF was an important point. 
However, despite Drax and Cowan noting the tactical advantages, there is no 
evidence that this issue was ever raised outside the BCF. It was one more 
factor that rankled with the BCF and conditioned Beatty's actions when 
discussing Harper's `Record'. 
Beatty's opponents were all too aware of his failings, but were 
reluctant to say so. What followed was a press campaign, supported by books 
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from partisans, to heap praise onto Beatty and disparage the role played by 
Jellicoe and others, not only at Jutland, but throughout the war in general. It 
was unfortunate that this was allowed to carry on unchecked for so long. 
One can understand that many wished to maintain a silence to prevent 
a distasteful war of words, but it is to be wondered if this is the policy to 
follow when others persist in stating claims that go unchecked. When such 
claims are made, it is best that replies are made sooner rather than later. 
Damage is inevitable, but it is advisable that one side is not allowed to gain 
such an advantage as that body of opinion that surrounded Beatty. Late 
responses are often associated with guilt. 
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3. The Genesis of the Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland. 
It was largely true that "Until 1867 naval history, other than a record 
of battles, could hardly be said to have existed", 1 when Captain John Colomb 
(aided by his brother, Admiral Philip Colomb) began to study history with a 
view to the formation of strategic policy. This was in response to what they 
saw as a limited approach by the Admiralty to meet the requirements of 
modern war. 2 It also became a common theme for future historians. The 
same could be said of the Dewar brothers in the early 20th Century, with the 
exception that they were part of a small, but increasing, number of 
historically-minded officers. The general reaction to the subject in Naval 
circles that the Dewars met, was much like that which faced the Colombs - 
that their audiences were ultimately unconvinced of the utility of history to 
the modern service. The dependence of officers on technical and material 
subjects and their prowess in this area had, from the materialist point of view, 
negated the utility of accounts of sailing ships in a bygone era. The numbers 
of materialists grew with increasing material and its increasing complexity. 
Not for the first, nor the last, time, there was a widespread feeling that the 
future lay in the hands of these specialists and that no-one else had anything 
useful to offer. 
The Dewars and Richmond realised that this feeling still dominated 
the Navy and both attempted to modify the reliance on detailed technical 
matters at the expense of a wider strategic view. In a wider sense, they 
realised that subject specialisms were becoming too self-concerned (if not 
self-important), losing sight of the reasons why the Navy was composed of 
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such vessels as it was and how these might be used in a future war. That, in 
itself, was enough to increase the general suspicion of history, because it 
questioned the extent to which each specialism alone was sufficient to meet 
the country's strategic ends. It also forced many of these specialists to 
wonder, at least, privately, how the Navy would actually conduct a future war 
in detail. Many had neglected the wider strategic picture, which was 
understandable when careers were based upon technical prowess. What 
worried the historical officers was that this wider picture had actually been 
completely lost. 
Naval historians, be they civilian or serving officers, faced a struggle to 
be accepted amongst technical specialists because they held different views 
and because of a perception by technical specialists that any deviation from 
technical issues undermined their effectiveness and, therefore, the Navy's 
ability to fight. Those that opposed history seldom showed signs of a detailed, 
reasoned objection. This further encouraged historical officers to promote 
history. Opponents of history were usually blindly dismissive through fear of 
change, or because they genuinely did not fully appreciate the didactic 
potential of history. For essentially these reasons, history was seen as a threat 
rather than a useful addition to knowledge. 
In one sense, this was understandable. None of the officers in the war 
had previously fought the modem ships in which they served. All would have 
to see how the war developed and act to correct any defects as best they 
could. To the historians, and increasingly to a wider body, in such events as 
the losses of the cruisers Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue (to U-9 in September 
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1914), it could at least have been expected that three closely-stationed ships 
predictably cruising the Broad Fourteens (off the Dutch coast) was a 
potentially dangerous situation. History was used to illustrate that patterns 
can emerge from a serious study and although they could not prescribe future 
actions, analysing problems (real or perceived) could be of use, if only to 
stimulate analytical thought. It was much lamented that original thought had 
been largely stifled by 1914. The most striking example of the time of the 
confusion that could arise from uncertainties over independent thought was 
the loss of Victoria in 1893. Along with others sharing an interest in history 
and analysis, Richmond was instrumental in founding the Naval Review, 
where any naval views could be aired, anonymously if so desired. Corbett, the 
Dewars and Richmond sought to increase and improve the study of history 
and analytical thought, but subordinated this aim to encouraging the adoption 
of their own naval views. 
What caused many to be suspicious of history was that original thought 
might subvert discipline. It is easy with hindsight to dismiss this, but it was an 
important consideration. Advocates of history had to be careful not to appear 
only to be encouraging sharp criticism of any policy, actions or individuals 
simply for its own sake. They were seldom successful in this. Indeed, many 
senior figures (especially Jellicoe) believed themselves to be criticised by 
individuals who had not taken into account the true nature of the 
complexities that were faced. This was mainly due to a selective approach on 
behalf of the authors, but also because of a lack of evidence. A serious, 
thorough approach to history should have lessened this supposition, but, 
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especially with regard to the Dewars' and Richmond's writings, their criticism 
did not appear to be balanced or adequately supported by facts. 
History was something of a novelty compared to other naval subjects; 
to many it was viewed as a subject for cranks. When Jutland was examined, 
discussion of the differences in the approaches of differing characters and 
individuals to war was bound to be potentially disputable, if not disruptive. 
Those whom the Dewars and Richmond criticised over Jutland were, in some 
instances, over-sensitive. However, responding to such criticisms helped 
increase an over all detailed, factual and critical analysis of the Navy and the 
battle. Raw evidence was pored over and debated. For many technical 
specialists, their first attempts at historical, or any serious, analysis were made 
defending themselves or their ideas regarding Jutland. The study of history in 
the service during the war, and later over Jutland, was part of a realisation 
that war needed detailed analysis to create a greater general awareness of the 
strategic and tactical aims. The lack of detail in the BCF's operations, 
therefore, had a profound affect upon the service. Not only was operational 
understanding vague, but, due to a lack of evidence, it was difficult for any 
author to delineate any benefits or defects in the free-thinking approach 
encouraged in the BCF. This was an important contradiction. Later, Beatty 
and his supporters wanted evidence to endorse their views. However, Beatty's 
suppression of evidence made this difficult. 
As it was realised that interpretations and evidence differed, Beatty's 
liking for history waned. Any attempt to analyse Jutland in an unimpassioned 
manner would probably have highlighted faults and faults usually meant 
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blame. This might explain why serving officers were not fond of history, 
especially contemporary history. The Dewars and Richmond were not 
interested in history for its own sake. Ultimately, this lay at the heart of their 
failure to promote historical study in the Navy. To those with differing views 
to the Dewars and Richmond, their various analyses seemed little more than 
criticism based upon selective and misunderstood evidence. It appeared, if 
anything, as detailed propaganda, or incomplete history. 
Although history had a purpose, its widespread adoption as a serious 
subject depended largely on the manner in which the Dewars, Richmond and 
Corbett presented it. If history as a subject, rather than as a device to support 
limited ideas, had been supported, the potential for impartial assessment 
might have been recognised by more of those whom the historians sought to 
convince. Instead, Dewar and Richmond supported reform with what 
appeared to their opponents as spiteful, wisdom-after-the-event criticism. It 
was not history that they were writing and history in the service suffered for 
this. 
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The Dewar brothers have been much maligned for the parts they 
played in recording the events at Jutland and there are few complimentary 
opinions regarding their motives or suitability to judge such an event. Their 
combined lack of sea experience compared to many officers about whom they 
were writing was a convenient excuse for many to dismiss what they had to 
say out of hand. There was a common belief that they had been selected by 
Beatty not simply to write an account favourable to his part in the action, but 
to write what Beatty dictated. Being unreliable, biased and ill-qualified to 
comment in the opinions of many - usually Jellicoe's supporters - meant 
that much of what they did' say in their Appreciation of Jutland did not reach 
many eyes due to its limited circulation. However, it echoed a side to the 
argument that had much to support it. 
The selection of the brothers was Beatty's responsibility, but they were 
by no means the first choice. On 22nd September 1920, Sir Julian Corbett 
was informed by Herbert Richmond that Harper's `Record' was not going to 
be released. On 5th October, Corbett saw Oswyn Murray who: 
"showed me correspondence between him, Beatty 
and Long ... against Adty. Jutland report. [Said? ] 
they wished me to take on whole 
thing... (according to Beatty version)+the charts in 
one appreciation with liberty to comment when I 
thought it not in accordance to [sic] evidence. 
Pointed out difficulty of bulk, but said I would 
consider their proposal with Capt. Harper, 
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Daniel.. . lunch at club with [amongst 
others]... Harper who was full of Beatty's bullying 
attitude. 
[7th October] Interview with Murray+Harper as 
to what could be done to take my view. Told him 
he c[oul]d say I agreed to take over subject to 
certain conditions. 
[15th October, from Daniel] notified proposed to 
give me a free hand. 
[16th October] Drafted Murray letter re. what I 
was prepared to do about Jutland. [Some time 
between these dates, Corbett rejected Beatty's 
offer] 
[13th November] also Richmond to tell me seen 
[sic] ... Beatty had sent for him to do my 
abandoned job+how he said he could not do it- 
too much work. Also know B wanted a clear 
statement from him [regarding his views on the 
future of battleships]... R said we had not 
completely agreed as to their necessity. Also how 
he explained to B that I was not for what they call 
the Defensive School. " 3 
This does not square with common understanding at all. Following his earlier 
approach to Corbett, Beatty, or at least someone acting on his behalf, felt 
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that it would be a coup if Corbett could work with all the available material 
and submit a work that pleased Beatty. Corbett evidently relished the 
possibilities that this free rein would have given him. Although any published 
work would still have been censored, Corbett seemed to have felt that it was 
better to remain outside direct Admiralty control, or where their interference 
would create greater problems for them than if he had worked solely under 
their auspices. As regards the publicly available finished product, he evidently 
felt that if there were to be censorship, it would probably make little 
difference for whom he worked. He was still contracted to work for 
Longmans, who had exclusive rights to the Official History, so his decision 
seemed to resolve itself around how wide an audience the work would 
ultimately receive. 
Corbett had often met with Harper and, therefore, knew all about 
Beatty's efforts to tamper with the `Record'. This was almost certainly a 
discouragement, not simply due to his possible reluctance in working in such 
an atmosphere, but that he might not be allowed to reach his own conclusions 
unless they agreed with Beatty's. It will be seen later just how he managed to 
contrive to receive the promised secret information anyway, so neglecting to 
accept this offer was probably in his better interests (certainly commercially). 
At the very least, he could always have applied pressure via Longmans if any 
major crisis regarding content arose. He could not have applied such, if any, 
working directly under Beatty. 
With Corbett's rejection of the offer, Richmond was evidently 
somewhere below on the list of choices. It was convenient for Beatty that he 
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claimed to have too much work at the time, especially as his views supporting 
smaller battleships and capital ship design were causing the Navy concern in 
the disarmament atmosphere of the early 1920s. Had Beatty chosen him, it 
seemed to have been thought likely that Richmond would write something 
along the lines that big battleships were expensive, useless and that the 
indecisive result of Jutland proved that they were ultimately ineffectual. This 
was not the thing to say in the disarmament atmosphere of the early 1920s. 
So, it fell to the Dewars to write this account with the freedom to comment 
on the evidence and action. It was Beatty's best choice of the three 
possibilities, especially given that his views and the Dewars' were in 
agreement, although Corbett and Richmond were more widely known as 
established naval experts. 
Prior to their undertaking to write the Appreciation, the Dewar 
brothers had developed an interest in the study of history and felt it to be an 
important part of Naval training. This did not endear them to the many who 
felt that a sound knowledge of contemporary material was all important. 
After the war they drew attention to the fact that the Navy spent £250,000 
each year on scientific research as compared to £1,000 spent on the historical 
section which "indicates the enormous strength of the material school. " 4 As 
their own interest was history, this naturally did not meet with their approval, 
yet they failed to fully appreciate why the material school was so large and 
acquired large sums of money. Technological advances in warfare had meant 
that many new factors needed to be understood and to fail to do this would 
have meant to fall behind in comparison with other nations. Ships were 
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becoming obsolete much quicker than even ten years previously and it is 
scarcely surprising that as all aspects in the functioning of ships were 
changing rapidly, many needed to be acquainted with new devices and their 
use. 
In this atmosphere, the Dewars rightly perceived that the study of 
history and its use in developing tactics and strategy was being neglected to 
the detriment of the service. Undue reliance, it seemed, was being placed 
upon new devices at the expense of developing an individual's understanding 
of war and how best to act in battle. Obeying orders was seen as preferable to 
exercising initiative, officers' self-confidence had suffered and, in their 
opinion, this had resulted in the unpalatable outcome of Jutland. If history 
were studied it was hoped that officers and, therefore, the Navy would be 
more able to force a favourable outcome in future. 
However, a large number of officers had been brought up in an 
environment where obedience to orders was paramount and in which little 
was done to experiment with new ideas regarding tactics. Incidents such as 
the loss of Victoria, in 1893, not only discouraged such experimentation, but 
highlighted the great difficulty in training officers in such a way and in 
coordinating their actions. Alfred Dewar remarked to his brother: 
"Do you remember Tryon's case 1893? nothing 
like obeying orders then you can't go wrong, even 
if the ship is sunk. " 5 
The brothers thought that this attitude needed rectifying. For many to have 
preferred a more conservative system which reduced the theoretical 
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likelihood of misunderstandings was not a surprising thing. Yet, to the 
Dewars and those of similar opinions, this was not a good enough reason to 
maintain the status quo. 
A little before Jutland, Kenneth Dewar wrote: 
"I don't think that there will be any real 
fundamental reforms in naval education and 
organisation unless the pressure of public opinion 
is brought to bear in the right direction. Those 
who will direct affairs after the war will be of 
much the same type as their predecessors... If a 
few officers writing together could publish a 
suitable book after the war much good could 
come of it. " 
In stating this, he was obviously aware that, in the existing climate, such 
change as he desired was unlikely unless others could be made aware of their 
case and realise its importance. Rather than being merely a difference of 
opinion, what Dewar wished to change was a system so apparently injurious 
to the prospects of improved tactics, strategy and in individual action of 
officers. Much good could come from writing a book bringing out the lessons 
to be learned from the war, if that book endorsed Kenneth Dewar's views. 
He would later be given the chance to develop and demonstrate his ideas and 
opinions. 
The difficulty in trying to change such a significant factor in the 
structure of the Navy as education lay not so much in the difficulties of 
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developing attitudes and adapting to a new system, but in undermining the 
basis of acquired knowledge and experience. For change to come about and 
in any way be effective, the majority would have to be convinced of its 
feasibility. Dewar was a little optimistic to have thought that pressure in the 
right area, presumably at the Admiralty or similar high position, would help 
bring about his aim. The "right direction" was to appeal to that part of the 
Navy unconvinced of such ideas. To appeal to some distinguished officers 
who would encourage reform on a larger scale, overlooked the fact that such 
measures needed the conviction of the majority who would work under the 
new regime. That majority were not convinced that greater tactical freedom 
was preferable to the current order. 
In early June 1916, Kenneth Dewar wrote to Richmond that: 
"I should like to know more about the Jutland 
J 
Battle. It seems strange that we should have had 
to engage in such superior force [with the result 
being so inconclusive]... The epic deeds of this war 
are all connected with withdrawals... the attack of 
Beatty's BC's and the 5thBS on the whole of the 
G. H. S. F. affords another example of the same 
kind. Evidently the co-ordination and [function? ] 
of a large fleet is not as simple as our P. Z. 
exercises would have us believe. I went on board 
the Barham a few days ago. The 6" magazines had 
a narrow escape and it is easy to understand the 
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destruction of the Queen Mary and 
Indefatigable ... I wonder if we shall ever get any 
intelligent criticism of the Battle of Jutland. " 
In this, one can detect his opinions forming regarding the action and how 
they linked to his theme of education and the principles of war. The 
reference to Beatty showed, even at this early stage, how the battlecruiser 
myth had started to develop. 8 His last statement was ironic from many points 
of view and was, perhaps, said in the hope that he might at some point 
contribute to an understanding of Jutland. Even from these few words, his 
opinions and sympathies were evident, just as they were expressed later in the 
Staff Appreciation. 
Other important concerns were illustrated in another letter to 
Richmond: 
"In your last letter you seemed to think that only 
the opinions of those who had taken part in the 
various North Sea actions would carry any weight 
after the war. I don't agree with that idea. I think 
your views on reform will carry [equal? ] weight 
with the rising generation quite independently of 
what ship you happened to serve in... But despite 
desperate efforts to compare it [Jutland] to 
Trafalgar.. . we 
know in our heart of hearts that it 
was a serious reverse... [Rushton] says that the 
Germans are superior to us in ship design, 
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gunnery and command, but especially in 
command. " 9 
To continue the irony a little further, this statement seemed to anticipate that 
any views an individual put forward for discussion would be dealt with solely 
on their merits. One would have to say that Richmond's assessment of the 
situation was much more accurate and Dewar's a little idealistic. It would be 
more accurate, however, to say that if views on reform were suggested by 
someone who took part in any of the North Sea engagements as opposed to 
someone who had not, many might incline to favour the participant of one or 
more of the battles purely for that fact, believing, however erroneously, that 
battle experience strengthens a case because those involved in battles must 
know better by virtue of seeing action. Many reputations were enhanced by 
battle, but not always accurately. It was always difficult to escape the feeling 
that those having seen action were exalted in some way, which was what 
Dewar feared, as expressed in his letters. If one attempts to say that service 
in battle is irrelevant in formulating changes, the retort is usually that these 
are efforts to undermine, ignore, or insult, heroes, which is hard to overcome. 
Dewar's last statement was evidence at least that he was not alone in sharing 
views regarding what was seen as deficient command and the ability of 
officers to act effectively against the enemy. 
Kenneth Dewar's Lecture on Historical Method 10 set out what he and 
his brother, Alfred, believed to be the purpose of historical study. It was 
tailored so as to encourage the use of history for practical purposes - to 
show that original thought could lead to greater operational freedom and, 
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therefore, success. So much writing on Jutland suffered from what Dewar was 
keen to overcome, that: 
"Individual action covers only a small field and to 
become available for general use must be 
collected with the experience of others and 
reduced to historical form. " 11 
This was nothing startling, but it did not pretend to be. Dewar's point, to 
= those unfamiliar with, and suspicious of, history, raised the fundamental 
questions regarding how history is written, for what purpose and whether or 
not the form of the work is suitable if an analysis was required. Dewar was 
attempting to clarify historical method whilst suggesting that original thought 
should be applied to assessing Jutland. Harper's task was to avoid 
judgements, but in the opinion of some, such as Dewar, he did not bring out 
the true picture of events because of this. It was this that the Appreciation 
sought to rectify. 
When Beatty asked Kenneth Dewar, aided by Alfred, to compose an 
account to bring out the lessons of the battle, he had chosen the authors with 
a vastly different reason in mind than had Wemyss. Contrary to popular 
dogma, the Dewars had not been selected merely to put into words Beatty's 
side of the battle. 12 It is unfair to both the Dewars and Beatty to say that 
they were chosen to comply unquestioningly with the First Sea Lord's wishes. 
They were chosen to compose a very different type of account. Beatty was, 
however, aware of their views on Naval matters, which were akin to his own. 
Difficulties arose with the Dewars' work because of the issues it raised 
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and its manner of expression. Personal criticisms appeared that Jellicoe's 
supporters thought to be too strong for publication, even if Beatty's 
supporters thought them to be justified. The major actors in the Appreciation 
were still alive and serving in the fleet, and the principles upon which the 
Navy in the 1920s functioned were being seriously questioned. The 
Appreciation thus had the potential to be damaging if misinterpreted and in 
the prevailing hostile atmosphere, it was almost certain to have been, 
intentionally or otherwise. The parts criticising Jellicoe found favour with 
Beatty's supporters, but even Beatty's supporters thought that whilst the work 
was accurate, issue of it would have caused disputes rather than encouraging 
reform. 
What comes to light in a comparison of the work of the Dewars and 
of Harper is how different types of history can cause such debate and 
ill-feeling. The question regarding the Dewars' work was the desirability of 
having an analytical account composed so close to the event in question. 
Cases could be made to attack or defend any side, which may not have been 
made to portray the truth, but to support or attack a cause. In this, clarity in 
the depiction of the battle would certainly be lost. Although the Dewars' 
work did have some defects, it was essentially moderate as an analysis of the 
battle. Nevertheless, its criticisms of the principles upon which the Navy 
functioned, without offering workable alternatives, led to its very limited 
circulation. To Jellicoe's supporters, Harper's work was a plain narrative of 
events which was sufficient for the time. To Beatty's supporters, the Staff 
Appreciation represented what should have been written to begin with, a far 
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more accurate and informative account. This marked the beginning of works 
that further blurred the battle itself with wider service issues and these works 
suffered as objective analyses of the events of the battle because of this. 
Dewar's lecture made many points that later appeared in the Staff 
Appreciation. The advantages of decentralised command were stressed, this 
being part of what Dewar hoped would be a Navy better able to fight 
successfully in future, with officers having the freedom and confidence to 
form their own judgements, based on historical analyses, and act upon them. 
Without such analyses Dewar believed that: 
"you may wander for months in a maze, 
dependent on your meagre stock of knowledge on 
what someone is prepared to dole out to you. " 13 
This may have been true, but not everyone has the time or inclination to go 
so deep into the past as perhaps they should. Therefore, they must rely to 
some extent upon what they are given. This repeated Dewar's point regarding 
how history is written, for what purpose and by whom. The obvious 
implication was that there was not enough historical information supplied, or 
in enough depth, by the Navy in 1919. This needed rectifying if progress was 
ever to be made. It might also be mentioned that at this time, access to 
official documents was very much restricted. Thanks largely to the efforts of 
Sir J. K. Laughton at the end of the 19th Century, and the Navy Records 
Society, moves were made to remedy this situation. Although Dewar's 
comment here appears to be obvious to any historian, sufficient evidence to 
produce detailed history was not accessible to most in the 1920s, even Naval 
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officers of the Historical Section. 
This opened a much wider debate regarding education within the Navy 
and the consequences of encouraging criticism and developing new ideas. 
Dewar, Richmond, Plunkett and others long since shared similar views, whose 
pursuit they hoped would lead to less centralised tactics and command, which 
Beatty undoubtedly preferred. Others argued that too much individual action 
and greater freedom of manoeuvre would lead to disunity and, therefore, 
disaster. If this were to happen in battle, the results could well be disastrous. 
The often quoted "Nelsonic" qualities are always cited as desirable and 
admirable. Yet, in practice, it seemed that the Navy had been happy to 
encourage admiration of Nelson, providing that few, if anyone, actually 
behaved like him. This did not please the Dewars. The Dewars, however, like 
many others, failed to realise that a systematic analysis, for example, of 
Nelson's major actions - St. Vincent, Aboukir and Trafalgar - would not 
have reflected the 20th Century assumption that initiative alone led to success 
and would do in future. Nelson's heroism was held as an example to all 
junior, and many senior, officers of courage and initiative. However, it was 
not mentioned that his most famous battle - Trafalgar - although 
successful, had little real strategic effect. History, to the Dewars, was all well 
and good if it appeared to reflect their opinions, but was of little utility if it 
did not. It was not sufficient simply to concentrate upon general conclusions, 
as the Dewars tended to do. 
Improvements of the kind the Dewars desired could only be made by 
encouraging greater individual responsibility, but all too often this was feared 
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as being an influence which undermined sound ideas: not heresy perhaps, but 
potentially damaging if everyone aspired to and practised it. Ultimately, it was 
a question of emphasis as to how far individual skill should rate in obeying 
orders, although the brothers do not seem to have seen the problem in this 
way. The Dewars were advocating a change which, if implemented, would 
significantly alter the Navy's approach to education and warfare and as is 
usual, conservatism had the greatest number of advocates. In fact, it was just 
as difficult to make each system work effectively, especially one which 
involved such a large number of vessels and personnel. There was also the 
vexed question of when it was advisable to conform to orders or use initiative, 
how to know when to use it and to what extent. In the climate of the early 
1920s it was too much to expect unity of action without having a highly 
effective communications system. That was where the problem lay. Even the 
later predominance of radio-based tactical devices could not prevent 
misunderstandings or tactical blunders. An excellent understanding of tactics, 
born of frequent and lucid communications between commanders, will make 
any system much more likely to function as required, regardless of whether or 
not it involves an emphasis on initiative or central command. 
Just as commonplace was the erroneous belief that in such arguments, 
there was room only for one set of beliefs, as if the two were incompatible. 
This was the essence of Jutland arguments. The side that favoured 
decentralisation of command and an increase in the study of history, did so 
without seeing, or fully admitting to, possible defects in this approach. This 
was true of those favouring central control and greater familiarity with 
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technical developments. Had compromise been possible, the Royal Navy 
would have been nearer to an adequate solution. 
Kenneth Dewar raised an important point, which was to be of 
significance after the Staff Appreciation was completed, when he stated: 
"We require provisional histories of events.. . not 
necessarily definitive, but so far as they go, 
substantially correct... Its object is to increase 
efficiency by close examination of the work 
actually done ... My argument for the utility of this 
resolves itself into an advocacy for the history of 
the present [i. e. immediate past]. " 14 
This highlighted a crucial difference of current opinion. One may well 
question how a history can be accurate enough to be of value so close to the 
event in question, taking personal perceptions and interests into account, but 
the Dewars knew that many years must not be allowed to pass before an 
objective analysis could be made. It was evident that any lessons to be 
learned had to be done nevertheless when they were still of value, or else the 
defects they perceived would only be perpetuated. 
Kenneth Dewar also noted that a holder of information: 
"may possess a monopoly of the information and 
is very often averse to anything in the form of 
history which might disturb that monopoly. 
History represents the pooling of experience. " 15 
It would seem that he meant that anyone holding certain views did not like to 
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be furnished with proof that they were erroneous or had little foundation in 
fact. This was understandable to a certain extent and especially applicable to 
the Jutland histories. The brothers thought that pooling experience would 
mean that solutions to problems could be arrived at through examining all 
available information. This ignored personal factors, opposing views and the 
means applied to compose the history. Kenneth Dewar did not explain in 
sufficient depth, here or elsewhere, how information was gathered, how facts 
were determined or how these factors could so easily distort the picture of 
events. He fell victim to factual defects in evidence in his works at this time. 
In a lecture entitled The Growth of pre Jutland Tactics, 16 by 
Commander Russell Grenfell, many points were made similar to those held 
by the Dewars and their supporters. From a reformer's point of view, an 
alarming statement was made that: 
"the great majority of officers had not open minds 
on the subject of tactics; they had empty 
minds. " 17 
Such reformers believed that they had much to do to achieve a satisfactory 
system. That empty minds were seen to abound, reflected a lack of sufficient 
effort to teach history, or offer any encouragement to develop ideas. Without 
any new ideas, the assumption was that orders would be obeyed 
unquestioningly according to current doctrine. 
Systematic study of warfare and tactics was essential, yet was not 
encouraged. So, if the compilation of battle orders was left to a very few 
senior officers and little or no discussion on tactics or strategy took place in 
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the subordinate ranks, then there must, the Dewars argued, come a point 
when those rising to high commands had little, if any, different ideas to add. 
This being the case, most would then perpetuate the ideas and beliefs that 
they had held for many years, without knowing any different means. 
After Jutland many retained the same Naval opinions they had 
possessed before. Some claimed that a disaster had skilfully been avoided and 
victory denied by cruel luck. Others claimed that a restrictive system of tactics 
and command had wasted an excellent opportunity for victory. The potential 
for strengthening Britain's strategic position in the war was, in reformers' 
eyes, achievable, but was denied by the restrictive ideas predominant in the 
BF, to which they were opposed. During the inter-war years, the recording of 
events at Jutland was more often used either to support reform or to 
maintain the status quo, rather than recording the events accurately for 
posterity. 
When work began on the Staff Appreciation, on 1st November 1920, 
the Dewars already had in mind the approach they would take and the points 
that they would amplify by way of educating the reader to developing their 
ideas of warfare. Upon reading it, one cannot escape the implicit conclusion 
that there needed to be a great reform within the service, particularly 
regarding education, tactics and strategy, if the Fleet was ever to act with the 
freedom and skill necessary in any future engagement. The purpose was to 
draw out the lessons from the battle however unpalatable they might at first 
appear. In doing this it was inevitable that wider issues than the battle itself 
would be addressed in some way. It was, perhaps, impossible to write a work 
156 
without making some criticisms or comments that could be construed as 
personal attacks. As the actions of individuals at Jutland were largely a result 
of the extant Battle Orders and training, to criticise either the BF system or 
individuals within it was to criticise both. 
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As distribution of the Appreciation to a wider audience was 
considered, one may well wonder what was the real intended purpose of the 
book. If it was to express any individual's or body's opinions then its limited 
circulation cannot have been much help in furthering the cause. This might 
be a false assumption. The mere knowledge of a secret book and hints of 
what it contained could cause all manner of differences of opinions and 
criticisms of the way in which study of the battle was being used. However, it 
would be difficult to ensure constructive criticism in such a climate, which 
might easily lead to the opposite effects than those desired. When one 
considers that the Despatches had already been published and that the 
Official History would soon follow, the existence of a secret book might well 
have led some to suppose that something was being hidden and that this 
could be important. Publication of Harper's `Record' was being delayed and 
many articles in the press saw this as part of the "hush-up" over the whole 
affair. On 29th November 1920, the Evening News told of the compilation of 
a new account of Jutland (the supposed "secret" account) and concluded that: 
"The idea of suppressing the work of a costly 
committee and having it done over again by a 
single officer naturally suggests that there is 
something to be hidden. " 
As newspapers often do, the Evening News jumped to the wrong conclusion 
by being too eager to find something that was suspicious. Although Harper's 
work was suppressed, the Dewars had used it as the basis for their work - 
and it lost very much in the process. 
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Many misunderstandings occurred in later years as to the reasons why 
another account was produced and then suppressed, but these were based 
upon an ignorance of the instructions upon which the authors worked and the 
ultimate purpose of the work. Shortly after Dewar began his work, Brock 
wrote that: 
"You are desired to write a full annreciation of 
the battle of Jutland. to serve as a groundwork for 
a further staff appreciation. Your appreciation is 
to include... a full analysis of the movements of 
the British Fleet. " 18 
Brock added a memorandum that there was to be one appreciation for 
restricted circulation, suitable to be issued to the Fleet and another founded 
on the original. but with no criticism or secret information. thus being safe 
for general Dublication. Contrary to popular belief, the Admiralty Narrative 
- edited from the Appreciation - was not a substitute for an account that 
was too controversial to he issued, but part of the plan to issue a publicly 
available account which was seen as beine lone overdue. It was all too often 
assumed that the Dewars' account was so controversial that it had to be 
edited in order for it to be published, but it was never intended that the 
original would be issued except in a very limited way. The mistake made by 
many was in assuming general publication to be the intention. There was 
criticism that the apparent suppression of the account indicated that sinister 
doings were taking place, but it is significant that these claims were greatly 
distorted. The Dewars' Appreciation was intended for limited circulation, for 
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a particular purpose and was the first stage of a planned issue of different 
Admiralty accounts on Jutland. 
The work went through various drafts, with the MSS of the previous 
drafts being destroyed when superseded. Shortly before printing, the first six 
chapters, Kenneth Dewar - who did the majority of work on the 
Appreciation - was informed: 
"have now been revised in accordance with the 
directions of the DCNS, all the parts criticised by 
the CNS and ACNS having either been omitted 
or modified. " 19 
So Beatty, Brock and Chatfield did have some influence as to the final 
contents, though in exactly what way is not possible to say. What is worth 
noting is that with all their other duties, Beatty and Brock (later Keyes, but 
less so Chatfield if he could avoid it) always found time to cast an eve over 
the contents at crucial points in its development. The influence of one. 
usually both, was detectable whenever the contents were examined with a 
view to issue. Beatty felt that this was the account that should be issued to 
the public, not an edited version, as it reflected his view and the views of 
other BCF personnel better than did Harper's work. He also felt that there 
was nothing wrong with the idea of making issue of it more general. 
It was noted by the Assistant DNI (Captain E. D. Cochrane) that issue 
would be decided by the Board as and when the need arose. 20 This implied 
that issue was a sensitive subject and that a public issue would necessitate 
alterations being made. Only a few were considered to be suitable recipients 
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of the work as it stood. Beatty felt differently. He and others members of his 
staff had seen the work and made comments upon it, so he felt that all the 
necessary editing had been done. Further editing would only emasculate the 
account, in his view, and failing to publish it would be disastrous. 
Publication of the work as it stood originally, or wider distribution of 
it, it should be remembered, was not the intention, but Beatty later remarked 
to Brock: 
"We decided not to distribute it for many good 
reasons i. e. that it contained comments and 
strictures which might cause heart burnings and ill 
feeling and not because it was inaccurate... [its 
destruction] is a crime against contemporary 
history. I was Chief of Staff responsible for it's 
[sic] production and had at my disposal the most 
competent staff which included 
Yourself... representing as it did the many units of 
the Fleet that took part in the battle.. . to produce 
a proper appreciation of a great Historical 
occasion.. .1 think 
it would be monstrous to 
destroy the one authentic and carefully prepared 
publication. " 21 
He seemed disappointed that the account did not reach more eyes. The 
Appreciation was compiled by two brothers who did not represent any units 
of the Fleet and Lt-Cdr John Pollen who had arrived to help explain Harper's 
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`Record', upon which the account was based, and to prepare the diagrams. 22 
Perhaps Beatty was genuinely convinced of his statement - it would help 
explain why he so strongly felt that the work was the most accurate 
representation of the battle. As First Sea Lord, Beatty seemed to have 
believed that those under him were ultimately to do as they were told and 
that Harper and his helpers were not an independent body. 23 The phrase 
above that he "had at my disposal" was consistent with this view that the 
account was his responsibility, and that he could detail work to whoever he 
chose and suggest the lines upon which it was to be written. Beatty was doing 
with the Dewars what he felt that he was entitled to do with Harper, the 
difference being that the brothers complied, as he suspected they would. 
In desiring wider distribution, Beatty seemed not to have given too 
much thought to the possible effects of the work, or if he did, then not to 
have cared much. It was, however, consistent with his opinion that this only 
reflected what had really happened at the battle and that there was no reason 
why others should not know it. Apart from the potential to affect relations, it 
did overtly question much regarding the Navy and the way in which it would 
behave in a future battle. It was Keyes (now DCNS) and Chatfield who felt 
that the latter issue was significant. The issue of this account with the 
approval of the Admiralty had the potential to "rend the service to its 
foundations. " 24This would have been disastrous. 
Perhaps the most important point was that the Dewars questioned the 
idea of fighting ships in a single line. However, it was not so much the single 
line itself being criticised, but its size at Jutland. Problems that the authors 
162 
saw at Jutland were largely due to the complexities of movements of the 
Grand Fleet, magnified by large numbers of vessels over such distances. The 
strategic position and concentration of the Fleet in the war could scarcely 
have been helped, but in the absence of any other tactical ideas, the single 
line had to stay, like it or not. If this work had been issued, criticising Fleet 
tactics and the principles upon which the Fleet would continue to work, there 
was a feeling that impressionable officers might assume that the single line 
was the cause of all problems. However, this seemed to be used more as an 
excuse to prevent publication and wider debate of the issue. A major rift may 
well have been avoided by Keyes and Chatfield in their willingness to prevent 
any controversy from spreading, particularly from within the service. 
However, this was not to say that they disagreed with what had been written. 
The priority was not necessarily to produce the most accurate account, but 
one which caused least damage, real or imagined. 
The comments of Keyes and Chatfield are worth examining a little 
further with regard to the possible effects of wider circulation for the work. 
Chatfield noted that the: 
"criticism is written in a somewhat severe style; 
and it is open to suggestion whether this is 
desirable ... I think 
it very desirable that the service 
should be told the reason why the British ships 
were blown up... namely, because the British shell 
were of-inferior make. " 25 
He noted that this could present problems, but his own favourite subject, he 
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felt, should be included, as it would aid his defence of the BCF's poor 
gunnery at Jutland. It is also interesting that, as in his dealings with Harper, 
he seemed not to have become too interested until BCF gunnery was 
examined, as it was of particular importance to him. 
Both Chatfield and Keyes concluded that: 
"While not approving of the tone in which this 
book is written... we are in entire agreement with 
the main conclusions of the writer. " 26 
Although both agreed with what had been written, they realised that allowing 
the Fleet to know that the Naval Staff endorsed those views within could have 
made matters much worse, especially as public criticism of Jellicoe was then 
common. Both found the edited version unsatisfactory as it did not represent 
the views of the present Naval Staff: 
"and we might be compelled to defend an 
incomplete and half hearted account which did 
not adequately express our personal 
convictions. " 27 
So, they felt it best not to advise any issue, hoping that any potential troubles 
would never emerge. Underlying these comments was the feeling that the 
whole affair was unsavoury and that a plain narrative was, if at all, the best 
possible type of work to issue at present. Agreeing what should be said was 
the point that seemed unsolvable. 
It was clear that while they supported Beatty, they did not approve of 
the lengths to which he was prepared to go. A chief reason was that only an 
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account which passed as the opinion of the Naval Staff and Board of 
Admiralty should be issued, which was not the case. Above all, the intention 
may have been to provide a piece for posterity which recorded certain views: 
that not all copies were returned for destruction is suggestive in itself. 28 
There seemed to have been an expectation of some disastrous controversy 
and that this was best forestalled, but this great rift never emerged. 
Although the original Appreciation received no further issue, 
production of an account that all could read was begun. When Brock was still 
DCNS, he felt that after Corbett's work was published, there would not be 
any need for another Jutland account. However, Kenneth Dewar noted that 
he: 
"pointed out however that Pollen who had helped 
Harper and myself and done very painstaking 
work on the diagrams would now be out of a 
job+would have to revert to his pre-war pension 
of £100 a year or thereabouts and I asked that if 
possible the Admiralty might do something to 
keep him on for a few more months... I suggested 
he might edit my appreciation so as to produce a 
plain narrative ... I think that [revision] was 
Admiral Brock's intention, but yesterday I found 
that Pollen had been told to prepare a narrative 
without criticism... [Pollen could then either] 
produce a hash up of my appreciation which I do 
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not think fair ... or after a very long time he 
produces another one... My appreciation was 
prepared so that the criticism+comments could 
easily be eliminated so as to have the plain 
narrative... [the original] met with the entire 
approval of the CNS+DCNS+both he [Alfred 
Dewar] and I would feel extremely hurt if 
someone else is told to prepare a new 
narrative. " 29 
Those comments carefully crafted with editing in mind, were now duly 
deleted. Given the above quotation, Kenneth Dewar could hardly have been 
upset or surprised at this editing being done. 
Pollen had been instructed to use the Dewars' account and to adhere 
as closely as possible to their wording in the edited version. 30 Captain 
Ellerton (DTSD) had told Pollen that he was to consult Dewar if need be 
and to consider Oswald Tuck as his representative regarding the editing. 31 
Although this would have to suffice, Beatty's supporters felt it to be a poor 
substitute. Captain Frank Spickernell wrote to Dewar that "So far as I know, 
the accuracy of your work has not been questioned in any way. " 32 Yet, this 
depended upon with whom he had been conversing, which must surely have 
been Beatty and his immediate circle of supporters. 33 The real irony in the 
affair was that this account utilised much of the work which Harper had 
produced, with the brothers adding their comments and expressing views. The 
Dewars knew that they had much wider scope than Harper and Beatty could 
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confidently rely upon their making comments more in keeping with his views. 
Despite this, a compromise had to be worked to enable wider issue, which, by 
the nature of compromise, ultimately failed to satisfy both sides completely. 
Early in 1922, Sir Julian Corbett, who was writing the third volume of 
the Official History, including Jutland, commented to Jellicoe regarding the 
Staff Appreciation that: 
"The presentation of the facts seemed to me so 
faulty ... but in a few days I was informed that the 
issue was to be stopped. " m 
He was then informed that an abridged edition was expected in two weeks. In 
early July, Captain Vernon Haggard (DTSD) wrote to Keyes and Chatfield 
that editing the work had proved "a matter of considerable difficulty. " 35 He 
had overseen the alterations and was ultimately responsible for the contents. 
Many potential points of issue still remained, but it must be remembered that 
it was not the intention to take all of them out. Corbett later wrote to 
Jellicoe: 
"the revision was entrusted to an officer who is 
attached to my staff [Pollen] and who thoroughly 
agreed with my own view of this burlesque of 
history. " 36 
Given what was said above and remembering that he also felt that the Harper 
`Record' was the most accurate yet produced, editing the work must have 
called for great restraint from Pollen. It should perhaps not be doubted that 
if Pollen had been any more extreme in editing than he had been, then 
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another editor may well have been sought, thus continuing the "burlesque of 
history. " Throughout the affair, what many quoted as the "Admiralty" view of 
any event, was really the personal view of Beatty. 
In letters to Jellicoe, Admiral Sir Charles Madden mentioned that "I 
hear J. C. 's account is not at all appreciated by Beatty", 37 which was in 
keeping with Beatty's view on the histories. Corbett also claimed to have 
insisted on using Harper's work wherever possible to elucidate the facts, but 
did not seem to have questioned it with regard to its accuracy. He remarked 
to Jellicoe that members of his staff had said that: 
"the Harper charts give, as you say, an accurate 
interpretation of all the existing records of what 
took place. " 38 
They were accurate, but Corbett's interpretations differed in some significant 
areas. Jellicoe, Harper, Corbett and Pollen amongst many others, were all of 
a similar mind regarding what happened at Jutland. One can scarcely be 
surprised that Beatty, the Dewars, Chatfield, Keyes and others did not share 
their opinions. The close inter-relations between those of both sides, only 
helped convince them that their particular views were accurate. 
These differences explain much regarding the comments of both sides 
and these help identify the authors of decisions regarding the Jutland 
histories. Madden expanded his previous comment to Jellicoe in that: 
"So far both the Corbett and Dewar accounts are 
It 
at the Admiralty, the former not at all appreciated 
there ... I 
impressed on him [the First Lord, 
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Amery] the fact that the bulk of the officers and 
men in the Navy served in Scapa Force... [if there 
were differences in Corbett's and the Dewars' 
accounts] there would be little difficulty in 
selecting the more accurate one [i. e. Corbett's]. " 39 
This made a crucial point. Due to the respective sizes of the two forces, those 
in the Battlefleet greatly outnumbered those in the BCF and it seemed as if a 
few of the latter, now at the head of the Admiralty, were trying to impose a 
view of the battle that the majority knew not to be accurate. The manner in 
which this was done did not help matters either. When Madden mentioned 
the "Admiralty", he quite clearly referred to Beatty, Keyes, Chatfield and 
those of the BCF who shared their views. 
Many would naturally not have agreed with one work (Corbett's or the 
Dewars') where they favoured the other, but the authors of the works did not 
sit idly by in the affair either. Corbett had discouraged wider circulation of 
the Dewars' work, but whether or not this had any effect is hard to say. The 
Dewars, later in 1922, received some disturbing news. Alfred Dewar wrote to 
Kenneth that: 
"I understand Corbett did not finish Jutland and I 
am inclined to think that Whitehall Gardens [the 
address of the Historical Section] [is? ] biassed 
[sic] against our report. Pollen says its facts no 
doubt are correct as if we got our facts from them 
[presumably Harper's account which they 
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had]... the German fleet in Harper's diagrams was 
entirely wrong. " 40 
This only endorsed the fact that although a few agreed with the Dewars, it 
did not find general approval in Whitehall. It was also notable that Harper's 
diagrams and facts were criticised as being faulty, but they were the least 
faulty compared to later works. This was further evidence that those who had 
any opinion in the affair wholly believed the point of view of one side only, 
there being no room for any so-called middle ground. 
Just as Corbett attempted to persuade the Admiralty against the wider 
use of the Dewars' account, so they did his. Alfred Dewar wrote to Kenneth 
that: 
"Corbett appears to have resented the attack on J 
by Beatty's [? ] and makes a firm counter attack in 
which I believe B is assailed for having dared to 
attack Hipper... I saw Roger B 41 and advised him 
strongly that the admly. refuse to have anything to 
do with the text of a chapter which differs so 
profoundly from the opinions of the naval staff. 
Unfortunately our monograph is regarded by 
almost everyone as much too strong and there can 
be no doubt that it would have served its purpose 
much better if we had distributed it, as it is, it 
isn't going out and there is all the trouble of 
writing another. I strongly advise the preparation 
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of a clear account based on the monograph with 
[the? ] diagrams and Jellicoc's remarks.. .1 think 
there is room for grave objection to be taken... to 
Corbett's having used our monograph (as he 
certainly did) to establish another opinion without 
a word of thanks. " 42 
This endorsed Madden's comments that Corbett's account was not 
appreciated by the Admiralty and it was easy to understand why and who 
exactly did not appreciate it. What was different about Corbett's account was 
that it was the first one published which did not square with the popular view 
that had been created by Beatty's supporters regarding the respective roles 
and characters of Beatty and Jellicoe. 
Dewar's comments to Bellairs may have been a contributing factor in 
the issuing by the Admiralty of the disclaimer at the start of Corbett's work 
(see Chapter 4), but it was likely that he was not alone in making such 
suggestions. One cannot really agree with Dewar regarding issuing the Staff 
Appreciation, unless of course, its purpose was to create debate and a 
possible schism in the service. It is difficult to see what good could have come 
from its issue. Although the public had been made aware that another work 
on Jutland was being compiled, the Admiralty wished to keep it as secret as 
possible, perhaps in the hope that it would be forgotten. For Corbett to have 
mentioned it would have given away the existence of a work which many in 
the Admiralty were keen to bury. Corbett's work might, if they were lucky, 
eclipse it, clearing the way for a riposte. 
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The use of Naval history was, at this time, very limited within the 
service. Great victories were held as examples of fine seamanship and 
courage, but in a way that suggested one was to admire, rather than analyse 
or learn from them. Defeats were seldom examined or even mentioned and 
the strategic elements and purpose of wars received scant attention. It was 
not surprising that some felt there was a gap in the education and 
understanding of what a Navy was and could be used for. Geoffrey 
Callendar's lectures to boys in their early teens encouraged admiration and 
there was often some theatrical element in the lecturer's delivery which was 
popular with many. This was all very well, yet some, especially Richmond, felt 
that although this might be acceptable for young boys, it was not so for young 
Lieutenants. Unless past events were fully examined in a more scholarly 
sense, some rightly argued that erroneous and insufficient conclusions would 
be drawn. 
It could be said that the manner in which the Dewars set about their 
proposed reform was clumsy, but they seemed to have been devoid of any 
ideas beyond the fact that there had to be some change. They showed signs 
of being against something, without supporting anything specifically or 
convincingly. They seemed to think that history would provide easily 
applicable solutions, but showed little evidence in their historical studies that 
they realised how to find them and convince others of the need for reform. 
The brothers' lack of formal training in history was not necessarily a 
defect, but serious errors in methodology and analysis resulted from their 
prejudice for reform. Most of the supposed inflammatory points resulted 
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from phrasing that was not as precise as it should have been, allowing the 
Dewars' opponents to take offence. This could have been negated by the 
Dewars admitting that there were alternative views to theirs. This would have 
lessened the scope for opponents to criticise them. They could have endorsed 
Beatty and their own reforms just as firmly, but the work would have 
appeared more balanced and reasoned. Because of their imprecise approach, 
however, the main points appeared not to be supported with sufficient proof 
and often read as unfounded criticisms. It was this for which they were 
remembered. 
As there was much evidence regarding the Dewars' account, its 
composition and responses to it, there is a tendency to assume that the Staff 
Appreciation caused more of a dispute than it actually did. The majority of 
the sources can only be found in the correspondence of Jellicoe, Beatty and 
Kenneth Dewar and this is because they were directly concerned with the 
work and the events surrounding it. As those who were directly concerned 
were few in number, the dispute over the account was limited in its scope. 
However, within certain circles, the issue was hotly disputed. The amount of 
evidence, although of quite a large volume relating to this affair, does not 
indicate that the Staff Appreciation affected the service deeply. That it 
affected certain individuals is true, but in other papers of contemporary 
officers, the absence of material relating to the dispute indicates its very 
limited scope. 
This work was very much an expression of the Dewars' thoughts on the 
battle and the service as a whole, views which they and others had formed 
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and held for many years. By 1923, it looked as though their hopes of making 
their names more familiar to others, and of educating officers, had failed. 
This led to some dissatisfaction, particularly for Kenneth, who continued right 
down to his death to advocate similar views as he had espoused in the 
Appreciation with similar vehemence. Many officers of the inter-war Navy 
were unaware of the Dewars, their views and support of a greater use of 
history in Naval education. 43 Although there were many lectures prepared on 
the battle and what could be learned from it, the reforms which had so 
interested the brothers did not materialise as they had wished. Despite their 
interest in history and their efforts, the brothers were ultimately unsuccessful 
in achieving their aims, or even in contributing towards them. 
Many felt that any lessons worth noting had been learned by 1922 - 
such factors as improved procedures for protecting against ammunition fires 
and improved shell quality - and that some accounts purporting to draw-out 
lessons only aimed at trying to rewrite the battle to favour a point of view. 
History and studying tactics and strategy through it, was not seen as of much 
importance or relevance to the practical problems that were faced. It is 
perhaps a simple, but nonetheless important, defect of the subject that it can 
evidence little in the way of immediate tangible results, whereas more reliable 
shells and better fire-control equipment, are physical evidence of 
improvement and of what science and engineering can achieve. These 
naturally leave a more favourable impression than apparently vague historical 
comments upon those actually required to go to sea. 
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4. The Official History & Admiralty Narrative 
The publication of the third volume of the Official History of the war 
at sea, in 1923, did nothing to settle previous disputes regarding what had 
happened at Jutland. More than anything, it was criticised for favouring the 
role of Jellicoe and the battlefleet. Far from helping to take away the passion 
from the affair by producing an informed, reasonably balanced account, 
matters were made worse. One would suspect that, due to the title of the 
work, it would be as accurate and unimpassioned an account as could be 
produced given the limitations of the evidence at that time, which would end 
any doubts and suspicions as to what had really happened. Much of the 
criticism came, quite correctly in most places, from the fact that Corbett was 
very sympathetic to the situation which Jellicoe faced. In many instances the 
work reads to justify, if not vindicate, his actions alone, which was not what 
many - both Beatty's and Jellicoe's supporters - felt should have occurred 
in an official work. By this very fact, one would wonder whether or not any 
information was being concealed or distorted. Whether or not this was the 
case, suspicions over this existed. By this time it was quite widely known that 
Corbett and Jellicoe were good friends and the account must be seen with 
this in mind. It is important to distinguish how far, if at all, Corbett was 
justified in making the comments that he did and whether or not these 
stemmed from his relationship with Jellicoe, rather than the information at 
his disposal. 
Shortly after the battle Corbett was already talking with the Admiralty 
and First Sea Lord (Admiral Sir Henry Jackson) regarding the battle and the 
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possibility of telling as full a tale as was possible when publication might be 
considered. When Jellicoe and Beatty came to London at the end of June 
1916, Corbett met them both and noted that Jellicoe was very concerned as 
regards the possible German use of mines and torpedoes. 1 On the 28th, 
Beatty came to see him and they discussed, amongst other things, whether or 
not the battle should be called Jutland or Horns Reef/Riff. In any event, 
Corbett was "much impressed with him" 2 and he gave Corbett the impression 
that he was in much higher spirits than was Jellicoe. 
Corbett's increasingly warm relationship with Jellicoe after the war was 
known to Beatty, and he might well have had good cause to be concerned 
over the official work, bearing in mind Corbett's reputation as a historian and 
that adverse comments about Jellicoe were common at the time. Corbett was 
certainly aware of both Beatty's and Jellicoe's views of the battle. Beatty's 
main worry was that Corbett would spring to Jellicoe's defence, especially 
before an account favourable to himself, or at least allowing his point of view, 
was issued under the auspices of the Admiralty. Corbett's rejection of the 
offer to write what became the Staff Appreciation almost certainly alerted 
Beatty to the fact that Corbett wanted to reach different conclusions from his 
and that these might accord more with Jellicoe's views when Corbett 
examined the evidence. 
What would be said in the official account would naturally be a 
pressing matter. By the very title, the work appeared to be the most accurate 
yet produced, both in the use of sources and in composition. Not only this, 
but as yet, public knowledge centred upon various ill-informed, mischievous 
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newspaper articles, Bellairs's book, Fawcett and Hooper and the Despatches. 
This combination very much favoured Beatty. So, it fell to Corbett, as he saw 
it, to start to correct these misconceptions. When the work was finished, not 
long before Sir Julian died, it would, like the two previous volumes, come to 
be read by some at the Admiralty before being approved for publication. This 
gave Beatty another chance edit an account of Jutland. His involvement in 
this way did not, however, have the harmful effects that many had assumed it 
would. Ideally, it is never a good thing for any work to be altered by any 
except the author. Yet, in this case, some of the comments were excessive in 
favour of Jellicoe and, by implication, to the detriment of the parts played by 
others. Many causes for complaint were concerned with phrasing, diction and 
tone, less so Corbett's narrative of events, but these did result in a more than 
trivial effect upon the text. Some of Corbett's comments did not appear in 
the published version, but it still strongly favoured Jellicoe. 
In early 1921, Corbett began working on Jutland. On 17th March, he 
met with Harper to discuss the request made by Brock, who closely supported 
Beatty throughout, that Harper's charts be revised. Brock told him that he 
"Found trouble with German [positions] as given by Scheer [which] will not 
tally with Harper's". 3 It was also agreed that Kenneth Dewar and Pollen 
would help him for 6-8 weeks initially, Pollen to start revising the charts, 
whereas Dewar seems only to have discussed the battle with him in general 
terms. 
At some points in the work Corbett almost anticipated where Jellicoe 
might face the most criticism and made too strong a defence of him than was 
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appropriate for an official history. If any analysis should have been made, 
which was a questionable thing, it should have been limited to an explanation 
of the possibilities and situations faced by those in question, but nothing 
more. The main points at issue affecting Jellicoe concerned the evening of 
the battle. Yet, a little before, it was noted that at approximately 2: 15: 
"It looked indeed as though Admiral Jellicoe's 
dispositions were exactly what was needed, and 
that if nothing incalculable happened Admiral 
Scheer would have little chance of avoiding the 
battle for which he had so long been striving. " 4 
A number of points should be made which are later repeated. The statement 
really had no place in a work of this nature and far from exonerating Jellicoe 
from blame, as was the intention, it drew attention to the fact that as the 
confrontation that was so desired did not emerge, excellent as the dispositions 
may have been, they were ultimately of little use. So, Jellicoe's abilities could 
be questioned. Anyone wishing to make a case against Jellicoe could point 
out that dispositions hours before the enemy were met, were of much less use 
than just before the battle and criticism was, therefore, invited. As the events 
of the evening unfolded, one could well argue that the incalculable did 
happen and that there was no sufficient counter. If Scheer did as it was 
hoped he would - engage in a battlefleet action - then this was all well and 
good, but no thought was given to what he might do that was not expected. 
So, Jellicoe appears to be ready only for a set-piece battle, which was not 
strictly true. The statement itself did not add anything to the account of 
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events, but invited critical examination. Its absence would not have affected 
the work at all. 
The first significant point of issue relating to the action concerned the 
movements of the BCF in relation to the 5thBS shortly after the enemy was 
first sighted. 5 It was stated that Lion's 2: 25 signal to the destroyers was 
repeated by searchlight to Barham, but that the signal might not have 
reached Evan-Thomas. Of the signal to alter course "repetition by searchlight 
would have entailed a loss of some minutes. " 6 This could have been an 
attempt to be as impartial as possible about the incident, but it should be 
noted that Corbett might not have been fully aware of the views of those 
concerned in this incident (see Chapter 5). The matter was only just 
becoming more heated and Corbett was probably not fully appraised of the 
opinions and evidence regarding whether or not the signal was repeated by 
searchlight. It is not certain just what evidence he had for this incident, but 
his assumption that the repeat was made suggested that he endorsed the 
popularly held view. However, his uncertainty here is, at best, unhelpful. 
In relation to the battlecruiser action, it was stated that regardless of 
the actual distance between the two forces: 
"it was an intense relief to the Germans that we 
did not open fire from a longer distance, when 
the superiority which they believed our heavier 
guns gave us would have denied them the 
possibility of making an effective reply. " 7 
Corbett added that Beatty was "bent on" paying back the Germans for 
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damage suffered at Dogger Bank. This was intended to imply determination 
on Beatty's part, but by saying that Beatty was "bent on" revenge could 
suggest an obsession to the exclusion of other factors in the battle, which was 
unfair and inaccurate. It was inaccurate to say anything more than that Beatty 
wished to cut-off the enemy from their bases so that they could not return 
without coming into action and to do this as soon as possible. The comment 
on the range and gunnery seemed to imply that the Germans performed 
much better at a closer range than the British. However, there was 
insufficient information at the time closely to examine the battlecruisers' 
gunnery and tactics, even though Corbett was right to wonder at this. 
In the climate into which the book was released, many were looking 
for such subtle comments and to draw argumentative criticisms from them. 
Criticism by the author was refrained from here, but examining Beatty's role 
more closely should really have been part of what should have gone into the 
work to keep a balance in examining different commands and their effects on 
the action. Concentrating on admiring Jellicoe, as Corbett did, detracted from 
developing a balanced account and missed an important issue. Jellicoe's role 
was discussed with the intention of forestalling or eliminating criticism and 
this made parts of the work seem to be highly favourable to him. Conversely, 
Beatty might have been relieved not to have had his part closely scrutinised. 
One of the most overt comments concerning a principal issue of the 
battle - battlefleet deployment - concluded that "It is scarcely to 
be 
doubted that his [Jellicoe's] reasoning was correct. " 8 This was open to a good 
deal of debate and many could argue convincingly to the contrary about what 
180 
Jellicoe's actions should have been. That such an author allowed himself to 
say something like "scarcely to be doubted" was a mistake that could never 
have been totally defensible unless the facts were undoubted. More 
importantly, it was another beacon for those looking to criticise Jellicoe. Most 
did feel that the actual deployment was the only realistic move in the 
circumstances. However, it was also felt that some time before, the 
movements of the battlefleet could have been better executed to give more 
freedom of movement and flexibility in deciding the options available to bring 
all guns to bear. A slight re-wording could have made the same point without 
making the potential for criticism of Jellicoe. 
During deployment much had been said regarding the BCF's 
movements to get to the van of the line at approximately 6: 15pm. In the 
proofs of the work, Corbett stated that: 
"Across his [Jellicoe's] front Admiral Beatty was 
steaming at 25knots and shutting-out all in an 
impenetrable pall of funnel smoke. Above all was 
the roar of the battle both ahead and to starboard 
and in this blind distraction Jellicoe had to make 
the decision on which the future of his country 
hung. " 9 
In the published work the language was tempered somewhat, which 
highlighted the fact that some of the original work gave a less impartial view 
than it should have done. If one believed the proofs, this would alter the 
interpretation of the manoeuvre. The picture was one whereby Jellicoe was 
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blinded by Beatty, but the former had to make a crucial decision amongst a 
chaotic scene. Corbett implied that Jellicoe did well despite the obstacles he 
faced. Again, the situation can be plainly stated without increasing the 
dramatic effect, leaving the same over all impression. Corbett was really 
praising Jellicoe for a manoeuvre well executed -a fact which itself was 
doubted - rather than fully explaining it. 
This incident caused stirring at the Admiralty, in 1922-3, especially as 
Beatty was seen to be responsible for muddying the waters. Captain Dudley 
Pound noted that on deployment "the Battle Cruisers did not mask the fire of 
Colossus as at that time the enemy were not in sight". 10 This questioned 
Corbett's accuracy and the extent to which the battlefleet was in action. 
Corbett made further comment on the situation as the Grand Fleet 
was deploying into line: 
"Such a mass of crossing ships were the waters at 
both ends of the line... officers held their breath, 
collisions seemed inevitable, but all was well, and 
in that fateful hour was reaped the harvest which 
in the long years of preparation had been 
laboriously sown by Admiral Jellicoe and his 
predecessors. " 11 
The intention was clearly to suggest that the result of years of sound hard 
work had come to a successful fruition, although many saw the irony in this 
statement. The phrase had a very different meaning to those who did not 
sympathise with the ideas Corbett supported. It was a complete contrast to 
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the view of the Dewars, to whose views this work was mostly an antidote. It 
could easily be said that for many years prior to the war strategy and tactics 
had been undervalued and had not been given the prominence that they 
should have had, and that, as a result of centralisation of tactics, the German 
Fleet was aided in its escape as there was little organised action that could 
have been taken to counter it - such would be guaranteed to annoy Dewar 
and Richmond. The primacy of seeking battle was a popularly held view and 
Corbett was somewhat in a minority in trying to show that command of the 
sea did not necessarily rely upon a decisive battle. The result of Jutland 
showed to him that this was proof of the views he had espoused and he was 
keen to emphasise this. 
Without any doubt Corbett was analysing the various factors that 
Jellicoe had to consider at such a crucial point, but the impression given to 
the reader was that there was little else open to Jellicoe other than to do 
what Corbett stated that he did. It was one thing to empathise, but Corbett 
did so to the point where there was little distinction between himself and 
Jellicoe. The extent to which this was true can be debated, but if an author 
intended to see into the minds of those involved, then he should at least have 
done so with uniformity to all. Many points relating to the battlefleet action 
dealt only with what Jellicoe was assumed to be thinking. This was mostly 
correct - to which Jellicoe attested 
in correspondence with Corbett - and 
was stated with a view to commending the actions taken, or at least not 
suggesting any faults. However, this limitation irked many of Jellicoe's 
opponents. 
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It was noted that Jellicoe had stated, in 1914, that he did not intend 
"to comply with enemy tactics by moving in the invited direction". 12 Corbett 
saw nothing wrong in this. Others often replied that adhering to what one 
had said two years previously did not make the management of the battle any 
more correct and that a little less caution could have been shown. Corbett 
continued that: 
"it is difficult to see, even now, how the action, so 
well begun, could have been pushed to a 
decision. " 13 
This invited suggestions that another commander could have managed the 
Fleet more ably so that the difficulties that were experienced in forcing the 
HSF into a decisive encounter would never have occurred under another. 
Generally speaking with Jutland at this time the more emphatically one said 
something, the more likely was it that it would be emphatically and insultingly 
challenged. Corbett's defence of Jellicoe only highlighted the difficulties faced 
in seeking factual clarity. In addition to saying that Jellicoe performed well, 
Corbett begged the reader to wonder how much better Scheer must have 
done to extricate himself, so the champion's laurels became withered. The 
author's statements were well-intended and their meaning was evident. Yet, 
those looking to find criticism could easily alter the emphasis of some of the 
wording to result in quite a damning picture of Jellicoe emerging. This would, 
then, work against him and the battlefleet. Indeed, one could well ask that if 
the shooting was so good and tactics so sound, where was the victory? This 
would have repeated the same arguments on the battle as had already begun. 
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Corbett appeared to follow Jellicoe's beliefs to the letter and attention was 
drawn to the fact that little seemed to have been done to force the battle to 
any conclusion. This again invited criticism where the author wished to praise 
the actions taken. 
One of the most dubious statements made was that as the German 
ships faded away into the gloom of the evening: 
"The situation was indeed so completely wrapped 
in mystery as to baffle even his [Jellicoe's] 
remarkable power of penetration. " 14 
This did Jellicoe no service at all. Here, he was seen to be without a doubt 
the premier tactical brain of the Navy and it was implied that if Jellicoe was 
baffled, then no-one else could have presumed to know any better what was 
happening. It would have sufficed merely to have commented upon 
conditions, which would have been better in achieving neutrality in the work 
and focusing the reader's attention to the real point of the work -a 
comprehensive analysis of events. It would also have made the subject as a 
whole less contentious, which was what the author should have done 
throughout. 
In commenting on the Official History it should be distinguished 
exactly what is being criticised. Because Corbett's and Jellicoe's opinions were 
the same, one should be wary of criticising Jellicoe's actions because of 
Corbett's style. In the 1920s, people criticised both Jellicoe's actions and 
Corbett's style, but many criticised Jellicoe in a response to Corbett's 
comments. For example, Jellicoe never claimed to be the Navy's premier 
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tactical brain. Beatty's supporters did not think this. Although Jellicoe helped 
Corbett, he cannot be held responsible for Corbett's phrasing. Many 
criticisms, as will be seen, were made of the work and its portrayal of Jellicoe, 
but these were really directed at Corbett. 
Following Corbett's death, what might happen to the work was a 
concern to Jellicoe. He expressed the view that he: 
"should like the story to be told as written by Sir 
Julian Corbett, and it is particularly undesirable to 
my mind to include alterations... This remark 
applies of course to any alterations which other 
people may wish to make ... I find it difficult to 
express my admiration for the style of the 
narrative, the language in which it is expressed, 
and its accuracy. " 15 
This was unsurprising and noted the undesirability of altering the work of a 
recently deceased historian of such repute, who just so happened to echo his 
own sentiments. Madden wrote to Jellicoe that: 
"I have confidence in his [Amery's] fairness and I 
think he is too shrewd to allow Beatty to send out 
an obvious partisan statement which could be 
pulled to pieces ... I 
don't think it can be altered 
and he agreed it would not be politic to do 
so... The Admiralty have placed themselves in a 
fix and I feel confident its solution will be 
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favourable to you and if not Bacon is ready to 
act. " 16 
Similar sentiments were common. In addition, Corbett's family were alerted 
to the fact that the work might be altered significantly. The persistence of 
public criticism of Jellicoe contributed to Reginald Bacon taking action, 
writing his book, The Jutland Scandal, published in the following year, which 
contained strong criticism of Beatty's role at Jutland. Some noted that the 
months following the publication of Bacon's book were the most bitter of the 
whole dispute. 17 The opinion Madden had of Amery was not well founded, 
in fact, the opposite seemed to be true. 18 Beatty might well have become 
even more determined to issue an account more favourable to his view of the 
battle, especially as he could not alter Corbett's work without creating much 
trouble. There was, however, the basic, widespread feeling that the work was 
too kind to Jellicoe and that its credibility suffered because of it. 
In judging the volume, many were quick to recall the close relations 
between Jellicoe and Corbett. Shortly after Jellicoe's The Grand Fleet was 
published, Corbett wrote to thank him: 
"for the welcome present of your book. I am 
reading it with the greatest pleasure and interest 
and I may say comfort to find that from the 
official material I have been able to get as near as 
I have done to your intentions and difficulties. So 
far I find very little to modify... Pray accept my 
warm congratulations. " 19 
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The historian was obviously pleased to have deduced many of Jellicoe's 
thoughts, or at least those to which he admitted. It was true that Jellicoe's 
book helped endorse the comments later made by Corbett and that Corbett 
made them with the confidence that he knew that he had a good idea of what 
was in the C-in-C's mind. Corbett also received more tangible help in 
composing his account of the battle in the form of notes from Jellicoe that: 
"will enable me to improve and strengthen the 
narrative in many places... it is a great satisfaction 
to have your approval of it as a whole. " 20 
This, at the very least, helped support Jellicoe's case in a climate where the 
BCF were still portrayed as being the heroes of the day. With this in mind, 
Jellicoe wrote to Daniel that "I anticipate considerable trouble with the 
present Board of Admiralty over certain passages". 21 This clearly showed that 
he suspected those with sympathies for the BCF would attempt to draw 
emphasis away from the role of the battlefleet. However, this was made 
almost impossible by Corbett's death. 
It must not be forgotten that since 1919, and especially after Beatty 
became First Sea Lord, an account favouring his version of events was being 
prepared. Despite all these efforts, the first official account published was one 
that favoured Jellicoe and the battlefleet. Corbett had done his best to deter 
the Admiralty from first publishing an account that he was sure would favour 
Beatty - the Narrative - and ultimately succeeded. That Beatty felt that the 
work did not reflect the Admiralty's views led to the need to publish an 
Admiralty account. Because of Corbett's support of his own views of the 
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correct place of battle in war - it being not an absolute necessity - it was 
felt desirable to draw attention to the fact that, ultimately, the raison d' titre 
of a Navy was to sink on sight enemy vessels, or, failing that, to inflict the 
utmost damage. Corbett believed that battle was not essential and felt that 
Jutland went a long way towards proving this. This caused serious concern at 
the Admiralty. 
If it seemed that the Admiralty was endorsing this view, or not 
opposing it, the fear was that it could be assumed by many serving officers 
and men to mean concurrence with Corbett's view. Thus, it might be thought 
that engaging the enemy would assume less importance in the minds of many 
present and future commanders. Many have said that as Corbett's account 
could not really be altered, the Admiralty's issuing of the disclaimer at the 
beginning of the work was a vindictive stab at Corbett. 22 This was erroneous. 
Primarily, the Admiralty had to maintain adherence to the belief in seeking 
confrontation with enemy forces as the only sure way of maintaining 
supremacy at sea, even though Corbett's view had much to commend it. It 
was admittedly a view which Beatty and others favoured, in that it implied 
aggressive strategy and tactics. Yet, there was hardly an officer that did not 
agree that damaging as many enemy vessels as possible was the best way to 
ensure success. Basically, the problem was one of degree as to where the 
emphasis on strategy should be placed. Although both views had merit, it was 
thought to be better to encourage the idea that being content with not losing 
mastery was insufficient. 
The foreword itself would, in Captain Pound's opinion, "be subjected 
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to much more intense criticism than anything in the book itself. " 23However, 
it was essential in the contemporary circumstances. Its inclusion was agreed to 
by, amongst others, Keyes, Field and Brock, and it was not merely a device 
by battlecruiser sympathisers to attempt to detract from the pro-Jellicoe text. 
It has been suggested that Corbett: 
"acknowledged that the concerted pursuit of these 
two central objectives of "Mahanian" maritime 
strategy [commanding the sea and seeking decisive 
battle] was usually valid. It was only his willingness 
to say that sometimes it might not be so, that got 
him into trouble with the Admiralty. " 24 
This was just what happened here. 
As the account could be read by anyone with the inclination to open a 
copy, many were naturally anxious regarding what had been said or implied. 
The DTSD, Captain Haggard, felt that in this type of work: 
"the author must decide on his viewpoint. Either 
he must be entirely detached or he must associate 
himself with one or other of the units 
engaged... [Corbett] selected as his observation 
post the bridge of the Fleet Flagship and the 
account is written entirely from the point of view 
of the C-in-C ... 
it is most unfair to take advantage 
of the select viewpoint to criticise the actions of 
subordinate commanders... [some passages] give 
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the wrong impression which subsequent and more 
authoritative accounts may be powerless to 
remove.. . The most 
ill-judged criticisms in the 
account are those concerning the alleged 
interference of the Battlecruisers with the 
deployment. " 25 
This reflected that the work was not universally well-received and was another 
source of potentially damaging views. Corbett's standpoint understandably 
disturbed the officer responsible for training. There was too, a feeling that 
the best Jutland account would really come from within the service, as it 
would be composed by professional seamen. This implied, to a wider public, a 
superior knowledge of all Naval matters. After all, Der Krieg in der Nordsee 
was composed by Von der Tann's navigation officer - Fregattenkapitän 
Otto Groos - under the guidance of Erich Raeder. The irony of this 
appeared to have been missed. The Navy's self-styled historians - such as 
Richmond and the Dewars - had previously stressed that Naval officers by 
no means excelled at history. 
Some might have resented Corbett being allowed access to official 
material to produce the "official" work purporting to express the opinion of 
the Naval Staff. Many felt that it was far from a true representation of feeling 
in the service and of the battle itself. Another felt that criticism in the work: 
"has in fact been entirely confined to the conduct 
of the Vice-Admiral commanding the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet. Certain passages show a strong bias 
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on the part of the author for which it is not easy 
to account. Praise on the other hand is reserved 
for the Commander-in-Chief and the energy, 
reserve and daring shown by, the V. A. C. B. C. F. 
receives no recognition. " 26 
This was mainly accurate. There was not as much criticism of Beatty as was 
implied here, but more importantly for the controversy, as for all the other 
works, it was not so much what the work said that was important, but how it 
was perceived. 
Beatty and those with similar views did not like Corbett's work at all. 
Given the latter's sympathies, they had reason not to. The proofs of Corbett's 
account had been seen by Beatty and at least one member of his staff. In 
certain parts, the wording was objected to. Few alterations were made for the 
published account, but the comments made on the proofs reflected a familiar 
theme in the affair. It was noted by Corbett that "The Lützow was completely 
disabled. " 27 The response to this remark was "by the Battle Cruisers!! " This 
was known not to be entirely correct, although Lützow did receive some 
damage in the battlecruiser phase and, later, from Invincible. Here again was 
evidence of the belief that some did not like to admit to the fact that the 
battlefleet played a part in the battle. One can sympathise with the desire for 
the shooting of the battlecruisers to be praised, but not to be praised for 
something the BCF did not actually achieve. The statement clearly implied 
that the damage was from battlecruisers alone, which amounted to another 
small attempt to under-play the role of the battlefleet. 
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Corbett continued that "The Derfflinger was little better off'. 28 This 
prompted the remark "also by the B. C. 's+5th B. S. (not the B. F. )", which was 
an odd remark. Corbett was referring to the total damage sustained by the 
ship in the action and this included the battlefleet action. The author of the 
remark apparently was aware of precise information as to hits received by 
German ships, but limits the comments to the battlecruiser action. At the 
time this was impossible to state with such accuracy. One must remember the 
BCF's gunnery practices and tactical muddles, which suggested that this 
comment was wishful thinking to suit a preconceived view of the effectiveness 
of the shooting of the battlecruisers. It was yet another attempt to state that 
all the damage that was done occurred before the battlefleet came into 
action, but this could not have been known with such certainty. A reluctance 
to admit any battlefleet involvement pervaded these comments and was 
testament to the fact that feelings were as divided as they had been since the 
battle. The same arguments were, therefore, being repeated. The curious trait 
of neglecting the 5thBS completely when it suited BCF sympathisers to do so 
still persisted, yet this comment was a rare mention for Evan-Thomas's 
squadron by a BCF supporter. 
In examining and commenting upon these proofs, Beatty and his 
friends or staff at least had the opportunity to correct obvious excesses. As 
has been seen, this was justified in some instances. Although one might not 
agree that the work should have come before the eyes of some at the 
Admiralty, some modest good did come from it, even if it was hard to know 
who exactly had done what and with what motive. Even Harper thought that: 
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"Very few of the alterations were made by 
Admiralty request... As the account now stands it 
is greatly improved, the original was not worthy of 
Corbett as it showed some bias. The altered 
wording, however, puts Beatty's actions in a better 
light than Corbett considered justified. " 29 
Corbett, as he worked towards the end of this section of the history, 
doubtless wanted to support Jellicoe wherever possible, but he also wanted to 
strengthen his own position to the maximum extent. He had taken advantage 
of the stalemate between Harper and Beatty, not only to get Harper's 
`Record', but it benefited him because a work by another author had not 
been released before his. He criticised the Dewars' Appreciation, as seen in 
the previous chapter, but it is hard not to suspect that he did this to help 
discourage the Admiralty from considering releasing this, or a work derived 
from it, before he had released his. Longmans had mentioned that they had 
exclusive rights to publish the Official History and both publisher and author 
did their best to ensure that they were not upstaged. Had the information in 
Harper's work been published, it would have helped provide a more accurate 
picture of the battle earlier on. However, Corbett's attempts to suppress prior 
release of accounts by others retarded a more complete understanding of the 
battle at a point where elucidation was most needed, and allowed the 
publication of scurrilous books and articles that influenced much public 
feeling against the battlefleet and Jellicoe's role. As a result, the faults in his 
and other works of the 1920s have persisted largely unchallenged, hampering 
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a better understanding of Jutland for many years after. The official account 
began to alter the popular image of Beatty's and the BCF's heroics. Inspired 
by this, BCF sympathisers felt that the truer picture of the battle had still not 
been told. So, they set about telling it more powerfully than they had 
previously. 
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In June 1924, after nearly five years, the edited version of the Dewars' 
Appreciation - the Narrative - became the Admiralty-approved account of 
the battle of Jutland. That many would disagree with what was written was 
evident by the presence of comments from Jellicoe that highlighted areas that 
some felt had not been fully understood or explained, and which others - 
BCF supporters - felt were an accurate statement of the events. Since 
Harper submitted his work, it seemed that an account that at least satisfied all 
concerned in the affair that they had been accurately represented would be 
impossible to produce. Many, indeed, might have wondered if one would ever 
be published. The Admiralty account did not improve relations or enlighten a 
still rather unenlightened public regarding what had happened at Jutland. In 
most parts, it read as an often spiteful re-statement of the views of BCF 
supporters at the Admiralty. 
The first page of the text noted that, with a few exceptions, all signals 
of the battle were published in the Despatches. 30 This was clearly not true. 
This might be taken to mean that all the signals of any importance were 
already published and that this should be taken at face value. One was then 
given to wonder what constituted an important signal and who decided that it 
was such. A contentious statement like this was not too good a start for a 
work that hoped to describe the battle in an unimpassioned manner. It 
should have alerted the reader that much was not as it would seem, although 
he was already being flatly told to accept that whatever was stated here was 
correct. 
One comment that was worth noting with regard to all the Jutland 
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histories, was that, in plotting ships' movements, a continuous plot implied an 
accuracy that it was not possible to achieve, and that a track was "not based 
on any one record, but was more of the nature of a complicated mosaic or 
puzzle picture". 31 It is true that the most accurate tracks were more likely to 
be mean plots from more than one source, but this was not always the case. 
It might have been assumed that where a track differed from any information 
in the text, the more accurate view could be gained from the text. However, a 
sensitive issue could be conveniently obscured to forestall criticism on the 
grounds of there being insufficient, or conflicting, evidence. The Dewars had 
not examined the logs, charts and details of gun ranges and were content to 
avoid detailed references to positions and scaled plans. However, if plans 
were included in any work, they must have been accurate enough to bear out 
what was written in the text, or vice-versa, unless they served no purpose 
except to confuse, deliberately or not. The statement quoted above was 
correct as to the nature of the charts, but it was possible to verify accuracy by 
comparison with other sources and possibly to discount the value of some 
plans. Here, the remark was used as a convenient excuse for making 
comments about the action, which other evidence did not support, so -using 
inherent inaccuracies in the charts as excuses as and when required. 
An issue of the battle that would not die, was the failure of the 5thBS 
to turn to follow the battlecruisers at 2: 32 on that afternoon. The Narrative 
noted that: 
"the Lion's alter course signal having been 
received, the Barham turned back fifteen points 
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to SSE. " 32 
Unusually, there was felt to be the need to elaborate on this point: 
"At 2: 30pm Barham had received a signal 
indicating the course that the Vice-Admiral 
intended to steer: the actual "executive" signal is 
logged as having been received at 2: 37pm vide. 
Barham (s). " 33 
No similar detail as to other ships' turns was entered into. It was very odd 
that, after reporting receipt of the signal, the authors felt the need to prove 
what was said, or to amplify the matter. This could only mean that the 
authors were aware that the issue was hotly contested and that they sought to 
support Beatty in this respect. As a result, it only made Evan-Thomas's 
actions then, and since, seem to be suspect. The details will be dealt with 
later (and in Chapter 5), but recording the matter in this way was gratuitous, 
unless it was to ultimately raise doubts regarding Evan-Thomas's handling of 
his ships. The time quoted obviously comes from the log that was altered 
(dealt with in Chapter 5) and the authors might have assumed that this was 
accurate, but checking facts was not part of the editor's job. The Dewars were 
unaware of tampering with the logs, or at least were willing to believe what 
they said to comply with their preconceived notions. This also showed 
negligence in their examination of the evidence. The over all result of this 
was not good for Evan-Thomas. There was no need for the note other than 
to be mischievous. No other signal had a footnote to confirm its receipt. This 
was highly irregular. 
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It was noted in the opening pages of the Narrative that Harper's work 
had been of great assistance. All the accounts contained obvious evidence 
to this fact. When the battlecruisers opened fire "The firing was hot and 
effective". 35 This exactly quoted Harper and the Dewars who copied it. When 
the 5thBS opened fire each account noted "It was some minutes before their 
fire became effective, for the light was difficult. " 36 At approximately 4: 33, it 
was reported that Hipper's ships were all in a condition to renew action. A 
note followed that: 
"The damage done to the German Battle Cruisers in 
this phase was considerable, but German information 
on the point is not conclusive. " 37 
This was another dubious statement. The reader was invited to believe that 
damage was considerable, but German sources, for their own reasons, denied 
this. The implication was that the "considerable" damage was inflicted by the 
battlecruisers. What was not mentioned, was that information did exist to 
prove that the 5thBS fired effectively from the outset. German evidence 
strengthened the view that the 1stSG was not seriously damaged by the BCF 
during the battlecruiser phase and that the most effective firing was achieved 
by the battleships of the 5thBS and later from the BE So, if the damage was 
"considerable" one would scarcely expect German ships to have been capable 
of continuing action. It was a remark to foster the belief that the 
battlecruisers inflicted more damage than they actually had. However, 
checking evidence was not Pollen's task. 
Following completion of the Dewars' Appreciation, copies had been 
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circulated amongst the few who needed to be made aware of the contents, or 
who held prominent positions at the battle. Jellicoe did not "find the account 
suitable and informed London - he was by then Governor-General of New 
Zealand - that there were a mass of inaccuracies and that if publication was 
to be considered, the work must undergo grave alterations. He told Oswald 
Frewen: 
"The carelessness and inaccuracy of the document 
are outstanding, and the charts or diagrams are 
even worse. Few of them have a scale attached, 
although supposed to be drawn to scale. Latitude 
and longitude are conspicuous by their absence, 
and successive diagrams illustrating events 
occurring at the same time show ships in quite 
different relative positions ... I don't know what the 
Admiralty will do when my comments arrive. I 
shall request that they be published alongside the 
narrative unless the latter is corrected to meet my 
criticisms, but in view of the nature of my 
comments I hardly think the Admiralty will care 
to publish them. " 38 
Regardless of one's view of the battle, it must be said that this view of the 
account was accurate. When Jellicoe stated that he felt that his comments 
would probably not be published, it suggested that he thought that someone 
would make sure that his views were not expressed. Alternatively, and 
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perhaps more likely, was the feeling that they were too contradictory to suit 
inclusion in such a work. Despite Jellicoe's thoughts, efforts were made to 
entertain his suggestions and the account altered, yet not enough to satisfy his 
objections. This indicated the influence of a Beatty sympathiser. 
General criticism from Jellicoe was pertinent and he informed Their 
Lordships: 
"I fully realise the difficulty of reconciling 
conflicting evidence but the narrative contains 
implications which are based on a far greater 
knowledge of German and some British 
movements than was within the cognisance of the 
Commander-in-Chief at the time... It is with 
sincere regret that I feel compelled to express 
dissent in any form. " 
39 
Yet, some, or all, of the Sea Lords did not feel that they should wait until 
Jellicoe was completely satisfied. 
On 23rd January 1924, the Board of Admiralty considered whether or 
not publication should wait until Evan-Thomas's health had improved 
sufficiently - he had suffered a stroke after his brief meeting with Amery 
regarding the work (see Chapter 5) - to ask if he concurred in the account 
being published as it stood. It was decided: 
"that this step should not be taken for the 
following reasons: 
1. It might result in the publication being further 
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delayed for an indefinite time, 
2. Viscount Jellicoe is known to have been in 
communication with Admiral Evan-Thomas, 
3. There could be no certainty that the erroneous 
views expressed in the Appendix would not be 
published at some future time when the Admiralty 
would not have the same opportunity of 
correcting them. " 40 
This clearly explained the Admiralty's view. It must be remembered that the 
delay referred to was approaching five years and Corbett had already 
published. Jellicoe had written several times to Evan-Thomas that he objected 
to the implication that he was responsible for the late turns of his squadron 
to follow the BCF. 41 The Admiralty might have assumed that Jellicoe's 
protests on Evan-Thomas's behalf would be little different if Evan-Thomas 
himself had submitted his own remarks. Thus, with this decision arrived at, it 
only remained to respond to Jellicoe's criticisms. 
Board agreement was reached that Jellicoe's views were "erroneous" 
and that this needed explaining to the reader of the work. One of Jellicoe's 
main objections was that the work: 
"is most misleading in deductions drawn, and in its 
attempt to indicate what was apparent or should 
have been apparent to the Commander-in-Chief 
from the information at his disposal at the 
time ... 
in my view the picture of the action at 
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present presented is inaccurate and misleading, 
the ideas attributed to me are in many cases 
entirely unjustified. " 42 
However, to those with differing views on the battle, the new work did 
represent what had happened much more accurately. Jellicoe had been 
informed that his: 
"comments thereon have been found most useful. 
It is the wish of Their Lordships that no pains 
should be spared to make the book an accurate 
narrative of fact... Some of the amendments 
proposed by you cannot, however, be 
accepted... as they conflict with the latest evidence; 
wherever possible your criticisms have been 
met.. . Purely conjectural matter, such as that in 
connection with the deductions which were or 
might have been drawn by you during the battle 
from the information apparently available, has 
been omitted or amended... Should you still be in 
disagreement with any of the statements 
made ... My 
Lords request that you will 
communicate... and those objections which My 
Lords then find themselves unable to meet will be 
inserted in an appendix in accordance with your 
desire. " 43 
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It would, therefore, appear that the Admiralty had some idea of when 
publication would be, as Jellicoe was being given one last chance to fight his 
corner. 
Following Long's promise to Jellicoe and Evan-Thomas that they 
should approve the account, the Admiralty were obliged to consult Jellicoe. 
An obvious delay occurred regarding Jellicoe's detailed criticisms reaching 
London, let alone in examining them. It had been the Admiralty's intention to 
publish their account as close as possible to Corbett's who, then, was doing 
his best to have his issued first. It was suggested that Jellicoe be politely 
requested to send his final remarks to facilitate as early as possible a 
publication. 44 It was the opinion of Captain Haggard that: 
"As this Narrative will be the basis for all future 
histories and appreciations, too much care cannot 
be taken to ensure accuracy. " 45 
However, he also noted that: 
"The undertaking given by Lord Long that no 
narrative should be published to which Lord 
Jellicoe did not agree gives Lord Jellicoe the 
power to represent or suppress the facts in 
accordance with his own ideas and removes 
entirely the element of impartiality which should 
predominate in an account of this description. " 46 
There was much to support this view. It was very similar to the methods 
employed by Beatty with Harper and as there had to be publication some 
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time, the Admiralty could not necessarily wait until Jellicoe was satisfied. 
Brock felt that Jellicoe had been allowed too much influence and 
Beatty did not like the delay that this was causing. 47 It was quite 
understandable that some should feel like this, but it must be remembered 
that Beatty felt that his ideas were not sufficiently stated in any official 
account and both he and Jellicoe were desirous to have the most correct 
account published. This did depend upon one's point of view, disputes over 
which created the very situation that Wemyss had wanted to avoid. Up to this 
point, in making comments or adjustments, each side sought to correct the 
views of the other, which, in their view, was the true picture. In Beatty's 
defence, it might be said that he was alarmed at the fact that Long had 
prevented him from altering Harper's `Record', but had given Jellicoe 
permission to alter the revised Dewar account. It was, however, evident that 
although Beatty was strongly supported in limited parts of the Admiralty, 
Jellicoe, although he was half way around the world, was even more strongly 
supported than was Beatty at home. 
That conjectural matter had been "omitted or amended" would seem to 
have met the objections raised to such material appearing. However, such 
parts of the text that were thus affected were as inflammatory as they had 
been in the original. A solution that satisfied both sides was probably not 
expected, given that there were such differences between those who had 
taken part in the battle. The result was always likely to have been an 
unsatisfactory compromise and it was exactly that. Neither those who 
supported and shared Beatty's views could agree that the work was as 
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accurate as it should have been. Jellicoe and many others sharing his views 
stated that many fallacies were still being perpetrated, despite Jellicoe 
registering a protest that was relegated to an appendix. 
As the work was issued under the auspices of the Admiralty, any 
comments or explanatory remarks regarding the material within would have 
to maintain a sense of continuity based upon a particular position. In order to 
reinforce the tone of the work, the introduction to Jellicoe's comments, in 
Appendix G, stated that: 
"Notes have been added, where necessary, mainly 
in amplification or elucidation of the text criticised 
in the Appendix. " 48 
This actually meant that attempts were made to reinforce the comments made 
in the text, simply by contradicting Jellicoe. They did not amplify or elucidate 
the text. If anything, they made it more confused. 
The first criticism regarded events of which Jellicoe could not have 
been aware throughout the battle and the inferences drawn by the author. 
The response to this was that: 
"Their Lordships are satisfied that the compilers 
of the Narrative have kept to the facts, and that 
inferences and implications have been strictly 
repressed. " 
49 
In a similarly abrupt response, when Jellicoe noted that Evan-Thomas was 
not at fault in handling his squadron, it was said "The facts are clearly stated 
in the Narrative. " 50 This neither explained, amplified or elucidated the text or 
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Jellicoe's comment. It merely stated the Admiralty's support for the views 
expressed, which were already known. The real fact of the matter was that 
this part of the battle was a genuinely contested issue and there was evidence 
to both support and deny the claims against Evan-Thomas. The comment 
gave the impression that there was no doubt as to the actions surrounding the 
two turns. This made Jellicoe and Evan-Thomas appear to be still believing in 
events that had conclusively been proven fallacious, which was not the case. 
Whether or not Barham could read flag signals from Lion was next to 
be mentioned. 51 It was followed by Jellicoe's complaint regarding what it was 
claimed he could and should have deduced when a fleet action approached: 
"The differences arising from the receipt of the 
various reports are not realised or brought-out, and 
a false impression is thereby created. " 52 
There then followed almost a page of notes regarding how it was possible for 
Jellicoe to have estimated the position of the German Fleet and how this 
could, and implies should, have been done from the information available. 
This was one of the worst instances of being wise after the event. Jellicoe had 
less than 90 minutes to ascertain this and was not in possession of all the 
information that the editor used. 
The confusion experienced during the night action was cause for 
another objection. The report from Birmingham placing battlecruisers - 
which could only have been German - astern of Iron Duke at 11: 30, 
according to the account, was supposed to have indicated the enemy's course. 
Jellicoe rightly remarked that the report: 
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"read correctly by the Commander-in-Chief, also 
gave the impression that the Battle Fleet was 
between the enemy and his intended route 
home. " 53 
In masterful irony, the reply was: 
"This is another instance in which an inference 
drawn by Lord Jellicoe is omitted from the 
narrative, because it is an inference and not a 
plain statement of fact. " 54 
If this was the case, then Jellicoe should not have been attributed with being 
able to have easily determined the position of the enemy earlier in the day, as 
this was an inference, not a plain statement of fact. It must be said that the 
author of these remarks (Kenneth Dewar) was not being consistent with the 
main text and was happy to use what he felt was a fact to prove something 
when it suited his view, other evidence was ignored or poorly explained away. 
The reply to Jellicoe was based on only one interpretation of the 
signal. The Narrative did not venture to explore the various possibilities that 
the C-in-C faced. It was biased essentially because it was ill-informed, 
amongst other faults. Previously, it had been stated that the intention was to 
make the work as accurate as was possible, but the authors did not 
understand that they needed to explore the situation in greater depth, or at 
least allow for differences in the perception of information by the participants 
in the battle. Had this been appreciated, what happened at the battle would 
have been better understood. Possibly, this might have reduced the extent of 
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the resulting disputes. However, it seemed that the intention was not to 
understand, but to make cases appropriate to the interests of some 
individuals. 
Another example of the lack of attention to the details of the battle 
and how this led to unjustified criticism, came when Jellicoe noted that many 
signals were not quoted completely and were, as a result, "liable to 
mislead. " 55 The Narrative stated that "it is not considered that these precis 
are misleading". 56 One must wonder why there were so many summaries of 
signals, when they had a crucial bearing on understanding of the affair. If 
they were not misleading (they often were, in fact), then those responsible for 
the summaries were trusted not to have omitted any relevant parts. However, 
most signals themselves were not so long that they could not have been 
recorded in full. This again pointed to the Dewars and the fact that they were 
rather confused by the volume and scope of the evidence. By being highly 
partial and seeking simplification, their work lost accuracy. There was also 
enough of a hint to suggest that some, or all, at the Admiralty were content 
to endorse fudging of this nature, even though accuracy had been stressed as 
a primary aim. 
As with Corbett's account, a good deal of criticism regarding the 
actions of individuals at the battle stemmed from the way in which it was 
being recorded. The new account, although edited, suffered like many 
histories of the battle suffer, in that the authors were keen to stress a point 
or fact where it coincided with their views or researches and, therefore, saw 
some justification of their views in the event. This was true both of the 
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Dewars and Corbett, but this was, perhaps, less of a criticism than it might 
seem. The differing views and methods of recording the events highlighted 
that with Jutland and many other historical disputes, there was much to 
support both sides from an examination of the evidence. As further evidence 
emerged, it became apparent that the views of those supporting the BCF at 
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Jutland were based upon dubious evidence. Yet, the extent to which the 
supporters of these BCF opinions doggedly held onto them despite 
conflicting evidence was revealing. It was also indicative that all documents of 
the battle and personal views never completely agreed as to precisely what 
happened, if they ever could. 
Much of the controversy that surrounded the Dewars' work stemmed 
from that rather dubious phrase regarding bringing out the "lessons" of 
Jutland. At face value, this seemed to have given the author carte blanche to 
make any criticisms. One might well agree that to work freely should be a 
requirement if the most accurate picture was to be attained. It did, however, 
give the author the freedom to run riot as well. This Narrative was some 
attempt at limiting the excesses as appeared in the original Appreciation, 
although the aim was to include as much criticism of the BF as was possible. 
What lessons there were to be learned naturally depended upon the teacher. 
It must be wondered if any two teachers can teach the same lesson -a point 
often made by Kenneth Dewar. By 1924, Jutland had been used both to 
support Beatty and the views of former BCF men, and by those supporting 
Jellicoe. It was used by the Dewars to show the supposed folly of placing too 
much faith in material matters alone and to advance the subject of history. 
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Yet, the outcome from all the accounts added little to a better understanding 
of what had happened, because every author subjugated the search for the 
required accuracy to his own concerns. Future disputes only illustrated how a 
dearth of knowledge made matters worse for some. 
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5. Poles apart: The 5thBS and BCF at Jutland. 
As the controversy wore on through the 1920s, some aspects became 
increasingly personal and not only involved heated debates, but had serious 
physical effects upon some of those involved. This was a direct result of the 
fact that, despite evidence to show that Beatty was not as correct in his view 
of the action as he led others to believe, Beatty's deliberate efforts to distort 
the battle were succeeding, thanks largely to shelving the work of Harper's 
committee. Beatty and those sympathetic to him took advantage of this. The 
assertions made against Evan-Thomas, relating to his part in the battlecruiser 
phase of Jutland, were especially fallacious. The subsequent effects which 
they had upon his health showed the importance of trying to establish as 
accurate a picture of the battle as was possible. 
At Jutland, shortly after the enemy had first been sighted, it is 
commonly believed that the signal made by flags from Lion, at 2: 32, to turn 
SSE, was only read and acted upon by the battlecruisers, as, due to the 
distance and increasing smoke, the 5thBS did not receive the signal until it 
was repeated by searchlight (see diagrams #1-4). This opened the gap 
between them, delaying the battleships coming into action. Yet, before this, 
Beatty noted that: 
"there was ample opportunity for the 5th B. S. to 
close the B. C. 's... That they did not do so was due 
to the fact that I could not get a signal to 
them... not stated at the meeting as I had no wish 
to impute bad manoeuvring on the part of the 
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R. A. 5th B. S. who had supported me so well. " 1 
So, contrary to popular belief, Beatty was accepting the principal 
responsibility for not closing the battleships. He did commend Evan-Thomas 
for the way in which he handled his ships in the battle and did not abuse him 
for not turning with Lion. Indeed, he only referred to this in the 1920s when 
his own position was under great scrutiny. He could have prevented attacks 
on Evan-Thomas, yet doing this would have meant admitting negligence or 
incompetence on his part and that of staff, which, not surprisingly, he did not 
want to do as Admiral of the Fleet, Earl, First Sea Lord and international 
Naval hero. There was, above all, an explicit admission that the confusion was 
the result of his own actions and that he did not expect Evan-Thomas to use 
his initiative. However, Beatty later made different claims. This must mean 
that he took time to consider his actions and this has other implications. 
Beatty knew that no signal had been received, even though he had 
tried to make one and he had followed GFBOs by attempting to get it to 
Evan-Thomas. Presumably, he was aware that his staff were at least trying to 
follow the correct procedure. So, Beatty was justified to some extent in 
shielding Seymour from blame over the 2: 32 failure to turn the 5thBS. 
Perhaps this was an unusually selfless act on his part, in that he was 
shouldering the greater part of the blame, but it was only admitted in 
restricted company and the others at this meeting, in 1916, failed to see the 
real importance. 
What seemed remarkable was that Beatty was unable to get any signal 
through, which can only be due to one or more serious failures. If personal 
213 
communications had broken down between the admiral and his signallers, if 
searchlights would not work, if flags would not fly or the wireless was not in a 
working state, with no-one being able to semaphore, then this is explicable. 
However, before and after this, Lion sent messages by searchlight, flags and 
WT and there was no record of a complete signalling failure. 
Since reports of sighting the enemy were first received from Galatea, 
there was a gap of 10 minutes before the battlecruisers turned SSE to meet 
the enemy, although some always maintained that they turned immediately, as 
did Beatty in his despatch. The signal for the battleships to assume a position 
5 miles from Lion had been made at 1: 30.2 Beatty wished to reduce that 5 
mile gap as action was imminent. The time of the difficult signal to which 
Beatty referred, must encompass 2: 20 to 2: 32. So, on hearing of the enemy, 
some difficulty was experienced in the BCF's procedures and Beatty almost 
certainly knew he had failed to communicate with Evan-Thomas, which he 
also knew was important. Far from rushing into space at the enemy, as some 
have suggested, Beatty waited for about 8 poorly accounted for minutes, but 
without much success due to signalling difficulties, excitement and dither, 
hence the poor explanation. If there were difficulties with the searchlight or 
wireless, other methods could have been used in the meantime, even firing a 
gun for attention if the matter was felt to be so urgent. That this was not so, 
suggested that there was no equipment fault and that Beatty only became 
aware of the difficulty regarding the 5thBS after the turn. As always, when 
battlecruiser signalling is discussed, blame always falls on the unfortunate 
Ralph Seymour, but others might have been responsible in those vital few 
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minutes after 2: 20. Any one of a number of people could have made a 
mistake, however small in itself, which led to a breakdown in signalling. With 
the signal to turn SSE being followed by the battlecruisers, the responsibility 
for repeating it to the battleships would seem to have fallen on Tiger, but 
again, assumptions should not be made upon a superficial appreciation of 
events. 
The BCF and SthBS had not previously worked together and this fact 
determined the original disposition of five miles apart. If there had existed 
any opportunity to train together, Beatty was sure that: 
"the R. A. would have done the right thing 
instinctively without orders as was done by every 
other squadron commander and ship. " 3 
This illustrated the significant difference in thinking which was so much a 
feature of the controversy. It confirmed that Beatty knew that Evan-Thomas 
expected to be signalled, so he made an effort to do so. However, the 
signalling organisation encountered difficulties that meant that the signal was 
never made. It is worth bearing in mind that although Beatty ordered the 
signal, he might not have been aware that a problem with the searchlight 
repeat had arisen until afterwards. As repeats had been made without error 
up to that point, he would have had little reason to doubt that the signal had 
got through. He obviously became aware of the fault soon afterwards. 
With the distance from the battlecruisers being roughly 5 miles, some, 
such as Bacon, believed that this made the 5thBS part of the screening force 
and not the BCF itself. If this was the case, which is doubtful, then the 
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actions of Tiger in not repeating signals to Barham, suggested that it might 
have been felt in Tiger that the battleships were not an extension of the BCF 
in this situation, but a separate force. Therefore, signals would not 
automatically be repeated to the 5thBS; that would be the responsibility of 
the Flagship. The use of flags might well indicate that the intention in the 
Flagship was to use this method only to pass signals amongst the BCF. Yet, 
over greater distances, this would not be the case and so WT or the 
searchlight would be used. For all Evan-Thomas knew, he was not an 
intended recipient of all flag signals. 
It is well known that Beatty did not want his ships to miss 
opportunities by commanders waiting for orders and introduced a system 
whereby initiative was encouraged. Evan-Thomas, though he might have been 
generally aware of this practice, would not expect to change course without 
direct orders, whereas those in the battlecruisers would. From Beatty's 
comment, it was evident that he knew the BCF's methods to be different 
from those of the 5thBS and was at fault for not making Evan-Thomas aware 
of how the BCF and Evan-Thomas himself might act in battle when working 
with the BCF. This meant that Beatty understood the necessity for closing the 
battleships rather than in relying upon Evan-Thomas to act as would the 
battlecruisers. Other battlecruisers might have assumed that when action 
seemed imminent, Evan-Thomas would act as did they and follow without 
definite signals, or that Evan-Thomas had been instructed how to act in that 
case. This was where defects in communication arose, not merely due to the 
battlecruisers not reporting the signal to the battleships, 4 but due to 
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incompatible assumptions and ill-defined procedures. It will remain a mystery 
as to what exactly occurred on board Lion and, as the battleships did 
eventually turn, at 2: 40, it might have been hoped that any faults could be 
played-down. After all, it could only have invited criticism and examination 
for Lion to have admitted to being responsible in any way. 
The failure in signalling was almost certainly due to muddles on board 
Lion. If, prior to 2: 20, searchlights had been used, one must wonder why 
there was a sudden change to flags alone and if efforts were made to signal, 
some error must provide the reason for the absence of a repeat. 
Evan-Thomas noted that: 
"as Lion had been signalling to Barham with a 
searchlight previously to the turn, and had made 
all alterations of course by that method, there was 
no reason why a signal should not have been 
made for Barham to turn with Lion, by 
searchlight, if not by wireless. " 5 
Whatever was the reason on Lion's part, something went wrong that needs 
more explaining than merely suggesting that Evan-Thomas should have 
known what was happening on board Lion and reacted as Beatty would have 
wished, when he actually had no idea of what was happening. Admiral Sir 
Charles Madden later wrote to Evan-Thomas, regarding the Admiralty 
Narrative, that: 
"It might be expected that VABCF would have 
stationed the 5thBS for action, or at least ordered 
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it to close.. . but the Battlecruisers & 5thBS were 
not manoeuvred as a unit and the late arrival of 
the 5thBS in action is mainly attributed to this 
departure from Fleet custom. At least in favour to 
you the account should state that neither previous 
to sighting the enemy, or during the battle-cruiser 
action, did you receive instructions stationing your 
squadron in action ... This & the fact that flag 
signals could not be read in Barham & the fact 
that they were not repeated... reduced the support 
that squadron should have been able to afford the 
battlecruisers. " 6 
For reasons already stated, Beatty did not disclose the attempt to signal 
Barham to close, so the view expressed by Madden was correct as far as he 
knew, in that his information must have come from someone on Barham. His 
comment regarding signalling in action indicated that Beatty might have 
hoped that Evan-Thomas would act as did the other commanders under his 
command. However, all the accounts should have noted that the evidence 
allowed for Evan-Thomas's explanations, just as well as Beatty's. It was 
possible that, as Barham reported that the battlecruisers' turn could not be 
distinguished until it was well under way, Lion might not have distinguished 
that the 5thBS had not made the appropriate turn until the distance opened 
even more. That flag signals could not be read in Barham was something that 
all those aboard confirmed, but, for unexplained reasons, others not present 
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later disagreed. 
There was some irony in the turn north, in that Beatty had begged to 
be allowed to have the 5thBS with him in such an engagement, but was also 
instrumental in allowing the gap between them to open, from 2: 32, to almost 
10 miles from Lion. Evan-Thomas then did his utmost to both close the 
enemy and Beatty, only to find that when the battlecruisers had turned north 
and Barham and Lion were abeam, in opposite directions, the gap of roughly 
1 mile was allowed to open by over 3 more miles before the 5thBS turned; a 
manoeuvre executed disturbingly close to the enemy. This was obviously not 
what Beatty meant when he wanted them with him, but after the fuss he 
made about needing them, on the two occasions when correct signalling 
mattered most to their unity, it failed. The responsibility, ultimately, was 
Beatty's. 
In Appendix G of the Narrative, it was stated by Jellicoe that Barham 
could not read flag signals, with a contradictory sting that "This assumption 
does not appear to be justified". 7 This statement could only have been made 
if the author knew something that most did not. Shortly before the end of 
Beatty's term as First Sea Lord, it was placed on record in Hansard that (as 
put by the Evening News): 
"signals from Lord Beatty which Sir Hugh said he 
never received were entered in the signal log of 
the Barham as having been received. " $ 
On 15th March 1927, the First Lord, William Bridgeman, replied to a 
question from Carlyon Bellairs, stating that the signal for destroyer 
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re-stationing was in Barham's log, received at 2: 30 by searchlight from Lion, 
and that the executive signal to turn was recorded as received, at 2: 37, by 
flags from Lion. It also mentioned that Barham signalled her destroyers to 
take station for screening on altering course. 9 In a letter dated 13.12.59, 
Alfred Dewar wrote to his brother, Kenneth, that of the destroyer 
re-stationing and 2: 32 signal to turn SSE: 
'Both signals were taken in in HMS 
Barham... recorded in her signal log as received at 
2.40pm [Barham's signal log Deptford no23346 in 
1927] The point is this as the executive of a flag 
signal is the hauling down, the flags.. . were hauled 
down at 2.32pm [not repeated by any other ship] 
the signal must have been received at 2.32 though 
evidently not recorded and acted upon till 2.40 by 
the Barham. " 10 
Hence, both sources apparently made the error for the battleships' failure to 
turn the responsibility of Evan-Thomas and his staff, and it appears to be 
damning evidence. Whilst C-in-C Nore, Evan-Thomas had suspected that 
Barham's log had been tampered with 11 and it can be proved that he was 
not wrong in this. 
It must be odd that two statements which purported to quote 
Barham's log - although there is no genuine quote in existence, usually the 
evidence given was merely a summary - differ in the time of the signal being 
received. From the language used, it would seem that Dewar did not have 
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any verbatim quote from the log. He did not doubt that the signal was 
received, so he seemed to have seen the (or rather, a) log containing these 
signals. Whoever supplied Bridgeman with his answer to Bellairs would also 
appear to have seen the log, or, more likely, the Official History or the 
Narrative which showed the same time (2: 37). If this was the case, the time 
would have been changed either before or after it was seen by Dewar. Yet, 
the reply given to Bellairs' question need not have actually come from the log 
in existence in 1927. The Narrative noted that it would seem that flag signals 
could not be read in Barham. Evan-Thomas was sure that they could not, so 
an alteration to the log must have been made by mid-1922 at the latest, after 
Dewar finished the Appreciation and before Corbett's account went to print. 
If the log had always contained these signals, it must be wondered why no 
mention was made in any account, especially in the Appreciation, of the fact 
that signals were received which, if true, made Evan-Thomas an undoubted 
liar and exonerated Beatty. After all, the authors of the latter account 
mentioned Iron Duke's log well enough and invited the reader to believe that 
they saw Barham's as well. They also implied that they saw many, if not all, 
extant logs, but their imprecision was misleading. 
With regard to the Narrative, Evan-Thomas wrote to Jellicoe that: 
"Nowhere is it mentioned that no signal had been 
made to me to turn ... and we all thought that we 
were intended to go on & that a signal would be 
made to us directly how to steer to cut something 
off... was our idea... It was quite out of the 
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question for us to see flags ... A great mistake was 
made by the Admiral commanding (Admiral, of 
course including his staff) but he must be 
responsible. " 12 
This maintained the view he held all along. The Narrative suggested 
otherwise, but did not state why or give any proof, merely hints. Serious 
historians would normally balk at accepting such statements at face value. It 
was unlikely that Evan-Thomas maintained publicly and privately that no 
signal was received without this being the truth. 13 It has been suggested that 
the signal could have been received as being made by flags, but listed by 
Barham's signal staff as a searchlight repeat when the log came to be written 
up with the timing fudged. 14 This is very plausible in light of the newspaper 
reports, but Evan-Thomas remained firm that no signal was made to turn, so 
this would surely discount a searchlight repeat. 
The evidence from Lion's actions both then and in the turn north 
suggested that the searchlight was not used as, if it had been, it would surely 
have been seen in Barham. In fact, it would have taken 1/37,280th of a 
second, or 0.000218 seconds, to have begun to read the repeat. If the flag 
signal had been read, and supposing that Alfred Dewar was correct, there 
could have been a delay or error in Barham's dealing with it. If this was not 
resolved by the time Barham turned at 2: 40, the staff might have thought it 
necessary only to record the actual movement rather than advertise their 
error. There was little doubt that Dewar believed what he said quite honestly, 
if misguidedly, but behind all this was Beatty's admittance of signalling 
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difficulties. 
If one examines some of the messages contained in the original record 
and Despatches one can gain some idea of how signals were made from Lion 
around the time in question: 
Time To Method Summary of signal 
2: 15 Barham SL Look out for enemy cruisers. 
2: 33 General Fl BCF intend to proceed at 22 knots. 
2: 38 General Fl Action stations all day. 
2: 47 Engadine SL Send up seaplane. 
3: 00 2LCS Fl Prepare to attack van of enemy. 
3: 01 General Fl Course E. 
3: 27 General Fl Ready for action. 
3: 33 Galatea WT Request bearing of enemy. 
3: 35 General Fl Speed and course. 
3: 35 Barham SL Ready for action, enemy in sight. 
3: 35 General Fl Speed and bearing of enemy. 
3: 47 General Fl Open fire. 
From this it is evident that when Beatty made general signals (i. e. to all ships 
in sight) he used flags. This confirms the system that all eyes were on the 
Flagship enabling the fleet (except cruisers) to adjust quickly as a whole. 
When a signal specific to a ship was to be made, then either the searchlight 
or WT was used. Both recorded signals to Evan-Thomas were made by 
searchlight either side of the turn towards the enemy at 2: 32, suggesting that 
nothing was wrong physically with the searchlight at those times. As 
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Evan-Thomas was aware that this method had been used before and after the 
turn to signal his ship specifically, it would scarcely have escaped his attention 
if the 2: 32 signal had been signalled to him. If the above method was in force, 
then Evan-Thomas could have had no reason to suspect that Beatty wished 
him to turn at 2: 32, as no specific signal was sent as had so recently been the 
custom. There was, too, the fact that at 2: 15, Barham was closer to Iron than 
at 3: 35. Conditions did not change drastically, so if Barham could see the 
searchlight at 3: 35, then one must conclude that it could be seen at a shorter 
distance. It would seem, then, that there was a definite signalling procedure 
amongst the BCF, which was perhaps less slipshod than some would have 
others believe. Although this did not explain why Evan-Thomas was not 
signalled at 2: 32, it at least supported his explanations of the event. 
Of the two disputed signals, the first, by flags, repeated by searchlight 
to the destroyers, was certainly received by Barham as recorded at 2: 30. It 
would seem that the 2: 30 signal was not seen by Evan-Thomas, but that he 
must have arrived on the bridge very soon after. The signal to alter course 
was hoisted after the first was hauled down and was itself hauled down at 
about 2: 34/5, when the BCF began to turn. At this time Barham had begun 
the zig-zag, course NbW. Shortly afterwards came the supposed suggestion by 
Barham's captain, Arthur Craig, that the battleships turn in the direction of 
the BCF, 15 probably 1-2 minutes after 2: 35/6. It seems likely that it was here 
that Evan-Thomas felt that a different course would soon be indicated. This 
not forthcoming, the turn was made to SSE, according to Barham's log at 
2: 38, others put it at 2: 40, as did Dewar. It was possible, however, that 
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Barham turned to starboard at 2: 38, the squadron came back into line around 
2: 40 and Barham simply continued its turn. 
Commander Geoffrey Blake 16 noted that comments made by Craig to 
the Naval Review, in 1927, stated that the destroyer re-stationing signal was 
made to Barham by searchlight, but not the 2: 32 to turn. 17 This, Craig 
believed, was intended to inform Evan-Thomas of the BCF's turn, even 
though he could not read it either. This meant that he saw the situation as 
did Evan-Thomas and probably expected a signal to follow, so he would 
scarcely have urged him to follow then. Above, it will be noted that 
Evan-Thomas mentioned that the expected indication of another course for 
the 5thBS to steer "was our idea" and that "we all thought that we were 
intended to go on. " This implied that the opinion was at least shared by one 
other, if not more. If Craig did inquire as to whether or not they should 
follow, it must have been done when another signal from Beatty looked not 
to be coming and Evan-Thomas surely reached the same conclusion at the 
same time. The only source for this alleged plea of Craig's seems to come 
from Craig himself and was almost certainly an afterthought in light of the 
events of the 1920s, designed to distance himself from any blame, which 
inadvertently put more onto Evan-Thomas. 
Craig's account has led commentators on the battle into endorsing the 
view of Evan-Thomas as a rigid adherent to procedure at the expense of the 
obvious, but it is based on one highly flawed premise: Craig's word for it. 
What has resulted, is the implication that Evan-Thomas was a liar. His word 
was doubted, but for some reason, Craig's was not, simply because the latter's 
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fitted in with what was commonly accepted. It was not possible to prove that 
Evan-Thomas was wrong, but nor was it that Craig was correct. As it 
turned-out, Evan-Thomas was correct. Indeed, Craig had admitted, in 1927, 
that he did not know any more at the time than did Evan-Thomas and that 
the absence of the repeat led him to the same conclusion. It is likely that 
Craig's reported plea or suggestion to Evan-Thomas was the wishful result of 
hindsight to place on record the action that he would have liked to have 
taken. 
One must also wonder how likely was it for one of Evan-Thomas's 
staff, possibly more, quickly to use his initiative in suggesting that they follow 
the turn when it was obvious that it was being made; it would seem to be out 
of character, given the events of the equally disputed turn north later in the 
battle. When the two Flagships were passing on opposite courses around 
4: 50-3, Barham steering for the enemy, surely this would have been an 
incident requiring initiative in pleading for a turn north without waiting for an 
order. Craig would seem to be urging Evan-Thomas to follow Beatty at 2: 32, 
when there was only a report of a few enemy vessels, yet was seemingly 
content to steam towards 8-12 German battleships shooting close to them, 
without feeling the urge to register a protest supporting a turn to follow the 
battlecruisers. 
The confusion at this time certainly came from the fact that Lion was 
keeping the 5thBS under control at 2: 30, but Evan-Thomas would have had 
no way of knowing if some difficulty arose in the next 2-3 minutes. In this 
time he assumed that if Beatty did not make a signal, then there was nothing 
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to do but carry on until ordered otherwise. As flags could not be 
distinguished, then no-one in the 5thBS could have had any inkling of the 
possible meaning of the signal, unless they were aware of the enemy report at 
2: 32, so they would need to wait for the searchlight repeat. If this did not 
come, they would have been justified to assume that it was simply another 
signal to the BCF, or at least one not intended for them. This would then 
make one wonder what exactly Evan-Thomas assumed or guessed was 
happening. His belief, stated in later years, that another course would soon 
be indicated was plausible and understandable, as it seemed that Beatty was 
deliberately not signalling the 5thBS regarding this turn. At worst, if he had 
followed immediately, he could have been ordered onto this new course 
without any significant loss of time or position. Yet, he had been receiving 
orders clearly right up until 2: 32 and there was nothing to suggest that this 
was going to change, so the absence of a signal would mean that none was 
being made. 
Given the information at his disposal at the time, Evan-Thomas gave 
thought to what might happen (i. e. be given a new course) and was given no 
reason at 2: 32 to suppose that Beatty wished him to deviate from what he was 
doing. As it turned-out, being given a new course had many possible 
advantages. When the 1stSG was spotted, if Beatty had sailed to cut off the 
Germans from their bases, which he rightly tried to do, to position the SthBS 
so that the enemy could not escape around the Skagerrak, thus trapping them 
between a rock and a hard place, could have ensured a bag of 5 battlecruisers 
R 
and more smaller vessels. Neither C-in-C knew of the presence of the others' 
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battlefleet, so a fleet action was still a possibility after such a success. This is 
not so much being wise after the event, but considering the possibilities of 
how forces might have been deployed and it was odd that Evan-Thomas 
never mentioned such a scenario as part of his defence. It did, after all, fit-in 
nicely with his expectations of being given another course. As he did not 
fabricate reasons for his actions, it is likely that he was being honest in his 
recollection of events and had no cause to serve but to tell what had actually 
happened. 
Evan-Thomas's post-war explanations for what was happening at this 
time should not be seen so much in light of his trying to find excuses, but of 
his trying to think what exactly went on aboard Iron. He was baffled in later 
years as to what this might have been. By suggesting possibilities such as 
being signalled a different course, he did not help himself, even though he 
was trying to get to the bottom of the confusion. If he had been aware of 
Galatea's report, Lion's new course suggested the possible direction of the 
enemy. However, by turning to NbW, he was steering close to the opposite 
direction. Given this, for every second that the two steered away from each 
other at such divergence, the less chance they had of executing a possible 
pincer movement and the greater the chance the enemy had of slipping away 
by virtue of it. Had he been less honest, he might have withheld this view. 
What can be stated from all this, is that the signal to turn SSE was 
never signalled by searchlight to Barham; Craig, Evan-Thomas and Beatty 
confirmed this. Craig confirmed the receipt of the destroyer re-stationing by 
searchlight (although Evan-Thomas was almost certainly not on the bridge at 
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the time, hence his conviction that he felt it was not received), but both noted 
that the 2: 32 was not repeated and they must be correct in this. Craig had 
just seen one searchlight repeat and both were looking at Lion. Regardless of 
whether or not one believes a searchlight repeat was made from Lion, when 
the BCF began to turn, Beatty must have been aware that the signal had not 
been received. 18 His admission that he could not get a signal through 
confirmed that no repeat was made and that he knew this. Thus, none could 
have been received in Barham and none logged. 
That this signal was not repeated by Tiger might have been for the 
very same reason that Evan-Thomas waited for a searchlight from Lion - 
that a different course would be indicated to them. If Tiger did not receive 
the signal either, it would naturally just conform to the turn, whereas 
Evan-Thomas would not. One must not forget that the reason Tiger did not 
repeat the signal was because it was evidently thought that it was not 
intended for the 5thBS, so it would have been folly to have repeated it. This 
did not account for the fact that it could not have been known that Lion had 
failed to repeat it. In Bridgeman's answer to Bellairs, there was a5 minute 
gap between the signal being made executive and its being recorded. If this 
were genuine and the signal was seen, it is unlikely that such a gap would 
exist. It was logged 3 minutes before the turn and Evan-Thomas would not 
have waited. 
Whatever the possibilities, one must then wonder why the signal was 
seen by some and not others. In Dewar's letter, his explanation was plausible, 
but one must believe that if the signal had been received it would have been 
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logged at 2: 33/4. There cannot, then, have been such a signal received. If 
Beatty knew that he could not get a signal through and Evan-Thomas and 
Craig were certain that none was made, then it was impossible that the signal 
could have been seen and recorded at the time in Barham. It is impossible to 
log a signal that was never made, so these quotes from Bridgeman and Dewar 
must result from fabrications. It would be folly to deny that signals were 
received when it was known that they had been and nobody in any other ship 
ever reported seeing the repeat. The statement in the Evening News was true 
as far as the author knew, but did not state how those signals got there. It 
obviously implied that they were recorded at the time and most would have 
believed this, yet this cannot have been the case. So, Barham's log must have 
been altered after it left the ship. 
In the list of signals in the Despatches, nowhere was any signal 
ordering Evan-Thomas to comply with the turn recorded. It might be 
assumed the 2: 32 signal was seen and applied to the 5thBS as well, but this is 
very doubtful. A signal of this importance cannot have been omitted, 
especially as the Narrative (page 1) boasted, mischievously and erroneously, 
that all signals made at the battle were recorded in the Despatches. This 
being the case, where in the Despatches is this unmissable signal, so strongly 
asserted in the Narrative as being in Barham's log at 2: 37 (and used in 
answer to Bellairs's question)? And why, despite the movements of Beatty's 
and Evan-Thomas's squadrons being controversial already, was this never 
mentioned until 1923, in Corbett's work, when it appeared to support Beatty's 
actions? It is not there because it was never recorded and it was not recorded 
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because it was not made. 
As Dewar made no mention of it in the Staff Appreciation, 19 which 
one must suspect he would have done, it must have been inserted after 
Dewar completed his work and before the draft of the official history went to 
the printers in early 1923. This was almost certainly done when protestations 
regarding the movements of Barham and Lion became more actively 
disputed in 1923. It was then considered necessary to produce a plausible 
solution to remedy the situation, by atypically forcing the point of the signal's 
receipt to the reader, and it appeared to be successful. 
Assuming Barham to have turned at 2: 40, it seemed to have been 
calculated that from receipt of the signal in the ship to it coming to 
Evan-Thomas's attention, 3 minutes elapsed. If this was so, Lion's repeat 
flash was at least five minutes late. If Barham's staff altered the timing in the 
log, they must have known something that Beatty, Evan-Thomas and the 
Captain did not. Even if they did not see the flash, could someone else not 
have told them? If the flash was seen, the turn would have begun almost 
instantly, so there would have been no need to fudge the timing at all, 
because the ship's staff would then have appeared to be too slow to react. If 
the repeat was made at 2: 33, Evan-Thomas would not possibly have held on. 
Such a clear instruction to one so well drilled in clear instructions, as 
detractors are quick to point out when it suits them to do so, could not have 
been mistaken. So, the staff could then have been rebuked for being slow to 
record the signal accurately, but this is as unlikely as the signal being acted 
upon too late. 
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The supposed 2: 37 repeat suffers from flaws on all sides of the 
argument. If it ever was accurate, it would support just one interpretation 
convincingly and it fails to do this, which was the forger's error -a 
post-dated effort to cloud the affairs of a few minutes. The events either side 
of 2: 37 prove it to be fraudulent. To disregard the forgery leaves the facts in 
accordance. To accept it, one must explain, amongst many other things, why 
the staff suddenly lapsed into slovenly standards regarding their work and 
then reverted to accuracy and competence. Yet, even then, the inconsistencies 
do not correspond to the mass of other evidence. 
This, then, makes one question the reasons as to why all this should 
have been done. There can be little doubt that some person or group 
favourably disposed to Beatty, probably without his knowledge, instituted the 
alteration of Barham's log to the detriment of Evan-Thomas and, therefore, 
to the advantage of Beatty. When the disappearance of Iron Duke's log is 
remembered and its inclusion in the Dewars' Appreciation for criticism, 
although in ignorance of how logs were kept, it is likely that malicious forces 
were at work. One cannot doubt that something peculiar had taken place and, 
coupled with Evan-Thomas's suspicions, it was evident that dubious actions 
surrounded some logs from the battle. As all logs are destroyed after a 
certain period it might have been, for some, an opportunity at forgery to 
make a point, knowing that the evidence would not last for long afterwards 
and that few would actually see it. However, the fact that no signal was 
received in the battleships is evident, but the author of the addition to 
Barham's log was not aware of the facts on both sides; that was where the 
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mistake was made. However desperately one may try to assert that the signal 
was received, the cases to be made by forging fall apart in Beatty's admission 
of signalling difficulties in a paper in his private possession that few, if any, 
could have seen. 
That Beatty was the author or instigator of such alterations should be 
doubted, 20 but he must have been aware of Evan-Thomas's opinion that he 
did not receive a signal to turn. He certainly knew that one was never sent 
and that the log of Barham was later seen to state this to be false. Thus, he 
allowed the publication of evidence, the validity of which he almost certainly 
doubted, which seemed to exonerate him and implicated Evan-Thomas. He 
was at least prepared to go this far to have people believe that he was not at 
fault. In all likelihood, the failure of the 5thBS to turn with the BCF to SSE 
was the result of a genuine misunderstanding by two forces working under 
different principles, not made easier by the difficulties which they faced at the 
time. The reasons for subsequent manoeuvrings are less easily explained. 
The importance of this incident, before action was under way, is often 
over-estimated. After the battle, claims of negligence and incompetence could 
be made to suit the individual, or a body of opinion, but as far as the actual 
importance of the event is concerned, it really mattered much less than some 
would have one believe. Had the battleships turned with the battlecruisers, 
the 5 mile gap would have opened from 3: 30, when Beatty ordered 25 knots 
for the BCF and in the 18 minutes before fire was opened, the BCF would 
have increased the gap anyway, despite the battleships cutting corners. When 
the battleships might have opened fire depended upon where Beatty might 
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have stationed them, which is purely conjectural, but the list of possibilities is 
not extensive. By ordering a speed that he knew the battleships could scarcely 
make, it was evident that Beatty's intention was, correctly, to engage enemy 
ships as soon as was possible. Had the battleships been with him when action 
began, it would not necessarily have guaranteed success. The Germans knew 
that with the 6 battlecruisers they faced they were already inferior, but this 
did not prevent them from trying to score such success as they could in 
leading Beatty to Scheer. 
However many possible scenarios are examined, it cannot convincingly 
be claimed that the presence of the battleships sooner in the action would 
have prevented the losses of Indefatigable and Queen Mary. The enemy 
would doubtless have been under a heavier fire earlier, which they would 
have been obliged to return, with difficulty, but the battlecruisers were lost 
from 1 or 2 hits each, which could have happened at any time. One only 
needs to consider the damage to Lion's Q turret, at 4: 00, through no design 
faults, but operational faults. It is convenient to note the lack of support from 
the 5thBS, but Beatty allowed the 1stSG over 20 minutes to adjust their 
fire-control data, when they could have been fired upon, unable to make any 
reply and being outnumbered. One must bear in mind the possibility that 
Hipper might not have accepted action with both the BCF and 5thBS in 
range simultaneously. As it was, he could have divined from Bödicker's report 
that the 5thBS were not likely to instantly assist the British battlecruisers, or 
if he was resigned to it, simply to have run to Scheer. He could still have 
maintained some firing, but he knew that whatever happened, heavy support 
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was not far away. This part of the controversy (at 2: 32-40) did appear to be 
important, but, ceteris paribus, neither Beatty or Evan-Thomas could have 
done much more by way of positioning than they did to score success had 
events proceeded without a hitch. 
It is worth noting that the gap that opened between the two Admirals 
was not really the issue. If Beatty was intending to have the 5thBS in line, the 
matter of the distance between Barham and Tiger is the issue, which was a 
little over 8 miles at 2: 40. Supposing Barham to have been 5 miles behind 
when Beatty ordered 25 knots, it would have begun to fall astern anyway and 
New Zealand and Indefatigable needed to be stationed astern of Tiger. The 
speed of the slower ships surely precluded them from being stationed in the 
van; in any event, Beatty would want to lead the line. One must remember 
that the battleships would be falling astern anyway, so, at best, the distance 
between the two forces would not have been much less than that which it had 
been at 2: 30. The real sore point was that the initial gap at 2: 40 was the same 
at 3: 47. It was more significant that Barham opened fire as soon as the 
targets came into maximum range, at targets that were very hard to see. The 
BCF opened fire well within their maximum range, to the relief of the 
Germans. 
To be fair to both Beatty and Evan-Thomas, in the absence of clear 
signals, little time was actually lost that was unavoidable, following the 
signalling hiccup. It would not become obvious that the BCF was turning until 
Princess Royal began to follow Lion, at roughly 2: 36/7. If one believes 
Barham's deck log, the turn was followed only a minute or so later, at 2: 38. 
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Most other sources quote 2: 40, which was only a loss of 3-4 minutes at worst 
and only about a minute after Tiger turned by commonly accepted timing 
(2: 40). So, the distance lost at this point was not so great as it would have 
appeared and could have been greater. The real distance lost was the extra 
21/2-3 miles from Tiger at 2: 40, not another 5 from Lion. 
When the turn was made, it was noted by Craig in the Despatches, 
that the BCF "were out of sight for some time. " Craig cannot have written 
this. The visibility to the east was approximately 111/2. miles. At 2: 40, Lion was 
10 miles away and Tiger around 8 miles. Craig had his eyes on the BCF from 
at least 2: 30. He did not forget what had happened in the following week or 
so until his report was submitted and suddenly remembered thereafter, nor 
did he shut his eyes. The ships involved did not suddenly develop speeds in 
excess of their designed maximum. The scenario of the BCF being lost to 
sight was physically and spatially impossible. As the 5thBS followed the BCF, 
one might well ask how they knew the course to follow to try to cut the 
distance if they could not see to anticipate the moves, and why Lion made 
visual signals to the 5thBS. If Craig could not see, this must apply to the rest. 
This remark was inserted after the event, to invite the conclusion that whilst 
the BCF pursued the enemy, the 5thBS dithered. 
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Once the action was under way, the subject of signalling recurred as a 
much disputed point (see diagrams #8-11). Whilst pursuing the lstSG, the 
BCF caught sight of the, approaching German Fleet. SMS Rostock, leading 
the HSF, had been reported at 4: 30, by Southampton, and a few minutes 
later, the HSF itself was seen. It is commonly stated that the BCF's 16 point 
turn away began at 4: 40. However, this was another example of the flaws in 
the evidence given to those compiling the list of signals. When Beatty sighted 
the HSF, he did not dither regarding what action he should take, it being 
obvious that he could not engage it alone, this was also contrary to his own 
BCFOs and GFBOs. The BCF turned, as Lion's TS noted (see Table 1, 
Chapter 1), at 4: 36. This also gave the lie to the popular image expressed by 
Hood, who stated that if Beatty had the SthBS with him "I think it is a great 
mistake... nothing will stop him from taking on the whole German Fleet. " 21 
Beatty was not as rash as many supposed, although he was in some way 
responsible for nurturing this belief, yet one could always argue that such a 
move was simply common sense. That such a senior officer as Hood had this 
erroneous opinion of Beatty was worrying. It suggested that even Squadron 
commanders were unaware of how exactly the BCF would be fought as a unit. 
The turn was completed at roughly 4: 40, when Barham was 
approximately 8 miles away. 22 Yet, a little over two minutes later, Beatty 
turned north, completing this by 4: 43/4 (see diagram #10). This took him on 
a course past the SthBS on the port side and directly at Queen Mary's 
wreckage. Following the war, the usual recriminations surrounded the events 
of the next 15 minutes, Beatty being blamed for not signalling a turn to 
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Evan-Thomas sooner than he did and Evan-Thomas for not reading the 
situation correctly quickly enough. When Beatty completed the 16 point turn, 
the 5thBS turned to starboard. It is not clear how Beatty intended to pass the 
5thBS, to port or starboard, but his turn at 4: 42 suggested that to port was his 
intention. Evan-Thomas's change of course seemed to suggest that he felt this 
was what Beatty wanted. Had Evan-Thomas not turned, the two squadrons 
would have come close to colliding. Shortly after the SthBS were on their 
new course, they were ordered to form into line ahead (they had been in 
sub-divisions since 4: 30, Barham leading Valiant, Warspite leading Malaya). 
Had Beatty simply continued his course at 4: 40, he would have passed the 
5thBS to starboard and not only maintained the most desirable course, but it 
would have meant the 5thBS turning less, less sharply and so more quickly, to 
follow the BCF. 
The advantages to an enemy firing at a turning point in a line, were in 
1916, considered a dangerous possibility. This has been dismissed and 
endorsed at varying times since the battle, but the practicalities of such a 
move as the 5thBS were ordered to undertake, jeopardised the squadron and 
would be as real now as then. Any object reversing the direction in which it is 
travelling, must at some point, cease to go forward and start to go in the 
opposing direction; at that point, it stops. The closer it is to that apex, the 
slower it must be travelling forward and the greater the distance from the 
target, the slower it will be relatively. From 20,000 yards away, the target at 
that point is, for practical purposes still and, therefore, easy to range, but it is 
also still until the last ship has steadied onto the new course. When the first 
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ship turning reaches its new course, the parabola defines the point of aim; the 
tighter the parabola, the slower, if smaller the target. Once under way, the 
180° turn itself means that no ship can go very far out of line without risking 
collision and if they cannot do this, they cannot be manoeuvred to throw out 
enemy fire or to shift out of range. It was surely greeted with relief that more 
damage was not done to the squadron under helm. It might be worthwhile 
mentioning that, contrary to Campbell's assertions, no enemy battlecruiser 
scored a hit on the squadron whilst it turned, because they were out of range. 
The signal from Beatty ordering the turn was hoisted at 4: 48 - this 
time stated in the list of signals as being the executive was not Pollen's fault 
- and remained flying at 4: 55/6 at least. 23 The Despatches recorded that, at 
4: 55, Evan-Thomas signalled, by flags, "Observe attentively the Admiral's 
motions". This indicated that the 5thBS was prepared to change course or 
speed without being signalled first, as explained in the Signal Book of 1898 
"Observe very attentively the Admiral's motions as he will probably alter his 
course, increase or decrease speed.. . with or without signals, as may 
be most 
convenient" (TA). This can only mean that Lion was still flying the signal at 
4: 55 and that Evan-Thomas had, with the memory of the 2: 32 signal doubtless 
in mind, at last decided to act on his own. The 4: 48 signal had been 
acknowledged by Barham, the rest of the 5thBS were aware of it and, by 
hoisting TA, Evan-Thomas was turning the squadron under his own direction, 
the signal not being hauled down in Lion. In fact, it was likely that the signal 
was only made executive from Lion when the 5thBS were seen to turn, but 
by then, it did not matter. If the 5thBS was acting upon the executive from 
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Lion, then the use of TA was pointless. The only explanation for its use, is 
that matters were becoming ever more dangerous and it required the 
squadron's SO to execute the turn in the absence of direction from SOBCF. 
Evan-Thomas was only prepared to wait a limited time for the signal to come 
through and an injustice was done to him, in the suggestions that he would 
probably have held on, whatever the cost, until told to turn. He has been 
criticised as being a slavish adherent to procedure, but the evident danger he 
was in did not escape him, nor did the fact that Beatty seemed to have 
forgotten him. Far from being ponderous, he knew procedures well enough to 
know that TA existed, what its purpose was and was not afraid to invoke it. It 
was no wonder in later years that he was to feel very bitter about Beatty's 
handling of the squadron and the suggestions that he had jeopardised the 
5thBS because he did not have the presence of mind or independence of 
character to do anything unless Beatty told him to do so. 
This was another example of how accounts on Jutland suffered from 
too superficial an examination of existing evidence, largely to suit erroneous 
assumptions or preconceived ideas. Pollen had available the logs of both Lion 
and Barham and recorded many less significant signals between these ships. 
So, if the 4: 48 signal was made executive, he could scarcely have missed it, or 
felt TA to be more important. One must also remember that the turn is 
assumed to have been on Lion's executive, but it was not recorded in the log 
and no-one present actually said that they saw the signal hauled down, or 
responded to it. There is probable proof in Evan-Thomas's defence of his 
actions at this point, when he stated that: 
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"The signal was "Compass 16" which was not 
hauled down some time after Lion had passed; so 
it should be stated. " 24 
At 4: 55 (see diagram #10), Lion was 41/a miles astern at a bearing of Red 178 
and with the wind, funnel smoke, smoke from fires and angle, it would have 
been hard to see anyway; at 2: 32 they were 41h miles away. Not only did 
Evan-Thomas make the turn on his own, but, by using TA, he was free to 
take the squadron anywhere away from enemy fire after the turn without 
having to waste time making more signals. There was also the fact that, 
should anything have gone seriously wrong subsequently that led to an 
Inquiry, Evan-Thomas could have mentioned that he was awaiting Beatty's 
executive, but acted according to procedure by using TA rather than 
executing Beatty's signal before Beatty had done so. However, all this does 
not change the fact that he had waited for the signal, lost ground on Beatty 
and gained it on the HSF. 
Beatty's signalling at crucial moments in the war had the combined 
effects of allowing enemy ships to escape; this was true in December 1914, 
January 1915 and at Jutland. Although he had wanted less signalling, it was 
ironic that it was attempts to make precise signals at crucial times on these 
dates, that confused officers (Goodenough, Moore and Evan-Thomas 
especially) who otherwise were fully aware of what to do. That they gave 
priority to these signals (which in 1914 and at Dogger Bank were ambiguous) 
was the result of Beatty not making his intentions clearly understood then, or 
before hand. One might mention that the signal which led to the combined 
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attack on Blücher at Dogger Bank was not only badly made, but pointless. 
After all, one must wonder at the utility of a signal that orders ships to 
engage the enemy that they were already engaging. Yet, as at Jutland, the 
signal had the effect of diverting the attention of ships and officers from the 
job that they should have continued to do and almost certainly would have 
done if left to it. It was also odd that at Jutland it was thought necessary to 
signal the distribution of fire. If the BCF had functioned as Beatty had 
hoped, this would have been unnecessary. It confused the obviously correct 
distribution, but was attributed to defective signalling. Signalling had nothing 
to do with it. The defect could have been offset by the BCF's initiative, which 
Beatty thought existed in his force. 
The blame for the late turns of the 5thBS in the 1920s was 
apportioned to either Evan-Thomas or Beatty. Since 2: 30 at Jutland, 
Evan-Thomas had been in control of his squadron and received no significant 
instruction from Beatty. Yet, at 4: 48, Beatty, by hoisting the signal, was taking 
definite control. By ordering his ships to form into line, Evan-Thomas had 
obviously deduced that a similar reversal of course on his part was a strong 
possibility. This was, however, very different from knowing exactly what it was 
that Beatty wanted him to do and he had good reason to suppose that as he 
was being signalled, Beatty was in control of what was happening. It is a little 
too easy to suggest that Evan-Thomas should have turned immediately upon 
passing the BCF, although that would have helped matters. The late turn was 
a combination of Beatty seemingly wanting to pass to port, of ordering the 
turn too late, in not making it a turn together and Evan-Thomas waiting for 
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the executive regardless of the approach of the German Fleet. It is difficult to 
say whether or not these circumstances could have been different. Had the 
5thBS been ordered to turn sooner and together, the German Fleet coming 
-into gun range was still likely and the rearmost ships might well have come 
into enemy range anyway. Unless the 5thBS was turning while the BCF 
passed, to port, it was unlikely that they could have avoided the German 
Fleet altogether. 25 
The effects that this turn and the one at 2: 35 had on the engagement 
are ironic. By trying to signal the 5thBS at both times, Beatty was doing only 
what one would have expected, but this was not helped by the fact that he 
had given them no signal since the action began. This had the result of 
confusing Evan-Thomas for a few minutes at a time when it was most 
important that confusion should not have arisen. Until 4: 48, he had been 
doing fine without any signals and, had Beatty not signalled at all, he would 
almost certainly not have felt obliged to wait for the executive once he knew 
why the BCF had reversed their course. What is often lost in these episodes, 
is that, as Beatty was attempting make specific signals, he was not only 
reasonably sure that they could be sent and received, but that he was not 
relying upon others' initiative. To later say that it was fairly obvious what 
Evan-Thomas should have done, forgets the fact that when a specific signal is 
made, what was obvious was of lesser importance than the subject of the 
signal and the signal must take priority over the apparently obvious. Although 
Beatty (following the raid on Scarborough) had noted that a captain might be 
in a position where he was more fully aware of the situation than the admiral, 
243 
there was no reason to suppose that Evan-Thomas had been encouraged by 
Beatty to disregard signals if, in his own judgement, they did not best apply to 
the situation. 
It was all very well to accept credit when things proceeded according 
to plan, but when they did not, it was not acceptable to claim that others 
should have acted upon their own initiative to correct any defects. This belief 
relied solely on the fact that others must know when to disregard apparently 
faulty instructions. Yet, if they could not be made aware that there are 
difficulties aboard the signalling ship, they could not know to act 
independently, as this required knowledge that it was not possible to impart 
because of those difficulties. At 2: 32, Evan-Thomas could have had no idea 
that there were signalling difficulties, precisely because he could not be 
signalled. As this was the only means of communication, it was no more 
possible for him to know that there were difficulties, than it was for Beatty to 
have imparted the subject of the proposed signal. Beatty's system of allowing 
initiative depended upon clear communication, between the commanding 
officers and between ships, but he wrongly assumed that a clear 
understanding between his officers existed and that this was all that was 
required. If one was to use initiative, then it must be obvious when it must be 
used and this was the great difficulty. What one assumes is obvious, might not 
be so for another and one might, or might not, have knowledge of something 
that prevents the use of initiative or the execution of a particular signal and 
needs to impart this to another for them to appreciate the problem and act 
accordingly. So, it was in this area where communications were most 
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important and were most lacking in the BCF. Their signalling could have 
been much more efficient, but even if it had been, there was no means for 
communicating other than the signalling methods of the time. As these were 
faulty, one cannot have expected the system to have functioned any better 
than it did. 
Such failures as there were resulted from the fact that communications 
depend upon putting into words and encryption the thoughts and experiences 
of others and much can be lost and gained in translation and transliteration, 
which often leads to misinterpretation. Even so, quick and understandable 
communications must be made before the events which they concern change. 
To solve these problems, all must be completely and simultaneously aware of 
all relevant phenomena with the same level of understanding. It is to be 
wondered just how far one can expect this to be the case. Facilities for 
sufficient real-time communications were certainly not technologically possible 
in 1916. All the post-battle bickering overlooked the fact that if something 
was known to be so obvious, why signal? 
Once the turn was complete, the BCF sought to open the range by 
small alterations to port and the 5thBS now drew much of the fire of the 
HSF, contrary to what many claimed in the inter-war years. This was another 
source of controversy, especially as Evan-Thomas was seen in many accounts 
to have sheltered his squadron on New Zealand's port quarter, away from 
the action. In fact, he did the opposite, being on its starboard quarter until 
junction with the Grand Fleet. It was stated by the Harper committee, but 
was generally ignored, that after the 16 point turn: 
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"the Fifth Battle Squadron altered course a little 
further to starboard to follow and support the Battle 
Cruisers.. . The enemy opened fire on the turning 
point, so Malaya turned short ... Malaya drew out a 
little to port at 5: 05 as the enemy had her range 
exactly. " 26 
This, whilst the battlecruisers pulled away. The accompanying charts noted 
this, but were in error in showing that the 5thBS then passed to the BCF's 
port side. The plan for 2-9: 15 (see diagram #14) placed the 5thBS from 
starboard to port at 5: 17, yet another only showed the 5thBS to starboard for 
about two minutes. 27 The text gave no reason why they should have crossed 
the BCF's wake again. After Lion re-opened fire, at 4: 48, the BCF steered 
further away from their counterparts and the frequency and detail of the 
notes made in the control top and TS rapidly became sparse. In fact, it had 
been noted that the target had two derricks on the after funnel. This could 
only have been one of the three 11"-gunned battlecruisers and since it had 
been engaged with a 12" since 3: 47, it would suggest that they were further 
away from the action than the 5thBS, and not altogether sure of the identity 
of the target. They did not wish to advertise this. 
In fact, in later years, Beatty wanted the distances reduced when being 
recorded in the `Record', which Harper was unwilling to do. 28 It was, 
following the turn, actually 20,800 yards (20,300 rangefinder), ' Dreyer had 
notes that quoted it as 20,400.29 Opening the range to this extent aided the 
5thBS in crossing the BCF's wake to starboard under Evan-Thomas's 
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personal direction, to cover the battlecruisers. Had Evan-Thomas obeyed the 
4: 48 signal, he would have placed his ships away from where they were likely 
to be most helpful and beyond the range of the German guns that were 
actually firing upon the 5thBS. Later, he received no recognition for his 
initiative in taking station on the BCF's starboard quarter. 
Soon after the battle, these two instances of muddled signalling and 
misunderstanding between the BCF and 5thBS were put down to their not 
having previously worked together, or of confusion arising from being in 
action. There was truth in both of these. Yet, after the war, Beatty and those 
with similar views began to express more fully that there were some 
ideological or institutional reasons behind these two turns, which accounted 
for that phase of the action not being as successful as had been hoped. Beatty 
accepted that Evan-Thomas would not have acted as would those of the BCF 
in action and that he had served him as best he could. Later on, his view 
changed, but the exact processes of his thought to reach this conclusion were 
far from clear. Even before the war, Beatty's views set him apart from most 
other officers and, as the war progressed, he increasingly thought that 
battlefleet men had been too slow to appreciate and deal with what crises 
arose. 
Having had a good deal of time to reflect upon Jutland, his changing 
attitude to Evan-Thomas's actions might well have reflected his growing 
dissatisfaction with those battlefleet officers who had a major influence upon 
the study of strategy and tactics, ordnance, signalling and other specialisms 
before and during the war. It was certainly possible, if one was in such a 
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frame of mind, to have concluded that those who held conservative views with 
regard to the Navy were responsible for retarding the development of such 
aspects as encouragement of initiative in action, less complex signalling and 
more effective and accurate gunnery. Given these possibilities, it was easy for 
Beatty to overlook the failings within his own staff at the battle, and 
elsewhere, as he could think that, had Evan-Thomas and others operated 
along the lines that he desired, such confusion with specific signals would not 
have arisen, because the underlying principles governing each others' 
movements would be self-evident and a mistake in signalling aboard the 
Flagship would be immaterial, instead of being of life saving importance. 
After the battle, Evan-Thomas was publicly seen to have neglected his 
role as commander of the BCF's supporting battleships. A full analysis of 
what had happened between the 5thBS and BCF was not undertaken. In 
Chapter 4 it was seen that, in the Admiralty Narrative, Evan-Thomas was 
unquestionably blamed for not supporting the BCF sufficiently, despite 
Jellicoe's protestations. Whilst the Dewars' Appreciation was being edited for 
publication, as the Narrative, Evan-Thomas attempted to put his side of the 
events to the First Lord, Leo Amery. He wanted nothing more than a 
hearing, hoping that this would be enough to convince Amery that the 
disputed events were not entirely as Beatty had claimed. 
Shortly after the battle, Beatty wrote to Evan-Thomas to: 
"thank you from the bottom of my heart for your 
gallant and effective support on Wednesday. It 
was fine to see your fine squadron sail down as it 
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did. Your coming down in support ... will remain in 
my mind forever. " 30 
Years afterwards, Beatty never personally made any attempt to state 
otherwise. Written soon after the battle, it was an honest statement by Beatty 
in which he firmly admitted that the 5thBS provided him "gallant and 
effective support. " Evan-Thomas and others with the BCF at Jutland, for 
example, Tennant and Cowan, all realised the effectiveness of the 5thBS as 
noted by Beatty in 1916. Many present, including Beatty, were aware that the 
5thBS made a, if not the, significant contribution to the action up to the 
junction with the battlefleet. That this was not being mentioned in the early 
1920s alarmed Evan-Thomas and battlefleet supporters. 
Whilst Evan-Thomas was C-in-C Nore (March 1921-4) "it was known 
that something was worrying him very much indeed". 31 This concerned the 
attempts by Beatty to enhance his image at the expense of others in 
publications. A meeting with Amery was arranged for 3rd December 1923, to 
discuss the proposed Narrative. How the meeting progressed is difficult to 
discern because the only accounts were written by Evan-Thomas in the 
summer of 1926. However, they are generally in accord. Beatty was 
determined that Evan-Thomas should not have a chance to make his case, or 
at least to prevent Amery from realising the full extent of his involvement 
with the Jutland accounts. 
Shortly after the meeting began, Beatty appeared: 
"To push me out of his [Amery's] room before I 
had been in there two minutes for fear I might 
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tell him the truth.. . it is becoming difficult for the 
Beatty party to keep up the lies they spread, to try 
to hide the too awful mistakes of their Chief - 
by trying to shift it onto others... [but with Beatty 
as First Sea Lord it is] very difficult to prevent his 
lies being believed. " 32 
It would seem that some kind of farce was being played out in the First 
Lord's office. In the earlier account, Evan-Thomas had written to Jellicoe 
that: 
"I spoke to him [Amery] for some three or four 
minutes, I think less, when he was informed that 
he must see the First Sea Lord - so I was shown 
OUt. " 33 
In this account, Beatty did not appear, but it was clear that Evan-Thomas had 
not the time to make his case. What was also strange, if not bizarre, was that 
the First Lord (Beatty's superior) was being ordered to see Beatty and that 
he seemed to comply with that order. Beatty and Amery might have arranged 
this convenient interruption between themselves, possibly to postpone a 
future meeting. In this time, it might have been hoped that the Narrative 
would have been published, so that Evan-Thomas would never have had his 
say. 
It is possible that Beatty, given his previous praise for Evan-Thomas, 
could not face Evan-Thomas directly in any discussion and was determined 
not to explain why he was now influencing the Narrative to suggest that 
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Evan-Thomas was at fault at Jutland when he knew this not to be the case. 
Throughout the affair, if not before, it seemed that Beatty had a much higher 
regard for Evan-Thomas than Evan-Thomas had for him. Evan-Thomas's 
nephew (Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Barnard) later noted that it was: 
"evident that he could have had nothing in 
common personally with Beatty, with his riches, 
his wife's yacht etc. etc., and I am certain that he 
did not like him personally because of his 
"Montgomery like" flair for publicity and dress 
and also because he was "Winston Churchill's 
pet. " " 34 
In general, then, it would seem that the two had no common grounds for 
amiable relations other than service loyalty. However, even on service issues 
his sympathy for Beatty was not strong. Evan-Thomas's views and sympathies 
were very much with Jellicoe. Furthermore, Barnard noted that Evan-Thomas 
had: 
"rather strict moral principles about any question 
of divorce or extra-matrimonial entanglements. " 35 
So, there were strong personal reasons why Evan-Thomas should feel 
aggrieved at the action Beatty took at the meeting with Amery. 
This was sufficient to explain Evan-Thomas's attitude in December 
1923, but during the war, and especially just before Jutland, two officers who 
were required to be aware of the same operational principles were not 
especially enthusiastic about seeking each other's company to discuss how 
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they would act together. There is no evidence in either Lion's or Barham's 
deck logs to show that Evan-Thomas and Beatty ever met before Jutland. 
Neither is there any evidence to show that Evan-Thomas had, or had read, a 
copy of BCF Orders, or even knew the general outline of BCFOs. 
It is possible that Evan-Thomas might have sought a meeting with 
Beatty. However, if Beatty was, for whatever reason, unavailable or unwilling, 
there was little that Evan-Thomas could have done. Evan-Thomas was a 
genteel and diffident character and was not one to force himself upon 
anyone, especially a senior officer. 
Beatty's personality and background were significant factors in his 
management of the BCF, as referred to in the Preface. In practice, he 
encouraged free-thinking and confidence inspired by his own confidence. It 
might appear obvious that it was crucial that two such commanders should 
have met to discuss how they intended to act. However, Beatty took 
free-thinking and decentralisation of command to dangerous limits by relaxing 
too much control. The BCF's officers spent most of their afternoons at 
leisure and it was not impossible - in fact, it was more than likely - that 
Beatty preferred indulging in "extra-matrimonial entanglements" rather than 
seeking a meeting with an individual who did not like extrovert characters, let 
alone one who had married a rich divorcee, both of whom had 
"extra-matrimonial entanglements". 
Those who were being slandered by Beatty and his supporters after 
the war, found common cause in that fact. This encouraged mutual support, 
which was often expressed in articles. Given that a few BCF sympathisers 
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controlled, or at least influenced, the proposed Jutland publications, to deny 
those with differing views - battlefleet supporters - an expression of them, 
encouraged an informal, but numerous, movement against Beatty and the 
BCF. Equally important was that battlefleet supporters out-numbered BCF 
supporters. In corrupting the Jutland accounts, therefore, Beatty upset more 
people than he pleased. 
Following Evan-Thomas's meeting with Amery, Beatty angered people 
even further. This was because Evan-Thomas suffered a partial stroke - that 
was to end his career -a few hours after Beatty had seen to his ejection 
from Amery's office. It is difficult to doubt that this further lowered 
Evan-Thomas's opinion of Beatty. Barnard noted that of letters between 
Evan-Thomas and his wife, Hilda, he was sure that they were all burned. 
Those of 1922-8 were said to be so "hot" that, when being sent to the British 
Library, the Library were advised to treat them as reserved. 36 However, 
Barnard noted that: 
"there is no breath of anything adverse about 
Beatty in any of his letters to my father and 
mother throughout the war. " 37 
This could just mean that Evan-Thomas wanted to keep his views private. It 
was also noted that Hilda "came to hate the Navy at the end". 38 Given her 
husband's experiences and the fact that she was herself not fond of the Navy, 
this can well be believed. 
Since hearing of the proposed publication of the Narrative, 
Evan-Thomas worried over it. However, "he certainly never told anyone 
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about the row until after he retired". 39 This suited Beatty perfectly. There 
was a general feeling that the Silent Service should continue to remain silent. 
That this was not so on Beatty's part, aided a deterioration of relations 
between Beatty and Evan-Thomas that were never close anyway. 
Without their brief interactions at Jutland, there is no evidence to 
suggest that Beatty and Evan-Thomas would have been mentioned in the 
same context. Jutland and Beatty had plagued Evan-Thomas since June 1916. 
Ultimately, they combined to end his career and might well have contributed 
to his death, aged only 66, in 1928. 
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6. A BCF take-over? 
Since 1919, there were suggestions that those who had served in the 
BCF and then battlefleet under Beatty, having found favour with him and 
others of similar opinions, were rewarded with promotion when he became 
First Sea Lord. It was also claimed that he surrounded himself with close 
service associates in important posts. The implication was that, regardless of 
an individual's ability, close friendship or other ties with former battlecruiser 
men had more weight when promotions were decided upon. Especially after 
the war, this meant, at least to battlefleet sympathisers (as Jellicoe believed), 
that Beatty's disciples shared high office purely by virtue of their loyalty to 
him. Towards the end of Beatty's term as First Sea Lord, the Sunday Express 
summed-up the growing public and service feeling against Beatty as the 
self-styled hero of Jutland: 
"His frequent photographs, his cap nautically 
cocked on one side of his head, his appearance of 
the great strong man, boomed for his dash and 
energy by all his friends with frantic talk of the 
Nelson touch (though anything less like Nelson's 
than the strategy of Beatty can hardly be 
imagined), the full-in-the-limelight, the 
hell-for-leather, slap-dash society's darling, he 
came to be contrasted with an assumed timid 
admiral, hiding up in Scapa Flow, enclosing his 
ships in cotton wool, and afraid to produce that 
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easy Nile or Trafalgar which every Englishman 
desired... [Beatty's former associates] have been 
appointed to the Admiralty because they have 
been of the Beatty school. " 1 
The article went on to state that Beatty had abandoned Evan-Thomas at 
Jutland because he wanted to fight the 1stSG on his own. Even allowing for 
journalistic hyperbole, there was much in this article, not least as expression 
of popular opinion. Bellairs had dedicated his book to Beatty as "the man 
who will give the Royal Navy a real war staff. " 2 He too had expected the 
Admiralty to be made up of former BCF men and sympathisers and, in 1920, 
it certainly appeared that Beatty was dominating the Admiralty by 
surrounding himself with former BCF officers. However, despite his position 
and the fact that former BCF men were Deputy and Assistant CNS, Beatty 
encountered problems in implementing his views of Naval reform, but 
particularly on Jutland. It had seemed to him to be so easy to simply order 
Harper to make suitable alterations to his `Record', but this led to involving 
the First Lord (Long) and Jellicoe's allies in opposing Beatty. They combined 
to ruin Beatty's immediate plans for the `Record'. Evidently this "Beatty 
school" was either not as influential as Bellairs had hoped, or as large. 
Examining the extent of Beatty's influence on the Royal Navy in the 1920s 
will lead to an understanding of the ultimate success of Beatty's efforts to 
establish his view of Jutland in print. 
With the recent experience of bitter controversy, when Fisher was First 
Sea Lord and bickering with Lord Charles Beresford, it was thought that 
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appointments would be made in a similarly adversarial way to the 
assumptions made about Beatty - to endorse each others' views within the 
service, so that the appointments of favourites of these two had a high profile. 
Some serving from 1904 (when Fisher became First Sea Lord) came to be 
seen as belonging to some kind of Fisher or Beresford "school" as it was 
frequently called. This opinion survived and just as those such as Jellicoe, 
Bacon and Jackson were seen as Fisher's men, so Dreyer, Cecil Burney, 
Goodenough and Evan-Thomas (amongst many others), came to be seen as 
Jellicoe men. Chatfield, Brock, Drax, Keyes, Richmond and Dewar, amongst 
others, were seen to be Beatty men. However, opinions regarding how 
appointments were made and who might or might not have been seen to have 
been someone's close followers, were more the result of how appointments 
and relations were perceived by others than about how they were actually 
made. 
It is not unusual that senior figures in any organisation choose people 
to administer it with whom they are familiar and in whom they have 
confidence. Jellicoe did so as C-in-C Grand Fleet and First Sea Lord, as did 
Beatty in these positions and as commander of the BCF. In making these 
choices, personal friendship, shared social interests, Naval views and 
especially service specialisms were involved to varying degrees that are 
difficult to fully determine due to their inherent complexity. 
The Navy in which all officers of this period served, was dominated by 
the big gun. Critics of the Admiralty and Jellicoe, especially Bellairs and 
Dewar, held Jellicoe responsible when, as DNO, he maintained "stereotyped 
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gunlayer's tests... against the advice of those who urged a more realistic 
system. " 3 Bellairs's general criticism was that "tactics were made subordinate 
to gunnery by the materialist, " 4 that is, the study of history and consequent 
tactical liberation were overwhelmed by the narrow views of material 
specialists like Jellicoe. Much of the controversy over Jutland stemmed from 
the struggle to assert the influence of differing specialisms - both material 
and historical - on operational policy. Many materialists were also gunnery 
specialists and, by 1919, were senior officers and supporters of Jellicoe. The 
lack of effectiveness of the use of other weapons at Jutland, such as 
torpedoes, irked both the Dewars, in the Staff Appreciation, and Bellairs, 
who urged greater tactical freedom in destroyer operations. 5 However, many 
other specialists were equally desirous as were the historians to usurp the 
prominence held by gunnery officers in the early 20th Century. 
Before the war, Lt. Robert Falcon Scott frequently avoided even 
walking near to his ship's gunnery Lieutenant, Hubert Dannreuther (later of 
Invincible at Jutland), and although he had nothing against him personally, 
would not speak to Dannreuther because it was not well-received amongst 
other torpedo men that the torpedo officer should converse with a gunner. 6 
This quasi-hostile inter-specialist friction existed long after Jutland. Similar 
hostilities are always evident in other large organisations, but common to all 
in the Navy was a desire for each specialism to assume as much prominence 
and influence over the service as was possible. The historical champions were 
no different in principle, but they were hampered in a fundamental way. 
There was no historical `specialism' as such and its supporters were dissident 
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members of the established specialist groups, with all the institutional lack of 
interest that implied. Neither the Naval Review nor the Navy Records Society 
nor even the War College were as central to Naval society as were HMS 
Excellent or HMS Vernon (the torpedo school). 
Bellairs and Dewar discussed gunnery, signals and torpedoes and their 
use at Jutland, but their efforts were all to a single end, to counter the fact 
that "the one thing lacking was the offensive spirit... in the high places of 
Admiralty. " 7 Aided by historical study - which they would provide - they 
hoped that Beatty would put that offensive spirit into the Admiralty. Simply 
because Beatty was First Sea Lord, Bellairs thought that the desired changes 
espoused by himself, the Dewars, Richmond and other supporters would be 
implemented, especially with former BCF personnel at the Admiralty to 
support Beatty. Examining the way in which appointments were made sheds 
much light upon the extent of the assertions that there was a "Beatty school" 
and what, if anything, it achieved. 
The Navy still suffered from the aftermath of allegations and 
suspicions that careers were being sabotaged as when Fisher was First Sea 
Lord. For example, Lt. Barry Domvile had disagreed with Fisher's views on 
dreadnoughts, subsequently being the apparent victim of a campaign by 
Fisher to oust him from the service by hook or by crook, although he later 
reached Flag rank. This was, perhaps, a sign that patronage can also have 
negative effects. Vice-Admiral Doveton Sturdee (Beresford's former COS 
and CO 4thBS at Jutland) was the man Fisher held responsible for not 
releasing the battlecruisers sooner to support Cradock's force in South 
259 
America. He went on to preside over victory at the Falkland Islands, which 
did not please Fisher, who tried hard, but in vain, to prevent Sturdee reaping 
any reward. With regard to the Staff Appreciation, there was some indication 
that this nature of personal bickering and recrimination might be re-kindled 
regarding Jutland. It was certainly feared, as shown by Chatfield's and Keyes' 
concerns over the advisability of publication of the Staff Appreciation (seen 
in Chapter 3). The Fisher-Beresford feud was within living memory to many, 
especially Chatfield, and the manner in which inter-war promotions were 
actually made suggested that stability throughout the service was the prime 
concern, rather than patronage to implement ideas. However, in 1919, 
promotions were still seen in some way as a continuation of the differences 
between two factions of the Navy, with the chief proponents in this case 
polarising around Jellicoe and Beatty and what they represented. 
It does not necessarily follow that sharing the views and friendship of 
one person means that promotion and high office are guaranteed. If this were 
true, from 1919, Beatty would have filled all posts at the Admiralty with 
ex-BCF and BF officers who shared his opinions and objectives. However, 
apart from Chatfield, Brock and later Keyes, the Admiralty was not packed 
with Beatty men, as a brief glance at the Navy List demonstrates (see 
Appendix 3). Service records also showed that all appointments were made 
on an individual basis by ability and achievement. Any attempt to make use 
of personal or service links to establish a pattern leads to many difficulties, 
principally because the detailed reports on officers are not yet publicly 
available. However, there is enough to at least provide a good view of how 
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promotions were made and affected the service. 
Chatfield was a well-known supporter of Beatty, so his promotion to 
Fourth Sea Lord and then ACNS, in 1919, could be said by opponents to 
have been influenced solely by Beatty. His service record, however, was 
exemplary, so it was doubtful if he would have needed such patronage alone 
to succeed. He certainly did not need it before he met Beatty. The only 
blemish on his record was where he incurred Their Lordships' "severe 
displeasure" for taking the destroyer Zebra up the Thames "at an excessive 
rate of speed" - on 6th July 1901. After that, he was rapidly promoted 
Commander and then Captain, and was a highly successful Flag-Captain to 
both Sir Colin Keppel and then Beatty. For services as Grand Fleet Gunnery 
Officer he received the KCMG and a good service pension of £100 pa, was 
appointed ADC to the King, commended for his help at the Washington 
Conference, was subsequently C-in-C Atlantic and Mediterranean and 
became First Sea Lord. 8 He would have done well regardless of any political 
influence. 
Walter Cowan was another close, old friend of Beatty and was once 
his partner in bullying a young cadet, traumatising him so much that he left 
the service. Rear-Admiral Lewis Bayly noted that Cowan: 
"lacks experience at sea. Not a good judge of 
off[ice]rs or men. Handles his ship v. well, is just- 
not tactful. " 9 
Brock confirmed Cowan's good handling of his ship, which "is in excellent 
order in all respects, +is a model man of war. " 10 Cowan was described 
261 
accurately, if unkindly, as a "ferocious midget" 11 which might explain the on 
board discipline and lack of tact. The service placed much emphasis on 
leadership and throughout all records for officers in this period, it was this 
ability that predominated in deciding promotion. Jutland or favouritism were 
not significant factors. It must be remembered that it was unusual for any 
admiral to have risen within the service and not to have influenced his 
subordinates at some point. In 1920, Cowan was recommended for his Baltic 
command (supporting the White Army forces following the revolution in 
Russia) by Madden, a Jellicoe supporter. Cowan also reported favourably on 
Dreyer (a Jellicoe supporter and his former Flag-Captain) in 1923. Regardless 
of differences of Naval opinions, the leadership element predominated and 
Beatty's and Jellicoe's supporters did not prejudice each others' careers 
simply for their respective sympathies. Throughout this, there was no 
indication at all that there was a "Beatty school" or a gathering of cronies 
around Beatty, nor, for that matter, one surrounding Jellicoe. Individuals 
would always have sympathised with one more than the other, but not to the 
extent that operations or policy would have been affected. 
Perhaps the most notable case regarding claims of prejudice in 
promotions after the war concerned Harper, who suspected that Beatty had 
been instrumental in preventing his promotion from captain and determining 
his employment (or lack of it) as a result of the difficulties that arose over 
Beatty's orders to alter the official `Record' of the battle of Jutland. 
Following the end of his work on the `Record', Harper took command of the 
battleship Resolution from August 1922 until April 1924. Then, he stated that 
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"much to my surprise, [I] was retained on the Active List. " 12 The reason for 
this surprise was that he suspected that Beatty had orchestrated some plot to 
prevent his further employment (less so the fact that he might not have felt 
that his command was successful). During this appointment, however, it was 
noted that Harper "gives me the impression of being an officer who is little 
inclined to take responsibility". 13 So, it would seem that there were strong 
grounds for doubting Beatty's supposed involvement in Harper's promotion. 
As taking responsibility and demonstrating leadership were essential to the 
service, Harper seemed to be less suitable than he would have had people 
believe for further employment as captain at sea or higher promotion. If he 
shunned responsibility, or was reluctant to take it, what would cause more 
surprise was the fact that he was retained on the Active list. 
In December 1923, Brock (C-in-C Mediterranean) reported to Beatty 
on Harper, in light of which Harper was considered "for shore appointment 
only. " 14 What this report said in detail is hard to tell, but if it was similar to 
the above quote (or stronger) and had substance, there cannot be much 
surprise at the decision. It was rare for this step to be taken, there being less 
than ten such referrals to the Admiralty from 1919-39.15 If Beatty had 
wanted to force Harper to retire or determine his employment, it is hard to 
see how he could actually have done this. There was a definite chain of 
command and a procedure for reporting on officers that could not be 
disturbed or circumvented for personal vendettas. The latter required 
authority and power that no First Sea Lord ever exercised. 
Rear-Admiral Alexander-Sinclair (Corn 2ndLCS Galatea at Jutland) 
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noted that Harper: 
"Handles his ship with marked ability +is loyal 
and capable. Possibly he is of rather discontented 
temperament+is inclined to complain. This may 
be the reason for the [high] no. of adverse reports 
on his officers [those under his command not] 
being above average ability. Average ability. " 16 
This, too, would seem to be consistent with other assessments of Harper's 
abilities. That he was seen to be discontented, could well have been a result 
of his experiences with the compilation of the `Record'. At least they must 
have played some part in contributing to an obviously unhappy state and this 
affected his work in Resolution. Apart from having the dark clouds of Beatty 
and other senior officers over him, it was decided later (8.3.23) that he would 
only be retained on the Active List if a favourable report was forthcoming 
from his C-in-C. 17 Such a move was not unheard of, but was by no means 
commonplace 18 and was serious enough to come to the attention of the 
Board. So, there were serious doubts about his suitability even to continue, 
let alone proceed any higher or further. 
Beatty had already satisfied himself that that no unfavourable Jutland 
account was issued. As long as Harper could not get his way over the account, 
that was enough for Beatty. Harper's future career was dealt with by forces 
outside the complete control of Beatty or himself. 
On 16th May 1926, Harper was informed that he was considered 
suitable for employment and, on 3rd June, that he would probably go to a 
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dockyard. On 25th November, however, he was informed that no employment 
would be offered to him and, on 1st February 1927, was placed on the 
Retired List. 19 To Harper: 
"This came as no great surprise as Lord Beatty 
was still in office and his influence in regard to 
the employment of Flag officers was 
considerable. " 20 
So, more than five years on, Harper still believed himself victimised, but the 
fact remained that Harper had received negative reports on more than one 
occasion. Peter Beatty (youngest son), writing to Langhorne Gibson regarding 
his and Harper's The Riddle of Jutland, stated that: 
"As to the animosity which has been displayed in 
the production of this book, I cannot understand 
why you should be guilty of such; as to your joint 
author (it is understandable, because my father as 
First Sea Lord received so unfavourable a report 
of the qualifications of Admiral Harper for higher 
command, that he could not recommend 
his... [promotion])". 21 
This was consistent with other reports. He was only confirming the facts of 
the reports, but these support the opinion that Harper was not suitably 
qualified for advancement. Beatty, if he had any say over the matter - which 
he did not directly - would have to have taken account of such reports. 
What is questionable, is the rather abrupt volte-face when Harper, 
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after being told he was suitable for employment, was later informed 
otherwise. It must be questioned on what authority Harper was told about his 
future employment (he did not say from whom he learned this). This false 
reassurance might well have been informal and ill-informed, giving Harper 
false hopes which led him to suspect a conspiracy when the truth became 
known to him. The intricacies of conspiracy are often elaborate (not to say 
implausible) and, especially given the dearth of evidence in Harper's case, 
conspiracy can be ruled out. However, there is evidence to suggest that with a 
change of First Sea Lord, Harper would have been employed. Harper, writing 
to Oswald Frewen, noted that Madden had told him "if I get there you will be 
given a job" 22 but that Beatty kept on and Harper "faded out". In light of the 
previous reports on Harper, it would seem that Madden would have secured 
his employment regardless of Harper's seniors' doubts regarding his 
suitability. This suggested that Madden felt that Harper had been badly and 
unfairly treated whilst Beatty was CNS and that a job was in some way 
compensation for his treatment. This came from someone who sympathised 
more with Jellicoe and Harper for taking such a stand against Beatty 
regarding the recording of the events at Jutland. If there is any evidence of 
favouritism, it is more anti- than pro-Beatty. 
With regard to the publication of Harper's accounts of his dealings 
with Beatty, in 1968,23 the Second Earl Beatty noted that: 
"1. Harper's promotion (lot of hearsay). 
2. Suspect unsupported by printed documents. " 24 
Although he went to excessive lengths to protect his father's reputation - 
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often flatly denying the facts, as had his father in the 1920s - one must share 
Lord Beatty's opinion. There was bound to be much hearsay, yet Harper's 
troubled relationship with Beatty was coincidental with meagre reports as to 
his suitability for higher office. One was not a product of the other. In 1927, 
it was noted that: 
"I understand from an officer who knew him 
intimately that RA Harper has always suffered 
from an almost insane fear of being found to 
blame for something. " 25 
This certainly supported the nature of the comments above and might have 
been suggestive as to some of Harper's actions taken regarding the `Record' 
of Jutland. After the `Record' was shelved, Harper went to great pains to 
ensure that he would not be held responsible for what it said, if it was ever 
published. His contemporaries thought this slightly irrational, but his surviving 
papers detailing his actions are accurate documents, little tainted and not 
corrupted by his dislike of Beatty. 26 Promotions and appointments do not 
seem to have been influenced by differences over opinions on Jutland as 
much as Harper believed his case was. Promotion depended largely upon 
individual ability regardless of where one served, or what opinions they had 
on Naval matters. As might also be expected, good performances in 
engagements with the enemy were looked upon favourably. Any claims of 
bias were more likely to have been the result of individuals' disappointments. 
Kenneth Dewar reflected charges of favouritism when he wrote to 
Herbert Richmond, in late 1916, that: 
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"Dreyer has been appointed to deal with the 
submarine question. It shows that such 
appointments only depend upon the personal 
friendships and acquaintance of those who happen 
to be in authority. " 27 
This sentiment is common in many organisations outside the Navy - that 
failure to achieve what is wanted in terms of promotion is often attributed to 
being out of favour with those who make the decisions. This could be true in 
some cases, but there is little, if any, evidence to suggest that it was so for the 
Navy. 
Dewar obviously felt differently, that Dreyer's having been 
Flag-Captain to Jellicoe alone seemed to have secured him the 
appointment. 211 This, however, ignored the fact that he was thought suitable 
by others as well. Jellicoe would, in any event, have been foolish if he had felt 
Dreyer to be suitable, but not allowed his employment in this role simply for 
fear of charges of favouritism. All promotions, however, could be subjected to 
the same criticism and all opinions are relative, but Dewar chose not to think 
that Jellicoe might have had little or nothing to do with Dreyer's appointment 
- they were condemned in Dewar's mind 
by their past association alone. 
However, leadership was crucial and Dreyer received favourable reports on 
his abilities in this respect. 
Dewar's comment also showed obvious symptoms of someone 
evidently considered by his contemporaries and superiors to be unsuitable for 
a post, carping at those that were, purely for personal comfort. Upon 
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receiving the list of promotions, in late 1916, Richmond wrote to Dewar that 
it was: 
"A very short list, one half of them [from] 
battleships of the Grand Fleet... Promotion is 
reserved for the ablest officers: the ablest officers 
are in the Grand Fleet... How satisfactory it is to 
know [-] that the talent of this Navy is all in one 
place: and how stimulating... to know that if we 
had more ability we should be in the Grand Fleet! 
It's a rum world. " 29 
There did seem to be a perception that the Grand Fleet (irrespective of 
battleships or battlecruisers) was seen to comprise the elite of the Navy, both 
in personnel and weaponry - at least to some outside wishing to get inside. 
This view was mostly imaginary, with both seemingly refusing to analyse 
themselves as harshly (or honestly) as they did others. All their comments 
about favouritism could be said about themselves by opponents. Dewar 
replied to Richmond: 
"The Grand Fleet is as you say the only path to 
early promotion at present... like calls to like and 
in the junior promotions this time we can plainly 
discuss the Jacksons, Jellicoes... of the next 
generation! The condition of original sin attached 
to those who were not in the Grand Fleet at the 
beginning of the war is somewhat difficult to 
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overcome ... I asked Calthorpe the Second Sea 
Lord to send me to one of the GF ships which 
was vacant at the time-the Tiger I think-From 
what he told me I could only guess that the decks 
of GF ships had to be scrubbed in a certain 
way... [and that] could not be learned by an 
outsider like myself. " 30 
This echoed similar feelings whilst giving an example (in which there was 
some irony). From the frequent correspondence between the two, it is 
evident that Richmond was not pleased simply with being captain of the 
pre-dreadnought Commonwealth, with the 3rdBS on the Thames, and both 
himself and Dewar felt that his talents were under-used. This doubtless added 
to feelings of being side-lined. During 1916-7, Corbett often told Richmond 
that he was "keeping you in Hankey's mind" 31 for a job (seemingly historical) 
more suited to his interests and talents. Instead, in April 1917, Richmond 
obtained a posting to the Grand Fleet, briefly commanding Conqueror, 
2ndBS. It is not surprising that Richmond and Dewar felt aggrieved to be 
denied the appointments that they desired, but there were good reasons for 
this. 
In Richmond's case, he had only himself to blame for his successes 
and failures. As is common, he took most of the credit for his successes and 
blamed others for his failure to get the positions he wanted. He was a rare 
example of both a serving officer and historian of some ability, as was Dewar, 
to some extent. It has been claimed that: 
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"His mistake was to come out as a `brain' at too 
early a rank.. . One can understand, perhaps, why 
the authoritarians sought to sideline Richmond 
away from the centre of power. " 32 
It is a view common to historians who like to champion Richmond's 
sailor-scholar abilities, but it ignores how his seniors and contemporaries (who 
knew him better) viewed him, and more importantly, exactly why he was seen 
to have been side-lined. Admiral John de Robeck noted that he "would make 
a v. g. staff officer. " 33 In April 1918, a suitable position became available, as 
the newly-formed Director of Training and Staff Duties. For someone with an 
interest in history, and supporter of Beatty, this promised a sound beginning 
for the desired reforms in tactics and education - if managed correctly. 
Admiralty Secretary, Oswyn Murray, tried many times to dissuade the First 
Lord (Sir Eric Geddes) from appointing Richmond, on the grounds that the 
fleet "would be against it. " 34 As DTSD, his views were felt to be too 
controversial and he left the Division at the end of 1918 to take up command 
of the battleship Erin. On 1st December 1919, he was back in the TSD, but 
not as Director. Later, in 1931, after a formal reprimand for expressing his 
views (in two articles in The Times, November 1929, regarding smaller navies 
and smaller capital ships) he retired at his own request. 
Although he received favourable comments for his intellectual abilities, 
the leadership element was not so prominent. Certainly, he did not seem to 
be able to settle in those posts for which he craved. Whatever mistakes he 
made, coming out as a "brain" too early was not one of them; persistently 
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upsetting senior officers was. Intelligent he certainly was, but although he was 
a "clever boy from a family of high intellectual ability", 35 he had evidently not 
the temperament or persuasive abilities that successful reformers possess. Hais 
historical work was thorough, but it would seem that he learned little of 
inter-personal politics from it. 
As Beatty was later aware, Richmond had radical views regarding the 
future of capital ships (as seen in Chapter 3) and that such a free-thinker as 
Beatty had reservations in allowing him official expressions of his views, 
shows that Dr. Gordon is totally wrong to feel that authoritarians "sought to 
sideline" him. This might easily be imagined, but the very person that Dr. 
Gordon claims that Richmond would naturally "gravitate" towards, the least 
authoritarian - Beatty, sought to distance himself from Richmond in the 
cause of using Jutland to endorse his tactical beliefs. After all, it was some 
measure of the suspicion that surrounded Richmond, that most of the Fleet 
was against his appointment as DTSD and he did not succeed in the positions 
he frequently told Dewar that he wanted and eventually succeeded in 
obtaining. 
Richmond's service record sheds more light upon his career path and 
gives little evidence of a vendetta. He had commanded Dreadnought, but 
subsequently commanded only two second class protected cruisers, Vindictive 
and Furious, 36 then served as Assistant DNO. Throughout his career he also 
turned-down an Antarctic mission, the command of Iris (second class 
protected cruiser) and a post on the staff of the Naval War College, 
Portsmouth. 37 It can be understood that commanding small ships did not give 
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him sufficient outlet for his abilities, but if he wanted to further his career 
anywhere in the service, refusing just one position was not at all helpful. 
Throughout his career, he criticised the system of training Cadets and 
commented that education was too badly planned and disconnected. 
Ultimately, his failure to progress was due to his refusal of certain posts and 
because he was "incapable of subduing his critical faculties". 38 A truly 
intelligent reformer would have known when, and when not, to have voiced 
his beliefs. 
Subsequent events only showed that Richmond did not truly recognise 
the technological nature of warfare, nor the economic and political dynamics 
of peacetime Naval competition, which led him to pursue a mistaken concept 
of arms limitation that was both impractical and unhelpful to those struggling 
to maintain the security of the Empire. 39 Chatfield later wrote anonymously, 
in The Times, that Richmond and his small ships theory had a malign 
influence on the service. 40 For an alleged forward-thinker and radical, 
claiming that long-range gunnery did not give accuracy, was not a proposition 
that was seriously entertained in the 1920s. Although Richmond 
demonstrated competent analytical skills, they were subordinated to his 
radical, deliberately critical personal opinions on Naval issues. 
Richmond may not have realised the full extent to which his views 
were considered potentially dangerous. He was never popular amongst his 
contemporaries. In 1917, the Prime Minister (Lloyd George) privately 
canvassed Richmond's Naval views, during which Richmond recommended 
that Jellicoe be replaced by Wemyss 41 as part of making the Admiralty seem 
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more aggressive in its approach to the war. Had others been aware of 
Richmond's role here, his reputation would not have been enhanced in most 
other sailors' views. Thus, it can well be believed that the Fleet was against 
him, but he only had himself to blame for this. 
During and after the war, Richmond was highly critical of Admiralty 
policy. In 1913, he edited the NRS volume The Loss of Minorca, the 
introduction to which was a typical expression of Richmond's criticism of the 
Admiralty. Even though the Admiralty being pilloried was over 150 years old, 
it could just as easily have been the Admiralty of 1913, which Richmond 
probably intended. Promotion depended on other considerations than just 
ability and the desire to hold important offices, suitability was largely judged 
by leadership skills or their potential. Richmond's own actions disqualified 
himself from significant offices. He was not the victim of any anti-Richmond 
campaign; his own actions persistently put him out of favour with his seniors 
and contemporaries. 
The irony in his letter to Dewar, was that it was perfectly reasonable to 
assess Richmond, on the basis of his insufficient qualifications, as not the 
most able or most suitable of officers for the Grand Fleet. This was naturally 
unpalatable to him and he found it difficult to admit to this. When he stated 
that "like calls to like" it was clear what he meant - that someone gathers his 
cronies around him - yet it was more correct to say that those with similar 
views will always attract support and friendship from others. This was just as 
true of Dewar and his associates. Richmond and Dewar complained, in 
1916-7, because their views differed from those of Jellicoe and his supporters, 
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but when Beatty became C-in-C and then First Sea Lord, they could not use 
the charge of cronyism for their failures any more. All this doubtless fuelled 
Richmond's desire for reform and dislike of higher authority. This manifested 
itself throughout his writing. 
Dewar, in the above letter, seemed just as reluctant to accept similar 
criticism by failing to grasp the subtlety of Calthorpe's comment and what it 
implied. He was being told in the face of obvious persistence, that he was not 
considered desirable for this post. Indeed, it could be argued that this 
inability to sense Calthorpe's meaning was evidence that this judgement was 
correct. Dewar and Richmond believed some kind of secret club existed from 
which they were barred simply because their faces did not fit, but the only 
debarment was lack of suitability, which was frequently commented upon by 
their seniors. 
After the war, it was felt that when Beatty became First Sea Lord, he 
would bring with him his trusty followers from the battlecruisers and Queen 
Elizabeth and reward them with significant positions, just as it was felt that 
Jellicoe had done in 1917. Evidence indicated that the opposite was true and 
many important positions at the Admiralty (see Appendix 3) reflected the 
respective sizes of the battlefleet to that of the BCF, in that those who served 
in the battlefleet at Jutland and after out-numbered those in the same 
positions from the BCF by over 4: 1 between 1919 and 1938. It is worth noting 
that of the ships in service directly after Jutland, there were 30 battleships 
(excluding Dreadnought) and 7 battlecruisers, so the respective sizes of the 
two forces is mirrored at the Admiralty (roughly 4: 1). There were others who 
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were not in Grand Fleet positions at the time of Jutland who also held these 
positions. The general conclusion is that "zeal", ability and leadership 
together, led to promotion and Beatty certainly did not pack the Admiralty 
with his henchmen. In fact, by selecting a few, and it was only a few, old 
shipmates, he did nothing that had not been done by others many times 
before and he certainly did not unbalance the service in making his selections. 
Overall, those of the BF, BCF and those outside in 1916, held subsequent 
posts in proportion to their numbers. 
For the first three years of Beatty's time as First Sea Lord, the posts 
of DCNS and ACNS were filled with close associates from battlecruiser days: 
Keyes, Brock and Chatfield. There was little protest at this from those 
supporting Jellicoe. For Beatty to have held onto Keyes and Chatfield for 6-7 
years, would have been to deny them opportunities for different experiences 
and, therefore, advancement. He would not have wanted to do this and to 
imagine that this, might be so (as did Bellairs and many newspapers) is 
fallacious. Both Brock and Chatfield later became C-in-C Mediterranean, 
advancement which would have been retarded if they had stayed where they 
were until Beatty retired. Beatty did lend his support to Keyes' bid to succeed 
Madden as First Sea Lord. 42 For the first few years after Beatty's succession 
as CNS, Keyes, Chatfield and Brock were the only members of this "Beatty 
school" in influential positions in the Admiralty, situations for which they 
were admirably qualified on their own merits. Beatty's secretary (Frank 
Spickernell) remained with him until retirement and only Seymour, as 
Additional Naval Assistant, was appointed by association. In light of this, the 
276 
claims of a Beatty/BCF dominated Admiralty cannot be sustained. 
Towards the end of his period in office, Beatty's Deputy and Assistant 
were Frederic Field, Dreyer and Pound, all battlefleet (and Jellicoe) men. 
Dreyer: 
"was a strong supporter of Jellicoe; but he knew 
Beatty well ... [he] had a great admiration for 
Beatty. " 43 
So, if the popularly believed picture of battlefleet personnel not liking 
battlecruiser personnel were true, then this would hardly have been the case. 
An important point is that Dreyer, Chatfield, Keyes, Pound and others might 
have favoured either Jellicoe or Beatty, but all were adaptable to work with 
each other. As Brock, Chatfield and Keyes confirmed regarding the Staff 
Appreciation, they put service unity before supporting their own beliefs. This 
was also true of other officers. 
The only recipient of Beatty's long-lasting personal support with regard 
to his work was his secretary, the Navy's youngest captain, Frank Spickernell. 
It was by no means unusual that an officer and his secretary formed a long 
working relationship. It would, indeed, have been unusual if the relationship 
was good, which in this case it was, to have broken it simply because a certain 
period of time had passed, or that it was time for others to take turns. 
Following Beatty's retirement, Sir Frank Spickernell became secretary to Lord 
Alfred Mond at the Mond Nickel Company and Beatty later became 
godfather to Spickernell's daughter. 44 
To further prove the absence of such a rift between two schools, as 
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imagined by the Sunday Express, Chatfield said of Dreyer that he "should be 
of immense value to the service in future. Ability exceptional". as Chatfield's 
assessments of any officer's suitability for promotion were based on other 
factors than allegiance to his old chief. Chatfield, in 1930, noted that H. W. 
Parker (Captain of Benbow at Jutland): 
"is inclined to ride roughshod over those who 
oppose his views +this is a serious defect in his 
character which limits his suitability for the 
highest commands in peace. " 46 
Once more, a serious character defect adversely affected Parker's leadership 
qualities. Chatfield also felt that Drax was a little shy and therefore not 
ideally suited to be a great, inspiring leader, but that he was at least a "leader 
in thought, " which was something. 47 If the assumption of inter-school rivalry 
and cronyism is examined again, people would expect from Chatfield glowing 
reviews of Drax and damning ones of Dreyer, but simple honesty prevailed. 
Although Drax was considered able, his apparent reluctance to present 
himself as a forceful character was an issue of leadership - the most 
desirable element. The important factor was finding suitable positions, which 
matched individuals' abilities and desires with the needs and good of the 
service. This was always foremost in senior officers' minds. Personal 
differences there might have been, but these did not adversely affect any 
advancement where it was justified. 
Kenneth Dewar's record did not record the disfavour in which he 
perceived he was held, but did note some areas to which it was felt he was 
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better suited. Pakenham noted that he was: 
"Somewhat wanting in experience with the 
working Navy, powerful, attentive, 
+ considerate.. . Average ability. " 48 
Despite what Dewar felt, the comment on his lack of fleet experience was 
common, a remark made by those who knew him better than any historian 
(Dewar did lack practical experience). He might have argued, however, that 
this was not due to want of trying to get into a prominent position. Two other 
comments are also worth noting: 
"He does not unfortunately possess the power of 
handling offrs. and men+is out of sympathy with 
his ship's company. His great and understated 
ability would be of more use to the service in 
organising and staff appts" -Culme-Seymour 
"he is perhaps uncompromising & occasionally 
unsympathetic to people with slow brains. 
Leadership not very striking-not sufficiently 
sympathetic: influence considerable owing to 
ability & power of expression: tact considerable in 
spite of his strong opinions and anxiety to reform" 
-Hotham. 
49 
All of these emphasised leadership. Far from being destructive, 
Culme-Seymour (to whose father Jellicoe had been Flag-Commander) was 
suggesting how best Dewar could serve the service. He might not have been a 
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potentially great leader, but others were not necessarily great organisers or 
reformers - which was also said of Richmond. Contrary to many opinions 
expressed about his abilities and nature, he was seemingly considered tactful 
despite an obvious forceful personality, especially where reform (a favourite 
concern) was concerned. In many ways an individual's method of expression 
can be seen as disruptive, regardless of content, especially if it is forceful and 
dramatic. This often tends to count against the cause, even if it has much to 
commend it in itself. Richmond, and, to some extent, the Dewars, continually 
showed how not to express opinions for easy acceptance and seemed to take 
some delight in this. Richmond and the Dewars might have felt that, as few 
seemed to take notice of them, the only solution left was to be dramatic, but 
anyone doing this must have known how the service would react, especially its 
senior, conservative figures. 
What was to be avoided in the service as a whole, was the wild 
expression of controversial views or comments which could be disruptive of 
discipline. Regardless of how well-intended any comments might have been, 
or how correct, the fact of having to maintain discipline on a daily basis was 
highly important, which people often forget when they support great causes. 
Failing to approach reform in a manner suitable to the service it is intended 
to improve can easily cause serious problems, and any who make rash or 
erroneous comments which could be dangerous, naturally cast doubt over 
their ability to handle men or situations properly; two important qualities if 
promotion is desired. In light of the incident on the Royal Oak when Dewar 
was captain, the comments above about his not very striking leadership could 
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be said to have been proved. This was further evidence that Dewar's 
advancement depended upon his ability to lead and that he was not a victim 
of some vendetta. In connection with this, Rear-Admiral Collard's (RA 1stBS 
Mediterranean) record noted that: 
"the regrettable incidents leading to [the] trial in 
question were largely occasioned by [a] lack of 
self-control+ particularly of temper on his 
part. " 50 
Again, this emphasised leadership skill. Chatfield reported favourably on 
Charles Forbes (Jellicoe's Flag-Commander at Jutland) along with many 
others. 51 He also chose former BCF member William James as his COS in 
the Mediterranean. Howard Kelly felt that James was not quite First Sea 
Lord material, but, curiously, that his wife would help socially in any 
appointment. 52 James was an unusual figure in assessing his Jutland 
sympathies. He served in the battleship Benbow as Flag-Commander to 
Sturdee at Jutland, but he had only held this post for a day, having come 
from Queen Mary on 30th May. His sympathies were very much with the 
BCF and Beatty, but it shows how difficult it is to know for certain if serving 
under someone necessarily meant that their views were shared. By contrast, 
Hubert Dannreuther, the BCF member entrusted by Beatty to take the BCF's 
plans to the Admiralty in 1916, was a supporter of Jellicoe. 
Lt. William Tennant, in his lecture Jutland, some suggested lessons, in 
addition to points made regarding the battle itself, stated that: 
"In these days of fearful competition for 
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promotion... do we not see officers... unwilling to 
take responsibility if it can be handed onto 
someone else? " 53 
This echoes a trait common to all organisations, that there exist many who 
are satisfied with their lot and have little, if any, desire for rapid promotion 
or more responsibility in their jobs than the minimum required. A job may 
not be seen as an opportunity for advancement of position, but a post where 
if nothing serious goes wrong, then a comfortable life will ensue. In any 
event, not all want to, or can, proceed at the same pace and an apparent 
failure to be promoted might be nothing more than reluctance and 
misfortune, not bias. Should anyone be unwilling or unable to work towards 
further rank, one cannot criticise others who do want promotion and are 
prepared to work for it, for achieving their goals and promotion. Richmond, 
for example, carped at Dreyer, but the latter received many favourable 
reports, whereas Richmond did not. 
Charges of favouritism were ill-founded and almost always stemmed 
from disappointment or frustration. The charge that old acquaintances 
flocked together, should not be surprising and can always be made if two or 
more are seen to have any ideological, personal or service connections. Any 
charges of being out of favour (as with Richmond) usually indicate a trend of 
being seen to be unsuitable or disruptive. That Richmond was seen to be 
side-lined, only shows a misunderstanding of the fact that extensive reports 
noted his unsuitability for senior commands. To try to assert this to be a 
deliberate ploy by authoritarians, borders on accepting highly implausible 
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conspiracy theories. It can be seen quite easily from service records and the 
Navy List, that many individuals from the BCF or Grand Fleet served 
together at some point, however briefly, but never for very long and there 
was nothing unusual in this within the Navy. The respective sizes of the 
battlefleet and the BCF are reflected in the ratio of Admiralty positions taken 
by those with each background in the inter-war period, and the large part of 
the Navy that owed neither allegiance. Promotions to posts after the war 
reflected a balance of officers from the service as a whole, with no noticeable 
bias to any area. 
Throughout an examination of promotions, there is no evidence that 
Jutland played a significant part, nor that cliques surrounding Jellicoe and 
Beatty exercised influence in appointments. In order to have instituted the 
system that Bellairs imagined, or hoped for, it would have taken an extensive 
and elaborate network of personnel to ensure, let alone convince, senior 
officers that certain officers be lined-up for positions under men whose 
sympathies they shared. The lack of this indicated that Beatty did not attempt 
to give prominent positions to those who supported his objectives simply 
because of the fact that they had served with him in the BCF, nor did he 
have the authority to do this extensively. Rewarding sympathisers with 
important jobs was not the way in which he intended to carry through his 
reforms. 
After becoming First Sea Lord, Beatty lost close control over the 
Fleet. Beatty simply did not have the numerical strength or the authority to 
position favourites in Admiralty posts to encourage his ideas. After becoming 
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First Sea Lord, he also had other important responsibilities. He would not be 
the first to have been diverted from his earlier aims by the demands of senior 
office. The RAF was a constant problem, especially in relation to the struggle 
for a sufficient Fleet Air Arm, as was financing a Navy to defend the Empire 
from no immediate threat. 
Even if Beatty had packed the Admiralty with his acolytes, it would 
have taken some time for their views to be adopted, if they ever would have 
been. Having Richmond responsible for training promised much, but 
Richmond himself ruined that opportunity. Because the First Sea Lord could 
not directly influence all departments, he needed men like Richmond in 
subordinate posts to influence others. As was stated in the Introduction, the 
men who actively supported Naval reform were very few in number. As 
Tennant noted, in his lecture, many officers did not want extra responsibilities 
or to cause any agitation. The majority of officers continued to be 
conservatives and were apathetic to the reforms desired by a few, largely 
unknown, individuals. Many of Beatty's supporters, such as Richmond and 
Dewar, were not thought capable for senior posts, which weakened the over 
all reform effort. Numerical strength was not with Beatty, so he could not 
thus organise the institutional acceptance of his views. Because of the lack of 
bureaucratic domination of Beatty and his supporters (Bellairs, Dewar, 
Richmond and others), they encouraged, via the histories based on selective 
evidence and interpretation, a belief in the view that Jutland showed the 
defects of current practice -a situation to which they had the remedy. The 
only serious hope for reform after the war, was in portraying the fallacies in 
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need of correction to as large an audience as possible. Jutland, reformers 
thought, was a widely-accepted example of events that should have proceeded 
better. 
A major problem for the reformers, however, was the manner in which 
they made their case. Reformers are often viewed with suspicion for behaving 
differently from the majority. They often fall into the trap of appealing to 
those they wish to convert in a manner that is neither understandable nor 
palatable. Beatty, Richmond and the Dewars were pleased with partisan 
accounts that supported their views, as has been seen, but that was their 
failing. The reformers did not have to be convinced, the mass of the service 
did. Bellairs, Richmond and Dewar were frustrated with the current service, 
but this frustration was directed into accounts that, to their target audience, 
seemed to be constructed simply to insult Jellicoe and the many thousands 
who shared his views. 
The fact that Jutland was not a cataclysmic defeat also failed to help 
the reformers' cause. Beatty and his supporters, throughout the 1920s, met 
with a growing rebuttal of their partisan views, in books and articles, from 
those whom they aimed to convert. Indeed, by 1927, when Beatty's term as 
First Sea Lord ended, much public and service opinion was sympathetic to 
Jellicoe. In the early 1920s, Beatty's influence over the Jutland histories had 
set in motion a counter-reaction for which support was overwhelming. 
Ultimately, it overwhelmed the reformers. The reformers' partisan accounts 
reflected a perception of bureaucratic weakness rather than strength. 
Although there were many improvements in the Admiralty under Beatty's 
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leadership, it cannot be said that he fostered the kind of major reform that 
Richmond and the Dewars wanted. Perhaps this was just as well. As Jellicoe's 
supporters were keen to point-out, Beatty and his acolytes had not performed 
with the distinction that they would have wished in the war just past, hence 
the need to doctor the official account to maintain the First Sea Lord's 
prestige. With his authority thus reinforced, Beatty could act as the 
professional head of a broad church of policy makers responsible for making 
Naval policy in the 1920s. The Admiralty under Beatty was a much more 
successful organisation than the BCF had ever been. 
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Conclusion. 
The controversy surrounding Jutland scarcely affected the service in 
any major way. Some important operational lessons were learned and 
implemented soon afterwards, such as in ammunition handling. However, all 
the major difficulties regarding signalling, the latent ambiguity in the detail of 
orders, cooperative understanding within and between ships, and in tactics 
and strategy, had not been resolved. It would take disarmament and reduced 
spending, along with aircraft development and technological advances that 
could benefit all fighting ships to alter the Navy significantly, in terms of size, 
structure, types of ships and operational ideas. 1 After 1945, Kenneth Dewar 
was still enthusiastically advocating greater use of history with the aim of 
formulating flexible operational policy and ideas. 2 Whilst this was admirable, 
he failed to refer to the material changes made in the inter-war Navy and 
especially during WWII. 
When Kenneth Dewar was writing the Staff Appreciation, in 1920/1, 
he was advocating Beatty's basic ideas so that they might be widely 
implemented within the service. However, by 1939, the Navy was much 
smaller than it had been in 1919 and would subsequently have to deal with 
varied situations in many theatres. That alone aided the greater freedom of 
action and adaptation to the practicalities of war that Dewar had advocated. 
Dewar had failed to fully appreciate that Britain's strategic position in WWI 
- necessitating most of the Grand Fleet 
being based in the North Sea - was 
as significant a factor as was Jellicoe's apparent reluctance to seek to engage 
the fleeing HSF. As well as his favouring centralisation in fleet movements, 
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Jellicoe's difficulties were compounded by the large numbers of ships that it 
was necessary to coordinate. That fact alone increased the likelihood of 
misunderstandings and has been understated ever since. It is now recognised 
that the Grand Fleet was a controversial concept before the First World War. 
Doubts were expressed about the ability to be controlled by a single Flag 
officer. The HSF, despite German protestations of defending any future 
empire, was designed solely for North Sea combat. After Jutland, Jellicoe's 
tactics were seen as limiting and his behaviour too cautious, but it was not 
technologically possible for him to have improved upon the wireless, 
searchlights, or flags signals that were then in use to enable more effective 
coordination. Even if more could have been done to clarify how the fleet 
would be coordinated in battle, contemporary technology would have had to 
be relied upon. The use of initiative was one thing, but that was of little 
utility in coordinating 150 ships, most of which were beyond visual range of 
each other. There were some things that initiative could not overcome. 
Historical study and the use of initiative were not the miracle cures that 
Dewar believed. Dewar had thought this to be so, because he allowed his 
dislike of Jellicoe's views to blind him to all the difficulties that Jellicoe faced 
during the war. Subsequently, Dewar only commented upon those difficulties 
that he thought Beatty might have dealt with better, but even then, what 
Beatty might have done was only conjectural. Above all, Dewar and his 
supporters could not guarantee that the use of initiative would always prove 
superior to obedience to signals. Initiative was a much-discussed point during 
and after the war, but its failure to gain widespread acceptance into 
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operational doctrine was because many realised the potential difficulties if 
individuals had incompatible views of how initiative was to be used. This had 
been a feature in the BCF - that anticipating others' actions caused 
confusion - so much so that many actually took refuge in obedience to 
specific signals despite Beatty's encouragement of initiative. 
Furthermore, many, such as Dewar, in the 1920s, criticised Jellicoe and 
his supporters without realising that the same difficulties of coordination and 
awareness between 150 ships that plagued Jellicoe in trying to bring the 
battlefleet to action also plagued Scheer as he tried to extricate himself from 
it. Beatty, via Bellairs and the Dewars, tried to style the argument about 
battlefleet deployment as one where Jellicoe bungled his approach to a fleet 
action whilst Scheer nimbly fled. This diverted attention from his role in the 
BCF and implicitly admitted, despite the content of the proposed forewords 
to Harper's `Record', that the battlefleet action was more significant than the 
battlecruiser action. It was, therefore, contradictory to assert that the BCF 
played the significant part, which Beatty did when it suited his own image, 
when he sought to criticise Jellicoe and the battlefleet, asserting that he had 
prepared the Germans preliminary to Jellicoe delivering the coup de grace. It 
was the failure of the battlefleet to do this which showed that Beatty realised, 
but would not admit, that the BCF had not played the significant part. 
Together with this disappointment and disbelief, Beatty could easily imagine 
the failure to have been Jellicoe's. 
In 1919, Harper threatened to ruin this belief by stating that there 
were faults on both sides. Beatty's attempts to prevent the true picture 
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emerging had begun with his efforts, in 1916, to control what was said to the 
public. However, in 1919, the same restrictions on publishing what had 
happened did not exist and Harper had discovered much to argue that 
Beatty's actual role was not as favourable as he had claimed. The suppression 
of accuracy in the proposed official publications and its substitution for 
Beatty's preferred version of events led to his public image being greatly 
enhanced, usually at others' expense. 
This self-image was highly important to Beatty on its own, but when 
used to support his own operational principles, it was important to show that 
personal determination and freedom of action were vital for success. 
Therefore, the action at Jutland had to be seen to reflect this - that the 
battlecruiser action and the BCF had performed with distinction, whereas the 
battlefleet had not (at least not as much). However, this view existed only in 
the minds of Beatty and his supporters. Opponents of Beatty's views realised 
that initiative had failed real tests, such as Dogger Bank and Jutland, not 
hypothetical ones. It was one reason why the service was not enthusiastic 
about adopting the BCF's principles. 
Once Beatty's attempts to stifle expression of views contrary to his own 
became known, this caused a counter-movement. This then led Beatty, via the 
Narrative, to assert even more forcefully than he had previously what he 
believed to be true about his and the BCF's role in the war. The movement 
against Beatty then increased. Officers who had hitherto remained silent now 
publicly defended Jellicoe and the battlefleet. This revealed the feeling that 
the service at large realised that Beatty had not performed as well as he had 
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publicly claimed, but that feeling was denied expression on two counts. Beatty 
was First Sea Lord and senior to many, who would defer to that authority, 
and many shared a dislike of public disputes, especially where personal 
criticism was made to no practical effect. The public, however, knew little 
more than what publications had told them. Therefore, in the early 1920s, 
they believed that Beatty was the hero he claimed to be. 
Had Beatty allowed publication of Harper's `Record', in 1920, it might 
have reduced the likelihood of any subsequent disputes becoming so 
embittered. However, it might also have resulted in an unfavourable view of 
the BCF and Beatty emerging in 1920, which Beatty might have found 
difficult to rectify. By 1920, Beatty had much public support and he was 
somewhat psychologically disposed towards encouraging public adulation 
regardless of whether or not it was justified. Few took exception to the BCF 
being shown in a favourable light, but they did take exception to others' roles 
being under-played and disparaged. Beatty wanted his role at Jutland to be 
legitimised in official works regardless of whether or not it was supported by 
any evidence. 
This work, therefore, has examined why this was so - Beatty's 
sensitivity to faults in his command of the BCF - and exactly how Beatty 
sought to force his opinions by influencing the histories. It also reveals that 
although Beatty's efforts to influence the official accounts were known, the 
influence of this upon later works has not been sufficiently recognised. After 
1925, much of the passion over Jutland waned. It was realised that Beatty had 
not done so well at Jutland, but this conclusion, although accurate, was 
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arrived at largely as a sympathetic response to the previously harsh manner in 
which Jellicoe had been dealt with in print, not an analysis of the evidence. 
What receives little mention here, are Beatty's roles as C-in-C Grand Fleet 
(1916-19) and as First Sea Lord (1919-27). This is largely because Jutland was 
the main issue with which Beatty persisted so strongly, but also because there 
had not been any subsequent actions to significantly support his operational 
principles. In itself, this is important. Beatty did not want excessive 
centralisation of mundane issues, but the basic principles of freedom that 
governed the BCF appeared to many within as being only applicable to 
actions with the enemy. There is little evidence that Beatty succeeded in 
encouraging initiative in all aspects, or that he realised that this had not been 
achieved. Had initiative been practised on a daily basis, it might have been 
better used when action arrived. 
If he was to succeed in fostering a favourable public image and 
encouraging reform, Beatty had to stand or fall by how Jutland was perceived. 
As C-in-C GF, Beatty made little significant improvement upon Jellicoe's 
operational principles and attempts to suggest otherwise, such as those made 
by Dr. Gordon, were considerably overstated. 3 In short, the only example 
that Beatty could have used to convincingly support his image was Jutland. As 
was seen in the Preface, Beatty's desire to "annihilate" the 1stSG showed that 
action in battle was how he judged success, rather than skill in administration 
or strategy. Only annihilation in battle was satisfactory to Beatty. He was 
seemingly unim ressed by the HSF's self-annihilation in June 1919. 
It has been stated that Jutland dominated the Navy's thinking in the 
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inter-war years, but the disputes dealt with here had little direct relevance to 
this. 4 However, Naval disputes did have some impact. Kenneth Dewar 
seemed to have failed to realise that although his views were not widely 
adopted, the general controversial atmosphere surrounding the whole war at 
sea did go some way towards the partial realisation of his aims. Discussing 
Jutland, personal performances and the war as a whole stimulated critical 
thinking. It was often stifled by personal interest, passion for a point of view, 
and was rendered largely ineffectual by limiting studies to these aspects, but it 
had been an avowed aim of the historians to increase critical powers. What 
was not palatable to Dewar, was that critical thinking could also lead to 
arguments being constructed against his case. Richmond and the Dewars 
believed that once the Navy was shown the potential utility of history, it 
would lead to others endorsing their own views. It did not do so as much as 
they would have liked, because they could not predict or control how these 
desired and newly-developed critical powers would be used by others. As they 
did not want officers to be rigid adherents to any ideas, this also applied to 
support of history. Both had to accept that opinion might form against them. 
They were reluctant to accept this, often believing dissenters to be 
misinformed, misguided, or intellectually deficient. 
The war had certainly indicated areas in need of development and 
improvement. Subsequently, discussion on Naval matters did learn from the 
past, but not obviously, which Dewar did not recognise. The missed 
opportunities of the war had been hard-learned lessons, but the most 
important factor that Dewar, Richmond and others did not realise, was that 
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there was a widespread awareness of the fact that the Navy should adapt to 
possible and real future circumstances. They also failed to realise that the 
Navy had indeed already done this in 1914. What was overlooked by Beatty, 
the Dewars and Richmond was the fact that both the British and Germans 
were not as proficient in manoeuvring most of their respective fleets together 
in action as they would have liked. Each had only one opportunity to 
demonstrate this and neither had performed particularly well. Beatty and 
Hipper, however, had more than one experience of action and this showed 
that Beatty had not only performed no better than had Jellicoe at Jutland, 
but that he had repeated previous mistakes. At Jutland, this was very much to 
Hipper's advantage, which Hipper contrived to realise. Adapting to the 
requirements of war was a familiar theme of Beatty's, the Dewars' and 
Richmond's. This required means and opportunity, that is, some real 
indication of exactly to what, and how, one should adapt. The criticism of 
these three against centralisation and obedience to orders appeared, to their 
opponents, dangerous and ill-founded. They were thought dangerous on the 
grounds of a loss of over all discipline, but, importantly, in an ability to 
coordinate fleet movements. The BCF's experiences did not suggest that their 
much-vaunted initiative in action amounted to a more effective system. If 
anything, they suggested that the BCF's system was worse. 
The historians and reformers also overlooked the fact that the strategic 
situation in the war was a real solution to a real problem. Opponents of 
history, or those with no interest, were bewildered to be told by Richmond, 
Bellairs and Dewar that history led to principles and these led to effective 
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operational policies. The historians' principles seemed to be directed towards 
hypothetical situations and possible scenarios. Their opponents simply reacted 
to the reality of the war. This might not have been executed as effectively as 
it could have been, but the reformers could not provide a convincing 
alternative. When the reformers made a case, it was directed, with apparent 
hostility, against the current scenario. This appeared, to the reformers' 
opponents, to neglect an allowance of all the strategic and tactical factors 
involved which had to be dealt with in reality, in favour of selected points 
that were used solely for criticism. There was some element of truth in this, 
because history was only useful to reformers if certain aspects of it supported 
their views and aims. Any inconvenient aspects were omitted from discussion. 
This selective approach was realised by others, so it was not surprising that 
the history as portrayed by the Dewars and Richmond was not enthusiastically 
endorsed. Those not interested in history also showed that they realised that 
the selective use of evidence was not good for any subject - including 
history. The historians ignored this and did not credit their opponents with 
the intelligence to have realised this. 
Many officers thought that they were sufficiently aware of Naval policy 
without needing to study it formally. The loss of ships resulting from the 
Washington Treaty concentrated thought on future planning, what the service 
was expected to do and could achieve. That no obvious changes were made in 
the early 1920s, which irked Dewar and Richmond, was essentially because 
there were no obvious or immediate reasons to do so, nor indications of how 
exactly to change. Indeed, most countries did not expect another war for at 
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least ten years. 
The use of a work showing the lessons that Beatty, the Dewars and 
Richmond believed that Jutland had to teach was instituted primarily to 
endorse basic principles of freedom of action. However, this increasingly 
came to be realised independently of the Dewars and Richmond, but not 
overtly. A future action like Jutland also became increasingly unlikely. In 
1917, an aircraft had landed on board a ship under way, which led to the 
commissioning of carriers with flush flight decks that could launch and 
recover aircraft without stopping. Not only would scouting over greater 
distances be possible (even if reliably reporting the information over such 
distances remained a problem), but so would the means of delivering an 
attack. The potential to carry-out such attacks and defend against them had to 
be considered. The Navy did not find the RAF's control over Naval aircraft 
easy to cope with, or the perception that, in future, the most important ships 
might well be only vehicles for the deployment of aircraft. 
Although the Jutland works of the 1920s understandably concentrated 
upon the battle and the prewar development of the service, they faltered in 
their attempts to serve an obvious didactic purpose. Works favouring Beatty 
were especially critical of the battlefleet's conduct at Jutland and urged its 
examination to teach lessons, but this all had a familiar ring to it. Had the 
works thought about the Naval future and how to use Jutland to help the 
service adapt to be more familiar with flexibility, they might have been better 
received, both as critiques of the battle and persons involved, and as Naval 
doctrine. As it was, most appeared to be retrospective criticism to no 
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purposeful end. Richmond had made much of the fact that Naval history had 
been little more than a celebration of heroic deeds, but the presentation of 
Jutland, in the 1920s, appeared as an indulgent squabble. A good opportunity 
to draw parallels between Jutland and other actions to concentrate upon 
generally applicable principles was the historians' main aim, but these 
parallels were not made. The accounts of the Dewars and Bellairs were just 
as limited in their approach as the previous histories which they criticised. In 
the early 20th Century, it was wondered what was the relevance of the history 
of sailing ships. After 1919, many wondered what was the relevance of works 
on Jutland that only picked-over certain defects whilst being highly critical of 
certain individuals. 
After making so much of the potential utility of history, Kenneth 
Dewar (as seen in Chapter 3) had allowed his own bias towards Beatty too 
much expression, which all readers noticed. Richmond would even have gone 
further than Dewar with his criticism of the service and, throughout the 
1920s, his views were a serious impediment to his career and to the Admiralty 
trying to defend the size of the Navy. When Beatty became First Sea Lord, 
his support for tactical liberation was essentially left in the hands of the 
Dewars and Richmond. Although it was important, from 1919, there were 
other great demands made upon Beatty, such as the role of the Navy in the 
immediate and more distant future. However, amidst the work load that this 
necessitated, Beatty always maintained a keen interest in the Jutland histories, 
especially where his role was concerned. 
Beatty's public image was always important to him and whereas most 
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are sensitive to criticism, few have reacted as vehemently and persistently 
against their critics as did Beatty. It is also true that few were in such a 
position that they could manufacture a favourable image of themselves and 
had the means to advertise this image. Not only was this a matter of vanity 
and prestige, but there were other benefits of perpetuating a favourable 
image. After the war, Beatty was awarded £100,000 and became an Earl; 
Jellicoe received £50,000 and became a Viscount. As Countess Jellicoe was 
later to point-out, Beatty had not commanded the Fleet in any action, nor 
had he been First Sea Lord during hostilities. 5 It is uncertain to what extent 
Beatty's public image led to the awards, but the alleged hero of Jutland who 
subsequently presided over the surrender of the HSF (to which Jellicoe was 
not invited) certainly sought and received more attention. With some of his 
award, Beatty bought Chicheley Hall, in Northamptonshire, to add to the 
family's collection of large houses. It was only after his term as 
Governor-General of New Zealand, in 1924, that Jellicoe was elevated to an 
Earldom. To Jellicoe's supporters, Beatty had taken over the GF moulded by 
Jellicoe, did little to improve it and was never tested in battle. 
The publicly-perceived differences between the awards to, and 
subsequent actions of, Jellicoe and Beatty over Jutland and the war as a 
whole added to controversy. By 1927, and the publication of Harper's The 
Truth About Jutland, much public (and certainly Naval) opinion had begun 
to realise that, with regard to Jutland, Beatty had made unfair and inaccurate 
claims about the roles of himself and others. Jellicoe's reputation as a steady, 
sensible leader had been mostly restored, but assessing the merits of what 
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had happened at Jutland still remained difficult due to Beatty's active 
involvement in infiltrating the histories with his opinions and corrupting 
evidence to endorse them. Jutland seldom fails to invoke controversy over 
eighty years afterwards, but much of the passion for the dispute is a reaction 
against Beatty's shameless criticism of his former colleagues (which stunned 
them in the 1920s) and surreptitious support for works that disparaged them. 
So, the controversy is very much centred upon Beatty's character and 
self-image, the evidence of what happened and the presentation of it. This 
was why Jutland concerned Beatty so much and why studying the histories is 
so important. Distinguishing between differences of opinion and factual 
differences is crucial, because they have been very much blurred to a tangled 
and confusing effect. This was Beatty's intention - he achieved that 
confusion - but the clearer the evidence and histories are understood, the 
more this can be seen. The confusion was designed by Beatty to avert analysis 
from his unsuccessful operational procedures. This work shows how Beatty 
succeeded in hiding the truth regarding his actions from his contemporaries 
and subsequent authors - which has hitherto been obscured. 
Throughout Beatty's time in the BCF and as C-in-C GF, his aim was 
to encourage tactical freedom. However, this mission was only partially 
successful. It depended largely upon ships' captains in the BCF to encourage 
it and to be themselves encouraged, but few were ever imbued with Beatty's 
basic principles. Even those who actively supported Beatty, such as Brock and 
Cowan, did not implement the initiative in action that Beatty had encouraged. 
Those who were not enthusiastic about Beatty and his ideas preformed no 
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better or worse than those who were. The success of Beatty's ideas depended 
upon how well he explained to, and encouraged, others and how fully they 
understood his aims. It must not be assumed that the fault was entirely 
Beatty's for this lack of success. Orders and his battle reports constantly 
emphasised that initiative must be exercised. However, unless this was 
followed-up with more personal explanation and encouragement from Beatty, 
the initiative aspects of the Orders were only a few paragraphs amongst many. 
Too many historians were carried away with the image fostered by Beatty's 
supporters that BCF Orders and operations were so much better than 
Jellicoe's. Beatty only separated general manoeuvring instructions from 
general principles towards the end of the war, from 1918, in BF Instructions 
and BF Manoeuvring Orders. The manner in which this was done showed 
that wholesale reform was not achieved by Beatty, only some refinement of 
emphasis upon orders. 
The battles of Heligoland and Dogger Bank were examples of a 
defective application of initiative and it is a wonder that Beatty did not clarify 
his intentions by changing BCFOs and drafting separate manoeuvring 
instructions and general principles in 1915. Alternatively, it was evident that, 
for whatever reasons, his aims were not being implemented and it was his 
responsibility to see to it that they were. It could be argued that Beatty could 
have been more forceful in this respect, and it might seem surprising that 
Beatty could have been anything other than forceful, given what is known of 
his personality. He could have flatly insisted that his aims were to have been 
executed regardless of whether or not his subordinates shared his views, and 
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he would not have been the first military figure to have asserted this. 
However, this strong approach could only succeed where precise instructions 
were rigidly enforced. As he encouraged initiative, a forceful ordering of 
initiative to be practised would probably have been counter-productive. 
Ordering initiative required it, firstly, to exist with subordinates, for 
subordinates to have had a good idea of how each other might have acted in 
battle, and not to have been afraid to use it through fear of reprimand (or 
worse) if things did not go according to the chief's wishes. Beatty's financial 
background and confident manner did not extend to most in the BCF. Hence, 
although initiative was a preferred option of Beatty's, many, in the 
subsequent actions, deferred to the belief that literally obeying and not 
amending an order which was evidently defective, was technically forgivable 
because it endorsed the overriding principle of obedience. It would also have 
been difficult to subject to reprimand any action not taken resulting from 
signalling difficulties for which the admiral was in any way responsible. For 
example, at Dogger Bank, Moore's failure to lead the battlecruisers to chase 
the 1stSG could be criticised, but he had a sound defence in the fact that he 
was obeying an order as it was signalled and sank an enemy ship. 
Although Beatty made confusing specific signals, he invariably blamed 
the intended recipients for their failure to execute his wishes. By encouraging 
initiative in his Orders, Beatty was also covering himself from possible blame. 
At Dogger Bank, his signal to Moore, ordering the attack of the enemy 
bearing NE, gave Moore only a general indication of what to do. However, it 
also absolved Beatty from sole responsibility because it was itself ambiguous, 
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I 
and because Beatty had his order formally recorded. He also had his 
principles as support. So, he could have criticised Moore if he had used his 
initiative to disregard the signal and this had ultimately proved fruitless just as 
much as he could have if Moore had failed to disregard that formal signal, as 
happened. Rather than encouraging his subordinates, Beatty was frightening 
them. This might appear to be a cynical analysis, but this was how Beatty 
operated. In all the actions that Beatty was involved in, the failures, from his 
point of view, were the responsibility of others. Beatty's actions regarding 
Evan-Thomas's role at Jutland showed that, regardless of what had happened, 
he was prepared to blame anyone but himself and took whatever measures 
were necessary to do this. 
Initiative was allowed for and encouraged to differing degrees 
throughout the Fleet, but any reluctance to use it could only be remedied by 
either encouraging its future use, or by issuing a directive that orders were 
conditional or optional (the gist of what reformers were urging). It is not 
surprising to find that the service viewed the latter as heresy. 
Throughout the war, although Beatty sought tactical liberation, he did 
so against a widespread background of rigid obedience to formal orders and 
ideas. To help break free from this, he wanted his chosen BCF captains to 
share his views, but - as with Cecil Prowse, of Queen Mary, and Pelly - 
not all wanted, or were able, to accept this. So, even in the BCF, there was 
not sufficient majority support for a widespread implementation of Beatty's 
aims and those aims had not proved to be easily workable. When Beatty 
became C-in-C GF, much of the Fleet endorsed Jellicoe's beliefs and carried 
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on doing so. So, there was even less support for Beatty's aims, not to mention 
an absence of the will to implement them. Not only that, but the BCF's 
self-stated success at Jutland was itself a factor that made the majority 
ill-disposed towards Beatty. When Beatty became First Sea Lord, much 
support still favoured Jellicoe, but Beatty no longer had regular direct control 
over Fleet instructions. In short, Beatty had missed his best opportunity at 
reform by 1919. From then on, he was concerned with wider issues and left 
Jutland mainly to Bellairs and the Dewars. Given the stridency of the latters' 
criticisms, especially against Jellicoe, many became even less well-disposed 
towards Beatty. 
Those closely involved with the battle or the histories were largely 
defending their reputations or promoting a general cause, with mixed success. 
Much of the service felt let-down and embarrassed by Jutland. After the war, 
it was realised that the Navy had done what it had to do - even if this reads 
like an apologist's insipid excuse - however distasteful that might have been 
to some, especially reformers. By the early 1930s, the developments of the 
Japanese and US navies, added to a reduction in spending, precipitated the 
development of strategy and tactics to suit the Navy's fighting capabilities. It 
was not committed to a future battlefleet action at the expense of future 
developments, as some supposed. 
In this sense, Beatty's support of greater tactical liberation eventually 
took hold. However, this was not the result of an ideological conversion. It 
was because the Navy faced very different circumstances in 1939 with less 
resources than in 1914, having ultimately to adapt to meet differing demands 
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worldwide. Compared with the Navy of the 1880s/90s, that of 1914 had 
changed significantly, especially since 1906 and Dreadnought. In eight years 
(1906-14) Naval tactics had changed markedly because of the new types of 
capital ship. Admittedly, the service could have done more to think about 
how a future war might have been fought both before and after 1906. Indeed, 
a common criticism of the Navy is that rigid late 19th Century peacetime 
practices, which were insufficient to cope with a modern war, were still 
prevalent in 1914. 
The main motivation for Plunkett's "regeneration" of the service was to 
use historical study to promote critical thinking on current issues. However, 
this came across as support for history more so than analysis of contemporary 
affairs. The difficulty in encouraging critical thinking on contemporary affairs 
was that any divergence from the predominant view of central control on the 
part of reformers, saw them being viewed as disruptive. This was largely a 
device used by conservatives to stifle or dismiss other opinions. From 1914, it 
became evident that whatever opinions one had, or which specialism was 
favoured, arguing over the importance these factors had obscured the fact 
that the new dreadnought types were not being used to full advantage. There 
was the opinion that action was preferable at ranges under c. 17,000 yards, as 
Chatfield endorsed. Despite the fact that the guns of all dreadnought types 
could reach at least 19,000 yards (some up to 24,000 yards), material 
weaknesses - mainly in fire-control devices - had led to a belief that tactics 
should be controlled by these weaknesses. This found easy acceptance 
because most officers were familiar with pre-dreadnought methods of 
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gunnery (as seen in Chapter 1) and used dreadnought types in this way - 
well within maximum gun range - even when visibility permitted the British 
to use their guns beyond the range of the Germans' guns. The only exception 
to this was the 5thBS at Jutland (see Appendix 2). A lack of over all analysis 
of the Navy and how to take advantage of superior gun ranges led to a 
reliance upon the fact that, in action, the greater numbers of guns and weight 
of shell possessed by the British would hopefully enable a German defeat 
before the British were defeated. This, then, relied upon the prewar building 
programme rather than superior and flexible tactics. To the reformers this 
was worrying because no tactical situation could rely wholly upon events 
proceeding as planned, or imagined. During the 1920s, this was a worry, to 
Kenneth Dewar especially, because superiority in numbers no longer existed. 
This motivated the Dewars' writing on tactical reform. However, they failed to 
fully realise that the Navy was beginning to adapt to circumstances whilst they 
were criticising Jellicoe for not behaving as they would have preferred him to 
have done at Jutland. That was why the Staff Appreciation was not 
well-received, except by Beatty - it appeared to offer nothing of use, only 
personal criticism. 
A thoughtful approach to an anticipated conflict is one thing, but any 
armed force can only enhance its effectiveness by responding to real 
developments. The naval scene from 1889 to 1914 had seen major changes in 
the technology of maritime warfare and a transformation in the nature and 
tactical reach of the Fleet. This had tended to emphasise technical rather 
than operational skills. Prewar training and attitudes have been criticised, 
305 
especially the importance attached to appearance, and the Navy could have 
done more to broaden its assessment of the merits of officers beyond paint 
work and general drills. Officers in 1914 were, however, able to function well 
enough within their own specialisms. The main weakness suspected by 
reformers such as Beatty and Richmond, was that because of the importance 
attached to drills and appearance, most were not adequately prepared to 
adapt to operational requirements with sufficient speed once hostilities 
commenced. Coordinating their efforts was also difficult and Beatty's actions 
within the BCF and GF were testament to the fact that flexible ideas were 
one thing, but implementing them was a quite different challenge. Beatty also 
showed that, despite his flexible ideas, ideas were not enough. Compared to 
previous wars and WWII, the war at sea (1914-8) offered little opportunity to 
hone the Navy's fighting and operational skills. 
Historically, the Royal Navy in WWI could be compared with the 
English fleet in the Armada battles of 1588, with its major units assembled in 
home waters under one command. Success then had become the basis for 
(perhaps exaggerated) tales of heroism, but the victorious outcome of 1918, 
likewise achieving the desired strategic aim, was not celebrated with as much 
enthusiasm. It was widely realised in WWI (for example, by Keyes, Jellicoe 
and Chatfield) that it was difficult to force the HSF to fight and not really 
necessary. Historically and strategically this was sound, but such was not 
referred to in most post-war accounts of Jutland because Beatty, and Beatty 
alone, could not accept this. 
The Dewars and Bellairs referred to those aspects of the prewar years 
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which they found distasteful, and they blamed Jellicoe for the perceived 
failure at Jutland. A comprehensive history of the war was not being properly 
composed, and the didactic purpose of those studies that were written 
suffered because of various authors' preferences for contemporary 
propaganda rather than history. The Dewars and Bellairs led their readers to 
believe that Jutland was the culmination of faulty practices which extended 
the war. An important lesson Jutland taught, was that a strength in one area 
(supremacy of the battlefleet) encouraged the enemy to seek to gain 
advantages in another. The increased use of submarines and the efficacy of 
German attacks on trade in the first half of 1917, eventually forced a 
countervailing response in this area. It can always be argued that trade 
defence problems could have been dealt with more effectively and more 
rapidly, but important lessons were learned that were not lost in the inter-war 
years. 
Distorting the evidence to suit a personal defence or cause, was 
essentially what the Jutland controversy was about, not differing 
interpretations of agreed data. This distortion was carried out by either 
suppressing original documents, destroying, or altering them. The various 
manoeuvrings in many cases were bizarre and often leave one wondering just 
what was the point of it all and if there was a point, was it one of any 
significance. Why should Beatty, with all that occupied his time as First Sea 
Lord, take pains to be present at, or send a representative to every meeting 
regarding the Harper record (even arranging meetings outside of normal 
hours)? Ultimately, it must be attributed to vanity. 
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Without a doubt, appearance was especially important to Beatty, not 
simply regarding his dress and posturing in public (although that was 
important), but of how well he was perceived to have performed. The subject 
of this work is that the controversy was driven by Beatty's refusal to accept 
what he perceived as a failure at Jutland. It was sickening, to the BCF 
especially, that when coming up the Forth on 2nd June 1916: 
"all the railway people were lined on [the bridge]. 
To our dismay they shouted "cowards! cowards, 
you ran away" and chucked lumps of coal at us. 
We were received at Rosyth with very, very great 
disapproval by the local people. " 6 
This was from one of Warspite's crew, the BCF were even more sensitive to 
this criticism, which led to the impetus to present a favourable public image. 
The same day, Commander Dannreuther wrote despondently to his mother 
and that he was to see Beatty the following day. No thanks to the Admiralty's 
morose communique on the 3rd, it looked as if the railway workers' opinions 
had some foundation. Dannreuther: 
"spent an hour or more in his cabin while he 
walked up and down talking about the action in a 
very excited manner and criticising in strong terms 
the actions of... [Jellicoe] in not supporting him! " 
This belief of Beatty's, that he had been let-down by Jellicoe, stayed with him. 
Earl Mountbatten also noted that the BCF were seen by the battlefleet to 
have let-down the Fleet at Jutland. 8 Yet, one must not suggest that grown 
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men should not have taken such comments so personally. All had risked their 
lives and were downcast. Prior to their arrival in the Forth, the BCF had 
weathered, on 1st June, a storm which left Beatty and Spickernell seasick on 
their return. This, added to any distress, might well have made Beatty even 
more determined to see to it that the BCF were not dismissed in posterity as 
abject failures. All felt that more might have been achieved. 
Jutland was by no means unique in spawning legends. The Battle of 
Plataea, in 479BC, repelled the Persian advance into Greece. It was won by 
the Spartan army despite the want of apparent cohesion and great tactical 
skill. However, the well-known account by Herodotus sought to attribute this 
to the Athenian army. The Athenian army (facing the Persians' Greek allies) 
was seen to be urged by the Spartans (on the flank facing the Persians) to 
swap places to allow Athens the greater privilege of fighting the great enemy, 
whose methods, the account noted, the Athenians were more familiar with. It 
was felt by many Athenians that, since their defeat of the Persians at the 
Battle of Marathon, in 490BC, they were the natural leaders of Greeks 
against Persians. This deliberately confused two important issues. At the 
battle, the Spartans were engaged whilst most of their allies were not. By the 
time the Spartans and some of their allies had won the battle, most of the 
Greek allies, including the Athenians, had not arrived at the scene. More 
importantly, from an Athenian viewpoint, was that the Spartans had 
frequently been extremely reluctant to become involved in affairs outside the 
Peloponnese (even when Athens had been ravaged), and it was only the 
threat of having the Peloponnese exposed if Athens was forced to accept 
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Persian terms that finally moved Sparta. A message from the Persian 
commander (of questionable authenticity) recorded that he was not impressed 
with the Spartans' behaviour in the battle. Contrary to the facts, the 
Athenians, just like Beatty, did not want it known that they had played little 
part in a decisive event. Herodotus wished to diminish the Spartans' true role 
and augment that of the Athenians. That Athens played the significant part is 
an unlikely tale, just as are Beatty's claims to have defeated the 1stSG and 
frightened-off the HSF with accurate and effective gunnery. Both accounts 
disregarded what actually happened and encouraged a favourable, but 
erroneous, partisan view that few could ever verify. This example shows that, 
despite the magnitude of any event, or the fame of the individuals involved, 
deliberately misrepresenting events to create a favourable impression is 
nothing new. It also shows that these misrepresentations can easily become 
popular fixations, which are often hard to redress. Thanks largely to Harper's 
protestations, re-assessing Beatty's role is possible. 
No matter who wrote about Jutland, the public were asked to take the 
events of that day in good faith from the accounts and that is why an 
apparent trivial bickering over a few words, gun ranges and distances here 
and there assumed the importance that it did. In fact, it is all important. 
More to the point, if evidence did prove what Beatty insisted that it did, his 
reluctance to have it scrutinised is suggestive. That the sons and heirs of some 
should have continued arguing in the same vein, was testament to the fact 
that painful suggestions of professional reluctance and incompetence seriously 
undermine self-image. To illustrate the blindness to the facts whilst 
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encouraging (and succeeding in establishing) a popular image, it was noted in 
David Beatty's entry in Nigel Dempster's Address Book, that he was the "Son 
of the victor of the Battle of Jutland. " 9 It would surprise many that there was 
actually a victor of Jutland, that he was British, and nowhere does Mr. 
Dempster describe George Jellicoe in relation to his father's role at Jutland. 
By the late 1930s, most realised that Jellicoe and Beatty had done 
great work and were universally admired for it. In 1938, Dreyer wrote to 
Chalmers that "The muck thrown.. . at Jellicoe and Beatty, has done awful 
harm-as I found". 10 This summarised much of the controversy, in that it was 
(at least from about 1923) a general muck-throwing exercise to enforce 
opinions and ill-founded assertions. Geoffrey Blake confirmed that: 
"it is obvious that among the junior officers there 
was a good deal of feeling. A great deal of it was 
fostered by the press and other cheap comments 
which were hurled about indiscriminately. " 11 
Many survivors and their families attest to the fact that many young officers 
remembered the embittered disputes throughout their lives, but it is often 
furious gunroom or wardroom debates (often after dinner) that are 
recalled. 12 One must see these in perspective. 
As has been seen, the importance of the battle, to Beatty at least, was 
far from imaginary. Chalmers's comment that Beatty stated that there was 
something wrong with the ships and "something wrong with our system" 13 is 
instructive. This "system" is always assumed to be the Navy's system as a 
whole and there is some truth in this. However, it is much more likely that 
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Beatty was stressing the BCF when he said "our system", because, however he 
looked at it, he realised that his system (particularly as seen in Chapters 1& 
5) had failed. Many post-WWII accounts have assumed that Beatty's 
sensitivity concerned simply the public perception of the battle, because his 
recollections differed from what Harper had written, but there was much 
more to it than this, as revealed here. If one asks exactly how and why the 
BCF fought as they did, and why Beatty was so concerned with regard to the 
histories, the line of questioning always leads back to Beatty's management of 
the force. He knew this and wanted to avoid examination of it. He also knew 
that, aside from his own failings, the losses the BCF suffered could have 
occurred to the battlefleet, had it been in action longer, hence much talk of 
the battlefleet not getting their feet wet and of failing to support the BCF. 
In order to assess the battle fully, the wrecks would have had to have 
been examined and a detailed examination held. Not only would this have 
presented logistical difficulties, but Jellicoe and the Admiralty of 1916 were at 
pains not to make an unsatisfactory affair any worse, with a risk to morale. 
Having said this, it must be wondered what any examination would have 
discovered that was not already generally known. Defective ammunition 
handling arrangements were the basic causes of the battlecruiser losses, but, 
as Commander Dannreuther noted, Invincible was conforming to typical 
Fleet practice with regard to these. Beatty and Chatfield must have realised 
that Grant's system had saved their lives and that an absence of it in other 
ships left over 3,000 BCF men dead. Grant's extraordinary promotion of his 
system removed him from the BCF and allowed the majority to take refuge in 
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the conviction that more armour plate could have prevented the explosions, 
or that the ships' design was basically flawed. This absolved Beatty and other 
officers from responsibility. If the matter was one of attributing blame, by 
making poor design the culprit and by not blaming individuals, then no-one 
could really have been held responsible. Many are absolved if no-one in 
particular is held to be accountable. 
With this in mind, one must wonder whether or not the Navy really 
wanted to discover the actual reasons for the losses. It must have occurred to 
many reasonably intelligent men that the chances of three battlecruisers all 
succumbing to the same disaster might not have been due to design, but one 
must then wonder why others survived. This was often attributed to luck, 
again because it was comforting to accept, but luck aside, few recorded their 
views on whether or not measures could have been taken to prevent the 
losses. There was no doubt from witnesses that only one or two shells caused 
the losses in each ship. However, it might well have been realised that, due to 
operational procedures, most ships were only one shell away from oblivion. 
To then have charged deceased officers and men with negligence that led to 
their deaths, could have been felt to have been an insult to the dead, as most 
battlecruisers operated in a similar way. As more stringent safety measures 
were adopted afterwards, the risk of such catastrophic losses being repeated 
had been diminished, suggesting that the defects were known. The problem 
was thus seen to be solved, obviating the need for any inquiry. 
One must also wonder if the Navy knew what questions should have 
been asked about the action, and whether or not it would have created an 
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uncomfortable atmosphere to have asked them. If suitable questions were 
asked, then there was the problem of collating the answers and, ultimately, of 
the extent to which the Navy would change in light of this. A flawed analysis 
of Dogger Bank failed the Fleet and battlecruisers especially, so it should not 
be too surprising to find that examination of Jutland was as confused. 
However, as Beatty succeeded as C-in-C, operational improvements were 
made, such as ammunition handling measures and ammunition being 
improved to a safer standard. Despite this, there was no special reason for 
confidence that the faults of the Falklands, Dogger Bank and Jutland could 
not easily have been repeated. For example, had Scheer accepted action on 
19th August 1916, extant evidence did not suggest that all the defects 
identified at Jutland had been rectified. 
Using Jutland to promote reform or endorse the success of the Navy 
in the war, deviated attention from fully assessing what had happened. 
Reformers usually urged for less rigid tactics, signalling and operational 
instructions. However, Jutland did not disclose anything remarkably new, even 
if it indicated areas needing development. The outcome of Jutland was not 
sufficiently clear to endorse the radical reform supported by the Dewars and 
Richmond. Urging reform led to the selective use of evidence, which 
undermined the case for it. 
This examination of the dynamics involved in the composition of the 
histories, shows that there was something painful to hide about the battle, 
notably the defects in the functioning of the BCF. It also shows that there 
were some real adverse effects resulting from accounts being tampered with 
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and that close examination of the histories, far from being an exercise in 
pointless minutiae, shows that much previous understanding was based upon 
highly flawed evidence. Individuals suffered at the time from a want of clarity 
of information, especially Evan-Thomas, but historians have also suffered. 
This was because Beatty's preferred version of events persisted so long as the 
evidence he corrupted went unexamined. 
Yet, one should not over-estimate the over all impact of the Jutland 
controversy. The extant evidence clearly shows that Jutland did not 
significantly affect the service, especially not in the universal manner 
erroneously implied in many previous accounts. This claim was simply a 
product of supposition. In fact, with regard to influencing promotions, policy 
and friendships, it is evident that Jutland had no unusual affect. 
The greater detail surrounding the controversy, particularly the 
inter-relationships of less prominent figures, is at present unclear largely due 
to a dearth of evidence. The BCF's operational faults have been shown here, 
but, as with inter-personal relations, the greater detail to enable a fuller 
understanding of the daily, or weekly operations and policy decisions at 
command level is, at present, lacking. It is telling that there is more evidence 
regarding the BCFs functioning in private papers - mainly Beatty's and 
Drax's - than in public collections, 
but even the evidence in existence is not 
extensive. In 1920, it was known that BCF evidence was removed from official 
files by former personnel. It still remains uncertain if all this evidence exists 
and what exactly it is. Future examination might shed light upon these and 
other aspects. The functioning of the 5thBS with the BCF is tantalisingly 
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vague, as are the thoughts of those serving within those forces about Jutland 
and each other. In the mid-1990s, the discovery of Alexander Grant's 
autobiography revealed significant hitherto unknown facts regarding 
ammunition handling, suggesting why the BCF were so sensitive to analysis of 
the operations. In 1968, Captain Bennett wrote that: 
"In short, the Jutland controversy has been dead 
since 1940; since then it has been possible to tell 
the full story... " 14 
This is quite clearly not correct. 
The motto of Iron Duke (Virtutis Fortuna Comes-Fortune is the 
companion of valour) might be seen to be ironic in many ways by Jellicoe's 
opponents, in that more valour on his part would have seen Fortune favour 
the British. However, valour or not at Jutland, the war was won convincingly 
at sea. What Jutland might have been, how close the Navy came to doing 
much better, consumed many in subsequent years, but the attempts to justify 
reputations by suppressing what had actually happened, did little to draw the 
correct lessons. The dispute resulted from a corruption of historical 
methodology for essentially political ends. The way history was composed and 
understood - or misunderstood - 
by authors and readers alike was not 
helped by the deliberate actions of a few to disguise the more accurate 
picture. Lion's motto (Concordant Nomine Facta-The facts agree with the 
name) is most ironic. For Beatty, the facts had to agree with the name and 
what it symbolised, to show that good fortune had accompanied his valour. 
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Appendix 1. 
The state of shells at Jutland. 
The deficiency in shell quality was the defence of Chatfield and others 
against criticisms of the effectiveness of the battlecruisers' shooting. Chatfield 
stated in his autobiography (p. 158), that few ever knew of this problem at the 
time and that the public view was that the battlecruisers simply did not score 
enough hits. This seemed to be the singular defence, but the accuracy of this 
statement on the action is not borne out by any evidence. German sources, 
especially von Hase and their official history, confirmed that the problem was 
that the battlecruisers could not make hits with enough accuracy and 
frequency, although poor quality shell obviously did not help. 
The deficiency was believed to lie with the fact that armour-piercing 
shells, rather than entering the ship and exploding internally, detonated upon 
impact, or not at all, thus reducing the damage done and making it almost 
impossible to damage enemy vessels. There were many defective shells, a 
problem that was partially remedied after the battle, but the effect of a 13.5" 
or 15" shell, weighing 1,250-1,9501bs travelling close to the speed of sound, 
coming to an almost instant halt and exploding was not inconsiderable. Upon 
the Germans' the return to harbour, Derfflinger was barely recognisable, with 
just some of the damage being described: 
"Two 15" shells had penetrated the armour.. . and 
one of them exploded inside. The other still lay 
unexploded... the best example of the power of 
these shells was to be seen at the bow. One shell 
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had entered the port side and had gone through 
the forward battery carrying an entire armour 
plate with it... it may or may not have exploded on 
the outside. " (in (ed. ) Horn, p. 214). 
Even a shell that might only have exploded outside the ship shows just how 
much damage could have been done in similar cases and there is evidence of 
shells being able to penetrate armour. The problems did not lie solely with 
poor shell. 
A similar instance was noted that Helgoland was hit during the night 
by "a heavy projectile on her side armour above the waterline. The shot 
punched out a piece of armour about 31/4 feet radius. This flew inboard. The 
shot itself did not enter the ship, but broke up outboard" (quoted in Tarrant, 
p. 290. ). Although this was not serious, it was significant. Not all shells 
suffered from the same defects, so the criticism cannot be applied in all cases 
and it must always be remembered that there was no guarantee on either side 
that all shell would do what they were supposed to do. 
The introduction of cordite had led to a feeling that it was much 
harder to ignite than powder, as Alexander Grant's memoirs testify. In 
connection with this, Dogger Bank had bred a feeling of the inferiority of 
German shell and the damage that they could cause. Chatfield's despatch 
noted: 
"The other shell that struck the ship... in several 
cases did not burst, nor was any important 
damage done by them. " (BTY 4/6/7. ) 
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In Notes re lessons learned from action on January 24,1915., it was recorded 
that: 
"German shell, for incendiary effect and damage 
to personnel, are far inferior to ours. Their only 
good lies in armour penetration and damage to 
material. On this it is necessary to consider most 
carefully the effect of any possible damage and 
the best means to localise it. " (Ibid. ) 
Rear-Admiral Archibald Moore noted: 
"The first thing that strikes one is the very limited 
explosive power of German shells.. . This is a 
matter of much comfort to us-.. If they know how 
little damage they do they will very soon take 
steps to improve burster and fuze. The blast from 
any large shell exploding is so great that all 
armoured doors and shutters fitted as protection 
against shellfire should be properly closed at all 
times.. . There 
does not appear to be much danger 
of fire being caused by enemy's shell. " (Ibid. ) 
[underlining added]. 
This endorsed the belief that although German shells might hole ships and 
cause flooding, or damage equipment when exploding, they did not possess 
adequate ignitive qualities. The amount of explosive needed to burst a large 
shell was not large, but that did not matter. Even heat or sparks from a 
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partially exploded shell could be sufficient, given British ammunition handling 
practices, to cause further, more serious ignition. It was not realised that it 
was not necessary for enemy shells to have a large incendiary effect, they only 
needed to be sufficient to ignite a few charges in order for there to be a 
danger due to the amount of cordite unprotected and open magazine doors. 
Moore seemed to feel that danger came from damage caused more by 
concussion of the air than the ignitive possibilities of heat sources. Lion and 
others were holed below the waterline at Dogger Bank, but as there was not 
much incendiary damage, this led to a confidence in the ships to withstand 
the effects of German fire. Other captains echoed the same points, so it 
seemed as if nothing needed to be improved upon, although it was largely 
Beatty's job to assess the reports, not simply to accept them. 
Following Jutland, the importance of shell quality assumed an 
importance over other factors regarding ammunition handling and gunnery. 
The general conclusions in the months afterwards made little mention of 
these and, rather than suggesting such practices be modified, the interim 
report of the Committee on Construction to Beatty (BTY 6/14/4.23.6.16. ) 
recommended that new capital ships should be of Queen Elizabeth type, not 
battlecruisers, and that armour plating should be thickened. The evidence 
could suggest that this was a good idea, but it also pointed to the fact that the 
problem with all ships was that no amount of armour thickness then carried 
could guarantee to prevent a shell from entering the ship, nor could it have 
prevented problems posed by exposed cordite (the loss of Defence appears 
to have been attributed to obsolete design). Hubert Dannreuther noted that 
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Invincible was hit by one shell which pierced Q turret, causing the explosion 
that led to its loss. 
However, producing more fast battleships or thickening armour could 
not stop this recurring. On 28th October 1914, it was noted that at least 16" 
of armour was needed to keep out a 13.5" shell at 20,000 yards (8" for a 
MkXI 12" shell). The increase of potential ranges in battle that had begun 
with the torpedo boat and the obsession of some with bigger guns - and 
assumptions that enemy ships had the advantage here - had led to the belief 
that the only counter was more armour. It did not seem to have occurred to 
most that if ranges of battle would increase, it was necessary to ensure that 
the large guns could fire as accurately as possible at these ranges. Following 
Jutland, it was concluded that if no shells could be excluded at expected 
ranges of engagement, the answer was not to improve fire-control, by both 
mechanical and manual methods, for the long reach, but to thicken armour 
and engage more closely as current fire-control machinery could deal with 
this better. 
On 10th December 1916, Beatty noted that high explosive shell 
"cannot be expected to reach the vitals of German Battleships by penetration 
of the side and turret armour, at ranges greater than 7,000 yards. " (ADM 
137/3834) All HE were ordered to be returned to ammunition ships and only 
armour-piercing common (APC) and common-pointed-capped (CPC) were to 
be used. The alleged instability of the explosive against concussion was also 
questioned and held partly to blame for premature detonation. It was 
concluded that a 13.5" APC (lyddite) and CPC (powder) would not penetrate 
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13" of armour at 20° at 7,000 yards and would only just dent 10" at 10,000 
yards (Ibid. ). Beatty then concluded "The disappointing results obtained by 
our gunfire [at Dogger Bank and Jutland]... are now explained. " (Ibid. ). 
Elsewhere he added that "it would appear that most serious damage might be 
inflicted on the enemy's ships at ranges between 7,000 and 16,000 yards. " 
(ADM 137/3836). If, as in Chapter 1, it seemed as if medium to short range 
firing was a BCF policy, this was Beatty's self endorsement of it and helps 
explain his apparent obliviousness to other factors. The shell committee noted 
that they had "reason to believe that the results of hits of our APC and CPC 
shell obtained [at Dogger Bank and Jutland] were better than is here 
implied. " (Ibid. ). One must favour this conclusion over Beatty's. Many wanted 
to believe that German shell were by far superior, but in many cases, they did 
not explode properly, or at all, passing through some of the lighter craft. 
Even in late 1916, Beatty was already reluctant to admit that uncertainty 
regarding shells was not the whole issue and was heading for disagreement 
long before Harper was appointed to write a record. 
The problem was not how many times a ship was hit, but how 
vulnerable it was where it was hit. This seemed to be ignored and there was 
nothing especially wrong with battlecruiser design. They were expected to 
overwhelm their opponents by heavy and accurate fire at the maximum 
possible range, which was why they had a speed advantage over battleships. 
They carried less armour as even a battleship's armour could not protect 
them in such circumstances. Battlecruisers never functioned as they were 
intended to do because of a lack of sufficient effective fire-control equipment 
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and operational misunderstandings of what they could do. The knee-jerk 
reaction, thickening the armour of Repulse and Renown, was not necessarily 
the answer to the battlecruisers' problems. 
There was no unfathomable secret in explaining the loss of the 
battlecruisers, but the faults lay in not collating the evidence that was before 
the eyes of many. In fact, it was so obvious as to be missed. 
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Appendix 2. 
Positioning the action from 3: 47-5: 00. 
It is evident from the accounts of the movements of the Germans, the 
BCF and SthBS, that Barham's positions from 3: 50 as shown in the diagrams 
accompanying the official history ("Prepared in the Historical Section of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence") cannot be correct. For example, at 3: 50, 
Barham was placed 7'/4 miles from Lion and 13'/z from Lützow (official 
diagram #23). At 4: 00, it was still 71/a miles from Lion and 11'/a from Lützow. 
Given Lützow's 4: 00 position and the maximum possible distance that Barham 
could have steamed in 10 minutes (24 knots/800 yards per minute), allowing 
for no deviations (which there were), Barham must have been at the very least 
T/4 miles from Lion and roughly 12.2 miles from Lützow (not 111/4). Such 
revised distances only serve to indicate that the errors are greater than the 
charts and sources would have the reader believe. 
At 4: 00, Barham must have been about 25,000 yards from Lützow (21 
knots/750 yards per minute). By 4: 06, the distance was the same, but by this 
time the lstSG had begun their turn southwards together, thus making the 
range to Von der Tann about 23,500 yards (see diagrams #5,7 & 8). By 4: 08, 
the range was a little over 23,000 yards. The addition of fire from the 5thBS 
was one of the reasons for Hipper's increase in speed, but given their 
respective courses, the distance between the two lines was falling at almost 300 
yards each minute and the continuation of this presented obvious concerns for 
Hipper. 
To prove the extent of the error in most charts and texts regarding the 
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relative distances of Lion, Lützow, Frankfurt and Barham, it is necessary to 
compare the consensus of texts and sources (principally Harper, the 
Despatches and later Corbett, but others based largely on one or more of 
these) as echoed, for example, by Tarrant (p. 86). Tarrant, in common with 
most, stated that Barham was roughly 7 miles astern of Lion during the run to 
the south (although his diagram showed almost 9) and when the 5thBS opened 
fire on the 1stSG, the range was roughly 19,000 yards. As no evidence for this 
was quoted, it must be assumed that the popular view, generated in the early 
1920s (deriving from Harper and hardly doubted since), was shared. It was 
then noted that "Fortunately for the Germans, the range was so great [that it 
was difficult for the 5thBS to see]. " Yet, this presents inconsistencies. The 
5thBS might have experienced difficulties with vision, but the 1stSG was seen, 
be it intermittently, and when the ships were obscured, gun flashes could be 
seen along with the stern waves. This would not change the firing range, as 
there was always some target at which to aim. 
It was noted that Konteradmiral Friedrich Bödicker (2ndSG) saw the 
approach of the 5thBS, masts first from over the horizon. One must also 
remember that Evan-Thomas noted that on his disengaged side (westwards) he 
could see for at least 12 miles (Beatty Papers, 1. #160). As Barham was seen 
approaching hull down, the distance to the horizon must have been at least 8 
miles, so Barham must have been at least 11 miles away as could be seen from 
Frankfurt. According to Bödicker, the 5thBS opened fire just after he sent his 
report of enemy vessels to Hipper. So, assuming the time taken from 
identification - which must have 
been almost instant - to the report leaving 
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the ship to be 3 minutes, the 5thBS must have opened fire at approximately 
23,000 yards at 3: 50 (the two could not have converged more than a few 
hundred yards in this time). 
To highlight a common error with the positioning of the forces at this 
point, Marder's diagram for 3: 48-4: 10 (Marder's #4) had Barham, at 3: 48,8 
miles from Lion, but the text noted that Barham was "hull down.. . too far away 
to take part" (pp. 57-8), which must make it at least 13/14 miles (as Marder 
stated) from Beatty. Roskill noted that, at 3: 48, the 5thBS were "hull down" 
(p. 157. ), but his diagram showed them 7 miles apart at 4: 00 (pp. 158-9). So, 
either Barham steamed instantly from 24 to at least 30 knots between these 
times, or Lion slowed considerably; both were simply quoting Corbett in their 
texts without any examination. However, if the distance apart was only 8 miles, 
the 5thBS was not "too far away" to join the action; Marder and others cannot 
have it both ways. By 4: 10, Marder's chart had been adjusted to suit commonly 
(and erroneously) understood ranges, but in his diagram Barham had steamed 
more than a mile more than it could possibly have done if it was to have been 
at this point. If these are accepted at face value, the authors needed to explain 
why the initial gap of 8-10 miles (sources vary) closed to about 7-8 around 3: 30 
and then opened to 13/14 by about 3: 48, only to close to between about 9 
miles (some have 7) by 4: 10. It was highly irregular steaming to say the least if 
this was actually done and impossible to have achieved in some places. 
Marder's, Roskill's and Tarrant's tracks here and elsewhere have been adjusted 
more to suit literary sources, rather than plotted according to actual speed and 
course. 
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Given the time of the 5thBS opening fire that was confirmed by 
Bödicker - in the list of messages Warspite remarked that Barham opened 
fire at 3: 50 - the distance from Barham (around 23,200 yards) must place 
Frankfurt on Lützow's port quarter, further astern, given that Frankfurt's 4: 10 
position was roughly 10 miles from Lützow. For obvious reasons, Bödicker 
never intended to have a running fight with the 5thBS and made for full speed 
to escape (see diagram #5). Yet, the respective courses meant that, without a 
significant alteration of course, the 2ndSG would not last long. A turn of at 
least 80° was made, which kept the range approaching 23,000 yards, until 
Frankfurt was lost to sight a few minutes later. 
At 4: 06, Tarrant noted (p. 86) that whilst pursuing the engagement, 
Evan-Thomas "suddenly caught sight of the German Battlecruisers" and turned 
towards them. The range at this time was roughly 23,600 yards to Von der 
Tann, shorter than that from Frankfurt (see diagram #7). This extreme range 
of 23,000 yards was confirmed (in Gordon, p. 113) by Commander Walwyn in 
Warspite's B turret and SL Caslon in Malaya, who gave 23,800. As this was 
the case, both Barham and Frankfurt are placed at least 11/2 miles closer to 
their respective leaders than they actually were. If any other relative distances 
and speeds are altered, the whole picture changes to be inconsistent with any 
sources. Re-placing Barham and Frankfurt, as above, only confirms the 
general picture, but the ranges of the SthBS's opening fire on the 2nd and 
1stSGs, accepted without question in most cases, commonly given as 18,600 
and 19,000 yards, are roughly 2 miles too short, Barham being almost 10 miles 
from Lion at 3: 50. 
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It is interesting to note that, at 4: 20, Von der Tann's A-turret was put 
out of action (by Tiger) and jammed facing 30° abaft the starboard beam. If 
the SthBS had been 7 or so miles astern of Barham, Von der Tann at this 
point would have been firing at the open sea astern of Malaya - clearly not 
correct. The extra 2 miles places the 5thBS as a target (Von der Tann had 
shifted fire from New Zealand to Barham for some 6/7 minutes from 4: 17). 
Too often, it appears to be missed (perhaps deliberately) that if Barham was 
some 6-71h miles from Lion at 3: 50, the two would have turned to the north 
earlier than they actually did, but as the two passed at 4: 50, given the speeds 
and courses they steered, they must have been nearly 10 miles apart at 3: 50. 
This would then mean that the sightings of the High Seas Fleet were all in 
error, that Lützow's positioning and course were in error and that the 2ndSG 
had been misplaced. Barham, contrary to many sources, was never to the east 
of Lion until after 5pm. It passed where Indefatigable sank, roughly 'h mile 
west at 4: 26 and Queen Mary roughly 11/4 miles west at 4: 46-7. 
Had Evan-Thomas opened fire at 18,600 and 19,000 yards, it would 
mean that he had deliberately neglected to attack the enemy for at least 2 
miles of the guns' range when the visibility was, by general consensus, roughly 
23,000 yards. He did not, of course, do this and had the guns, longer base 
rangefinders and practised crews to achieve hitting at such long ranges as he 
did. Tarrant re-cycled a familiar theme, stating that, at 3: 30, "Ranges were 
coming down from the finders- 20,000 yards, 19,000 yards. All guns were 
loaded, the questing muzzles... raised to their maximum elevation. " (p. 71). 
However, the maximum range of the 13.5"-gunned battlecruisers was nearly 
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24,000 yards, so Tarrant was wrong on at least one count. As with so many 
authors, he asserted the assumptions made in earlier accounts over the much 
more tangible calculations for ranges and contemporary evidence that show the 
greater ranges at maximum elevation. The longer distances are more plausibly 
what German sources and Hipper referred to as "portentous ranges". For a 
15" gun with such elevation as was possible, one could assert that a range of 
19,000 yards was not particularly great. The guns mounted in the 5thBS, with 
the maximum 20° elevation and full charge of medium density (4281bs) could 
reach 23,734 yards. 
As it is known from Walwyn and Caslon that the guns were frequently 
against the elevation stops when firing commenced, the range can be accurately 
calculated. It is also known that Barham's first salvo fired at Von der Tann 
was over, the second short, the third straddled with a hit being achieved. If one 
then takes the maximum theoretical distance as above and applies a range 
correction of 600 down (4-600 was quite normal), the short second salvo hit the 
water at around 23,134 yards. The original correction would then be halved 
and added to the range of the second salvo (23,134+300=23,434), so one shell 
found its target within tens of yards of 23,434 yards distance. 
Throughout the first hour and a half at least, most shooting (except for 
the battlecruiser duel) began when visibility allowed and this means that the 
longer ranges must be accepted. This has important implications for the 
controversy over all, in that the 5thBS is often seen to be slow to react to 
opportunities to attack and that the attempts in later years to reduce the 
ranges to suit the notion that the BCF were closer to the enemy, were 
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face-saving measures, principally at the expense of Evan-Thomas. Too many 
authors have been led along the lines that those favourably disposed to Beatty 
and the battlecruisers would have wished. 
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Appendix 3. 
Personnel in Admiralty posts, 1919-38. 
In order to establish the extent to which former BCF personnel were, 
or were not, posted in influential Admiralty positions with the aim of 
encouraging or introducing Beatty's ideas (as his contemporaries suspected 
suspected, in Chapter 6), it is instructive to examine certain posts held 
between the wars. Those chosen are the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff 
(DCNS), Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (ACNS), Directors, Deputy and 
Assistant, in the Departments of Operations, Plans, Intelligence and 
Ordnance. The data chosen are from 1920 to 1938. These offices were the 
most influential over all and their background would suggest whether or not 
the imagined affects on promotions were based on any factual grounds. 
Listed, are the names of officers who held inter-war commands in the 
above posts, in which ship they served at Jutland, the post(s) that they held 
and the number of months served in each post to the nearest full month. 
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Battlefleet at Jutland. 
J. A. Fergusson (Thunderer) - ACNS 20 (4) 
W. M. James (Benbow) - DDNI 20 (4) DCNS 36-8 (36) 
C. V. Usbourne (Colossus) - DDNO 20-1 (4) DNI 30-2 (24) 
S. R. Bailey (Erin) - DOD 20-1 (2) 
H. W. Parker (Benbow) - DOD 22-3 (19) 
A. D. P. R. Pound (Colossus) - DOP 22-5 (32) ACNS 27-9 (24) 
J. C. Hamilton (Superb) - DDOP 22-4 (21) 
J. C. W. Henley (Marlborough) - DNO 23-5 (26) 
G. K. Chetwode (Royal Oak) - DDNI 23-5 (18) 
W. A. Egerton (Barham) - DDOP 24-5 (11) DOP 25-8 (32) 
F. C. Dreyer (Iron Duke) - ACNS 24-7 (29) DCNS 30-3 (30) 
F. L. Field (King George V) - DCNS 25-8 (35) 
F. T. B. Tower (Barham) - DDNO 25 (2) DNO 31-3 (27) 
C. M. Forbes (Iron Duke) - DNO 25-8 (34) 
W. W. Fisher (St. Vincent) - DNI 26-7 (7) DCNS 28-30 (25) 
S. D. Tillard (Barham) - DDOP 27-8 (8) 
G. F. B. Edward-Collins (Superb) - ADOP 27-8 (8) DDOP 28-9 (19) 
R. M. Bellairs (Iron Duke) - DOP 28-30 (35) 
J. F. C. Patterson (Orion) - DNO 28-31 (33) 
A. R. Dewar (Hercules) - DDNO 28-9 (17) 
A. E. Evans (Orion) - DDNI 29-30 (10) 
F. Elliot (Benbow) - DDNO 29-32 (32) 
F. H. W. Goolden (Iron Duke) - DDOP 31-2 (14) DOP 33-4 (12) 
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W. E. C. Tait (Collingwood) - DDNI 32-3 (19) 
J. A. G. Troup (Temeraire) - DNI 36-8 (24+) 
C. S. Daniel (Orion) - ADOP 37-8 (7+) = (684) 
BCF at Jutland. 
0. de. B. Brock (Princess Royal) - DCNS 20-1 (12) 
A. E. M. Chatfield (Lion) - ACNS 20-3 (30) 
C. D. Burke (Princess Royal) - DDOP 21-2 (6) ADOP 22-3 (6) 
P. Macnamara (Tiger) - ADOP 26-7 (16) 
C. B. Prickett (Princess Royal) - DDNI 27-9 (24) 
D. B. N. North (New Zealand) - DOP 30-2 (30) = (124) 
The total months possible to have had in the given posts (number of 
posts x number of months) was 2736. Former BF officers spent 25% of this 
period in the given posts. Former BCF officers spent 4.5% in the posts. 
Throughout the period, 70.5% of the time was spent by those not present at 
Jutland in the BCF or BF. 
Former BF officers spent 5.5 (mean average) times more in total 
holding their posts than the total of BCF officers. Former BF officers spent a 
mean average of 26.3 months per person per post; former BCF officers 
averaged 20.6 months per person per post. 
Of those who became Directors of their Divisions, the BF had 12, the 
BCF 1. The BF had 4.3 times more officers in given posts, than BCF officers 
(BF=BCF). After Jutland, by the same calculation, there were 4.28 times 
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more battleships than battlecruisers in commission. Approximately, BF 
officers were four times greater in number, taken from four times as many 
ships. In the positions given, the BF spent five times more total time than the 
BCF (largely by virtue of their greater numbers than duration of each 
appointment), but this was only as 29.5% of the total time that could have 
been spent. At any one time, never more than half of the posts were held by 
any single body. 
Throughout the inter-war period, no large body of personnel imbued 
with BCF (or Beatty's) opinions on tactical liberation or support for history 
existed. Little more than 4% of the total possible tenure was filled with BCF 
sympathisers and even less at any one time. It is simply not true to say that 
the battlecruiser men took over the inter-war Admiralty. 
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Appendix 4. 
Signalling at the time of Jutland. 
All training in signals took place at sea until 1882, when the post of 
Qualified Signalman was introduced (Kent, Signal! p. 19). With the advent of 
wireless telegraphy (WT), in the closing years of the 19th Century, the 
potential to communicate beyond visual distance added an important 
dimension to warfare. Until July 1907 (and the formation of the Wireless 
Telegraphy Branch), WT was seen as an expertise in electricity and hence, 
was under the command of the torpedo school, HMS Vernon, not the signal 
school. The increasing fitting-out of ships with WT equipment led to the need 
for more WT operators and in July 1908, signal training was extended to WT 
use to enable signal specialists to obtain at least a working knowledge of the 
equipment. In 1914, WT was incorporated into the Signal Branch. 
Prior to WT, all signals were made by flags, semaphore (mechanical 
and manual) or light. This meant that in order to see beyond the horizon, a 
line of ships would need to be deployed. Although this had been common for 
sailing ships, by 1916, WT was not sufficiently advanced, nor reliable enough, 
to effectively break with this tradition. The problems for any ship out of 
visual touch with another in reporting on an enemy, using WT, were 
essentially knowledge of relative positioning (which was not certain) and the 
fact that broadcasts could quite easily be intercepted and blocked-out. Making 
transmissions would also betray a presence to the enemy which, from the 
intensity and volume of traffic, could estimate the size and proximity of a ship 
or force. With the establishment of Admiralty shore receiving stations, it was 
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possible to locate the enemy's approximate range and position from their 
broadcasts. However, this was of little tactical utility in a fast-moving battle. 
At the time of Jutland, all ships carried WT sets in proportion to their 
sizes. Battleships and battlecruisers carried a 14kw set, with a range of 
approximately 500 miles (Kent, p. 35) in addition to an auxiliary set of 1kw. 
Cruisers carried a 1.5kw (100 miles) set, destroyers l kw (50 miles) and 
submarines a set with approximately 30 miles range (Ibid. ). It was, perhaps, 
surprising that cruisers were given such short range sets, as this limited their 
effective scouting range. The battlecruisers, however, were better equipped to 
perform their scouting role (given their speed and greater WT range), yet 
they did not make sufficient use of this at Jutland. 
Much of the signalling at Jutland was visual and whereas flags were 
seen to be obsolescent, they did at least make signalling a quicker procedure 
than WT. The quickest method was the searchlight (SL) mounted on, or near 
to, the bridge. Along with flags, it could (in theory) be operated within a 
minute of an order from the senior officer being verbally made and be seen 
in the receiving ship almost as quickly. The lack of enthusiasm for WT also 
stemmed from the fact that it was believed by the British that because they 
could read German call signs and signals (having captured German signal 
information), the Germans could also read British signals to the same extent. 
The less the use of WT, it was thought, the less was the risk from being given 
away. This abetted the use of visual signals and, therefore, of keeping ships 
within visual range of each other. What also supported this was that WT 
depended upon electricity, which could be (and had been) lost in action. 
336 
Limitations on signalling ranges kept fleets in relatively compact formations. 
For the largest ships (battleships and battlecruisers) the distance to the 
horizon from the bridge was approximately 14 miles, and a few miles less for 
smaller ships. The adverse effects of this were insufficient time for the senior 
officer to deploy forces as he might have wished even if visibility was good, 
and the greater likelihood that contact between forces might have been 
missed because cruiser screens were not wide enough. 
Concern over security with WT also extended to the searchlight when 
the enemy were within visual range. At Jutland, this was to be a source of 
concern (if not criticism) when Lion was alleged to have lost the identifying 
call sign during the evening and asked Princess Royal for it by SL It was 
believed that a German ship saw at least part of Princess Royal's reply. 
However, even if this was the case, it was only of limited utility to the 
Germans. The Germans could not have been sure that they had seen a call 
sign. Even so, the reply part could only have been of use if a German ship 
was challenged by the British, in poor visibility or the darkness, and even 
then the German ship would have betrayed itself when opening fire. If the 
Germans had suspected any vessel to be British, using part of the British call 
sign would possibly have delayed action, but not by much. 
Signal security at Jutland was a worry to Jellicoe, but, as with many 
things, it was over-played by him and others of the BF. He did not want the 
Fleet to be betrayed by unnecessary signals, but he overlooked two important 
points. Signals imparted information and the attitude of favouring less rather 
than more had to strike a balance between discouraging the trivial and 
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encouraging the important. As with many Jutland issues, a lack of clarity in 
what was expected caused uncertainty and confusion amongst subordinates. 
Beatty's Flag-Lieutenant, Ralph Seymour, has been criticised for 
signalling blunders by his contemporaries (predominantly Jellicoe's 
sympathisers) and historians such as Marder and Gordon, as has Beatty for 
not ensuring that Seymour was fully trained in this respect. However, failings 
in action due to signalling errors were not due simply to confused signals 
themselves, but wider aspects of the initiative that Beatty considered the 
essential operational requirement. Signalling had become extremely complex 
at the turn of the Century and Beatty correctly perceived the problem that 
this presented. He did not want the complexity that signalling (especially by 
flags) had become to cause confusion in action. To that extent, he did not 
want a fully-qualified Long Course signal expert, because providing that all 
signalling staff were conversant with the basics, this was sufficient, assuming 
that he could rely on his subordinates' initiative. What faults there were must 
be seen in the wider context of Beatty's effort to liberate the service (via the 
BCF initially) from unnecessary and unhelpful complexity. 
Basically, flag signals were made by hoisting the relevant flags at the 
dip, waiting to see this repeated in other ships, then fully raising the flags. 
When this had been repeated, the hauling down of the flags was the order 
for the signal to be acted upon. All flags hauled down together formed one 
signal. This was to be the cause of confusion at Dogger Bank, when a lack of 
halyards added to the errors made. 
When a signal was made by flags, it was usual for it to be repeated by 
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SL, WT, or both, unless ships were in close company (approximately 1-2 
miles) in good visibility. Flags were susceptible to the wind and were often 
positioned near funnels, whose smoke might obscure all, or part, of them. A 
separate slip of paper was used to record each of the different means. Lt. 
Arthur Peters, of Southampton, recorded (in Kent, p. 61) that a WT signal 
was coded from the signal book, then the ship's position was added from the 
plotting operator, given to the WT office (to which was added the ship's call 
sign) and then transmitted. After this, the bridge was informed by means of a 
buzzer of the transmission. The coding officer then decoded the signal and 
sent it to the bridge for confirmation. Given that this would take time, 
assuming there was no interference, the use of flags gave the receiving ship's 
bridge more time to see (and, therefore, to understand) and when made 
executive, could be acted upon immediately without the need for passage to a 
separate office. A SL signal required similar coding and decoding to WT. 
Most importantly, the records of signals should be taken literally. That is, a 
signal's time of transmission and receipt referred to that and only that. The 
message within was not necessarily known to the senior officer (if he was 
required to know it) at the recorded time of receipt. 
In the BCF, Beatty used flag signals sparingly, but at least imbued in 
his captains the fact that the movements of the Flagship should be their 
guide. If the Flagship turned before the signals had either been made or 
received, the turn was to be followed. The recording of the signals was not as 
important as the movements they indicated and what was most important in 
action was moving against an enemy, not waiting for signals to confirm that 
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this should be done. Given this, it is hard to ascertain the relation of signals 
to the movements made in action. Particularly for the BCF, signals should not 
be assumed to be hard and fast indications of timing. Other evidence is 
available to gain greater accuracy relating to movements. 
The recording of signals. 
In sea-going ships, all visual signals were to be recorded in the same 
log; WT messages had a separate log. According to the Instructions for 
Keeping Signal Logs, both logs "are to be written in pencil. They are to be 
kept in original only, except that in Flagships an additional copy of the signal 
log may also be made for the Admiral's use. " This was to cause the Dewars 
confusion when the Staff Appreciation was being written. They believed that 
someone on Jellicoe's staff had forged Iron Duke's signal log, omitting 
signals that might have caused Jellicoe embarrassment. Much was made of 
the fact that the log was written in ink (see Chapter 3), but this was evidently 
a copy made for Jellicoe. The Instructions also noted that: 
"When the ship is paid off, each of the books is to 
be labelled on the back with the name of the ship 
and the date. They are then to be despatched to 
the - DEPUTY CASHIER IN CHARGE, 
ROYAL VICTORIA YARD, DEPTFORD. 
Signal logs of Flagships will be preserved for five 
years, and other Signal Logs for three years. At 
the end of these respective periods they will be 
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destroyed. " 
When Dewar was writing his account, none of these periods had yet expired, 
but it is evident that he did not have access to the logs already at Deptford, 
or he would have seen Iron Duke's pencil original. The only possible proviso 
to this, is that the logs reported as having been destroyed by November 1920, 
are only the rough notes, but this is not made clear. It is equally unclear if 
the destroyed logs are the originals only covering the period including 
Jutland. Although most of the ships at Jutland were deleted from the Navy 
List soon after the war, their logs should still have been in existence. 
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Appendix 5. 
The Battle of Jutland: Order of Battle 
Grand Fleet 
Battlefleet (from van to rear when deployed) 
Second Battle Squadron 
King George V Captain F. L. Field 
(Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Henry Ma Mn Jerram) 
Ajax Captain G. H. Brind 
Centurion Captain M. Culme-Seymour 
Erin Captain the Hon. V. A. Stanley 
Orion Captain O. Backhouse 
(Flag of Rear-Admiral Arthur Cavenagh Leveson) 
Monarch Captain G. H. Borrett 
Conqueror Captain H. H. D. Tothill 
Thunderer Captain J. A. Fergusson 
Fourth Battle Squadron 
Iron Duke Captain F. C. Dreyer 
(Flag of Admiral Sir John Rushworth Jellicoe) 
Royal Oak Captain C. MacLachan 
Superb Captain E. Hyde-Parker 
(Flag of Rear-Admiral Alexander Ludovic Duff) 
Canada Captain W. C. M. Nicholson 
Benbow Captain H. W. Parker 
(Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Frederic Charles Doveton Sturdee) 
Bellerophon Captain E. F. Bruen 
Temeraire Captain E. V. Underhill 
Vanguard Captain J. D. Dick 
First Battle Squadron 
Colossus Captain A. D. P. R. Pound 
(Flag of Rear-Admiral Ernest Frederick Alexander Gaunt) 
Collingwood Captain J. C. Ley 
Neptune Captain V. H. G Bernard 
St. Vincent Captain W. W. Fisher 
Marlborough Captain G. P. Ross 
(Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney) 
Revenge Captain E. B. Kiddle. 
Hercules Captain L Clinton-Baker 
Agincourt Captain H. M Doughty 
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Third Battlecruiser Squadron (temporarily attached) 
Invincible Captain A. L. Cay 
(Flag of Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Lambert Alexander Hood) 
Inflexible Captain E. H. F. Heaton-Ellis 
Indomitable Captain F. W. Kennedy 
First Cruiser Squadron 
Defence Captain S. V. Ellis 
(Flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Keith Arbuthnot) 
Warrior Captain V. B. Molento 
Duke of Edinburgh Captain H. Blackett 
Black Prince Captain T. P. Bonham 
Second Cruiser Squadron 
Minotaur Captain A. C. S. H. D'Aeth 
(Flag of Rear-Admiral Herbert Leopold Heath) 
Hampshire Captain H. J. Savill 
Cochrane Captain E. La T. Leatham 
Shannon Captain J. S. Dumaresq 
Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron 
Callipoe Commodore Charles Edward Le Mesurier 
Constance Captain C. S. Townsend 
Caroline Captain H. R. Crooke 
Royalist Captain the Hon. H. Meade 
Comus Captain A. G. Hotham 
(Light cruisers attached principally for repeating visual signals) 
Active Captain P. Withers 
Bellona Captain A. B. S Dutton 
Blanche Captain J. M. Casement 
Boadicea Captain L. C. S. Wollcombe 
Canterbury Captain P. M. R. Royds 
Chester Captain R. N. Lawson 
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Fourth Destroyer Flotilla 
Tipperary Captain C. J. Wintour 
Acasta, Achates, Ambuscade, Ardent, Broke, Christopher, Contest, 
Fortune, Garland, Hardy, Midge, Ophelia, Owl, Porpoise, Shark, 
Sparrowhawk, Spitfire, Unity. 
Eleventh Destroyer Flotilla 
Castor (light cruiser) Commodore James Rose Price Hawkesley 
Kempenfelt, Magic, Mandate, Manners, Marne, Martial, Michael, 
Milbrook, Minion, Mons, Moon, Morning Star, Mounsey, 
Mystic, Ossory. 
Twelfth Destroyer Flotilla 
Faulknor Captain A. B. Stirling 
Maenad, Marksman, Marvel, Mary, Rose, Menace, Mindful, Mischief, 
Munster, Nessus, Noble, Nonsuch, Obedient, Onslaught, Opal, 
Abdiel Minelayer 
Oak Destroyer tender to Fleet Flagship 
Battlecruiser Fleet 
Lion Captain A. E. M. Chatfield 
(Flag of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty) 
First Battlecruiser Squadron 
Princess Royal Captain W. H. Cowan 
(Flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de Beauvoir Brock) 
Queen Mary Captain C. L Prowse 
Tiger Captain H. B. Pelly 
Second Battlecruiser Squadron 
New Zealand Captain J. F. E. Green 
(Flag of Rear-Admiral William Christopher Pakenham) 
Indefatigable Captain C. F. Sowerby 
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Fifth Battle Squadron (temporarily attached) 
Barham Captain A. W. Craig 
(Flag of Rear Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas) 
Valiant Captain M. Woollcome 
Warspite Captain E. M. Philpotts 
Malaya Captain the Hon. A. D. E. H. Boyle 
First Light Cruiser Squadron 
Galatea Commodore Edwyn Sinclair Alexander-Sinclair 
Phaeton Captain J. S. Cameron 
Inconstant Captain B. S. Theisger 
Cordelia Captain T. P. H. Beamish 
Second Light Cruiser Squadron 
Southampton Commodore William Edmund Goodenough 
Birmingham Captain A. A. M. Duff 
Nottingham Captain C. B. Miller 
Dublin Captain A. C. Scott 
Third Light Cruiser Squadron 
Falmouth Captain J. E. Edwards 
(Flag of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan Dacres Willis Napier) 
Yarmouth Captain T. D. Pratt 
Birkenhead Captain E. Reeves 
Gloucester Captain W. F. Blunt 
First Destroyer Flotilla 
Fearless (light cruiser) Captain D. C. Roper 
Acheron, Ariel, Attack, Badger, Defender, Goshawk, Hydra, 
Lapwing, Lizard. 
Ninth and Tenth Destroyer Flotillas (combined) 
Lydiard Commander M. L. Goldsmith 
Landrail, Laurel, Liberty, Moorsom, Morris, Termagent, Turbulent. 
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Thirteenth Destroyer Flotilla 
Champion (light cruiser) Captain J. U. Farie 
Moresby, Narborough, Nerissa, Nestor, Nomad, Nicator, 
Obdurate, Onslow, Pelican, Petard. 
Seaplane carrier Engadine 
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High Seas Fleet 
Battlefleet (van to rear when deployed) 
Third Battle Squadron 
König Kapitän zur see Brüninghaus 
(Flag of Konteradmiral Paul Behncke) 
Grosser Kurfürst Kapitän zur see E. Goette 
Kronprinz Kapitän zur see C. Feldt 
Markgraf Kapitän zur see Seiferling 
Kaiser Kapitän zur see Freiherr von Keyserlingk 
(Flag of Konteradmiral H. Nordmann) 
Kaiserin Kapitän zur see Seivers 
Prinzregent Luitpold Kapitän zur see K. Heuser 
First Battle Squadron 
Friedrich der Grosse Kapitän zur see T. Fuchs 
(Flag of Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer) 
Ostfriesland Kapitän zur see von Natzmer 
(Flag of Vizeadmiral E. Schmidt) 
Thüringen Kapitän zur see H. Küssel 
Helgoland Kapitän zur see von Kameke 
Oldenburg Kapitän zur see Höpfner 
Posen Kapitän zur see R. Lange 
(Flag of Konteradmiral W. Engelhardt) 
Rheinland Kapitän zur see Rohardt 
Nassau Kapitän zur see H. Kappenbach 
Westfalen Kapitän zur see Redlich 
Second Battle Squadron (pre-dreadnought battleships) 
Deutschland Kapitän zur see H. Meurer 
(Flag of Konteradmiral F. Mauve) 
Hessen Kapitän zur see R. Bartels 
Pommern Kapitän zur see Bölken 
Hannover Kapitän zur see Heine 
(Flag of Konteradmiral Freiherr von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels) 
Schleisen Kapitän zur see F. Behncke 
Schleswig-Holstein Kapitän zur see Barrentrap 
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Fourth Scouting Group (light cruisers) 
Stettin Kapitän zur see F. Rebensburg 
(Broad Pendant of Kommodore Ludwig von Reuter) 
München Korvettenkapitän 0. Bäcker 
Hamburg Korvettenkapitän von Gaudecker 
Frauenlob Kapitän zur see G. Hoffmann 
Stuttgart Kapitän zur see Hagedorn 
Flotilla Leader 
Rostock (light cruiser) Kapitän zur see 0. Feldman 
(Broad Pendant of Kommodore Andreas Michelsen) 
First Torpedoboat (half) Flotilla 
G39 Korvettenkapitän C. Albrecht, G38, G40, S32 
Third Torpedoboat Flotilla 
S53 Korvettenkapitän Hollmann 
Fifth half flotilla: V71, V73, G88 Sixth half flotilla: S54, V48, G42. 
Fifth Torpedoboat Flotilla 
G11 Korvettenkapitän Heinecke 
Ninth half flotilla: V1, V2, V3, V4, V6. 
Tenth half flotilla: V8, G7, G8, G9, G10. 
Seventh Torpedoboat Flotilla 
S24 Korvettenkapitän von Koch 
Thirteenth half flotilla: S15, S16, S17, S18, S20. 
Fourteenth half flotilla: S19, S23, V186, V189. 
First Scouting Group (battlecruisers) 
Lützow Kapitän zur see Harder 
(Flag of Vizeadmiral Franz Hipper) 
Derfflinger Kapitän zur see Hartog 
Seydlitz Kapitän zur see M. von Egidy 
Moltke Kapitän zur see von Karpf 
Von der Tann Kapitän zur see W. Zenker 
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Second Scouting Group (light cruisers) 
Frankfurt Kapitän zur see T. von Trotha 
(Flag of Konteradmiral Friedrich Bödicker) 
Weisbaden Kapitän zur see Reiss 
Pillau Kapitän zur see K. Mommsen 
Elbing Kapitän zur see Madlung 
Flotilla Leader 
Regensburg (light cruiser) Kapitän zur see Heuberer 
(Broad Pendant of Kommodore Paul Heinrich) 
Second Torpedoboat Flotilla 
B98 Kapitän zur see Schurr 
Third half flotilla: G101, G102, B97, B112. 
Fourth half flotilla: B109, B110, B111, G103, G104. 
Sixth Torpedoboat Flotilla 
G41 Korvettenkapitän M. Schultz 
Eleventh half flotilla: V47, G87, G86. 
Twelfth half flotilla: V45, V46, V69, S50, G37. 
Ninth Torpedoboat Flotilla 
V28 Korvettenkapitän Goehle 
Seventeenth half flotilla: V26, V27, S36, S51, S52. 
Eighteenth half flotilla: V29, V30, S33, S34, S35. 
349 
Appendix 6. 
British and German Naval Ranks, 1916. 
BRITISH GERMAN 
Admiral of the Fleet Grossadmiral 
- Generaladmiral 
Admiral Admiral 
Vice-Admiral Vizeadmiral 
Rear-Admiral Konteradmiral 
Commodore (2nd class) Kommodore 
Captain Kapitän zur see 
- Fregattenkapitän 
Commander Korvettenkapitän 
Lieutenant-Commander Kapitänleutnant 
Lieutenant Oberleutnant 
Sub-Lieutenant Leutnant 
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1. The Battlecruisers: something to hide? 
1. BTY 6/4/7. 
2. BTY 4/5/6. 
3. Beatty Papers, 2, #120. It must be noted that the Admiralty Progress in 
Naval Gunnery (1918) (ADM 186/205) endorsed Chatfield's view of the 
engagement and that, at the Falklands, failure to establish early hitting was 
because the 9' base length rangefinders were not good enough (ADM 
186/238), showing that the problem was not fully realised even after the war. 
4. Der Krieg in der Nordsee, V, p. 235. 
5. BLE 12. 
6. Beatty Papers, 2, #122. 
7. Ibid. #123. 
8. Ibid. #125. Although the Pollen system could not overcome the spread 
problem, von Hase noted that the salvoes of Queen Mary at Jutland, one of 
the few ships with a Pollen type system, had practically no spread, but were 
nearly always over or short. It seemed that such a close spread was thought to 
be most desirable, which of course it was, if the target was hit with sufficient 
frequency, and that with director control all guns were set to the same range, 
not deliberately spread. Those battlecruisers opting for individual firing with 
less sophisticated calculating equipment appear to have been least successful, 
even with an evident greater spread that was inherent in this system. The best 
solution to the problem did not appear to have been evident. 
9. Gordon, p. 567. 
10. Vide. Gordon p. 54ff. 
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11. HMSS 54477. Harper noted "The copy of the notes in possession of Sir 
A. Chatfield which he used to refer to during the arguments on Jutland. " 
"These records, when examined by (G) experts, indicate that Lion's shooting 
was exceedingly bad. " It was noted in "Our Bloody Ships" or "Our Bloody 
System"? N. A. Lambert, Journal of Military History, 62, p. 41, that Jellicoe 
said, in 1915, that guns should not even wait for rangefinder ranges or 
information from a plot if there was a chance of success. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Kiel and Jutland, p. 142. A common error was repeated in Tarrant (p. 69) 
that, at 3: 22, New Zealand was sighted by Seydlitz at 16,000 yards. The fact 
that New Zealand was just becoming distinguishable through the rangefinder 
at this time, proves that this distance quoted was highly inaccurate. At 8 
miles, the profile of the ship could have been seen easily enough and if this 
was the case, the ship's crew must also have seen the other column of 
battlecruisers. There was no mention of this, so the range must be much 
greater than 16,000 yards. If von Hase could see all six battlecruisers clearly 
through his periscope, the same would be true of other ships if they had an 
uninterrupted view. Marder noted that the 1stSG was seen by New Zealand 
and Lion respectively at 3: 25 and 3: 30 (p. 57) 14 miles away. Roskill (p. 157) 
agreed with him, unfortunately. 
14. p. 235. 
15. Beatty Papers, 2, #122. 
16. p. 238. Beatty noted that the fourth German salvo hit after 1'/i minutes, 
the British after four, leading to it being said "It is not for one moment 
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intended that... control officers' hands should be tied... by a hard and fast 
rule. " (ADM 137/1946) This seemingly endorsed his previous views. 
17. HMSS 54477. It may be interesting to note that extracts from Iron Duke's 
TS were published in the Despatches along with those of other battleships. It 
is commonly understood that the Harper committee was given every available 
piece of evidence, yet one must then wonder why the above were not used in 
any work that the committee produced. Chatfield's notes, in his possession, as 
Harper noted, should not have been withheld, unless there was some copy, 
but this can almost certainly be excluded. It was evident from Harper's 
dealings with Beatty, Chatfield and Seymour, that these two pieces were not 
disclosed until the `Record' had been completed, when they were used in the 
battlecruisers' defence (or supposed defence) and it is almost certain that 
they are genuine. They not only accurately correspond to other records and 
accounts, but if Chatfield had forged or tampered with them, he could 
definitely have made a better effort at exonerating his ships. 
18. Ibid. 
19. See Appendix 2. 
20. Extract from The London Magazine. 1916. 
21. True Glory. (ed. ) Arthur, p. 75. 
22. Ibid. p. 29. 
23. CAB 45/269. 
24. See also DRAX 1/2. 
25. CAB 45/269. It is worth noting from this, that of the many British and 
German reports commenting upon the excellent targets that ships to the west 
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made due to the sun, have been misunderstood in places. They would only 
show up as clear silhouettes if the viewer was looking at the target from an 
oblique angle. The diameter of the sun is greater than the sum of the 
diameters of all the planets in the solar system and even at 92.8 million miles 
away, if one looks directly in the direction of the sun, no size of ship could 
possibly be distinguished. The sun did hamper as well as help the enemy. The 
question of visibility itself was sometimes a convenient red herring for those 
wishing to magnify certain difficulties with gunnery to hide other defects, or 
to emphasise the excellent targets that the enemy are assumed to have had 
throughout this phase at least. 
26. Kiel and Jutland, von Hase, pp. 149-50. 
27. It might be significant that the entry for Chatfield in Who Was Who, 
made no mention of his being responsible for BCF gunnery, but noted "Flag 
Capt. and Fleet Gunnery Officer to Sir David Beatty... 1917-19. " James did 
appear to be correct in his assertion - he left Queen Mary two days before 
Jutland - as Chatfield's service records endorse (ADM 196/43+89). The 
Admiralty noted that Jutland led to developing a way of firing "by definite 
rules". This implied that this was not compulsory before (ADM 186/238). 
28. BLE 13.13.2.67. When Q turret was hit above the right gun it was loaded, 
yet one individual killed by the explosion knocked a lever sending the hoist 
with a full charge down to smoulder four feet above the working chamber 
(ADM 137/1946). After the war, only one full charge per gun was permitted 
except in extreme cases, had only one full charge been in the turret for this 
gun, little other cordite could have been present to catch fire and fall down. 
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29. Despatches, p. 146. 
30. Grove, Fleet to Fleet Encounters, p. 74. In many accounts, the inaccuracy 
of the ranges at which shots were fired was seen to be the fault of the 
rangefinders, more so those operating them. However, it should be 
mentioned that the ranges recorded from most rangefinders in most 
circumstances were as accurate as the devices allowed for. Any inaccuracies 
crept in due to the defects in the non-Argo Dreyer equipment not being able 
to cope with giving sufficient information swiftly enough to the gunlayers, so 
that when guns were fired, the circumstances that the information had 
provided for, had changed sufficiently to adversely affect shooting. 
All rangefinders are extensions of the human eye, which function 
much like coincidence rangefinders, taking two images from slightly differing 
angles, with the brain combining the two. Due to this, Barr & Stroud noted 
"If one image is moved into coincidence with the other, it will generally be 
found that the image can be moved some distance further and still appear to 
be in true alignment. " (ADM 186/205) Over 20,000 yards, the ability to cut 
the image was dependent on the observer's astigmatism. 
31. The Navy and Defence, p. 150. See Appendix 1. In 1934, Beatty noted 
that the loss of the battlecruisers was "not the fault of anybody in them, poor 
souls, but of faulty design... [the German battlecruisers] were too stoutly built 
whereas ours went up in a blue flame on the smallest provocation. " 
(unacknowledged quote in Tarrant, p. 98). It would seem that, even in 1934, 
Beatty was totally unaware of what had saved Lion. Although known to those 
directly involved, it seemed that Lion's ammunition handling system was very 
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much Chatfield's and Grant's secret. This was largely responsible for leading 
people into thinking that the ships' design was at fault and this gained 
universal acceptance, but it also clouded understanding of the manner in 
which the BCF had worked and performed. This quote from Beatty could not 
be more wrong, yet he had to believe it. After the war, Seydlitz's experience 
at Dogger Bank, when 62 charges had ignited and jeopardised the ship, was 
common knowledge. Lion adopted similar precautions against igniting 
explosives before Jutland, but not many ever seemed to make the link to the 
causes of the losses, which was a very painful thing to admit to. It was 
sufficient to most to accept the first remotely plausible answer, that the BCF 
were let down by poor shells and bad ship design. 
32. p. 73. 
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2. The Harper Record. 
1. Vice-Admiral J. E. T. Harper (1874-1949); entered RN 1888; Lt. 1896; Cdr 
1906; Cpt 1913; Ogaden Somali expedition 1900-1; Commander uIM Yacht 
1911-4; Master of the Fleet for the Naval Review of 20.7.14; various 
commands during the war; Director of Navigation 1919-21; Anglo-American 
Arbitration Board 1921-2; CO Resolution, Atlantic Fleet, 1922; ADC to the 
King 1923-4; RA 1924, but given no further employment; retired and VA 
1927; Nautical Assessor for the House of Lords 1934-6; Home Guard 1940-2. 
It is worth noting that the work of the Harper committee, as it was not 
published, did not have a formal title. It has been referred to, at certain 
periods, as the "record", "Record", "report", "account", "narrative", or the work 
of Harper's committee. In 1927, an edited version appeared, entitled the 
Reproduction of the Record of the Battle of Jutland, which implied that 
"Record" might have been used. As Harper always referred to it as the 
"Record", this has been used here. 
2. Jellicoe Papers, 2, p. 464. 
3. HMSS 54477 (23.1.19). The request from Wemyss suggests that the original 
intention was to publish Harper's work, not merely to leave it as a staff 
account. 
4. BTY 21/3. 
5. HMSS 54477 f. 27. 
6. Ibid. f. 23. 
7. Ibid. f. 28. 
8. HMSS 54477. 
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9. Ibid. f. 29. Discrepancies (deliberate or accidental) are evident throughout 
the list of signals. For example, at 3: 50, Lion remarked upon frequent hits 
and a turret wrecked at 4: 00, yet it was not hit until 3: 50'/2 and cannot have 
been remarking upon other ships without noting this to be the case. It was 
quite clearly a summary of this part of the action, for some reason placed 
under the time before the events actually happened. There was a record of 
the 5thBS opening fire on the 2ndSG, but not of the First. At 4: 20, Lion 
remarked that Queen Mary blew up, six minutes before it actually happened. 
Lion also remarked that at 4: 50 the 5thBS had passed, when the text showed 
that the Flagships had not yet come abeam. Most of those who use the 4: 48 
signal ordering the SthBS to turn, use the list of messages, not any text, as 
evidence, which is of a highly flawed kind; the Despatches is certainly not a 
primary source. By itself, the list of messages is of highly doubtful reliability, 
unless corroborated by other evidence. 
10. Vide. Gordon, pp. 136-7. 
11. ADM 167/56 (3.7.19). 
12. Instructions for Keeping Signal Logs. The ease with which alterations 
could be made to pencil entries is obvious. See Appendix 4. 
13. ADM 167/56. 
14. Ibid. 
15. BTY 9/1/1. 
16. ADM 167/56. Vivian, at Jutland, had commanded Liverpool and was now 
Captain of Collingwood. Oliphant had been Sturdee's Flag-Lieutenant at 
Jutland and was now at the Signal Division of President. 
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17. Ibid. 
18. HMSS 54477. 
19. BTY 22/9 p. 6. There was a comment that Woods made a complete copy 
of the log (ADM 137/1946). 
20. The Dewars evidently saw a copy, probably the one made by Woods. 
21. BTY 22/8 p. 24. The condition of the log at this point is discussed in 
Gordon, pp. 139-40, it being worthwhile to consider the convenience of 
damage to the log. Whatever state it was in after it had caught fire, if it had, 
being dowsed with water would not have helped its long term preservation. It 
was highly probable that the leaves dried together, possibly being defaced 
upon opening and, unless placed in a vacuum, the chances of it becoming 
mouldy would only have increased. At 4: 55, it is also worth noting that Lion 
was nearly 21,000 yards from Lützow, when the maximum range of Lützow's 
guns was a little over 20,000. 
22. TEN 37. Godfrey-Tennant (16.1.63). 
23. BLE 12. 
24. SLGF 6/4 Beatty to Shane Leslie, 1922. 
25. Schurman, Julian S. Corbett, p. 187. 
26. Ibid. 
27. Jellicoe Papers, 2, p. 465. 
28. HMSS 54477. This document did not show any signs of handwriting other 
than that of Harper's, which, in general, was only to make typographical 
corrections. There are marks in blue pencil which were made by the DCNS 
on the advice of the DNI, regarding signals that it was felt should not be 
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published. Marks in red pencil indicated parts that the First Sea Lord wished 
to be altered or deleted. However, these marks were not necessarily made by 
the individuals in question, but could have been made by someone else on 
their instructions. There were few marks made on the document, which 
suggests that either Beatty had a copy, or saw a slightly different version. 
Harper stated that the original MS was in Beatty's possession from November 
1919 to 11th February 1920, when it was returned to him. In 1927, when it 
was proposed to issue the account, in abridged form, it was recorded that the 
original account could not be found, thus the MS with least alterations was to 
be issued instead. The original had been in Harper's keeping, which 
suggested that Beatty, or anyone else, did not have this piece, therefore no 
copy. 
The way the marks in red have been made suggested that they were 
done as the account was being read for the first time, so Beatty could well 
have made them. If this was so, then the fact that there is little red pencil 
throughout the work, suggests that there were only a few points of contention 
at first. However, this does not square with popular understanding, although 
any alterations need not necessarily have been made on the MS. It seems that 
in Harper's meetings with Beatty, most of the alterations desired were not 
indicated on the MS now in 54477. Harper's copy is marked "triplicate" which 
suggests the least number of such originals. This does assume that the copy in 
54477 was the original version, or a copy of it. If it is, then it is to be 
wondered why, in 1927, the original could not apparently be found from at 
least three. The lack of pencilling in Harper's copy suggests that the original 
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is not in Harper's papers. It also shows that Harper had not amended the 
original to Beatty's satisfaction, such as regarding the 360° turn of the BCF, 
because this section is marked. 
29. Jellicoe Papers, 2, p. 465, the original is in BTY 9/2/71. Harper's evidence 
to the ACNS is in BTY 9/2/72-6. Chatfield's autobiography noted that at the 
time, a 180° turn to starboard commenced and that he was seeing to the 
wounded. He might not have been aware of the turn whilst below deck, but it 
can scarcely have escaped his attention later and he obviously preferred not 
to become involved in this dispute, nor some others. He was content to 
record his personal experience (p. 147) and to ensure that no-one could make 
erroneous or mischievous inferences. 
30. BTY 9/2/78. Chatfield's notes recorded that, at 6: 45, Beatty sent a 
message to Indomitable that "I am altering course starboard, prolong line 
astern. 6: 48 course SSE 6: 56 180 rpm. 7: 03 course SSE". Harper added "good 
evidence in favour of 32pt turn", which it is. Midshipman Frank Layard 
recorded that not long after the loss of Invincible "on orders from the Lion 
we turned round and took station astern of the other battle-cruisers" (Arthur, 
op. cit. p. 74). This would have brought about possible collision had Lion 
turned back 180° as Beatty stated. 
31. The Truth About Jutland, Rear-Admiral J. E. T. Harper, p. 98. n. 1. Jellicoe, 
in The Grand Fleet, noted that "our Battlecruisers experienced great difficulty 
in locating and holding the enemy after 7: 20pm, even when far ahead of the 
Battle Fleet. " (p. 371. ) 
Harper had suggested, on 4.11.19, that more detailed diagrams could 
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be produced for the period of 6: 30-8pm, but, unsurprisingly, "no reply was 
received to this". In the final version, Harper had moved Lion '/zmile further 
southward at around 6: 53 and moved the 1stSG to make the given ranges 
correspond and conform to the notion of the 180° starboard-180" to port turn. 
32. COW 17/4 p. 274. 
33. Ibid. p. 276. 
34. TEN 4. The account was written approximately 3-4 weeks after the battle. 
35. Ibid. 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Jellicoe Papers, 2, p. 470. 
39. Ibid. p. 471. Beatty seemed also to admit grudgingly any battlefleet 
involvement, with Harper also noting that he said "Well I suppose there is no 
harm in the public knowing that someone on the Battle Fleet got wet, as that 
is about all they had to do with Jutland". In stating this he contradicted what 
he was trying to have the `Record' state. 
40. ADM 116/2067. 
41. They can be found with Harper's responses in Ibid. 
42. Ibid. There is a sheet of typed comments made at the meeting in CAB 
45/269. Of the battlefleet's involvement, Harper agreed to note that "Action 
became more General" and stated that, over all, "No attempt has been made 
to prepare such an account as would be prepared by a Historian. Simply a 
record of events without criticism or comments, prepared in the first instance 
for the information of the Board. " This assumption led to the dispute in the 
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first instance. Chatfield made most of the comments of those present. As a 
result of this meeting, Lion's track was altered as detailed in n. 31. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Ibid. 
45. Jellicoe Papers, 2, p. 469. 
46. ADM 116/2067. 
47. Jellicoe Papers, 2, p. 469. The original is in BTY 9/1/1 f. 2. 
48. BTY 9/1/3 Seymour to Beatty 20.2.20. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Reproduction of the Record of the Battle of Jutland. (Cmd. 2870), p. 42. 
52. ADM 116/2067. From the committee's own table, firstly in HMSS 54477, 
from 6: 17-54,15 battleships opened fire. At 7: 10, Ajax opened and from 
7: 15-7,5 more battleships, in the van, opened fire. It is also curious that 
Erin's withholding fire was not criticised. For the action from 7: 35, Harper's 
title was "Proceedings after the General Fleet Action ceased" but, following 
the first three words, someone has written in its place "enemy Battlefleet 
turned away". It is evident that this individual was expressing the opinion of 
someone more in sympathy with the BCF than the battlefleet. 
53. ADM 116/2067. 
54. BTY 9/1/3. 
55. Diary 1920. Jellicoe had been persuaded to read the account after initially 
refusing, believing that none present at the battle should have read it before 
publication. 
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56. HMSS 54477 (4.7.16) in NID 21.9.20. Chatfield, in The Navy and Defence, 
stated that "The German Battlecruisers, despite their two big successes, showed 
themselves strangely disinclined for further fighting. They had evidently had 
enough. " (p. 144. ) In conjunction with the statement that the battle "was a right 
in which there was really only one serious round, the Battlecruiser action. " 
(p. 148. ) This summed-up the opinions of those in the battlecruisers, but 
without taking note of German intentions at the battle. (See Appendix 2). 
57. Der Krieg in der Nordsee, V, pp. 241-2. 
58. Jellicoe Papers, 2, p. 472. Captain Frank Spickernell was Beatty's secretary. 
59. Ibid. pp. 474-5. 
60. Ibid. p. 475. 
61. Ibid. 
62. Diary 1921. 
63. Jellicoe Papers, 2, pp. 476-8. 
64. Ibid. p. 463. 
65. Schurman op. cit. p. 189. 
66. BTY 21/3 (19.12.68). 
67. BTY 21/3. Pipon's service record showed many complimentary remarks as 
to his abilities and enthusiasm, except that "memory exceptionally bad, has 
gained little knowledge of Admiralty procedure and could not be trusted to 
deal satisfactorily with papers. No initiative or self-reliance. -Capt. Harper. " 
(ADM 196/48). Relations seem to have been strained. Many also erroneously 
assume that what criticism there is in The Truth About Jutland extended from 
events relating to the 1919 `Record', but much had happened since to 
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strengthen Harper's case regarding what had happened. 
68. COW 17/4 p. 275. 
69. DRAX 1/57. 
70. SLGF 12/1. 
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3. The Genesis of the Naval Staff Appreciation of Jutland. 
1. Schurman, D. M. The Education of a Navy, p. 1. This work also has 
chapters dealing with Richmond's and Corbett's contributions to history. 
2. Ibid. pp. 10-11. 
3. Corbett's Diary, 1920. 
4. DEW 4/2f. 176. 
5. DEW 35 (24.2.56). 
6. DEW 34 ff. 497-8 (7.5.16) to Richmond. 
7. Ibid. ff. 501-3 (8.6.16). 
8. That is the belief that the battlecruisers had been at the forefront of the 
action, bearing the brunt of the damage, whilst the battlefleet was not 
involved. 
9. DEW 34 ff. 509-10 (25.9.16). Captain E. Rushton (XO of Southampton). 
10. DEW 4/2 (5.6.19). 
11. Ibid. f. 3. 
12. DEW 35 (23.10.51). Alfred wrote to his brother that Chalmers's 
biography proved that "Beatty never intended to influence its composition. " 
13. DEW 4/2 f. 4. 
14. Ibid. ff. 5-8. 
15. Ibid. f£4-5. 
16. Ibid. 1933. Grenfell had served aboard Revenge at Jutland. 
17. Ibid. f. 237. 
18. BTY 9/5 Brock-Kenneth and Alfred Dewar (15.11.20). 
19. BTY 9/5/6 Kenneth Dewar. 
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20. BTY 9/5 (4.10.21). 
21. ROSK 3/4. 
22. Beatty Papers, 2, #247 (14.8.22). Lt-Cdr John Francis Hungerford Pollen 
had, in 1913, contracted polio and was subsequently invalided out of the 
service. His service record noted him to be (in April 1910) "Slow, lacking in 
zeal. " However, improvements were noted and on 10.11.19 "TL appreciation 
of meritorial work in connection with Battle of Jutland. " (ADM 196/53). My 
thanks also to Sir John Pollen. 
23. Dr. E. J. Grove. 
24. Beatty Papers, 2, #236. 
25. BTY 9/5/7 (14.9.21). Following a conversation with the Swedish naval 
attache soon after Jutland, Chatfield became convinced that the failure to 
inflict greater losses upon the 1stSG especially, was due to deficient shell (see 
Appendix 1). The Chatfield Coat of Arms depicts a sailor accompanied by a 
shell and is a little evidence of the importance that he attached to this point. 
26. As n. 22. 
27. Ibid. 
28. The destruction of the work is undoubted, yet few seem to agree as to 
when the work was actually destroyed. Beatty's eldest son stated (BTY 22/9) 
that it was ordered to be destroyed by Madden, the date being 1928 (but this 
could be when the destruction was ordered, not necessarily executed). 
Copy #4 (ROSK 3/13) bears the insert When I was preparing the 
Jutland lectures at the War College in 1922-3 Spick. lent me this copy. He 
explained that D. B. (1st SL) considered it inaccurate and biased so I 
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understand had ordered existing copies to be burnt. It is quite certain that he 
stopped the issue. " (Blake to Roskill 9.8.60). Alfred Dewar noted "The 250 
copies of it remained in a cupboard in DTSD! room were all burnt by 
[? ]... before Madden left (about 1932). " (DEW 35, to Kenneth Dewar 
10.5.57). If these are put down to failing memories then the work was 
destroyed between late 1927-30, which is the popular understanding. If there 
were 250 copies in total then only 247 at most could have been burned, 
though Alfred Dewar might not have been aware that not all copies had been 
returned. It does seem as if Dewar and Blake had their facts wrong, but if 
one or more is right then the plot thickens. What is also significant is the way 
Spickernell was keen to lend his copy in this case, perhaps on his own 
initiative. Jellicoe was sent two copies when in New Zealand, one of which 
was to keep and he may have held onto the other. It may or may not be 
significant that the copies currently known to have survived belonged to 
Beatty, his secretary and former Flag-Captain. CHT 8/2 noted that Chatfield 
could keep his copy (#9) if he so desired. 
29. BTY 9/5/8 K. Dewar to Ellerton (late 1921). On 6th October, Corbett 
noted that "Dewar came to tell me his [account] of Jutland was 
completed+that he expected it to be handed over to me. Also to ask if I 
could find some means of keeping on Pollen. " On 23rd December "Tuck with 
Capt. Dewar re Jutland who said yesterday that he had seen 
Beatty+ Brock+ they decided I was to have all there was including his super 
secret appreciation unexpurgated. " [Diary]. It seems that throughout this 
period Brock was also heavily involved (not unsurprisingly, perhaps, as 
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DCNS) with the work, as suggested by his reluctance to authorise the 
publication of Harper's work in 1919. Chatfield, however, did not seem to 
have sought such close involvement, if anything, he wanted to distance 
himself from it. 
30. DEW 4/2 f. 137. From Captain W. Ellerton (DTSD) to K. Dewar 
(28.11.21). Ellerton was succeeded by Captain Vernon Haggard. 
31. BTY 9/5/8 (28.11.21). Cdr Oswald Tuck was with the Historical Section of 
the War Cabinet. 
32. DEW 4/2 f. 143 (18.2.22). 
33. Ibid. f. 145. "There is the question of the accuracy of the book-in fact I 
understand it is only too accurate+it has been thought better to keep the 
criticisms unpublished for the present.. . the real fact is they haven't the 
courage to publish it until certain people have passed away. " (18.3.22). 
34. Jellicoe Papers, 2, #134 (16.3.22). On 15th February, Corbett met 
Haggard and told him that the Appreciation should not go out with the 
Admiralty's approval, though he doubtless felt the same. On the 22nd, 
Corbett learned that the work was to be destroyed. Two days later, Haggard 
requested that Corbett return his copy and from the 27th, Corbett sought to 
retain it (he had not yet reached working on the night action) and apparently 
succeeded. [Diary]. 
35. BTY 9/5/2. 
36. Jellicoe Papers, 2, #137 (18.7.22). 
37. Ibid. #145. (14.2.23). 
38. Ibid. #132. (13.6.21). 
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39. Ibid. #147 (25.2.23). 
40. DEW 35 (3.11.22). 
41. Captain (later Rear-Admiral) Roger Mowbray Bellairs (1884-1959), Cdr. 
Grand Fleet torpedo officer 1914-16 (Iron Duke); War Staff officer to Beatty 
1916-9; Naval Assistant to Beatty 1919-25 (Brother of Commander Carlyon). 
42. DEW 35 (28.5.23). 
43. My thanks to Admiral Sir Charles Madden. 
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4. The Official History & the Admiralty Narrative. 
1. Diary 1916. 
2. Ibid. Corbett also wrote a brief narrative at this time, finding universal 
acceptance (ADM 137/1946). 
3. Diary 1921. 
4. History of the Great War: Naval Operations., pp. 328-9. 
5. Cf. Chapter 1. 
6. Official History, p. 331. 
7. Ibid. p. 334. On 27th May 1922, Corbett had written to Bentinck (Naval 
Assistant to the First Lord) asking why Beatty opened fire so late [Diary]. No 
evidence exists of a reply to this. It would have been unusual if any reply was 
received, but Corbett might have given this point more consideration than he 
did in the work. By his own wording, it was not a matter of incidental 
importance. It must be said that he did not have access to much evidence to 
prove why late opening of fire might be the case and he was certainly asking 
one of the people who were least likely to offer any explanations. 
8. Ibid. p. 362. 
9. Ibid p. 361. 
10. ADM 116/2067. Pound was Director of Plans. 
11. Official History, p. 364. 
12. Ibid. p. 371. It might be mentioned that there was a widespread feeling 
before the battle that the Germans would try to hatch some sneaky plot if 
ever encountered. The probability that they might bolt for home in fear of 
their lives if met with overwhelming force, was not apparently considered. 
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Jellicoe was certainly not alone in sharing this view. 
13. Ibid. p. 372. 
14. Ibid. p. 384. 
15. Jellicoe Papers, 2, #146, Jellicoe to Daniel 16.2.23. In the Corbett 
Papers, Box 7, it was noted by Roskill that Corbett could, perhaps, have 
appealed more strongly to his employers regarding the actions of the 
Admiralty and their reading the proofs, but apparently failed to do so. On 
19th June 1922, Corbett received a "Recorded cable from Jellicoe approving 
all but two paragraphs I had altered with Pollen. " (Diary). 
16. Ibid. #148 14.8.23. 
17. BTY 21/4. David Beatty (the Second Earl) to Temple-Patterson 6.7.67. 
18. Cf. Chapter 5. 
19. Jellicoe Papers, 2, #122 13.2.19. Relations between Jellicoe and Corbett 
were initially far from warm. For example, on 18.1.17, he told Richmond "I 
am afraid there is very little chance with Jelly and still less with that jumpy 
neurotic inexperienced amateur 1st Lord [Carson]. Good Lord, we are lucky 
people to get on as well as we do. " On 6th April "I had to see Jelly today to 
try to persuade him to let us have some more stuff for the history. He made 
a bad impression on me - his feet seemed very cold. " (CP Box 7) Relations 
remained cool after the war, yet by late 1919/early 1920, Corbett was 
becoming ever more aware, largely from his meetings with Harper, of the fact 
that Beatty wanted, first and foremost, an account favourable to himself and 
was prepared to use some measure of chicanery to get it. Corbett admitted 
that it was not until he looked at Jutland in any depth, that he appreciated 
374 
more fully the task that faced Jellicoe and Beatty's actual role. It was about 
this time that Corbett began to look more disapprovingly upon Beatty, 
conversely with Jellicoe and, given that he was forewarned of Beatty's 
intentions for the Jutland history, over compensated in his work. 
20. Ibid. #138 3.8.22. 
21. Ibid. #1412.10.22. 
22. The disclaimer read "The Lord's Commissioners of the Admiralty have 
given the author access to official documents in the preparation of this work, 
but they are in no way responsible for its production or for the accuracy of its 
statements. Their Lordships find that some of the principles advocated in the 
book, especially the tendency to minimise the importance of seeking battle 
and of forcing it to a conclusion, are directly in conflict with their views. " 
23. ADM 116/2067. This view does seem not to have drawn the attention 
feared. C. J. Longman wrote to Lady Corbett "I am delighted with the notices 
in the press so far. They have been very numerous, very full and the large 
majority have been highly appreciative. If that ill-natured unaccountable 
Admiralty note was intended to influence public opinion adversely it has 
failed in its object. Very few of the papers have noticed it and so far as I 
know have endorsed its view of the book. I think you may rest assured that it 
will do no harm to the book: that it should injure in any way whatever Sir 
Julian's reputation is of course out of the question. Indeed, it will strengthen 
his reputation for independence of judgement and courage. It affords 
evidence that on some points his considered opinion ran counter to those 
held by the Admiralty (or someone there) at the time when the book was 
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being printed and that he had the courage to adhere to his own judgement 
against official pressure [and had Jellicoe's approval]. " (November 1923). 
Longman may or may not have been aware of Corbett's dealings with Jcllicoe. 
Colonel Daniel wrote "In my honest opinion Sir Julian's "Battle of 
Jutland" was his crowning achievement. I only wish he could have lived to sce 
it and to answer the foolish note which the Admiralty insisted on being 
inserted. If I had refused to put it in I shouldn't like to say when the book 
would have been published. There is a certain stamp of naval officer who 
never could understand Sir Julian's views on the subject of searching out the 
enemy and destroying him... a large number of well-informed naval officers 
have the highest admiration for Sir Julian, and I can assure you that his 
teachings have been taken seriously. " to Lady Corbett. (Mockridge MSS). 
24. Corbett and the 1990's. G. Till, in Mahan is not enough, p. 222. 
25. ADM 116/2067. Haggard-DCNS 7.2.23. 
26. ADM 116/2067. 
27. BTY 9/4 f. 4. The author of the marginal comments was possibly one of 
Beatty's staff. It could have been his secretary, Frank Spickernell, but this is 
doubtful, or Roger Bellairs. The handwriting does not suggest that it was 
Seymour, Chatfield or Keyes. 
28. Ibid. 
29. Harper's marginal notes in his copy of the book (in the possession of 
Commander J. A. Harper). 
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30. Narrative of the Battle of Jutland. (HMSO, 1924). 
31. Ibid. p. 3. 
32. Ibid. p. 12. 
33. Ibid. n. 6. 
34. Ibid. p. 2. In his article The Jutland Scandal, in the Naval Review, 1925, 
Dewar noted the sentiment that Harper's work was only the beginnings of a 
work on Jutland and that a chronological account could not bring out the 
lessons of the battle (p. 223. ). He continued that "The suggestion that Lord 
Beatty or his advisors edited or altered the facts in the Admiralty Narrative 
can be flatly and absolutely contradicted ... The Narrative was written quite 
independently. " (p. 224. ) He often confused the Narrative with the Staff 
Appreciation. He had already admitted that Harper's work had been used in 
his work, so the Narrative could not possibly have been written independently. 
It seemed that his intention was to mislead the readers regarding the nature of 
the Admiralty-approved account, which was more in tune with his own, and 
Beatty's, beliefs. 
35. Ibid. p-15- 
36. Ibid. p. 17. With regard to the wording, it does suggest inaccuracies, 
generated by the Harper committee, which were not properly verified. Kenneth 
Dewar seemed to think his work was more accurate and that it would gain 
acceptance by repetition; something that has continued to the present day. This 
phrase suited the Dewars' views, but Von der Tann was straddled after 
Barham's second salvo and had its steering gear jammed with the third; "some 
minutes" was, in fact, under two. 
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37. Ibid. p. 21 n. 2. 
38. Jellicoe Papers, 2, #146 6.12.22. Jellicoe's objections, replies to them, the 
rough draft of the account, proofs, diagrams and other correspondence arc in 
ADM 116/3188. 
39. Ibid. #149,6.12.23. 
40. ADM 167/69. Haggard noted that "First Lord has promised adm 
Evan-Thomas that he shall see paras dealing with the movements of 5th B. S. 
while with B. C. S. before publication. " (March 1923) ADM 116/3188. This 
suggested that this was not done purely for Evan-Thomas's information. 
41. Vide. Jellicoe Papers, 2, #150. 
42. Jellicoe Papers, 2, #143. 
43. Ibid. #149,6.12.23. 
44. ADM 116/3188 Oswyn Murray (23.11.23). 
45. ADM 116/3188. (5.4.23). 
46. Ibid. 
47. Ibid. (January 1924). 
48. Narrative. p. 106. 
49. Ibid. n. 2. 
50. Ibid. n. 3. 
51. C£ Chapter 5. 
52. Narrative. p. 108 n. 1. 
53. Ibid. p. 113. 
54. Ibid. n. 6. 
55. Ibid. 
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56. Ibid. n. 7. 
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5. Poles apart: the 5thBS and BCF at Jutland. 
1. Beatty Papers, 1, #174 (26.6.16). Beatty's contemporary remarks on the 
incident, such as this, did not blame Evan-Thomas or attempt to imply bad 
manoeuvring. When the matter was being recorded for public issue, his actions 
were somewhat different. In 1923, he had the idea from discussions with 
Algernon Boyle (CO Malaya at Jutland) that Evan-Thomas "could certainly 
have seen Lion turn to sthd and conformed without signal. The real reason for 
this delay was RA waited until his TBD screen assumed new position for 
screening... From his despatch he does not consider there was any undue 
delay. " (ADM 116/3188). The truth of this depends upon what he actually 
asked Boyle. Evan-Thomas was adjusting the 5thBS's destroyer screen, not 
necessarily to conform to the battlecruisers' turn, but to continue their zig-zag. 
Beatty's comment assumed that Evan-Thomas knew why Lion turned, but he 
forced himself to believe this in the 1920s, whereas he did not feel the need to 
do so in 1916. This is a telling fact. 
2. In the Despatches and DRAX 1/57. Barham's ship's log (ADM 53/34796) 
stated "1.33 a/c 2pts to take up station 5 miles NNW of Lion. " 
3. Beatty Papers, 1, #174 (26.6.16). It was noted in the proofs of the Official 
History that "At 3.5 the Tiger signalled to the Lion that the 2: 32 signal and 
signals made since have not been passed to the Barham. " " (BTY 9/4). This 
appeared on page 331. Marder (p. 52. ) held Tiger responsible 
for not also 
repeating the signal, but added that Lion's signal staff "was sorely lacking in 
common sense" for not making an immediate searchlight repeat. This was not 
exactly true. Marder, along with others, often noted the deficiencies in the 
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signalling arrangements and attributed them all to a bewildered Seymour 
(Harper had said that Seymour "was such a fool that I'm surprised he didn't 
hoist it at the jackstaff. "-Cdr Harper. ). Seymour was following common practice 
at this time, but to make him responsible for the BCF's signals, one must also 
make Beatty, amongst others, responsible for any defects in organisations 
under their control. Responsibility accepts taking credit when things succeed, 
but it must also accept any failures. As was common in Jutland accounts, many 
authors are eager to point to certain successes or failures in organisations 
under an individual's control, but do not examine the whole structure with the 
same criteria., Selective analysis is a paradox and has misled many writing on 
Jutland. 
On p. 68, Marder noted that the 3: 35 to Barham was "taken in and 
obeyed at once". However, Marder needed to explain why the 2: 32 was not 
acted upon. The alternative courses theories only arise because the 2: 32 
searchlight repeat was never made. Even if it was made, its subject matter was 
not necessarily Evan-Thomas's concern or open to his interpretation. An order 
is an order. 
4. Following Dogger Bank, Archibald Moore had noted that "visual flag signals 
are very difficult to distinguish with the interference from smoke from funnels. " 
(BTY 4/6/7. ) Jellicoe and others realised this and the possible implications. 
5. Beatty Papers, 2, #241 (14.8.23) Evan-Thomas to Haggard. 
6. Beatty Papers, 2, #243 (19.8.23). 
7. p. 107, n. 2. 
8. (4.9.28. ) in Gordon p. 557. 
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9. Ibid. pp. 557-8. 
10. DEW 35 (Dewar's brackets). Barham's log read "2.38 a/c SSE. 2.40 action 
stations. " 
11. ROSK 3/3, from Barnard. 
12. Beatty Papers, 2, #245 (30.6.26). See also #246. Evan-Thomas did admit 
in a letter to the editor of The Times that "it was impossible to distinguish flag 
signals... except possibly on very rare occasions. " (16.2.27) Jellicoe stated that 
flag signals were not "apparently clearly distinguished. " (Jellicoe Papers, 2, 
#144), but this seemed to result from a reaction to the baseless publicity over 
the incident that had even led some to begin to question their memories. 
13. ROSK 3/3, Barnard. 
14. Gordon, p. 558. 
15. Paper by Commander Michael Craig-Waller. 
16. Later Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Blake (1882-1968): entered 1897; Lt. 1904; 
1911-3 Lt. gunnery experiments; Cdr 1914; Iron Duke 1916; Queen Elizabeth 
1917; Cpt 1918; Naval Attache to USA 1919-21; CO Queen Elizabeth 1921-3; 
War College staff 1923-5; Director RNSC 1927. 
17. BLE 13. Blake to the editor of the Naval Review, Vice-Admiral Mansergh 
(28.6.66). The account is a typed sheet, with the initials "A. C. W. " which he had 
sent to Blake. For the tale as told according to Craig see, for example, 
Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World War, p. 162, (wrongly timed to 2: 32). 
Marder (p. 55) believed Craig's plea and, along with Roskill (p. 156), that the 
repeat was made and received. 
18. Paper by Commander Michael Craig-Waller. 
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19. Page 47 only stated that the battleships held on until 2: 40 and then 
conformed to the turn. The evidence for this came from the reports of the 
5thBS, not the signal or deck logs. On the turn to the north (p. 59) it quoted 
Lion's signal log making the signal executive at 4: 48, but the evidence for the 
5thBS again, was only the reports of each ship. It is odd that Alfred Dewar 
quoted Barham's signal log in his letter to Kenneth, but no such quote 
evidenced itself here. This suggests that, in 1921, the forgery to Barham's 
signal log had not yet been made and almost certainly that Dewar had, at this 
time, either not seen any signal log from the 5thBS (but he implied that he saw 
all logs) or had seen the log which did not yet have the forged signal in it. In 
1921, Kenneth Dewar, who did the majority of work on the Appreciation, had 
probably not seen the log, but Alfred definitely had not. If he ever did, he only 
saw it subsequently to the signal being inserted, hence his belief as stated here. 
It seemed that Dewar's failure to dwell on this point was due to the fact that, 
whilst being disputed since the battle, Beatty had not yet come under heavy 
criticism for it. The absence of any reference to the signal logs of the SthBS is 
also odd, but, in later years, people quoted Barham's log with apparent 
familiarity as if it had always been available. However, this was usually only the 
2: 37 signal quoted elsewhere, which was convenient to Beatty's purpose to say 
the very least. 
20. He had been caught out by Harper and he denied the 32 point turn that 
Harper, the Dewars, Chatfield and his navigator, amongst others, confirmed 
that he made. This might have been discouraging. 
21. Dannreuther MSS. Hubert Dannreuther's notes made at a meeting on 
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board Invincible roughly a month before the battle. 
22. It was likely that, with the battlecruisers being in line ahead, Lion began 
the turn whilst hoisting the signal, or just before it, with the others conforming 
when reaching the turning point and repeating the signal as soon as was 
possible to the next astern. It would not have been unusual for them to begin 
to follow without a signal, but such a large change of course needed to be 
specified. The turn must be sooner, rather than later, given the fact that 
visibility to the east was roughly 23,000 yards and, allowing time for a clear 
enough image for identification of the HSF, beginning the turn at 4: 40 would 
have meant that the battlecruisers would have been under fire from the 
German battleships before Tiger and New Zealand had completed the turn. It 
would have meant that the two Flagships could not have passed at 4: 50 and 
they would have been at least 2.5 miles apart. Evan-Thomas noted they were 
little more than a mile apart and was correct in this. Had the battlecruisers 
turned at 4: 40, they would, by 4: 43, have been to the east of Queen Mary 's 
wreckage and would have made their dog-leg towards it, for no apparent 
purpose. Yet, they made this turn to avoid it, so they must have been heading 
towards it, as Lion's TS noted, steering north (magnetic). There was a 
convergence in this time (4: 36-40) of about 3,000 yards (a loss of c. 1,5/600 
yards as the BCF turned and c. 1,500 in which the HSF advanced), 
bringing the 
HSF almost into range of New Zealand when it steadied onto the new course. 
The "split second decision" which Beatty needed to make at this point, to which 
Chalmers referred (p. 237), was exactly that. 
23. Vide. Gordon, Ch. 8. Marder made a frequent mistake concerning this 
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point, in trying to fudge information from varying sources. Ile noted that the 
signal to turn was hoisted at 4: 48 (p. 64), but it was recorded in the source he 
used as the executive and he did not explain why, when quoting from the same 
source, the times of flag signals hitherto understood to be executive, were not 
so in this case. Curiously, he then quoted the executive of the signal as from 
the Narrative (4: 57) and stated that the 5thBS turned at this time "or as soon 
as the signal was hauled down". Again, he cannot have it both ways. It was just 
possible that the 4: 57 quoted in the Narrative was accurate for the signal's 
executive, but if it was, it was by default and one must dissociate it from actual 
obedience to the signal, as the 5thBS were already turning under TA. 
However, it was much more likely that this time was estimated to suit the 
purpose of the work, as nowhere was it mentioned or recorded previously. If it 
was genuine, it must have been recorded in 1916 and cannot have been 
overlooked for so long. It is also possible that the signal's (TA's) timing was 
misaligned in the Despatches, but unlikely. Even if the time was wrong, the 
actual sequence of events as stated here is not wrong. 
The 4: 48 in the Despatches would clearly have the reader believe this to 
be the time of the executive, but as it was not so stated in the Narrative, 
Marder tried to alter the evidence to hopefully explain the discrepancy and 
ended up explaining nothing. The 5thBS actually turned before the signal was 
hauled down late, precisely because Evan-Thomas was the stickler for 
procedure that Marder stated and waited for the executive until the advance of 
the HSF altered matters. It was Marder who did not commit himself to a time, 
rather than admit he was unsure. So, by his account, the signal was hoisted at 
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4: 48, he was correct in this, but by default, and obeyed when it was hauled 
down, which might or might not have been 4: 57, in which case, why quote the 
Narrative? He accepted much too readily the infallibility of the evidence, as 
did others, rather than attempting to construct a single sequence of events. 
This left the reader no wiser. Roskill (pp. 161-2) stated that the signal for the 
battlecruisers to turn was not seen by the 5thBS, but did not say that it was not 
intended for them. If anything, his account relied a little too much on Marder. 
24. Beatty Papers, 2, #241, underlining added. In Gordon, p. 139, this read 
"until some time later" although Evan-Thomas was only stating that the signal 
was still flying when the ships passed, not giving an account of the incident. 
Neither version alone provided an answer to the exact sequence of events and 
responses to them. 
25. Marder (p. 65. n. 31) stated that Seymour might have added to the 
confusion, the direction in which the 5thBS was to turn was seemingly his 
decision. However (in n. 33), Marder noted that Beatty wanted them to pass on 
the disengaged side, in which case, Seymour had no choice. Again, one cannot 
have it both ways. Beatty's defence of Seymour was often questioned, but his 
comments suggested that he was soon aware that the operational system that 
he believed existed in the BCF never did, which explained many of his 
subsequent actions. 
26. HMSS 54477 f. 29. 
27. HMSS 54479 (see also, Gordon, pp. 405-7). When it was decided, in 1927, 
to publish the report of the committee, the charts were not reproduced with it, 
the reason given being the expense involved. They were, however, made 
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available, upon application, to anyone who wished to see them. On 15.6.27, 
Oswyn Murray noted that "It would probably be disappointing to him [Ilarper] 
to know that not a single member of the public has.. . come to inspect the 
diagrams. " (ADM 1/8722/290). It would seem that interest had waned 
considerably. A study of them would, however, have helped anyone interested 
in the battle and subsequent controversy. 
28. HMSS 54477. A dispute arose relating to the battlecruisers re-opening fire, 
at around 5: 40, presumably recorded from Pipon's evidence in Marder (p. 74. 
n. 49) that Harper and Beatty had a "first class row" over the ranges concerned. 
The ranges given and notes of brief firing are, however, highly similar for both 
times. At 4: 50, Pelly's Report noted that the range was 18,000 yards, but the 
BCF were fast moving out of range, enough to check fire. Von Hase confirmed 
that they disappeared from sight, but the 5thBS did not (pp. 172-4). lie gave 
Derfflinger's maximum range (HMSS 54477) as 19,674 yards and stated that, 
from 4: 55-5: 05, the range was rarely below 19,700, which must be at least as 
true for the later period. At a little after 5: 00 until 5: 20, he recorded that he 
"only fired to make sure that the enemy were still out of range.. . The guns 
were trained on the upper edge of the funnels or the mastheads. At these 
long 
ranges the enemy's shooting was not good either. " (see pp. 171-2). 
Lion's TS noted at 4: 50 "20,000 ... a/c 
P" and at 4: 50'/2 that a correction 
of 400 up be applied. Harper's notes recorded that the range at 5: 46 was 
recorded as 14,000 "by time of flight" to which he noted "(? J. E. T. II. )". This was 
probably where the dispute with Beatty, told by Pipon to Marder, arose. The 
convenience of this short range with Beatty's erroneous views that the BCF 
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were at continuous close action can scarcely be doubted and only confirmed 
his attitude to the battle that Harper already knew. 
Incidentally, at 6: 211/2, when Beatty and his supporters, especially 
Bellairs, would have one believe that he was leading his ships and the 
battlefleet into action with the HSF, Lion's TS noted "Enemy going into mist, 
can't see" and from 6: 38-7: 1312 there was no entry. At 7: 20, it was noted by 
Harper that Princess Royal recorded 18,000 yards, Tiger 20,000, Lion's 
rangefinder 17,500 with a range correction of 800 up, i. e. around 18,300. 
However, Beatty noted Lion firing at 16,400 ("!!! JETH"). From roughly 5: 00, 
the BCF remained further away from the enemy than they claimed and Harper 
was justified in stating that Beatty was trying to falsely emphasise his own role 
and fiddle the account. 
29. CAB 45/269. 
30. BL 52504 (4.6.16). 
31. ROSK 3/3 Barnard-Marder. 
32. Evan-Thomas-"Bertha" [his sister-in-law and Barnard's mother] 10.7.26. See 
also BL 52505 f. 190. 
33. Beatty Papers, 2, #245. Evan-Thomas-Jellicoe 30.6.26. 
34. ROSK 3/3 Barnard-Marder. 
35. BL 52506. Beatty told his wife that Evan-Thomas was "alright [sic]", BTY 
17/36/17 (4.12.16). 
36. ROSK 3/3 p. 4. 
37. Ibid. 
38. BL 52505. 
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39. Ibid. 
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6. A BCF take-over? 
1.6.3.27. 
2. Bellairs, p. vii. 
3. Ibid. p. 17. 
4. Ibid. p. 43. 
5. Ibid. p. 70. 
6. Dannreuther MSS. 
7. Bellairs, p. 73. 
8. ADM 196/43+89. 
9. ADM 196/88. 
10. Ibid. 
11. Gordon, p. 28. 
12. Jellicoe Papers, 2, p. 483. 
13. ADM 196/89. 
14. Ibid. 
15. ADM 167, Board Minutes 1918-39. 
16. ADM 196/89. (17.5.24). The comments were made in note form and 
might also be understood to refer to Harper alone if "this officer's" is 
substituted for "his officers". However, he was highly critical of subordinates 
- for Harper's blot on Pipon's otherwise complimentary record, see Chapter 
2, n. 67. 
17. ADM 167/67. 
18. ADM 167, Board Minutes 1918-39. 
19. As n. 12. He had been promoted, but not employed as Rear-Admiral. 
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20. Ibid. 
21. SLGF 12/1 (21.11.34), this was not sent and the words in brackets arc 
marked "omit". 
22. ROSK 3/11 (23.12.44). 
23. Jellicoe Papers, 2, pp. 458-490. 
24. BTY 21/2/18. 
25. ADM 1/8722/290, ? to Oswyn Murray. 
26. As did Oswyn Murray with regard to the charts. 
27. DEW 34 ff. 521-2. (12.12.16). 
28. He was actually assistant to Rear-Admiral Alexander Duff, head of the 
anti-submarine division of the war staff. Shortly after taking this appointment 
he became DNO (his forte). 
29. DEW 34 f. 669 (31.12.16). 
30. DEW 34 ff. 525-6. (6.1.17). 
31. CP Box 7. 
32. Gordon, p. 381. 
33. ADM 196/89. 
34. DEW 38. 
35. Schurman, Education of a Navy, p. 117. 
36. ADM196/43. 
37. Schurman, Education of a Navy, pp. 121+7. 
38. Ibid. p. 128. 
39. Grove, EJ., Richmond and Arms Control, in Mahan is not Enough, 
pp. 231-2. 
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40. Ibid. p. 232. 
41. Marder, A. J., Portrait of an Admiral, pp. 257-60. 
42. The Keyes Papers, 2, #206 (Feb. 1930 ). 
43. Admiral Sir Desmond Dreyer to the author, (21.12.96). 
44. My thanks to Lady Akers-Jones (nee Jane Spickernell). 
45. ADM 196/89. 
46. Ibid. (5.3.30). 
47. ADM 196/90. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Ibid. 
51. Ibid. 
52. Ibid. 
53. TEN 41/4. 
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Conclusion. 
1. Roskill, S. W. The Navy Between the Wars. 
2. For example, see DEW 28,29, passim. 
3. Gordon, pp. 527-9. 
4. Barnett, C., Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 44. Barnett also holds 
other mistaken ideas about Jutland and its outcome (pp. 5-8). 
5. ADM 167/56,96,108. 
6. Midshipman Bill Fell, in Arthur (ed. ), p. 83. 
7. Dannreuther MSS. Dannreuther definitely supported Jellicoe more than 
Beatty, also having been gunnery Lieutenant when he flew his Flag in 
Albemarle. 
8. BLE 12. 
9. p. 23. 
10. ADM 203/83. 
11. BLE 12. 
12. My thanks principally to Admiral Sir Charles Madden; Admiral Sir 
Desmond Dreyer, Captain R. P. and Mrs. Dannreuther, Lord Keyes; Earl 
Jellicoe and Mrs. S. Ballance. 
13. Chalmers, p. 262. 
14. Bennett, p. 242. 
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